Department of State Release of Documents on Argentina and the Latin American Region, 1977‒1980

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State Release of Documents on Argentina and
the Latin American Region, 1977-1980

SUMMARY

This collection of documents was selected for two ehapters, on Argentina and the Latin
Ameriean region, to be published in a forthcoming Foreign Relations of the United States
volume on South Ameriea, 1977-1980. These 119 documents, totaling 574 pages, are made
available to the public today by the U.S. Department of State at the request of the Government of
Argentina and in support of the President’s commitment to deelassify U.S. Government
documents pertaining to human rights abuses committed during Argentina’s 1976-1983 military
dictatorship. In autumn 2017, these two chapters, including additional annotation to the
documents released today, will be formally published on the Offiee of the Historian’s public
website, history.state.gov. The full volume, ineluding the remaining nine ehapters in the Foreign
Relations volume on South America, 1977-1980, will be published in early 2018. This volume
will be one of 32 Foreign Relations volumes documenting the foreign poliey of the Jimmy
Carter presidential administration.

The Foreign Relations series, published since 1861 by the Department of State, presents the
official documentary historieal reeord of major foreign poliey deeisions and signifieant
diplomatie aetivity of the U.S. Government. The Foreign Relations series is required by law to
be a thorough, aceurate, and reliable reeord of U.S. foreign policy and serves as one of the
longest-running examples of the U.S. commitment to openness and transparency. Research
for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted doeuments from
all relevant U.S. Government repositories. For this volume and these chapters, historians
searched for the documents that were most important in the proeess of developing and
implementing U.S. foreign policy in the following ageneies and repositories: the Department of
State, the National Archives and Records Administration (including documents held at College
Park, Maryland, and the Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia), the National Security
Council, the Library of Congress, the Central Intelligenee Agency, and the Department of
Defense. These doeuments include minutes of discussions between the president and foreign
leaders, memoranda about deliberations inside the National Seeurity Couneil and the Department
of State, cables from U.S. embassies abroad, and intelligenee analyses. Doeument selection for
the Foreign Relations series is guided by the prineiples of historieal objeetivity and aceuracy.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The documents released today show high-level U.S. concern over human rights violations in the
Southern Cone at that time and policy debates within the Carter administration over what exactly
to do about those violations. In these years, U.S. policy toward Argentina sought to promote
human rights, moderate the internal dynamics of the ruling junta, and encourage the
reestablishment of electoral democracy and an orderly end to the military government that had
taken power in March 1976. At the same time, U.S. officials tried to calm disputes between
Argentina and its neighbors, limit the spread of nuclear weapons, encourage the stabilization and
growth of the Argentine economy, and, in 1980, ensure Argentine cooperation in the grain
embargo that the United States had placed on the Soviet Union. Many of the documents are
relevant to the Argentine Government’s request regarding information about human rights
abuses. However, not all the documents relate specifically to this request; some were selected for
inclusion in the Foreign Relations series because of their importance to other aspects of U.S.
foreign policy toward the entire Latin American region. These documents provide context into
the entirety of the relationship between the U.S. and Argentina from 1977-1980.

Much of U.S. policy toward Argentina from 1977-1980 grew out of President Carter’s new
global emphasis on human rights. In addition, it was driven by a Congressionally-mandated halt
on U.S. arms sales to Argentina, which was enacted in August 1977 and went into effect on
October 1, 1978. U.S. officials grappled with internal disagreements over what tactics should be
used to implement the human rights policy. The disagreements inside the Carter administration
were not over whether or how to support the Argentine Government, but rather over how to
influence its behavior.

The declassification review of the documents in this collection was coordinated by The Office of
the Historian under regulations established in Executive Order 13526, “Classified National
Security Information.” Each document underwent a careful word-by-word review with special
emphasis on releasing as much information as possible, consistent with the protection of United
States national security. The interagency declassification review resulted in minor excisions in
16 documents and an excision of a paragraph or more in one document. The public release of
these documents builds on two previous releases in August and December 2016. Due to the
breadth of the search undertaken in U.S. Government documents for information on Argentina’s
1976-1983 dictatorship, there is some overlap between documents released earlier and those
released today.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

South America; Latin America Region, 1977-1980
South American Regional Compilation

Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV
South American Region

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1 .

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC- 1 7
Washington, January 26, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1980, Box 2,
PRM/NSC 1-24 [1], Secret.

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20606

UmS^IED January 26 , 1977

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC - 17

TO; The Vice President

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO; The Secretary of the Treasury •

The Attorney General
The United States Representative to the
United Nations

The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Commerce
The Chairman, Coxuicil of Economic Advisers
The Administrator , Agency for International
Development

The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

The Director, United States Information Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Trade Representative

SUBJECT: Review of U.S . Policy Toward Latin America (U)

The President has directed that the PRM/NSC-1 on Panama lead into
a broad review of our overall policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean. The PRC, chaired by the Department of State, will be
responsible for preparation of this review , which should clearly
state areas of inter-agency agreement and disagreement.

The study should analyze the major issues of concern to the U .S .
and Latin America and examine whether the current assumptions
underlying U.S. policy toward the region as well as the policies

UN^raFIED

by NARA on fhe recommendafion of fhe NSC.

themselves are appropriate to an effective handling of these issues .

The review should concentrate initially on six areas and then proceed
to 9 . discussion ctf an overall policy .

The stodjr shbuld be completed by March 1.

The six areas for initial analysis include:

1. Interests . What economic, political, and military changes
have occurr^ oVer fire jikst decade in &e ihtemational environment,
in the U.S. and in die countries of Latin America and the Caribbean?
How have these changes affected die ways in which U.S. policies can
advance or protect U.S . interests in the region or influence the internal
or external poHcies of the region's governments?

What are U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean
today, and how have diey evolved over the past decade? What is the
broad psychological climate within the hemisphere into which U.S.
policies and action will be prelected over the next decade?

2 . Economic Issues . The economic issues of concern to
Latin America, including trade, commodities, debt, international
financial institutions, foreign direct investment, science and tech-*
nology, and develc^ment assistance make up the agenda of the North-
South dialogue. Therefore, in developing options for U.S. policies
on these issues , the review should include a discussion of (a) how

it would impact on U.S. and Latin/Caribbean interests, and (b) how
it might be implemented, including pUssible heed for new legislation
or a tnodificatlon of existing legislation . These options should take
explicit account of the differentiation of Latin America and the
Caribbean as between middle range powers and less-developed
countries. Discussion of strategies for each option should address
its relationship to the broader North-South dialogue and should
identify which institution(s) — if any — might be the most appropriate
and effective for dealing with the issue.

The review should also include an analysis and possible
options for U.S. policy toward Latin American and Caribbean efforts
at regional economic integration, including the Central American

lJM®IFIED

3

Common Market, Caribbean Commvinity, Andean Pact, LAFTA, and
also the Latin American Economic System (SELA) .

3 . Human Rights . What options are available for U .S .
foreign policy to reflect a higher and more effective level of concern
for fundamentad human rights in all nations?

Options should be developed for U.S. policy in: (a) bilateral
relationships (taking into consideration distinctions between degrees
of human rights violations and types of governments); (b) multilateral
organizations , including intergoveriimmital organizations like the OAS ,
the Inter- American Development Bank, the Inter- American Htunan
Rights Commission, the United Nations Human Rights Commission;
non-govemmental organizations like Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists; and third parties like Western
European governments and the Vatican; and (c) signing and ratifica-
tion of various conventions , including the Aimerican Convention on
Human Rights .

A discussion should also be included of ways to strengthen
the internal capacity of the U.S. Government to assess reports and
to make determinations on "consistent patterns of gross violations of
htiman rights" . It should also include a review of present U.S. policy
with regard to temporary asyliun in U.S . Embassies, and emigration
to the U.S. of refiigees from political repression.

4. Special Countar Problems . With regard to each, what
are U.S. interests, and in the light of those interests what should U.S.
objectives be? What options and strategies are available to the U.S. to
attain those objectives?

a. Cuba (can be dealt with s^arately and more quickly)

b . Brazil

c. Mexico

d. Central America

5. Caribbean . This section should consider: (a) a discussion
of the economic and political problems of the independent and non-self-
goveming islands of the Caribbean; (b) a review of U.S. security,
economic, humanitarian, and political interests in the region, and
strategies for advancing or protecting those interests; and (c) the
desirability and feasibility of assisting the development of the region

M MaASS IPIFD

4

in a way which will not collide with the aspirations for national inde-
pendence of the new ind^endent coiintries of the region.

6. Institutional and Other Issues . Issues for review include,
but need not be limited to:

a. Inter- American Syst^ : U.S. purposes with
respect to the Organization of American States,
the Rio Treaty , and other regional organizations
like the Inter- American Defuse Board.

b . U.S. Policies on Territorial Disputes :

(1) Bolivia-Chile-Peru

(2) Peru-Ecuador

(3) El Salvador-Honduras

(4) Belize

(5) Guy ana-Surinam- Venezuela

(6) Venezuela-Colombia

Arms Sales, military training and U.S. military
representation .

d. Nuclear Proliferation and safeguards .

e. Narcotics .

Immigration .

This review should identify at the conclusion &e basic options for an
overall U.S. -Latin American policy in light of the options identified
for the major issues considered above./

Zbigniew Brzezinski

imSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

2 .

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter

Washington, March 5, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File,
Country Chron, Box 39, Peru, 1977. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top right-
hand comer of the memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

\\i\\U)H:\sin \\

V ‘r ' ^-''4 <1

753 Rc-<!o

TMK Wfll TK norsj:

WASIIIN(nil»i

March 5, 1977

INFORMATION

MKMORANDUM FOR;

FROM:

THE PRESIDENT

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJIiCl’:

Your Request for an Assessment of Peru's
Military Threat and Appropriate U.S .
Response

Attached at Tab AVis the study you requested on the Peruvian armament
level and potential threat. State prepared it in consultation with Defense,
CIA, and NSC Staff. At Tab B is the quantitSt iir e summai - y uf Ure
military capabilities of Peru, Chile, Bo^vi^sg^Ecuador , and also
some options for U.S . policy suggested[SS|^^^|^| At Tab C is
a short paoer prepared by the CIA assessing the Peruvian threat.

At Tab D, tlie State Department has prepared a comprehensive list
of options for U.S . policy with regard to the arms build-up in the
Andes and the possibility of a war.

The pHncipal points made in the studies include:

1. Since 1973, Peru has bought or made commitments to purchase
weapons from the Soviet Union valued at approximately $500
million. This has permitted Peru to gain a considerable advantage in
materiel over its neighbors. One reason the Peruvians have done this
is to compensate for clear inferiority in human materiel (education and
competence of its Indian soldiers) .

2. While Peru's neighbors fear its possible expansionist and
revanchist (lost territory to Chile in 1879) designs. State,
Defense, and CIA belive that^ if anything, Peru has grown more
cautious as a result of its near-war with Ecuador in December, 1976.
The political instability in Peru, however, could conceivably create
a situation or a (Peruvian) government tliat would attack its neighbors .
The combined assessment of State and the CIA is that the chances for an
outbreak of hostilities this year are slight.

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
'by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

SECRET

- 2 -

3. With its military materiel advantage, Peru ■vviil undoubtedly call
for regional arms limitations agreement, but its neighbors arc'

not likely to want one . The U.S . can try to play the role of honest
broker to bring the countries together, but it is possible that our motives
would be questioned. Bolivia, however, has invited the United States
Government to make a clear public declaration of its strong opposition to
conflict in the region

4. While Peru's neighbors have sent missions abrbad to purchase
arms, an arms race is hardly inevitable. The Bolivian Foreign

Minister, for example, has informed our Ambassador tliat he believes
Bolivia will not shift funds out of economic development into the purchasing
of new weapons. Nor are we'likely to see a significant shift in preferences
from U.S . and western sources of supplies to Soviet sources . In spite of
our veto of the Israeli sale of Kfirs to Ecuador, the President of Ecuador
has informed our Ambassador that he intends to send a high-level mission,
including the Foreign and Defense Ministers, to Washington — not to
Moscow — to reaffirm Ecuador's interest in close ties with the U.S. as
well as to discuss their concern for Ecuador's militciry security .

5. By cutting FMS credits for Peru this year and vetoeing the Kfir
sale, we have already taken a few steps to show our resistance

to an arms race in the region. Besides privately urging the nations of
the region* especially Peru, to limit their arms purchases and publicly
stating fire need for peace in the region, other options for the U.S .

(Tab D) include stimulating a multilateral effort among arms suppliers
to limit sales and monitoring purchases closely with the idea of trying
to lend balance when possible. It is not expected that any U.S. initiative
to the Soviet Union, except in a multilateraTframework , will succeed
in limiting their sales. to the region. The Policy Review on Conventional
Arms Sales (PRM-12) and on Latin American (PRM-17) will look into
these questions more deeply . ^

SECRET -

UNCLASSIFIED

3.

Article in the National Intelligence Daily
Washington, March 8, 1977

I Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Joh 79T00975A, Box 299,
Folder 1, National (Current) (Central) Intelligence Daily/Cahle. Secret; [handling restriction and
drafting information not declassified]. The information in this article was covered in the March

I I President’s Daily Brief (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material,
President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 1, 3/1/77-3/13/77)

UNCLASSIFIED

Latin America: The Human Rights Question

Tke vltarsM aellati af nilitefy
f Ov gnu iK m It SoMk AsHltai tfiiaat

(twtpi ho kd to bmua figlMt

«ioi^aM la mat )«i. Ite (InKUloa
fiOMticvtioosl I^NMniBfii pnMctiBf
dhrirtiil finpedaiK'hll ftlM fvOMd Ac
(Bf <ifagdh ywipi. iiiwwtioMi
siffiBOritik ml file iMemiliMil pnai ••
inSKHI fCMliOBI li tluK fC^OAa
■ Inm ten flic imIi ttfpot 9t iMc
aWcteSa tel teny.Minliui tei iriio
heca Aaciti M atkcr lutkoriuriu
n^ncc lifltf tonteni omc. Tte Uoc4)^
Mnak katana te toft lad la
BSaSBl rtouUac to anr 1 Jtt dtalha
' fa IfN rfoaa, to l a lj li irtliK tow faaam-
awat af fwaMna Vtototo to iaranato^

Tka Untaajtoa |o«wawiai kai kaa
a i Mdy allkU iad iar III atotoiaalauat af
pafafaal pi fa aa iia . Tka Suaaaaaaf tob-.
wunltoa fa hncaar kaa lafato afek aa
iraa kaad tor ama towa ]D jiaaia, aaf ka
fattiaal aacatlQr pnadaii kaaa kai kaea
a aaktocaaferUckaa. Laai aitato|aa kaa
kaaa aaU la tonafl fa aaaaal aaaalka, ana
lka«k kaawa iVto itohtoaaa «a aecar
tkaaa.

Ai a arkato. kaacaw . djoc kaa

fa toe kaaiaa i%kli toaadaa fa Ikan
aaaal i ia i toarlat tow pM pair. Tka
piato wil i tor ftatoar yiagfaai an aa-
aaantolataalaaaaatiafalailaktafla-
wnfloftd 4|teion ii tenflbl M tectM
toap iaklaai .A^USaeifaa a ai W i ai daa
A ilvm mciw4iMli teid w

cUniteiG nofie <tei 9 M ttet flw Os b k»-
icrvtehiK kti flw ^ y*Tt**r clWn «f tten

ItaRM riffcic clolctbw teifc te tte
Idt ste flK dgib ffowte Mrion to Aii^
itoCatobiteliw^Bwcyite— toofatowc
te toe e cnc i ty IteBM ad hf ri||rtto

w« «t katt tem ftefle Bito od flme fl
fltedn. altoMSk toe ra^itfig od
e onCTg tf toe Btew eeifaiie i w ia ir ie
ft a toffioll 10 tea ao^
pfbacw htm sow bm ntooiod m «t
totel aeegtrf tor, that tte total
goiter of flwoc anwtod b pot Irataa.
teteraafldoal criUcboi aod tovaa^afloto
odite touau tigtoi fliMtlQB toSSBSi

•mm g gaBB offictob. pcfttoalaitr

teflacsMfHBa anufarc.

A hte a fb Ite afoafl foraa teg tefl
watted ncccn agcfiai fla knorittt. toe
jab b id8 far tern wimiilrir, if fbe

Amic to ctei'gir af aaeaMtiefrariit
flviflai fcatelto poto fbr a man to
fla toad i«gidb|tt af MitiMOMd toftba
ttef voe fetofi nto mmmm toto yaar,

■■■■to aapocit aana wacaadat
r a l a l iaa i atok Ika US aw tka kawia
lifkii tona kat waaraallp ftadk Ha kaadi
told by iwHt i ra l aiaittaiMi kapandT by
hud-liae faetiaai iritlifa the anaad

. BraiHaa aaoutoy Ikrea ban apanwd
into c aa tod araMa aataaeny afaaa tka
itotoafy laat paaer fa IfM. Ika
aaaadntoaa af IMT aad a aaatowr af aa-

tka atoUtar y d a ariaatad Maatoex
(Miiaaiaa^ aridch anw la pawer fait
Sapliatocr* kn grant taRaatoato^ na-
wiaaiafitapoarRpalaliaaahiaadaiUlw

. aaaan aw toa dattrlacalhg Mta af fti
idiibaa*ttotoKU$,

Itoiaa, bat toa atolkaiyk gtop aa tow

-ai-aa» -- «- ^Mkto^wrt a^

CWMOO owe oeoi o^nwa er wev

pfliialclitei.

A lOMnMoofl Offictol. to o ceoito

«blif totooettoo Ip tte tetot^mfrim
Himuo lUfhu C a wwte too ood g

<itf Irl] dto inninr toniftot nf hjiiiteolf

dtetotowtdtooetotf Wfcto

Adomdrtfittoo offietoto obo te*e
pfoatoed flat 0 fBoetto fbcnlattoo b to
fla oorto tor tte d o wwto o itebp tor

oeoBte od ertog to eto f to l ^tettowri

flew Boaflo to ifj P fr fft oic t e flao
yaan after the adH t a rylafceaw. Own af
toa l] peaanitow fS^SSBSf law

pranowaif atia ba aantaaeid naiL Tka
gawaawat lafa fan pair awnd laawe

aacBilQr*aadg»eatoanaaii|y1bceardw Iwi year-aioat wML ir iia dn di af atona
aatowrkpwtoaulaaaapaaaaibkiadlyfor aik i l i g tone toa iriS eeop, Iwaa aa(

la tka Oiicatarata af Natlaaal

haataarltofal.

LM paar, ka a am. Pmddrai Gdad
wak a inam paUfa aiaad agtoaii lailan
by ffaaii'fa i a adtoiaip nearly aftidal
aad a aaafar aaaaaaaadar after twa

awnaw towt aia akaad at naiirfag daa
praani. haann^ aia bagged dawa la toa
Itgidiili'i paaaiii. Ai af Oeiabit; akaat
2MI> penaaa lapanadlp aara bdag
datafaad aa toaigai af ertaw agdaal toa

The dawanw hae pparawd ai a aaeiel
wknfaeeaw a ea d b fa aalyt ^fanrkai

BefeRBBMWOB k nay

Pangaay aftaa

aMHnia died fa adlliaip fall. Since kan ndfaad kl pnetoan aad adapted paSlfaal prfaaawa
Maaary tPM, tone ban baai atdy aa- loan aabito watkadi af diM»a|jkb tka aaiidaillilid I
aadaaal lepnrta af taitata pi Hlfa i l alleged •Vncnifai af tow iialc.*eWl> I m nlgi l in tod

petol to too flgwtoo ed
aa aad toa trnlianal af

: aa nkabfe ^nai aa toe

laadkbtollfaahlepfadnn

rarpalittaalpifaaaarifakniB.Ia rtipimkinilp far toa ifagal deMatfaae

. Oct aba r IPPS, Ai a anty latiraitliail
rapartad Ikal laaia 2,flM paHtfaal

The pawnaeat aawiti toal tone pea-

p i faaa tn aara i ir a it id dadag l»7> aad pb kan akher Bed Ike aagaay ar gene
I9M aad'toal becaaea POP aad no af Mdcapaiaid. Iaaaamanai.faftfauiaay
toeai nan atm aader detaadea. US an- baanainltelo^w^^iwwaaieal
banyefBefala fa ki a ilii lirifa n th a t b ath by apaaaeifag da^ af aSe^ tofadag
dwaa eatoaaica in rrnfanatid; di^ penau.

aefcaatafadge. k aae nr . toat they da act Ike ad baa gra^ af toa UN Kaaiaa
tew tty firoi ooi tefco . OooitoBfloo bw liwoi o B j pfl it

Tke aiip ra r iw a i fa the bnnaa ifatai fe a dwnnliig the ‘kalkakad paaard! af
•lUMCtootoflraflldBttoiitepoBiou’tei tot CUkoo toteffiflcoeo ttowtonfle otol

lovwitototoc field trifli l<tobo won
tew toted to ooofino «nr ofikbt vIm of
■bow or ttoorfte. It to fitaflsr. boo wu ;
ttei lodtow fi*to| oototoe fligi iwoi^

MoUe Intone to 8o«b Awortoi, tet of*
fidto coowra oteto ^terwrto o* od
*bKbwnto^ to ponogofl sod ■oooooto
far toa itwa af dage that kae kaaa fa aSect
far the part TO pearl. Eetonane fa peepla
cawntly bdag datafaed aa laeh’charin
magernai loiladDO.

Tke g e n ea iac at kai keep awnd by re-

OdeeTi petiaaal faiemrafaa aa toe aide
fa andaradna. Ike giaag kgiacat toana

tette ffftflT" mrf ***

fa rraddeat ckaigfag toat toe a w d d aeu far paBUeal jafatpinae

a.fa.Cklte k6 dfan ea..

iHialtta c Bwniiga iliaaily w
Haacfwt gaeananaat'k itabkara

allcaliaapnawtoeaabiecifatoaialae. icfanltaallaaraafagieelinaleaiBlayiilC
aaliaaal pren. toeaavauy.

Chic Haaiaa righli niacia a paceaiin

TbegawaateaifaPiaridaalfianelM piableai.1kejaaanaprahtoipanalfaBa
fan d e r n a ailrated pragraw fa kl tmam toeila<aiicadiaaaidaataialfaalfaa.Tke
ilghte piacifaei aw toe pan aaniil pace, harnw, «■ d^aad Iwscly aa toa
awatfa. Otetmll faipraf ii al i kandka faaiak pneepiiaa fa- fte lecaiiQ' ra-

ja b apro n ke taiakbad haage. Itlaap-
4 )anat|y IMagap wieipniBbaia briig
■ abre niw la adal and la adaan Ibaac
agaiaat ahan dwre laaaaeHd addeana.
Trfabfapnlhiiaipiiiaaen-toeHifahdd
fa paara— kegaa at toaaad fa 1973.

IMto caaditwai far awat d d d nwa
ban inprand aaaaidarably. Praia
icpans afaa fadfaaw toat ai nav n fO
pneaH i ranaaied fantowiiaahanbaea

I by aaawfatoefaaWkiBait gdnaiaM aad KaetoeCe rrOfagnaii In hadbanfafaa brUyaan.1

lidfae fa Odfa, p ii d c fa a r ly toe Cbtoafc
Chaato'l Vicariate fa SaWnlty aad toe
bMcfOMiooto of tte Rod

Oaea,

Tte ouobcr of {prtooocis I rfl ' f tobttuMfl
cbwi§o hw tecfiiiod flnrpte fl^ ifograh
mow ao)* oobr ooe 011 ^ tom tiic

AJkote cn to toBI hw p ftoooa d oitiNNa
ohovRe. It Ig oflood to codtoMic teo for
« ppootteest prbonflr bdfl tette CMteM.

Mow of flww teiiR tttod or osrvtoc
osoteoces are sow OBI g btflg M poiolei
w oodw teow arfiwt Tte fogaatoflg ii
■bo ufcii^ atofo to oooMiots tito
acMOBOi ^ NUB^ {wmow itesidi' oeo'
wetocL

lUpoiw^ flkial iicgtom^lBgtotepW
bfite(s have u^porod tolT oeotoioiite^>
Tbero baw «ffWPC8fl3f beni goKfc io>
•Useei flte )pe». Ob flw ma bwid, ite
■ Mhorflsrtoa of Ite jtotg tes tBol

boeo vetoxed, ■ad igi etikagf foirlcH

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

UNCLASSIFIED

4.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State
Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1980, Box 60,
PRC 008 — Latin America — 3/23/77. Secret. Borg forwarded to Brzezinski under a March 12
covering memorandum and noted that Vance requested that copies of the study be distributed to
members of the PRC for use at the PRC meeting scheduled for March 15, which was postponed
to March 24. See Document 7.

UNCLASSIFIED

CEGRE ^

PRESIDENTIAL REVIE\^ MEMORANDUM NSC- 17

REVIEW OP UNITED STATES POLICY

/

TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

SECRE T

CDS

DECLASSIFIED

NARA on the ge

NSC under provisions of E.0. 12958/

UNCLASSIFIED

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORAI^DUM/NSC-17
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA: OVERVIEW

I. Introduction

We have prepared the response to PRM/NSC-17
in two parts. The first is this overview. It
integrates major policy problems into two conceptual
and eight specific issues. The second is a set of
papers that examines particular policy areas in more
detail, presents pros and cons on individual options,
and reflects work undertaken prior to preparation of
this overview.

In the overview we have sought to be didactic
by posing somewhat stark options that show the
occasional conflicts among U.S. interests and
between U.S. interests and those of other hemispheric
nations. We have formulated these issues in ways to
elicit guidance from the PRC on general policy
directions .

Finally, the outcome of separate Presidential
Review Memoranda on human rights, non-proliferation,
and North-South questions will have a major impact
on U.S. policy toward the hemisphere. Because of
their global nature, these issues are touched upon
in the overview, but are not drawn out as distinct
issues.

DECLASSIRED ON uln/cw by
M( ip tfip gf the

SECRET uiiuiii p.'Ovi^ions of E.O. 12958

XGds-3

II

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. The Setting

The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean
are more diverse, prosperous, confident, independent
and self-aware than any regional grouping in the Third
World. They also have an alarming population growth,
the dizziest rate of urbanization and the most highly
developed systems of military government. As popula-
tion and economic pressures have increased, the
governments of this hemisphere have increasingly moved
from the one-man caudillo to institutionalized, largely
military regimes. Democracy, never strongly rooted,
is weaker today than at euiy time since the Second World
War. Its immediate future is not bright.

Trade and resource flows are the central concerns
of the nations of this hemisphere in their dealings
with us. Escalating import bills and heavy debt
burdens seriously cramp development prospects — creating
strong pressures for better terms of trade and credit
from us. They also want us to respect their sovereignty,
independent interests, and dignity.

What we want from them is less focused — and
often intrinsically negative. We Weuit them not
to aggravate East-West tensions; not to deny us
access to their energy reserves and other raw materials;
np-t to develop nuclear capabilities. In sum, we want
sufficiently stable and healthy economic and political
growth not to weaken our security, create new
global problems, or offend our values. We weint.
moderation on North-South issues and support in
world councils on matters of importance to us.

At our most hopeful we want democratic systems
to be revived in this hemisphere.

It is self-evident, however, that the
U.S. is neither capable nor ready to undertake
the resource transfers on a scale that could
eliminate the disparities between us. It is just
as self-evident that mounting frustrations over

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> 0-1 the recommendation of the

Nbc under provisions of E.O. 12958

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trade and financial issues are likely to
undermine the international support we have
traditionally received from Latin America,
increase the flow of the unemployed over our
borders, and damage our economic, political and
security interests.

Latin America and the Caribbean bring home
most dramatically the importance of North-South
issues. From no other part of the world does
foreign poverty impinge so intimately on our own
society or create such an implicit obligation to
help. The Alliance for Progress made important
contributions — "but its programs proved
unsustainable both here and in Latin America.
Moreover, because it was conceived largely in
response to fears of Soviet penetration and assumed
greater U.S. influence than in fact existed, the
Alliance had strong overtones of intervention.

Our relations since the Alliance have led to
a steady reduction of official contacts. For a
decade, we have appeared increasingly out of
step with the processes of change in either
Latin America or the Caribbean, even on matters
directly affecting our own interests. Our
criticism of repressive governments has now
placed us more clearly on the side of change,
but we have little leverage on how that change
comes about. Our pressures for human rights
and non-proliferation have raised new fears about
U.S. intervention and paternalism.

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III. ISSUES FOR DECISION
A. Conceptual Issues :

The first two issues are conceptual — designed to
elicit overall guidance for considering the directions
under the specific issues presented subsequently,

1. The Special Relationship :

Discussion of the “special relationship"
has focused in recent years on economic issues.

But shared traditions, historical links, and common
institutions are also involved. Four concepts are
frequently combined under the heading "special
relationship" :

— preferential economic treatment for
Latin America (as a whole or to indivi-
dual countries such as Mexico) ;

— an inter-American system of political, cultural
and security links based on the OAS and the
Rio Treaty.

— our historical hegemony and its freight
of paternalism; and

— the accompanying rhetoric about shared values.

We find it increasingly difficult to deliver on the
first, useful to retain the second, and undesirable
to prolong the third. And whether or not we "share
values," there is little doubt that we expect more
from Latin America and they from us.

To reject the special relationship in toto
because of its traditional paternalistic overtones
and its irrelevance to most economic issues risks
discharging a potential asset in the North-South
dialogue and in maintaining hemispheric security.

Issue for Decision . How do we reconcile the
"special relationship" with our global commitments
and the desired independence of the nations of the
Hemisphere?

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Direction A ; Seek to end the "special
relationship" in its various manifestations. Make
clear there will be no hemispheric preferences in
the trade area, downplay the OAS and Rio Treaty,
and play a passive role in other hemispheric
institutions. Move toward eventual withdrawal.
Stress bilateral relations and global institutions,
pointing out that Latin America's development gives
it a relative advantage over other LDC's. Deal
with subregional disputes or conflicts through
global institutions (UN) or bilaterally. Drop the
the’ rhetoric of shared values and historic ties.

Direction B ; Differentiate by using bilateral,
regional , and global institutions as necessary.
Concentrate on the global for the North-South issues.
Strengthen bilateral ties with major hemispheric
nations. But remain active in those hemispheric
institutions that can further our mutual interests
— particularly the OAS, the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission and those institutions that
promote cultural and technical cooperation. Use
the OAS and Rio Treaty for dealing with regional
conflicts.

2. A North-South or East-West Approach?

Our reaction to political change in Latin
TUnerica is critical. Our major interventions of
the post-war period — Guatemala, Bay of Pigs,

Dominican Republic, and Chile — have probably had
more impact on our relations than all our resource-
tremsfers and business activities combined. They
were motivated by a strong East-West bias.

In recent years, we have been thinking
more in North-South terms. We are more tolerant
of Guyana's Burnham declaring himself Marxist-
Leninist, and of Peru's military purchases from
the Soviet Union.. But should we consider significant
help to Manley's Jamaica to divert him from
"communism" and Cuba or primarily to assist an
important neighbor who is trying to bring about

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social change and developmeht simultaneously?

The following directions are not
mutually exclusive. Ihe emergence of North-
Soxith issues does not eiijainate East-West

concerns. We can accept

pluralism in 1977 than wfcOuId in 1962 — but
we could not be happy with a Communist Brazil,
»texico or Pancuna. CJan we abicle additional
Soviet military sales, op increased Soviet
influence in some coihitries? a

choice?

Issue for Decision . How dp we react to

Soviet or Cuban inVolvament in political change

or regional conflict in this hemisphere?

*

Direction A - East-west Focus ^ Devise
programs and- policies — short of military
inierventibh-^-deSigned to head off Significauit
Soviet influence or indigenous eommimist control
over governments in the area. Should armed
conflicts arise in this hemisphere involving
Soviet or Cuban participation, support the other
side. Place our economic resources where Soviet
or Cuban efforts threaten. Bend our arms sales
policies to head off new Soviet inroads in this
area.

Direction B - North-South Focus : Our
primary concern now is tension between the
rich north and the poor south. Encourage
independence — political, economic and
psychological. Do not discourage diversification
of contacts, even with communist countries.

Place no ideological conditions on
economic assistance. If another communist
lOr radical socialist government emerges, or if
I a conflict situation arises, avoid actions that

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would polarize it into an East-West problem.

Do not deviate from policy lines on arms
transfers to head off Soviet sales in the area.

Specific Issues ;

The new Administration has already set a new
course for hemispheric relations. It has confirmed
the need for a new treaty with Panama as the best
means of protecting our interest in an open,
efficient and secure canal. The State Visit of
Mexico's President set in motion a reexamination of
relations with the Latin American country with the
most pervasive impact on our own society. Separate
consideration is being given to the reestablishment of
contacts with Cuba — a process with important implica-
tions for our relations with Latin America, and with
the entire Third World.

This overview now raises eight additional specific
issues for decision. These issues do not pretend to
be all-encompassing. They highlight major problem
areas. They also address those problems where the
Administration may have the greatest flexibility to
give a fresh and more constructive tone to inter-
American affairs.

1, Intervention :

Our concerns over human rights, the
nature of our relations with military regimes,
our past policies toward Cuba, the revelations
of CIA activities, and some activities of
multi-national corporations affect the way we
view ourselves and have significant implications
for how others view us.

The common thread linking these concerns
is U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of
other countries. Covert intervention in Chile in
1970-73 led the United States to become identified
with the military dictatorship that replaced
Allende, and associated us to some extent with

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its subsequent abuses of human rights, U.S,
actions designed to control Latin American
behavior have ranged from economic sanctions
to direct military intervention. They have '
cumulatively cast a pall over our motives and
aroused suspicions that may take years to
overcome .

Some of our programs and activities are
still viewed as interventionist:

— Our intelligence and law enforcement
agencies maintain close liaison with
local security forces in most countries,
collaborating to combat crime and drug
traffic, counter communist activities
and develop national security information,

— Our efforts bn behalf of imprisoned
American citizens has led us to urge
on governments new laws, changed prison
regulations, and new judicial procedures,

— Our concern for human rights has led us
to take actions that have been criticized
as interventionist by some of the major
nations in the hemisphere,

— Can one really exclude the possibility
that we may have to intervene in
Panama should negotiations break down
and violence break out?

-- And what of the activities of Cuban
exiles and other rightists who
operate out of and in the U.S.
against foreign nationals and
foreign governments? Exile terrorism
is frequently believed to be controlled,
or at least condoned, by the U.S.
Government.

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. Issue for Decision ; Given- our past history
and current interests and programs, how do we deal
with the continuing charge that we are interventionist
in Latin America?

Direction A - Limited Intervention - A Part of
Interdependence! Reaffirm publicly and forcefully
our commitment to non-intervention in the OAS
Charter; announce a policy of broader contacts with
all legal political forces, including visas to
communists; explain that cooperation with others
in combatting drugs, crime, and terrorism requires
activities by U.S. agencies abroad; and explain that
our promotion of human rights and protection of U.S.
citizens is justified under international law.

But stress our actions will not extend to interference
into internal political processes.

Direction B - Dramatically Reduce Interventionist
Activities ; Announce a firm commitment to non-
intervention combined with a decision to make a major
cutback of U.S. activities in the hemisphere.

Announce the end of all covert action and make an
unequivocal commitment opposing the unilateral use
of force in the hemisphere. State firmly that U.S.
concerns for human rights will be stressed primarily
through recognized multilateral institutions.

2. Relations with Military Regimes ;

Fifteen governments in Latin America
are now run directly or indirectly by military
officers. We are uncomfortable with this level of
military involvement in politics, all the more so
since some of the regimes involved are consistent
violators of hximan rights.

Our posture toward military regimes is
complicated by the fact that;

— Military rule has deep roots in Latin
America and is legitimized to some
extent in most constitutions;

— The fragmentation of political parties
and the relative weakness of civilian
institutions sometimes provides no
viable alternative to military rule;

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— Military rule, traditionally directed

largely at repressing popular disturbances,
is now in some cases combined with efforts
to expand the technocratic and even
political roles of civilians in
government .

The military regimes resulting from these
patterns vary greatly, . ref lectincr the different
conditions in each country. Although these national
distinctions and institutional differences are signifi-
cant, strong generalized U-.S. opposition to military rule
could unite South American military regimes into a bloc
directed against us. Our decreased military presence
cind our dramatically reduced role as arms supplier has
already diminished our capacity to influence — or
even relate to — the leading military elites.

Moreover, generalized U.S, opposition to
military regimes combined with U.S. rhetorical and
political support for civilian opposition elements could
promote heightened internal tensions and political
instability combined with charges of U.S. intervention
in internal affairs.

Issue for Decision ; Given our objectives on human
rights and a clear preference for democracy, how should
we relate to military governments in the Western
Hemisphere?

Direction A: Work with all Military Regimes .

Develop new programs for military relations as
incentives to support democratizing trends and
greater civilian participation. Use military
training programs, sales and joint maneuvers as
tools of influence.

Direction B: Diverse Treatment . Adopt a deliberate
and evident strategy distinguishing among civilian
regimes, non-repress ive military regimes, and the most
repressive military regimes. Maintain warm relations
with the first, normal relations with the second, and
cool but correct relations x<ith the third. Do not
attempt to polarize the hemisphere between democracies

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euid military regimes, but stress non-military
aspects of cooperation with countries where the
military come to power. Cut back military programs
and contacts with the most repressive military
regimes.

3. Arms Transfers

Our policy on arms transfers to the
region should be closely related to the previous
issue of relations with military regimes. It
should also relate to our global arms policies and
our posture on non-proliferation. The introduction
of costly modern weapons systems into the world ' s
least armed region is creating new dangers of local
conflicts and posing new challenges to the global
control of conventional arms.

Because military security is the ultimate
expression of national sovereignty, an aggressive US
posture could easily become counterproductive. We
have traditionally maintained a more restrictive
policy toward arms sales to this hemisphere than
toward the rest of the world. By sharply reducing
military programs over the past decade, we have
reduced our capacity to influence local military
postures or limit new acquisitions. (We are the
fourth-ranking arms seller in the region now.)

There is little left to cut. To move further in
that direction while increasing our attention to
human rights could result in a virtual break with
the critical institutions in Latin America — the
military.

The United States, however, has taken no
major initiatives on arms transfers to Latin America
for several years. We have made no high-level
pronoiincements of any consequence or detail on
the growth of local tensions and war fears. The
Declaration of Ayacucho in which eight South American
nations pledged themselves in 1974 to limit acquisition

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of "offensive" weapons may offer a potential
opening for a cooperative review of military
security issues.

Issue for Decision ; How should we approach
arms transfers in the region in view of our
declining role with the Latin military and the
rising role of extra-hemispheric suppliers?

Direction A - Actively Promote Restraint ;

Continue our regional restrictive sales of
advanced weapons? seek a suppliers agreement to
limit sales? and actively promote regional or
subregional arms control efforts. Refrain from
competitive sales with the Soviets and other
suppliers. Resist use of arms sales as means of
relating to Latin military establishments.

Direction B - Flexible Approach ; Use arms
sales modestly to restore U.S. influence with
some military regimes (e.g, a carrot for himah rights
improvement). Also selectively promote U.S. arms
sales to limit intrusion of Soviet arras and retain
some control over the pattern of regional weapons
build-up. Promote voluntary restraint agreements
among suppliers and buyers.

4 . "Rights"

The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights includes a wide variety of social/ economic
and political "rights". The United States and
Latin America tend to view these rights from
different perspectives. We emphasize political
rights — from habeas corpus to freedom of assembly
and speech. The Latins admire our political freedoms/
but believe economic and social rights — jobs and
income — are more important to most of their citizens,
particularly the poor. The debate over "rights" thus
frequently becomes a clash between the libertarians
and the egalitarians.

Obviously/ however/ the Latin leaders and
military are often egalitarian abroad and elitist

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at home. They do not readily share their wealth.

Yet if there is one issue that unites the poor of
this hemisphere with their rulers it is that the
United States must share more of its wealth and
consume less. We must not deceive ourselves — this
growing rich/poor dichotomy is the bottom line in our
relations in this hemisphere.

As the United States projects its values
on human rights abroad, we can be more effective
if we demonstrate in word and deed that we also
give great weight to the egalitarian aspirations of
the poor nations. We may be entering a period of
fiscal restraint on foreign lending (reduced
contributions to the IFI's) in order to retain our
way of life. We risk being seen as justifying our
reductions on moral grounds so that we can continue
to absorb a third of the globe's resources. The Harkin
Amendment symbolizes to many our overriding stress on.
political as opposed to economic rights. Moreover,
any moves toward trade protectionism will hit Latin
America first and most severely. Our concern for
fundamental political rights is thus out of phase
with the appeals and ideologies of most of the
developing world. Most simply, the poor nations see
life and survival as more important than liberty.

Issue for Decision ; Can we square our renewed
emphasis on human rights with the rest of the '
hemisphere's obsession with economic and social
rights?

Direction A - Stress Fundamental Human Rights ;
Stress that the real linkage between economic and
political rights rests in democracy and mixed economies.
Extend Harkin to all IFI's. Voluntarily recognize our
responsibility for increased resource transfers but
link it to foreign governments' v/illingness to distribute
income .

Direction B - Recognize Link between all Rights ;
Move forcefully to expand IFI contributions and
bilateral assistance. Take forthcoming posture in

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North-South dialogue. Move to repeal Harkin, re-
examine our negative position on the UN Charter on •
Economic Rights and Duties and "collective economic
security" in the OAS Charter Reform, Pressure
governments politically to eliminate torture and
assure habeas corpus and due process.

5. Resource Transfers; Private Investment

The outcome of the presidential reviews
on North-South issues (PRMs 7 and 8) will be critical
to our economic relations with Latin America. Trade -
not aid — is the issue for Latin America. Any move
toward or away from concessions to the Third World
affects Latin America first.

This overview addresses two issues where
we may have greater flexibility in regional terms:
private investment and the MNC's (considered in this
section) and public development assistance (considered
in the section that follows) .

Multinational corporations are key agents
of resource, managerial and technology transfers.

They have also been one of the most consistent
sources of tensions between the US and the other
nations of this hemisphere.

Latin American governments are now more
secure in their dealings with foreign investors.

MNC's are more mature in recognizing the need to
respect — and adapt to — the laws and development
priorities of the host countries. Now that a large
portion of investments in extractive industries and
utilities have already been nationalized, and that
new modes of non-equity investment have become a more
prevalent method of doing business in the area, the
wave of expropriations that swept Latin America in
recent years seems to be receding .

In this changed environment, we may have
an opportunity to work out — with both foreign
governments and US corporations — some new approaches

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to bring our policies on investment disputes and
the promotion of US private investment more into
line with the new working relationships that are
evolving.

We could, for example, revise President
Nixon's 1972 policy statement on foreign investment
and expropriation to recognize more explicitly the
rights of host governments to define the terras of
receiving foreign capital, as well as their duties
to provide fair treatment. We could even explore
the far more legally complex and time-constiming
possibility of negotiating bilateral investment
treaties with Latin American governments.

Alternatively, we- could seek to take
advantage of. the absence of expropriation disputes
and the comparative quiescence of controversy over
I4NC's to quietly disengage from active promotion of
private investment.

As for other forms of private capital flows,
there ordinarily is no major role for the US government
to play with respect to borrowings from private
money markets. Consideration might be given, however,
to the establishment of some sort of balance of pa^Tnents
safety net or guarantee facility which would enhance
the attractiveness of paper floated by Latin American
countries.

Issue for Decision ; Should the US government
encourage US private investment in Latin America?

Direction A - Disengage ; Make clear that MNC's
are on their own. Eliminate incentives designed to
increase new investment. Say nothing new on
expropriation. Stress that these are decisions for
private corporations and foreign governments, not for
the USG. Maintain a hands off posture toward
commercial bank lending.

Direction B - Promote New Investment Relationships ;
Work on standards of conduct with the private sector and

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foreign governments and formulate a modified US glonal
policy statement on expropriations. Seek repeal
of Hickenlooper and Gonzgilez Amendments. Consider
measures tQ facilitate Latin American access to
U.S. private capital markets.

6. Resource Transfers; Development Assistance

US involvement in development in Latin
America and elsewhere takes many forms: trade,
debt rescheduling, investment, official development
assistance (ODA) , actions on international monetary
matters, initiatives in the fields of science and
technology, food, population, etc.

Official development assistance, which
facilitates cooperation in many of these fields, now
plays a decreasing role. Bilateral US AID financing
for Latin America has been on the decline for a decade.
International financial institutions (e.g., IBRD and
IDB) now provide the region with most of its official
external capital — but we are in arrears in our
contributions. In addition, under present criteria,
only Central America, the Caribbean, Bolivia, Paraguay
and Peru will have bilateral aid programs after 1980.

These trends create a gap in the instruments
available to us. The IFIs focus their attention on
growth; in countries where our bilateral assistance
has ended, only limited attention is paid by official
capital suppliers to the many problem.s still associated
with income maldistribution. In addition, the middle
income countries are important to us politically in
the context of the North-South dialogue, but we have
virtually no bilateral aid instruments to promote
institutional and h\aman resource development in
countries other than the poorest.

Issue for Decision : Should US official
develo^ent assistance be increased, and if so,
should the increase extend to both multilateral
and bilateral assistance and include middle-income
countries as well as poorer countries?

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Direction A - Maintain the Status Quo ;

Meet current US coimnitments to the IDB and
OAS. Do not seek to resume bilateral
assistance in countries where we no longer
have such programs. Continue bilateral aid
phase-outs. Sustain the current bilateral aid
focus on the poorest countries.

Direction B - Expand, Innovate and Strengthen
Development Aidl Strengthen support of IFI's.

Develop new ways to cooperate with middle-income
countries on institutional and human resource
development, food production, technology transfer.
Develop new criteria for such cooperation, including
harder terms, greater matching contributions, jointly
managed projects, and use of US guarantee mechanisms
which do not necessarily call for flows of public
funds. Expand both bilateral and multilateral
assistance to the poorest countries and the poorest
sub-regions (Central America and the Caribbean) .

Educational and Cultural Exchanges

The level of professional and academic
exchanges and cultural programs with Latin America,
as well as support for research and study on Latin
America in the U.S., has fallen drastically over
the past 10 years. The Fulbright-Hays program in
Latin America (and worldwide) is 30% less in
constant dollars than it was in 1968; USIA book
publishing and distribution have dropped by 50%;
and the staffs of our Binational Cultural Centers
have dropped from 114 to 14 in recent years.

Greatly expanding these programs would
dramatize a new approach to Latin America and the
Caribbean. The goals of such an initiative would
be (a) improving intellectual and institutional
relationships within the hemisphere; and
(b) strengthening the capacities of Latins and
North Americans to perceive each other accurately,
and to cooperate on the solution of common problems.

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Such a program might include joint initiatives

— including joint commitments of long-term funds

— with at least a few of the major Latin American

countries.

Such an undertaking would also:

symbolize our commitment to hviman rights
by providing new means of communication
between intellectuals, professional
associations (such as lawyers), universities,
think tanks and other interested groups in
the hemisphere.

— enhance the development of human resources
through graduate education and professional
exchanges

Issue for Decision : By how much should our
educational and cultural programs for the hemisphere
be increased?

Direction A - Doxible Funding for Current
Educational and Cultural Program to Approximately
$30 Million . Such an increase would enable us to
devise and establish much broader linkages between
universities and communities, including Hispanic-
American groups.

Direction B - Recast and Expand Programs ;

Direct the Department of State , in cooperation with
other agencies, to reexamine basic objectives and
programs in consultation with U.S. institutions and
with selected Latin American governments, preliminary
to making a major specific proposal to the White House

* The Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs observes that a greatly increased
program in Latin America could produce
pressures for similar increases in exchanges
with other areas of the world.

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Then approach Congress for new funding (up to
$100 million a year) . This level would imply
major support for relevant U.S. and Latin
institutions. It would subsvime some of the
activities now conducted by AID, USIA and HEW.

Care would have to be exercised to avoid charges
of cultural imperialism. New or amended legislation
might be required.

8. Style and Attention

Many Latin Americans believe we alternately
take them for granted, then expect too much of them.

They suspect that US leaders have time for everything
and everyone except for Latin America. They feel
unheard, unappreciated, and discriminated against.

Much of this is inherent in the relationship.
But much is not. We sometimes spring unnecessary
surprises by not consulting or informing others in
advance on matters of vital interest to them. And
their cabinet ministers and even presidents sometimes
have a hard time getting through to us.

During 1977, as a minimum program we should
plan on one or two additional State Visits by
democratically elected Latin American leaders (Perez
of Venezuela and perhaps Williams of Trinidad) and
a return State Visit by President Carter to Mexico.

The Vice President might likewise consider visiting
one or more Latin American countries. The Secretary
of State should attend the OAS General Assernbly in
Grenada in June for 2-3 days and visit Venezuela,
Colombia, and Brazil, plus one or two Caribbean countries

In addition, we should carry out continuing
formal and informal consultations with Mexico, Brazil,
Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica and Argentina
on global issues, such as Law of the Sea and the North-
South Dialogue, as well as on bilateral initiatives
and our major foreign policy directions in other
parts of the world.

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Meinbers of Congress should also be
involved whenever possible in both travels
and consultations.

A more ambitious program for the
President and the Vice President would be to
prepare for. visits during the Administration's
second year to other democracies such as Colombia,
Costa Rica and one of the Caribbean nations. Such
early "attention" by a newly elected President and
Vice President would be unprecedented and would
help set a new tone.

Issue for Decision ! How much attention should
the President , the vice President, and the Secretary
give to Latin America and the Caribbean in the first
year?

Direction A - Minimum ; Plan two State Visits
here, a return Presidential Visit to Mexico, and
a possible visit by the Vice President to the region.
The Secretary should attend the OASGA, make one or
more trips to the region, and exchange occasional
letters with key foreign ministers.

Direction B - Maximum ; Plan the above plus
Presidential trips to two or three democracies in
the hemisphere during the President's second year in
office. The Vice President might make an additional
visit or two as well. Both the President and the
Secretary of State would seek to maintain a regular
correspondence with their key counterparts.

secre t

UNCLASSIFIED

5.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, March 14, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject
Files, Box 64, PRM-17 [Latin America]: 1/77-3/14/77. Confidential. Sent for information.
Inderfurth and Brzezinski initialed the first page of the memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

/ ' I 1414

CONriDCNT -fAfc

with GCCRET Attachment

March 14, 1977

INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:

SUBJECT:

“Do We Need a Latin American Policy? "

Your question- struck at the heart of the issue. The idea of "Latin
America" as a region is a myth . it is composed of extremely diverse
economies and politics , which Ccui manage to form a collective negotiating
position only when there is a symbolic need to confront the U .S . , such as
in the case of the Trade Act of 1974 (GSP/OPEC provision) . The most
important business of the governments of the hemisphere is dealt with
bilaterally or globally . One symptom of this trend toward globalism
and bilateralism is the decline of the OAS .

Secondly , given the diversity of the economies , it is xinrealistic to believe
that a single foreign economic policy — like the Alliance — to so diverse a
region is possible any longer , even if it were desirable .

So the answer to your question is "no. " In terms of the objective realities ,
we do not need a Latin American policy, and I hope that in the future, we
will not have one .

Btit the fact that the President chose Latin America as the one region to
have an overall policy review, and the fact that he is being beseiged to
speak on Pan American Day and to give a major pulley address' on Latin
America, and the fact that the President has repeatedly expressed a
special interest in Latin America all these are indications that we
cannot move from our current policy — which is indeed a special one
to no policy in a single step. (To put my point in perspective, I should
mention that ARA thinks it would be too risky if the President did not
have a Pan American Day speech.) We must do it gradually with some
sensitivity to the region and to its constituency in the United States , but

COWnPENTIAL

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017

COPJriDEHTL ' ^

- 2 -

I agree with you entirely that if there are the same kind of demands
for a Latin America speech in the first year of the President's second
Administration, then we will have failed. Therefore, the policy that
we should seek in this fii'st re\dew is one which will help us to move
from a special policy for the region to a global North-South policy.

if; 9);

Attached at Tab A ^ the response to PRM/NSC~17.' There are parts
of the Overview and of Tab 1 (Interests Section) which are first-rate,
but the docximent as a whole is unwieldy. The issues slated for decision
are posed poorly sometimes they miss the principal question entirely.
The options are deliberately skewed; they seldom offer a real choice.

The whole exercise has been a great disappointment to me personally,
and it has lead me to conclude that if you want new policy directions
toward Latin America, the last place you should turn to for advice is
ARA. Since ARA is the pi-incipal source of advice for Secretary Vance,
however, I strongly urge you to discuss with him before Tuesday's
meeting what it is you would like t o emerge from the meetin g . 1 would
also i-ecommend that the meeting follow the agenda -ra^er than the specific'
issues and options listed in the " Overview

Permit me to make some suggestions, starting with the peg which we
should use to hang the new approach on, and then suggesting the
specifics of a new policy .

Outcome of the hieeting

As I wrote to you in my memorandum of March 10 on the request for the
President to give a Pan American Day speech, T believe a speech on Latin
America by the President is necessary before Pan American Day (April 14)
in order to preempt any criticism that he is ignoring the region. There
are, however, more important reasons for a speech. If the U.S . is to
move to a point where Latin American speeches are not necessary, the
President must give the bureaucracy some guidance because they are
moving in the other direction . He must also alert Latin America and the
entire developing world of his views, concerns, and perspective on this
question. Thirdly, it is necessary for him to focus on the problem soon
with some guidance from the PRC as to the right approach, least he

COflFIDENTL^

CON FIDE Mqrai<> rEr

- 3 -

inadvertently send conflictiiig signals during a press conference to Latin
America, to tlie bureaucracy, and to tlie U.S, public. Fourth, it would
be more desirable for him to make the speech in the United States now
rather than save it for a possible trip to the Latin American democracies
later in the year, not only because of timing, but more im.poi-tantly , because
Presidential trips tend to bring out the worst kind of rhetoric about our
"historic ties" and "shared values," and tlius, it would be more difficult
to expect an address setting for such a new approach.

What would he say? An outline of the speech can follow the agenda of
the meeting.

I . Overall Approach — General Policy Directions

Important changes within Latin America, within the U.S . , and in inter-
national politics and economics have dramatically transformed U.S.
relations with Latin America, but our psychology and the assumptions
underlying current U.S . policy have not adapted to these changes.

In Latin America , relatively rapid economic development and
increasingly institutionalized governments have made them more
resistant to foreign influence, pai-ticularly North American, At
the same time, the economic cheinges have incrceised the hetero-
geneity of the region, making the notion of "Latin America" as an
homogenous region more unrecdistic than ever before.

Internationally , Latin Americans have been at the forefront
intellectually, politically, and economically of a determined
movement by the developing world to alter the terms of exchange
between the industralized and developing worlds .

-- In the United States , several developments, including the passing
of the Vietnam trauma and the reduced insecurity due to detente,
served to divert American interest from the problems of the
developing world. At the same time, Americans still maintained
the "special relationship" mentality, demanding more from Latin
America in human rights, restraint on arms transfers, and on
other issues, while also promising (though not delivering) more
resources to the region.

CXJNnDENTIAL

€;QN^IDE^^TIAL

-4-

The guiding principles of a new approach — rather than a new policy —
to tlie region should include;

1. North-Soxith . Rather than trying to divide Latin America from the
rest of the developing world, we should encourage Latin American
leaders to take the general issues which concern them to a North-South
forum and to take a for^vai'd (leadership) position on these issues.

Rationale : Several Latin American leaders have been in tlie
forefront of this movement, and we should recognize their efforts,
by adopting a global as opposed to a regional approach. Regionalism
in all its manifestations - the OAS , the Inter- American Defense
Board — has declined in importance over the last two years, and
the trend not only seems irreversible, it makes sense; There is
less reason to use regional institutions wlien the issues can only be
effectively addressed globally.

2* Global Policy: A Single Standard for the Developing World . U.S.

policy on trade, finance, investment, science and technology, aid,
human rights, arms transfers and nuclear proliferation should be formulated
according to global criteria. In the formulation of these policies we could
consult bilaterally with selected governments, or regionally if the forum is
an effective one, but the policy we adopt should be a general and a global
one.

Rationale; If we are interested in furthering Latin American
economic development, then we should adopt a general policy
which will confer special trade and financial benefits on Latin
America by the nature of the region's relatively advanced economic
^ position. In the long-term, a special and direct American effort
will not bring any more benefits to the region than a general policy,
and it is likely to have significant negative political consequences
since direct resource transfers inevitably get tied to special American
political concerns (i.e. , human rights, or treatment of U.S. investors,
or anti-Communism) , leading to unintended paternalism.

3. Mature bilateralism will be enhanced by a global approach , but

particularly from the decline of a regional institution which encourages
artificial unity on the wrong issues posed in the least constructive way.

C ONFIDENTIAL

-5-

4 . Diversification of Political and Economic Relationships . In response
to the central political need of all Latin American countries to reduce

their dependence on the United States or any single source, the U.S . should
encourage the present trend toward increasingly diverisified relations
between Latin America, Europe, Japan, and even Eastern Europe. At the
same time, the U.S. should exhibit a gi~eater tolerance for regimes of
viddely different political philosopliies , distinguishing only on the basis
of their respect for fundamental human rights .

5. Non-Intervention . The U.S . should pledge its full respect for the
sovereignty of each Latin American nation and should commit itself

not to undertake unilateral military intervention or covert intervention in
their internal affairs ,

Rationale ; This simple statement will go far in a region that has
experienced the vast majority of U.S .-military exercises abroad.

The question to which this answer is addressed is not only how
do we view and respond to political change in Latin America, but
also to what extent and in what ways can we influence it. U.S
policy to Cuba from 1959 to 1961 offers a classic illustration of the
way power and its use have been transformed. Currently, our
ability to influence events in Latin America appears greatest not
when the power equation is most weighted to our advantage, but
when we are cognizant and sensitive to the principal norms of the
developing world sover^^nty and social justice.

Bearing this in mind, a reflexive action by the U.S . to counter
Soviet efforts to gain influence either through arms sales or
increased trade is more likely to have the opposite effect. Andy
Yoxing's argument that we are more likely to influence events in
Africa if we pay attention to Africa's obsession racism ^ them
to our own v/ith respect to the East-West conflict has direct
relevance to Latin America, where the North-South economic issues
are their principal preoccupation.

II. Economic Issues

’ Relevant Criteria for Formulating U.S, Economic Policies . The
U.S . should adopt economic policies which relate to two or three
levels of development of the Third World, rather than to an heterogeneous

CONFIDCl^lTIAL

COI'cTIDEHTIAL

- 6 -

regional grouping. This means concessional assistance for the poorest
countries, and increased trade prospects and improved and coordinated
dfebt management for the middle-^income developing countries, which are
most of the Latin American countries . Trade, not aid .

2. Thus, external financing to the region should increasingly be made
through the international financial institutions , and less and less
through bilateral assistance .

? bhis represents both a political desire to begin a post-aid relationship ,
where we do not respond to problems as donors and recipients, and an
economic urge to get the most out of our money, since U.S . contidbutions
I to tlie IFIs are multiplied more than ten-fold because of other country
J pledges.

3. On foreign direct investment (FDI) , we should recognize the

sovereign rights of host countries to set the terms of investment.
Similarly, the United States Government should adopt a more independent
stance premised on an independent definition of the national interest in
investment disputes ,

Rationale; We should begin to steer an independent, neutral path
bebveen labor, which wants to discourage U.S. FDI, and U.S.
corporations, which seek U.S. help. On investment disputes,
which have been the source of considerable tension in inter-
American relations, the U.S. should also seek to identify a
position which is representative of the national as opposed to
a specific interest.

4. The U.S . should work with the governments of Latin America to

seek ways to increase access of the products of Latin America and
other developing regions to tlie markets of the industraHzed world on a
non- discriminatory basis .

Rationale: The Lome Agreement between the European Community
and 46 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries has a discriminatory
impact on Latin American exports. Furthermore, vertical and
regional preferential arrangements (between industrialized and
developing countries) run counter to the U.S. objectives of an
open global economy .

CONFIDENTIAL

-7-

4

HI . Human Rights

1. Single Standard . The U.S. should not adopt a different standard
for human rights violations in this hemisphere than for anywhere

else .

2. IFIs. Human rights considerations should enter into all U.S .
decisions with regard to the developing world, but the U.S . should

not adopt any automatic or fixed formulas . This means that we should
try to obtain some flexibility of the Harkin amendment (to the Inter- American
Development Bank Act) , while resisting its extension to other ITTs .

3. Multilaterlize Our Efforts . To the extent possible , the U.S. should
try to multilateralize its concerns and its..,efforts on human rights by

working through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights .

IV . Relations with Military Regimes

Excluding the use of punitive sanctions, the U.S . should nevertheless
adapt its relations with individual governments to the character of the
j;egime, maintaining warm relations with civilian and democratic govern-
ments, normal relations with non-repressive military regimes, and cool
but correct relations with repressive governments . The U .S . should put
particuleu- stress on non-military aspects of cooperation with military
governments .

V. Arms Transfers

Agciin, the policy should be a global one, but one which actively promotes
restraint in any appropriate fora or framework (bilateral, sub-regional,
regional, or global) . We should also avoid competitive sales with the
Soviets or with other suppliers .

VI . Organization of American' States

The OAS should be reorganized so that it only carries out those functions
for which it has a comparative advantage. These functions are peacekeeping
and human rights. Its economic and technical assistance functions could
be done more effectively by the IDB ,

<30NgiDCNTIAL

- 8 -

Rationale : Despite recurrent efforts to strengthen the OAS, it
continues to decline, largely because the most important business
in the hemisphere is not hemispheric. Secretary General Orfila
has said this to me in a conversation two weeks ago. He also said
that he needed the help of the U.S . to reduce the OAS bureaucracy
from its current 1,500 to a staff of about 300 which could have
responsibility for peacekeeping and human rights . He would also
like to do away with the Permanent Council, and believes that if
he obtained the complete support of the U.S . he would succeed. It
remains to be seen whether he would succeed, but we should
certainly help him do that .

One indication of the irrelevance of the OAS in addressing economic
issues is the lack of any enthusiasm (or even support) for the
Secretary General's proposal for an OAS Special General Assembly
on Economic Cooperation and Development. They still have not
yet set a date or a site for this meeting, and it is not clear whether
they ever will

Vn . Educational and Cultural Exchanges

The Department of State, in cooperation with other agencies, should
reexamine basic objectives and programs in educational and cultural
exchanges in consultation with U.S . institutions and with selected Latin
American governments, and suggest a specific proposal to the NSC for
improving U.S . policy in this area.

Vin . Country and Sub -Regional Issues

Mexico, Cuba and Panama have all been dealt with in other contexts .

The two critical areas demanding some kind of U.S. Government attention
are Brazil and the Caribbean.

With regard to Brazil, the critical question is whether the U.S. should
maintain the Memorandum of Understanding in the light of quite critical
comments of this arrangement made by President Carter during the
campaign. Given the extreme sensitivity of our current relationship, it
would not be advisable to mal<e the decision on the Memorandum of
Understanding at this time.

With regard to the Caribbean, you might want to recommend that we
devote a special PRC meeting to that at some future date.

CONFIDENTIAL

-9-

IX. Final Items

1. President's speech-- University of Texas?

2. A quick trip by the President to the democracies in November?

3. A Vice Presidential trip?

4: 3|c 3|: 4:

For your use, I have prepared an abbre\dated outline of the agenda and
the major points recommended in this memorandum . It is attached at
Tab B . A draft Presidential Directive is atfachibd at Tab lU.

CX3NriDENTIAf 7

UNCLASSIFIED

6 .

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina,
Bolivia, Uruguay and Chile

Washington, March 24, 1977, 1455Z

65403

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asuncion 1969-1979.
Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by Zimmermann, cleared by Luers and in INR/DDC/OP-F, and
approved by McAfee.

UNCLASSIFIED

mm-

Department of State

OUTGOING

TELEGRAM

PAfiE II S’ATE

ORItiK IWR»-W

ISS(03

](8(

INFO OCT-11 ISO-M fm »

ORAFTEO tv A«A:ECA:RIRIIUEtilAIIN;lK
APPROVED tv INR/DOCsMlCAFEE
ARA;«IKIUERS
l*R/DtC/0P-F. DE TARR

-2422SI1 110328 /34

R 24t4SSZ HAR V
FH SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AUEUASSV ASUKClON
AIEWASSV tRASIllA
AMEUDASSV tUENOS AIRES
ANEUASSV lA PAZ
AMEHtASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEHBASSY SANTIAGO

■ SC O R -t-r STATE 165413
ROGER CHANNEL

STATE 165413

SPESMl HAMSlir

4. RECENT REPORT 1HG*SUGGESTS THAT THE CONOOR OPERATION
MAY BE SHIFTING MORE TO NON-VIOIENT ACTIVITIES. -AT A
MEETING OF CONOOR IN DECEMBER 1376 IKE PRINCIPAL SUtiECT
Of DISCUSSION NAS THE PLANNING OF COORDINATED PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL NARFARE OPERATIONS AGAINST LEFTIST AND
SOMETIME EARLIER A PROGRAM HAD BEEN APPROVED NHERE6Y ONE
MEMBER COUNTRY WOUIO PUBLISH PROPAGANOA USEFUL TO ANOTHER
member so THE COUNTRY Of MAJOR INTEREST NOUIO NOT BE
REVEALED AS THE SOURCE. EXTENSIVE BSE NAS ‘TO BE BADE Of
THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA IN CARRYING OUT THIS PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL M»t»F PROGRAM. ANO THER CONOOR MEEIINO IS TO BE HELD
IN lantleRMHiNHlCK day clarify THE FUTURE
DIRECTION OF THE OPERATION. ENO flUOTE.

VANCE

£.0. 11652: XGOS-2

IA6S: SHUM, PINS, PINR
SUBJECT: OPERATION CONDOR

1. THE CIA HAS PREPARED THE fOlLONING SUMMARY OF THE
STATUS Of OPERATION CONDOR AS Of MARCH 1377 MUCH NE ARE
PASSING FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.

2, OTE: OPEBATION CONDOR IS A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY SEC

SERVICES OF CHILE. ARGENTINA, URUGUAY, PARAGUAY, BOLIVIA
ANO BRAZIL TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION. AS IT NAS
FIRST ENYISACEO, THE OPERATION NAS TO BRIIIG ABOUT AN
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING SERVICES
OS SUBVERSIVE GROUPS, BUT LATER DISCUSSIOliS INCLUDED
CONSIDERATION OF MOUNTING ASSASSINATION OPERATIONS ABROAD,
SECURITY SERVICES OF CHILE, ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY AGREED
TO SEND TEAMS TO EUROPE. OUT APPARENTLT BrAZIl, BOLIVIA
AND PARAGUAY 010 NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THIS ASPECT OF
THE OPERATION. A TRAINING COURSE NAS LATA SET UP IN
^^^^^FM^^^™TK«TOBftSENTTO^^PE, ,

OPERATrilGMNST URuLaYAN TERRORISTS. THjS TEAM NAS
UNSUCCESSFUL IN CARRYING OUY ITS OBJECIiejANO ITS FAILURE

NAS AIIRIBUTEO TO THE OPERATION HAYING BE^I LEAREO TO THE
TERRORISTS. AS A RESULT OF THE SUPPOSED |4AR, THE
URUGUAYANS HERE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE DESIRA-
BILITY Of PARTICIPATING IN FURTHER JOINT CONDOR OPERA-
TIONS.

S. ACCOROINC TO ONE REPORllHSWBBBSiWil^ THE
ACTtVtllES OF THE CONOOR OPERATION OUTSIDE OF CONOOR

COUNTRIES IBAT*?”'*"

INFORMATION IS OBTAINED REVEALING THE NHEftABOUIS OF AN
EXTREMIST ABROAD, A CONDOR TEAM MIGHT IE J’ENT TO THE
LOCATION, DOT ORLY TO VERIFY THE EXTREMIST'S PRESENCE ANO
TO OETERUINE HIS FUTURE TRAVEL. IF UNSPECIFIED ACTIONS
AGAINST A PARTICULAR EXTREMIST HERE DESIRED, THE COHDOR
SERVICE NOUIO ASR A SECURITY SERVICE OF TIE COUNTRY WHERE
THE EXTREMIST RESIDES TOCARRTOUTJjlES^lJONS. II
SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ONCE A
CONDOR COUNTRY REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN . CONOOR PROCRAU.
THAT COUNTRY IS NO lONCER INClUOEO IN FUR HER DISCUSSIONS
RELATED TO THIS PROCRAU.

i

/ 6^ dd

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017

mm

UNCLASSIFIED

7.

Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting
Washington, March 24, 1977, 3:30-5 p.m.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1980, Box 60,
PRC 008 — ^Latin America — 3/23/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House
Situation Room. The minutes are printed in part in Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. XXVI,
Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 266.

UNCLASSIFIED

Deputy Secret<iary Christopher opened the meeting by saying that the
new Administration had been dealing with many specific Latin American
problems — for example, Panama, Cuba, and Mexico — but we had not
had an opportunity to develop an overall approach , particularly with
respect to those economic issues which were of greatest concern to the
Latin Americans .

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

S EGUE D

- 2 -

He suggested that the best overall policy may be a non-policy . To follow
the remarks in the President's United Nations speech, the U.S . should
treat Latin America in a global context, rather than think about a regional
policy. The President's Pan American Day speech on April 14 provides
the natural culmination of this process and the opportunity to suggest
this approach.

He then initiated a discussion of whether the U.S . had a special relationship
with Latin America or not .

Assisteuat Secretary Todman suggested that we drop the rhetoric about a,
special relationship and deal with Latin America on bilateral, regional,
or global levels depending on the issues. In the major economic areas,
it is necessary to deal on a global basis 3uid develop a single policy , and
this is also the case on nuclear proliferation and immigration . But because
of the geographiccd proximity, Latin America impinges on us more directly
than other areas. For example, we share a border with Mexico and that
requires special policies . We have certain regional institutions , and they
require special policies .

Under Secretary Anthony Solomon agreed that we had special problems
with respect to Mexico and Brazil, but the question of the special relation-
ship relates to the region rather than to individual countries. He suggested
that we would need special policies to &ese two countries. He said that
the eirguments against an overall special relationship to the region are
very powerful .

Enno Knoche said that the possible consequences of ending the special
relationship would be that it would tend to encourage Latin America
to form blocs agrinst the U.S . , but he added that since this would not be
in Latin America's long-term interest, he felt such blocs would not endure.

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan said the U.S . has hewi a special relation-
ship with Latin America, and it still does. General Brown agreed, but he
said that our special military relationships are eroding, and that we are
going to miss them when they are gone . He said that this relationship —
for example, the training assistance program for foreign air force
personnel — provides an opportunity for us to influence these govern-
ments on human rights other matters .

SECRET

-3

Intervention

Todman said that this issue aroused the greatest interest and controversy
in Latin America where the U.S. has had a long history of intervention —
most recently in the Dominican R^ublic eUid Chile. Now, we are being
accused of intervention on behalf of human rights . The question is : to
what extent do we need to intervene?

Duncan said that we fiLrst needed to define our interests in the hemisphere,
and said such a definition would be necessary to decide on the need for a
"special relationship." Then, he prefers the option of "limited intervention."

Brzezinsld returned to the question of whether we should have a special
policy to Latin America. He said that the notion of a special policy is
ahistorical. In the past, it has done nothing more than lock us into a
cycle of creating, unrealistic expectations and then having to live with
the subsequent disappointments. The Monroe Doctrine which luider lines
this approach is no longer valid. It represents an imperialistic legacy
which has embittered our relationships .

He recommended that if our relationships eu-e to become healthier, then
we ned to put them on a more normal footing. He said that we can do
this by stressing our bilateral relations and in seeing the region's problems
in a global context, as the President said in his UN speech. And we should
use this as a point of departure in the Pan American Day speech . What
was needed was a normalization of our relations with Latin America. We
did not wsuit another Alliance for Progress .

Christopher said that he agreed with Brzezinski's assessment.

General Brown agreed and said that we should put the statement in the
context that we have recognized that Latin America had reached adulthood.
Brzezinsld. warned, however, that such an approach was also patronizing.
Instead, he said that we should encourage Latin America to diversify its
relationships with other countries and regions, and that we, in turn,
should differentiate our approach to different governments.

Dvuican agreed that a bilateral approach makes sense, but he said the
relevant question on intervention is how should we react to the Soviets
in this hemisphere.

SECRET

SECRET - -4-

Brzezinski said that we shovild not react reflexively; rather we should
judge our response in terms of the likely consequences if the U .S . did not
intervene. Nevertheless, he does not see a great likelihood of the U.S .
intervening in Latin America in response to Soviet probes . He said that
individual governments have a good sense of their own independence and
therefore our reactions should be contingent on the way the other Latin
Americans respond. But we cannot accept a blanket policy for all cases .
Later, he said, and Solomon agreed, that a statement on nonintervention
might be misinterpreted.

Leon Sloss of ACOA Scdd that he agreed with Brzezinski's emphasis on
a global and a bilateral approach, but he said that we should not discourage
some regional institutions which have potential to contribute to the solution
of certain problems — for example in arms control 2 ureas .

Brzezinski agreed that we should not discourage regional institutions,
but he suggested that the healthiest approach would be a hands-off one,
where the Latin Americans would approach us — instead of we, them —
to pay attention to the regional institutions .

Solomon and Brzezinski agreed that the President should redefine our
relationship rather than renounce it. Solomon said that the only viable
regional economic institution was the Inter- American Development Bank,
and a sign of its relative importance is the fact that Secretary Blumenthal
will attend its annual ministerial meeting whereas he would not attend the
one at the Asian Development Bank. Even the IDB has diversilien its
relationships — bringing on donors from Europe and Japan — although
we are still the biggest contributor. But in trade or aid, it is hard to see
a special relationship .

David Aaron pressed the issue of the special relationship a couple of
steps further. One implication of a change in strategy would involve
a shift in the distribution of U.S . resources abroad. Secondly , he noted
that there was, in fact, a collective consciousness in Latin America.

Brzezinski said that we should not deceive ourselves. The consciousness
is only collective when it is negative and in opposition to the U.S . Con-
structive relations demand greater specificity.

In ideology , we want to show an affinity for democratic states .

SECRET

SECRET

GEeRET -5-

Security considerations demand that we recognize the geopolitical
importance of Brazil and perhaps the special importance of the
Caribbean to the United States .

Economically, we need a more diversified strategy.

However, Brzezinski said we should not try to package these clusters
of interests into a single policy .

Weil from Commerce agreed.

Relationships With Military Regimes

Christopher applied the approach suggested by Brzezinski to this next
issue. He suggested that we ac^ust our relations so as to differentiate
according to the kind of regime: warm relations with civilian and democratic
governments , xiormal relations with nonrepressive military regimes , and
cool but correct relations with repressive governments .

Brzezinski agreed , noting that Brazil was not so repressive as is commonly
thought. Duncan and General Brown also agreed with Christopher and
repeated the need to distinguish between kinds of military governments .

David Aaron suggested joining the two agreed approaches — die movement
toward globalism and establishing a closer affinity with democracies — by
a Presidential trip to selected democracies , say in Latin America as well as
in Africa or Asia .

Aaron also said that if we are going to be sincere about moving toward a
global approach , we must make clear that our policies with respect to
democracies or repressive regimes must be the same in Latin America
as in Africa or Asia. Given the special constituencies in the U .S . , that
would not be easy . We will have to go out of our way to do that .

Human Rights

Christopher said that it was very important for us to stay committed on
our policy on human rights, but at the same time, we must explore
affirmative ways to express our policy .

SEG R E T

- 6 -

S fi eRET

Solomon said that we should work with Congress to make clear why they
should not be thinking about a Latin American policy on human rights .

He and Christopher agreed on the need to obtain more discretionary
authority and make more relevant distinctions in the application of our
policy. If we define gross violations as torture or degrading treatment.
Instead of denial of due process , then we only single out seven-ten
countries rather than 60 - 80. Then, we can have some impact.

Todman said that we shotild look at aid as a way to improve human rights
conditions in very poor countries . For example in countries like Hcdti,
violations of human rights occur often because of impoverished conditions ,
and it does not make much sense for us to cutt oi£ aid in these circumstances .

Arms Transfers

Christopher asked whether the United States , as a declining source of
arms to Latin America, is justified in adopting a special policy on arms
transfers to Latin America.

General Brown reminded everyone that in the early Kennedy years we
tried to get Latin American governments to shift defense expenditures to
nation-bmlding, but as sovereign states, they just turned to other sources
to buy arms. As long as they are going to buy, he preferred that they
buy from us rather than the Russians .

Sloss from ACDA said that we must approach this problem globally at
both ends . Discuss it with the Soviets and with other suppliers, and at
the same time urge restraint by purchasers . If this does not work , he is
inclined to agree with George Brown.

Organization of American States

Christopher asked whether the OAS was part of the special relationship .

Todman thought the OAS was useful, but that it wasted a lot of time
because it is not well-focused. He said he would like to see it strengthened.

Christopher suggested that we alter our relationship to the OAS to the
way we relate to other regional organizations, like CENTO or ASEAN.

SECRET

- 7 -

SECIUST

Solomon asked Todman how he would strengthen the OAS , and Todman
answered that he would eliminate the Permanent Council and reduce the
U.S . contribution,, but we shoiild do so after consulting with the Latin
Americans .

Solomon said that in his experience in State and in ARA, every Administration
had tried to strengthen the OAS and tried to make it more efficient, by cutting
personnel and reorganization. The trouble is that the Latin Americans are
very sensitive to their "perks," and they perceived every effort to strengthen
the OAS as an attempt to weaken it . He concluded that the OAS was useless ,
and there was nothing that could be done.

David Asuron said that if we want to follow the global approach to its
logical conclusion, then our involvement in the OAS , which once played
the role of a nrini-UN, should be phased out. We really do not need it
any longer. We should say we want to deal with Latin America like
other regions .

Solomon acknowledged that that would indeed be perceived as the end
to the special relationship, but noted that before doing that, we should
look at the politiccd ramifications and the domestic reaction, which he
predicted would be negative. In converations he has had with Latin
American leaders , they all acknowledged privately that it was a worthless
organization, but at the same time, they were horrified at the prospect
of its being abolished. But he did not see anything we could do.

In fact, Latin Americans use the global North-South forum more and even
take the SELA more seriously than they do the OAS .

Christopher said that the OAS was one of those institutions which would
not die a natural death. Whenever it looks like it will, somebody turns
the oxygen back on, and it has another life.

Aaron said that rather than try to leave it, abolish it, or resuscitate it
with new ideas, the U.S . should just ask the OAS to justify itself.

William Luers from State said that we should be careful in formulating
our policy to the OAS and more generally to the hemisphere , least our
new policy be perceived as a massive rejection of Latin America.

SECR ET

ccppjr:!'

OL.O» \cl I

gSGRET -

- 8 -

Ciiltural and Educational Exchanges

Todman said that the value of individiial contacts is very important to
increase mutual understanding.

Christopher asked whether we should return to a more enlightened and
generous policy with respect to cultural and educational exchanges with
Latin America. Todman nodded yes .

Technical Assistance

Christopher asked whether we shotild put more money into technical
assistance to Latin America .

Weil from Commerce said that question brought die discussion back to
the beginning: What are our interests? If they are not special, then
we should not give special assistance.

Summary and Miscellaneous

Christopher nbted that Todman will be meeting with the C ubans la Nww
York, that the Canal Treaty negotiations will be continuing, and that we
should be increasingly sensitive to Brazil . Any overall statement needs
to take into account our concern for special problems . He noted diat the
discussion was a little more philosophical than usual, but that we were
probing for a relationship which adapted to die new realities .

The next step is the speech at the Organization of American States.

SECR E T

9

UNCLASSIFIED

8 .

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter
Washington, March 29, 1 977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18,
Evening Reports (State), 3/77. Secret. At the top right-hand comer of the memorandum. Carter
wrote: “To Warren J.”

UNCLASSIFIED

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:

March 29, 1977

THE PRESIDENT
Warren Christopher

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

2

of Caireer cipj

!l^‘

Security Assist^ce and Human^ Rights As you
may five Latin governments ''rejected" American

military assistance based on the submissioh to Congress
of the required htimari rights reports. It is interest-
ing to no^e that four of the five seem to be having
second thoughts about turning their backs on American
military aid.

•r-* Although the Argentines turrie<i down our PY 78
For eigu' Military Sales (PMS) credit program of $15
million^ ^heY ^ want tg receive in grant

r training They also want; te sign Coh
^ $30 million in unobligate<i 77 have

refused thus far to honor their requests b^^ of
htnoan rights con<iitions irt that country.

//

co-r

' * ^ we have begun to receive indications that Brazil

didn't realize that its rejection of the $50 million
credits for FY 78 meant that they would be unable to
participate in the Foreign Military Sales cash sales
program. They may ask permission to buy spare parts
for American P-5E fighters and naval equipment r drawing
on unobligated FY 77 money.

Lgr- ^ — El Salvador and Guatemala are now hedging on

f their initial refusals to participate in rather small
>1 credit an<i training programs for FY 78 and unobligated
FY 77 money.

We have told the Congress that we are not now asking
that the ?Y 78 budget request for these countries be
withdrawn. We prefer to let the situation settle down
and assess our security relationships at a later date.
However, the atmosphere in the House Appropriations
Committee is such that some of these FY 78 programs may
be eliminated, although we doubt that the Congress would
eliminate the PY 77 funds still in the pipelines.

[Omitted here is material imrelated to Argentina]

UNCLASSIFIED

9.

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
RP 77-10090
Washington, April 1977

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 78T02549A, Box 3,
Folder 3 1, RP 77-10090: Soviet Interest in Latin America. Secret; [handling restriction not
declassified\.

UNCLASSIFIED

Soviet Interest in Latin America

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

Secre t

RP 77-10090
April 1977

Copy

SCCR gf

EO

Soviet Interest in Latin America

Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1977

Key fudgments

The Soviet Union has long been interested in increasing its influence in Latin
America, but has had difficulty in formulating a successful policy for the area. Eaily
attempts by Moscow to use the local communist parties to gain a foothold failed, in
part, because the Soviets did not understand the Latin American milieu and had
little expertise in Latin American affairs. Until the eariy 1960s they seemed to
assume that because of the basic instability of the area, “socialist” revolution was
inevitable once a local communist party was activated. The basic flaw was their
belief that Latin America was, and is, overwhelmingly dominated by conservative
forces that have been unsympathetic to Moscow. Moreover, the area did not fit the
Soviet mold of revolution in less developed nations. The countries have been
independent for a long time; they are. culturally and politically developed; they have
a rather extensive educated elite, and for the most part, they are not attracted to
foreign political ideologies and have regarded the Soviet Union as a political and
ideological pariah.

In recent years, however, the Soviets have had some success in the area— most
dramatically, of course, in Cuba. They have made these gains by shifting their
emphasis from local communist party relationships to state-to-state relations. Soviet
prospects are still limited, however, by Moscow’s own economic problems and its
inability in most cases to provide the Latins with any civilian technology they do
not already have. Soviet successes have been partly the result of growing expertise in
Latin American affairs and a relative decline of US influence in the area. Other
factors have been the latent anti-US nationalism present in Latin America, the Soviet
Union’s emergence as a global power with observable economic, military, and
political clout, and the survival of Castro’s Cuba with Soviet assistance.

seen CP

Gcenc =f

There now seems little doubt that the Soviet presence in Latin America will
increase in the future, especially as East-West tensions relax. The Soviets are now
beginning to view the area not as a region within the US sphere of influence, but as
an arena for US-Soviet competition. Although Latin America certainly is not on the
“front burner” of Moscow’s priorities, the Soviets are not likely to ignore any
opportunity to erode the economic and political power of the US. The Latin
Americans’ grudging appraisal that they have been overly dependent on the US for
political, economic, and military assistance and should now seek alternative friends,
suppliers, and markets is made to order for Soviet exploitation.

The current economic recession in the West, the increasing effort by many
Latin nations to use their raw materials as an economic lever against the US, and the
current impasse between Washington and much of Latin America over the human
rights issue can only encourage Moscow. As long as the Soviets continue their
low-key approach to the region, as long as they are willing to cut their losses during
periodic reversals such as in Chile, and as long as the US fails to stabilize its own
relationship with the Latins, Moscow will be able to make inroads on the
still-preponderant US influence in the area.

ii

GCCnOT '

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

UNCLASSIFIED

10 .

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Multiple Recipients

Washington, April 23, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4,
Defense Department, 4-5/77. No classification marking. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to
Vance, Blumenthal, Brown, Bell, Lance, Wamke and Strauss.

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON ..

April 23, 1977

lidEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT.
AND BUDGET

THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE SPEaAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

SUBJECT: Pollow-up of the President's Latin America

Speedi on April 14, 1977

The President wants the State Department to coordinate with
.appropriate agencies .a.report which contains .prxi^osals to follow-up
on his ^eech of April 14, 1977, before the Permaneni Gounc dl of the.
Organisation of American States . Proposals for in^Iementing action
need not be limited to the items mentioned in due memorandum . With
the exception of the first two items — American Convention on Human
Rights and Protocol I , both of which should be forwarded to the White
House by April 29 — please provide a combined status report of no more
than ten pages by COB May 2, 1977, covering the following items:

T. The American Convention on Human Rights should be forwarded
for signature by the President and transmittal to die Senate. Apprc^riate
reservations should be submitted in two forms: a single gener^
reservation and specific reservations . .

2 . . In coordination with the Defense Department and the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency , the State Department should forward Protocol I
of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with interpretative statements , reservations ,
or whatever is considered necessary for Presidential signature and Senate
ratlB cation.

3. Please provide proposals for implementing the following pledges,
initiatives , or conc^ts mentioned in the President's speech:

To consult with Latin American goverxunents in advance of
major decisions on global policies made by the United States
and in the formulation of "a wider and more flesdble approach"
in North-South economic relations , in conv^donal arms transfers ,
and in peaceful uses of the atom. (State should coordinate with
Defense, Treasury, ACDA, and STR.) .

To increase support for the Inter- American Human Rights
Commission and for other multilateral approaches to promote
human rights and democratic values .

To support, in cooperation with international agencies, broadened
programs for aiding, protecting, and resettling political refugees.
(State should coordinate with the Justice Department.)

To devise and/or expand programs for training technicians for
remote sensing and for using space commiinications technology
for helping national television systems to promote educational
and cultural objectives . (State should coordinate with NASA ,

AXD, and 0MB .)

To -develop proposals by which other nations can deal more
emotively with the problems of the needy 'through institutional ,
human development, and technological approaches . (State .
should coordinate with AID, Treasury, and OMB .)

To avoid differences and misunderstandings in problems related
to U .S . foreign direct investment and Latin American goverzunents .
(State should coordinate with Treasury.)

To contribute to the implementation of the Ayacucho Agreement^.
(State should coordinate with DOD and ACDA .)

To support the peacekeeping efforts of the OAS Secretary General
on an individual case basis > (State should coordinate with DOD
^ ACDA.)

To support regional and subregional integration efforts .

To increase the number and kind of people-to-people programs,
bilaterally and through the OAS , to increase professional .
cultural and scientific exchanges . ^

Zbigniew Brzezinski

UNCLASSIFIED

11 .

Report Prepared in the Department of State
No. 785

Washington, April 28, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 29, Mrs
Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, 5/30-6/13/77: 3/24/77-6/16/77. Confidential. Drafted
by Hyman and Estep. Forwarded to Brzezinski under a May 5 covering memorandum from
Pastor, who recommended that the report be sent to Mrs. Carter in preparation for her trip to the
region. Brzezinski approved the recommendation. (Ibid.) An attached NSC Correspondence
Profile indicates that Inderfurth “apparently” forwarded the report to the First Lady. (Ibid.)

UNCIASSIFIED

CONPIDDNTIAL

PROBLEMS ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN WEST COAST

BUREflO Of
lOTflLIGEnCf
(100 BfSfOBCH

Overview

The developments that have led to the
present degree of tension among the West Coast
countries of South America extend back over a
century. Peru's current efforts to establish
itself as the dominant West Coast power have
alarmed its neighbors and have provided a South
‘ American foothold for the USSR, which has become
Peru's major supplier of arms since 1973. -

i

x

; Analysis of the available evidence leads to

1 the following conclusions:

— Peru has and will maintain for some time
arms superiority, but it will be unable,
i. in our judgment, to effect a definitive

shift in the balance of power on the West
, Coast because (a) it lacks the economic

and human resources, and . (b) there is no
: i real, imminent, external threat.

: i —Peru's arms program will nevertheless spur

; I a costly and divisive arms race with its

; 1 neighbors and could eventually lead to

armed conflict.

— US influence and leverage in this situa-
tion is reduced — sharply in comparison
with the past. Nevertheless, countries
which feel themselves threatened (Bolivia,
Chile, and Ecuador) look for protection
first to the United States and second to
the Organization of American States (OAS) .

!

>

.« t

; j CONFIDENT lAL/ GDS

■ Report No- 785

j April 28, 1977

i ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

• ' . by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017,

C ONFIDENTIAL

- ii

The roots of any solution over the mid- to long-term
lie in South America itself:

-through the efforts (including self-
restraint) by the states most directly
concerned (i.e., Chile, Peru, Ecuador,
and Bolivia) ;

-through the efforts of leading South
American states (e.g., Argentina,

Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela); and

-with US support (if not leadership) .

******

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

12 .

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, May 9, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject
Files, Box 65, Terrorism, 5/77-1/78. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. No drafting
information appears on the paper. In the top right-hand comer of the first page. Pastor wrote:
“File Terrorism.”

UNCLASSIFIED

9 May 1977

5

SUBJECT: Counterterrorism in the Southern Cone

The security forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
and Uruguay have for some time engaged in a formalized exchange of
information on leftist terrorists. Moreover, these governments jointly
carry out operations against subversives on each other's soil. This
effort, dubbed "Operation Condor**, is not publicly known. One aspecc of
the program involving Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina envisages illegal
operations outside Latin America against exiled terrorists, particularly
in Europe. Because the existence of Condor is known to foreign security
services, such activities have so far been frustrated. The extent of
cooperation In Condor is unusual in Latin America, even though the exchange
of intelligence information. by governments facing a common problem is a
routine practice throughout the world. j

The mil itary-contro lied governments of the Southern Cone all consider
themselves targets of international fiirxisro. Having endured real and
perceived threats From leftist terrorists, these governments believe that
the very foundations of their societies are threatened. ,In nwst cases,
government leaders seek to be selective in the pursuit and apprehension of
suspected subversives, but control over security forces generally is not
tight enough to prevent innocents from being harmed or mistreated.

Cultural and historical developments in the region go a long way toward
explaining, if not justifying, the often harsh methods. In Hispanic law,
for. instance, a suspect is presumed guilty until proven innocent. In
addition, most Latin American constitutions have pr-ovisions for states
of selge or other emergency clauses which greatly increase the governments*
powers of arrest, detention, and censorship.

\

There is a long history of bilateral efforts to control subversion
in the Southern Cone countries. The regional approach eventually formalized
in Condor, however, apparently was endorsed in early 1974 when security
officials from all of the member countries, except Brazil, agreed to
establish liaison channels and to facilitate the movement of security

officers on government business from one country to the other.

♦

• Among the initial aims of Condor was the exchange of information on
the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR), an organization believed to
consist of representatives of terrorist groups from Bolivia, Uruguay,

ADP Declassification Review

declassified

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay, The JCRj^m^^^Bcoordinaten activities
and provides propaganda and logistical support for its members. The Junta
has representatives in Europe, and they are believed to have been involve^]
in the assassinations in Paris of the Bolivian ambassador to France last
itay and an Uruguayan military attache in 1974. The attache had been
involved in the successful campaign to suppress Uruguay's terrorist Tupamaros,
a meoiber group of JCR. i

Condor's overall campaign against subversion reportedly was inten-
sified last summer when members gathered in Santiago to organize more
detailed, long-range plans. Decisions Included: ;

I

*

— The development of a basic computerized data bank In
Santiago. All members will contribute information on
known or suspected terrorists. i

Brazil agreed to provide gear for "CondorteT" the
group's communications network.

Uruguay consented to join Chile and
operations against JCR activities!
in Europe.

'>26 3,3(b)( 1 )

The basic mission of Condor teams to be sent overseas reportedly was
"to liquidate" top-level terrorist leaders. Non- terrorists also were
reportedly candidates for assassination; Uruguayan opposition politician
Wilson Ferreira, if he should travel to Europe, and some leaders of
Amnesty Internation were mentioned as targets. Ferreira may have been
removed from the list, however, because he ts -considered to have good
contacts among US congressmen. A training course was held In Buenos Aires
for the team heading overseas. More recently Condon leaders were con-
sidering the dispatch of a team to London — disguised as businessmen —
to monitor "suspicious activity" in Europe. Another proposal under study
included the collection of material on the membership, location, and
political activities of human rights groups in order to identify and expose
their socialist and Marxist connections. Similar data reportedly are to
be collected on church and third-world groups.

Evidence, although not conclusive, indicates that cooperation among
security forces in the Southern Cone extends beyond legal methods. Last
Hay, for example, armed men ransacked the offices of the Argentine Catholic
Commission on Immigration and stole records containing information on
thousands of refugees and immigrants. The Argentine police did not
investigate the crime — a signal that Latin refugees, principally from
Chile and Uruguay were no longei welcome. A month later, 24 Chilean and
Uruguay refugees, many of whom were the subjects of commission files, were
kidnapped and tortured. After their release, some of the refugees insisted

2

EO 13-526 3.5(c)

— ISSIIH

:■

... ♦

IFO 13526 3.5(c)

their 1nterrog.jtors were security officers from Chile and Uruguay. A
number oF Uruguayans v/ere held in Buenos Aires last summer for two weeks
and then flown to Montevideo in an Uruguayan plane. Uruguayan military
officers offered to spare them their lives if they would agree to allow
themselves to be 'captured*' by authorities — as if they v/ere an armed
group attempting to invade the country. Moreover, tv/o prominent political
exiles In Argentina were killed under mysterious circumstances.

Condor also is engaged in non-violent activities, including
psychological warfare and a propaganda campaign. These programs heavily
use the media to publicize crimes and atrocities committed by terrorists.
By appealing to national pride and the national conscience, these programs
aim to secure* the support of the citizeni^ in the hope they will report
anything out of the ordinary in their neighborhoods. Propaganda campaigns
are constructed so that one member country publishes information useful to
another — without revealing that the beneficiary was in fact the source.
For example, Bolivia and Argentina reportedly are planning to launch a
campaign against the Catholic Church and other religious groups that
allegedly support leftist movements. Bolivia will collect information on
the groups and then send it to Argentina for publication.

The Condor communications system uses both voice and teletype.

Member countries co.mmunicate via radio and each is required to maintain
an open channel. No commercial equipment is used, but each country can
monitor the conversations of another over the Condor net. Sensitive data,
not of concern_jte_alI_ menibtrSj_a re forwarded via diplomatic pouch.

that Condor suffers from some organizationa
inefficiency, but this factor has not inhibited its overall effectlyg ness.
C ondor has, tightened security mpaciiresj

ecurity has been strengthened at Condor's operations center
in Buenos Aires, and compartmentation has been, increased. In addition,
once a Condor member has declin^ to participate in an operation, he is
excluded from all further details of that pa rticu *
active members, such as Paraguay and Bolivia

— may not 6e aware ot many operations.

Outside the Condor umbrella, bilateral cooperation betiveen other
security organizations in the region also is strong. For example,
intelligence organizations in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile work together
closely. Each security organization assigns advisers to the other countrier
primarily to identify subversives in exile.

UNCLASSIFIED

13.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tamofi) to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, May 11, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject
Files, Box 55, Human Rights, 1-5/77. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the
memorandum. According to another copy of the memorandum, it was drafted by Lister on April
27 and cleared in draft by Todman and Schneider. (National Archives, RG 59, Warren
Christopher Papers, Lot 8 ID 1 13, Box 17, Human Rights-Latin America) Forwarded to
Brzezinski under a May 16 covering memorandum by Pastor, who recommended that Brzezinski
send the memorandum to Carter and the First Lady. There is no indication of approval or
disapproval of the recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material,
North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 55, Human Rights, 1-5/77) See Foreign Relations,
1977-1980, vol. II, Human Rights, Document 42.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDBNTIftL-

May 11, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
TBE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Human Rights Policy Intact: Latin America

The Carter Administration's human rights policy is
hetving a significant impact in Latin America. A good
many Latin American governments have reacted negatively,
but some of these have nonetheless taken steps to
improve their performance. There have been nvunerous
indications of approval in important sectors of Latin
American public opinion. Of cotirse these general-
izations should be treated with caution.

The United States Government's new higher priority
for human rights, as reflected in Administration speeches
and statements, diplomatic representations, military
aid cuts, actions taken on IFI loans, and Congressional
hearings, has caused the governments of Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay, Guatemala, and El Salvador to reject, in whole
or in part, security assistance predicated on human
rights considerations (actually the Brazilian Govern-
ment attributed its reaction to the issuance of our
Brazil Human Rights Report, a decision made prior to
the Carter Administration) . Leaders in these and other
governments have expressed resentment and concern, as
well as some bewilderment, at the United States Govern-
ment's human rights stand. Many in Latin American
ruling circles regard our actions and words as inter-
vention in their domestic affairs and a self-defeating
abandonment of old allies who are' fighting a common
enemy, international Communism. This reaction has been
reflected in pro-government press comment, at least
some of which has been -^directly inspired by local
regimes.

^ CONFIDENTIAL

GPS

, ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

eONFIDEMTfAL

On the other hand, some officials of these govern-
ments have privately expressed approval of the Carter
human rights policy.- And a significant minority of
Latin American governments, including those of Venezuela,
Costa Rica, and Colombia, have openly voiced their
support.

Impact on the actual human rights performance of
L atin American governmen ts has also been mixed, with a
few regimes taking more progressive and repressive
measures at the same time. In some cases our human
rights can^aign seems to have strengthened the hand of
hardliners (e.g. , in Brazil, Uruguay and probably in
Argentina) , at least temporarily. The Geisel Govern-
ment has used alleged Yankee intervention in Brazil's
domestic affairs, specifically the Government of
Brazil's nuclear energy and human rights performance,
to rally domestic support for its policies. Geisel has
subsequently weakened the legal opposition MDB through
amendment of the Constitution by Executive Decree.
However, there is no question but that a good many
Latin American governments have become increasingly
concerned about their human rights image. Some un-
doubtedly have been influenced, consciously and/or
unconsciously, to release prisoners (e.g., Chile,

Paraguay and Haiti) , to caution security officers
against excesses (e.g., Brazil and Nicaragua), to
refrain from repressive actions which otherwise might
have been taken, etc. Some of these positive results
were already londerway even before the Carter Admin-
istration, partly as a result of Congressional stimulus.
The net incremental changes are difficult to identify
and impossible to quantify. No government is likely to
admit that it is piirsuing a more civilized and humane
policy towards its own citizens because of outside
advice or pressure. But there are indications that
some governments hope for public or tangible recognition
of positive steps taken. These might well be encouraged
in the direction of still further progress.

It is much more difficult to calculate the pact ion
o f 'Latin American public opinio n. Unquestionably mucn
or it nas oeen positive, axtnough often muted in fear

CONFIDEHTIAI r

; A T “T*’’ -r T-*: — xiTT'

f '■ •

COin?’lDEN gIftir
- 3 -

of reprisal. There has been considerable favorable,
independent press comment. Sme Brazilian papers, even
while supporting the official reaction to foreign
government preparation of a Brazil Human Rights Report,
criticized htanan rights violations and called for a
domestic investigation. M any democratic OTspositi on
parties -gmnp s have hailed our human rights stand,
including the Christian Democrats in Chile, the PRD in
the Dominican Republic, some factions of the MDB in
Brazil, and the opposition coalition in £1 Salvador.
Catholic church representatives have commented very
favorably. And there have been warm words of praise
and encouragement from influential intellectuals,
journalists, sociologists, etc. Once again, this
positive reaction has not been imiform. Various
supporters (e.g., some Latin American government of-
ficials as well as leaders of the Buenos Aires Jewish
community) have quietly cautioned aga inst pushing s o
hard publicly as to make xfipressive ' regimes feel they
areT^lfigrSornered, thus leading them to take even
harsher measures.

It is, of course, far too early to make any
definitive judgments as to the net impact of our cur-
rent human rights policy. Many Latin leaders are still
trying to sort out where they stand in the face of what

they regard as an onslaught on their legitimacy. Some

see, or pretend to see, the most recent public human
rights statements by United States Government officials
as a backing away, at least to some extent, from our
previously voiced high priority for human rights.

Latin Americans both in and out of government are
watching carefully to see whether and how effectively
we intend to continue our present human rights com-
mitment. In this connection, there is attached the
revealing March 27 comment of Robert Cox, the coura-

geous British editor of th^
Aires Herald. Mr. Cox prepil
become ”more and more effeC|1^

Sng]

ct^

Lish 1
'Presi
' if

anguage Buenos
dent Carter will
3 sticks to his

guns. — , 1

_ . ' j

Pet

1 <1

,er 1

farndl

f

Executive Secretary
Attachment ; ‘f

As stated.

COMriDDMTITUS -

UNCLASSIFIED

14.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter
Washington, May 19, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18,
Evening Reports (State), 5/77. Secret. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum. Vance
was in Geneva to meet with Gromyko.

UNCLASSIFIED

r

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1977

SECRET -

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

PROM: Warren Christopher, Acting

[Omitted here are portions unrelated to Latin America.]

Todman Trip to Latin .^erica . Assistant Secretary
Todman returned this week from a quick swing through
Latin America. In Colombia , President Lopez Michelsen
pressed for the helicopters which we promised him in
1975 under our narcotics assistance program, but which
we are hesitant to deliver because of reported
narcotics-related corruption in the Colombian Government.
Lopez generally supports our human rights policy but
warned that we should not try to be the "world's moral
policeman." He urges that we internationalize the

GBCREf

CDS

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

\

SECRB ?-

- 2 -

effort (which of course we are trying to do) .

Colombian officials pressed their view that we should
give special preferences to Latin American goods to
offset the preferences the European Community extends
to former European colonies.

Venezuela r President Perez, looking forward
to his forthcCTning state visit, is anxious to cooperate
with us in all areas and to take a strong ^tand on
human rights. The Venezuelans stressed that the
single most important issue in our bilateral relations
is the removal of Venezuela (and Ecuador) from the
list of OPEC countries excluded from o\ir system of
generalized trade preferences.

Todman talked with President Videla of Argentine
who was also visiting Venezuela. Videla said that te
understood our human rights position and did not ar ' '
with its importance, but that Argentina just coulcl no :
meet the highest standards until it wins the war against
terrorism. Videla asked for our understanding of
Argentina's difficulties.

Foreign Minister Silveira stressed that Brazil
attaches great importance to the Memorandum oT
Understanding signed with the United States in 1976.

He was obviously concerned that ambiguity on its
future would not only hinder bilateral problem-solving,
but could lead to a further deterioration in U.S. -Brazil
relations. Cy will be meeting with Silveira next week
during the CIEC meeting and will try to put Tiis doubts
to rest on this score. Although not discussed
extensively with Todman, the nuclear issue remains of
primary concern to the Brazilians.

Bolivian President Banzer and other Government
officials promised to speed up adjudication of the
cases of Americans held on narcotics charges. BasGd
on our pledge of assistance, the Bolivian Governiner ,
is now fully committed to a program of crop substitution
for the cocaine- source coca now produced there.

SECRET -

[Omitted here are portions unrelated to Latin America.]

J

UNCLASSIFIED

15.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, May 28, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58,
Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81 . Confidential. Sent for action. On the first page of
the memorandum, Aaron wrote, “ZB — See my comments. DA.” Dodson also initialed the
memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

3324 7,4

SUBJECT:

Follow-up on the President's Pan
American Day Speech: Peacekeeping

In the Pan American Day Speech , when the President said that
the United States will siqjport the efforts and initiatives of the Secretary
General of the OAS in his "active and effective involvement in the
search for peaceable solutions to several longstanding disputes in
this hemisphere," he was signalling a departure from past policy .

Since U.S . intervention in the Dominican Republic, U.S . policy
has been to keep our distance from any territorial problems in the
hemisphere because it was felt that our involvement woiild be the
"kiss of death" for any initiative, regardless how desirable. Thus,
die U .S . did not even comment favorably when the Andean countries
signed the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974 calling for mutual arms
limitation in the region .

This non-profile policy may have been appropriate, for the decade
after the Dominican Repub He, but times have changed. There are
now many leaders in the hemisphere — and I would count Secretary
General Orfila as a potential leader — who are either looking for U.S .
support or leadership in this area. The President signalled the
possilnlity of such a new postiure in the Pan American Day speech
not only in his reference to the OAS peacekeeping efforts , but also
in his positive comment about the Ayacucho Declaration.

"1 spent most of this morning working on a new United
States policy to reduce the sale of conventional arms
around the world. Again, you in Latin America have
taken the lead. The pledge of eight South American
nations to limit the acqmsition of offensive arms in
their region is a striking example . If the eight nations
can implement their pledge . their own people will not
be the only ones to benefit . They will have set a
standard for others , throughout the world , to follow . "

nONFIDENT t A tr

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

CONnDENTIAL

2

(

There are three relatively serioiis territorial disputes and several
others less serious problems in the hemisphere. The three deserve
o\ir attention:

1. Belize - Guatemala . Belize is a colony of Great Britain which would
have achieved independence had it not been for the fact that
Guatemala, which has claims to BdUze, has threatened to invade if
it becomes independent . TMs is the most urgent issue because it
has divided Latin America, whidi supports Guatemala, in varying
degrees, and the Caribbean, which support Belize. Panama has
recendy shifted to the side of Belize, and Guatem«da broke diplomatic
relations. The British have asked us to help, and Secretary Vance
asked ARA for options, which I believe they provided, albeit reluctantly
(Luers said he thought it wo\ild be a mistake for us to get involved.)

2 .

3.

El Salvador and Honduras still do not have diplomatic relations^ • ,

A little support for Orfila's efforts might help there.

Andean Tensions.

In the memorandum asking for follow-up on the President's speech,
optio ns on peacekeeping efforts were requested, but we never receive d
anyTr ARA^ split on dds issue. Bob WUte, Deputy Chief of the U.S .
Mission to the OAS , believes that we shovild take a more active role in
this area, and Secretary Vance's request for options on Belize is one
indication that he may be in agreement with this new posture . Obviously ,

I th ink an active — not necessarily as a leader, but at the le ast, as an
intere sted party searching for d>e most effective way to get inv olved — role
is enti rely consistent with the main theme in the P resident's speectTyT
mentioned this to Bob White, and he immediatSy^ orgaiilzed"a meeting in
ARA on May 25, and in my opinion, it wais the most prodvi ctive meeting
I have ever gone to in ARAVi The people he brought in knew each of the
disputes and had some good ideas on what the U.S . cotild do. Luers
attended the meeting only for the first ten minutes, and I suspect he was
the one who slipped t hat ridiculotis n ote to the Secretary which vou
mentioned on Friday^ The irony is that I would bet that the Secretary
wotild support a more active role by the United States in this area .

CONFIDENTIAL

(

CONFIDENTIAI r

3

Anyway , I siispect that the only way that we will get any movement
on this issue is either by a formal request or perhs^s a phone call
to Secretary Vance.

I would recommend a formal request for two reasons: (1) in order to
give us the opportunity to show something to the President on this
subject — letting him choose the options on the questions of future
involvement; and (2) so that we can monitor the interagency process
to ensure that it is not sandbagged in ARA.

RECOMMENDATION

UNCLASSIFIED

16.

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
RP 77-10129
Washington, June 1977

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 78T02549A, Box 3,
Folder 136, RP77-10129: Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Confidential.
{drafting information not declassified].

UNCLASSIFIED

Co n f i den t ial

Human Rights in the Southern Cone
of Latin America

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

Confideiiti fri'

RP 77-10129
June 1977

Copy 149

CON Fi P E NT I At -

Human Rights in the Southern Cone
of Latin America

Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence

June 1977

Key Judgments

Human rights have been violated— sometimes flagrantly— by the
authoritarian military regimes that have come to power in the southern cone
of Latin America. Repression, characterized by torture and other inhumane
practices, has been directed for the most part at leftists, but others have been
victimized as well, largely by governments reacting to real and Imagined
threats to stability. As a result, human rights guarantees have been
subordinated to the priority concerns of imposing order on sometimes
fractious societies and concentrating on economic development and growth.
Our basic judgments about this pattern are that:

• Authoritarian military or quasi-military governments will
remain in power for the foreseeable future and will continue to
accord low priority to the human rights question.

• Improvements in human rights practices will depend more on
the military’s assessment of local security and insurgency
conditions than on outside pressures

• Where basic reform is instituted, the process will be slow at best
and may be measured only in terms of cosmetics rather than
substance. Moreover, the continued existence of security
apparatuses geared to repression increases the chances of
retrogression.

• Where the terrorist threat has subsided, there has been a gradual
easing of the worst kinds of offenses, but this trend is by no means
irreversible.

• External criticism of human rights abuses in the southern cone
may lead to limited improvements; reprisals by Washington will be
viewed as infringements on national sovereignty, and are more
likely to provoke continued defiance than serve as catalysts for
improving the human rights situation in any fundamental way.

CO N r i DEMTIAL

CO N r t DE W T t At

Human Rights in the Southern Cone
of Latin America

The judgment of what rights all people
are entitled to enjoy is a subjective one. and
it varies from culture to culture. Hunutn
rights for the purposes of this paper are de-
fined as protection of persons from arbi-
trary arrest and imprisonment, torture, and
murder. Although this paper addresses the
relationship between authoritarianism and
human rights, a broad definition of human
rights that includes the right to a democratic
form of government and to certain social
and economic benefits goes beyond the
scope of this discussion.

In trying to define human rights there are
limitations in venturing generalizations
about a geographic region. In the case of the
five South American countries— the south-
ern cone— discussed in this study, however,
there are some common trends that can be
discerned and various conclusions that can
be drawn about recen t developmen ts.

The Roots of the Problem

Human rights problems are not new in Latin
America. Throughout the history of the region,
even so-called “democratic” governments have
sometimes engaged in repression and systematic
violations of basic individual rights. The noto-
riety of these acts— especially among the authori-
tarian governments— has become more pro-
nounced in recent years because of improved
worldwide communications and greater inter-
national emphasis on human rights problems.

South American military regimes today are re-
acting in similar fashion to real or imagined
threats to order and stability and have adopted a
doctrine that is stridently anticommunist, but
largely antidemocratic as well. The resort to tor-
ture and other inhumane practices to suppress
perceived threats to stability has been a part of
this pattern.

Constitutional rule has been extinguished or
drastically altered; political freedoms have been
shelved; and political parties have been banned or
tightly circumscribed. Where elections are still
held, they are usually rigidly controlled with
little doubt as to their outcome.

The protection normally afforded by the judi-
cial process has been abrogated by the imposition
of states of siege in some countries, thereby giv-
ing the military broad discretionary powers to
suspend many rights and guarantees. Govern-
ments have used these emergency powers to
crack down on suspected subversives. Although
the target has been leftist extremists and other
opponents, innocent persons have also felt the
impact of arbitrary actions.

The preeminent role of the military in count-
ering subversion in Latin America and a long-
standing tolerance of highly centralized govern-
ments have reinforced the trend away from dem-
ocratic practices. Once in power, the military has
assumed sweeping measures to guarantee security
and combat leftist influence.

COHr i DCNT I At

1

CONfl D eN T IAl

There are a number of sociopolitical factors
that have facilitated this process. The first is that
little value is placed on the rights of the individ-
ual. In the Latin American context, fundamental
rights are not viewed as sacrosanct. The state is
the arbiter of what rights are inalienable and de-
termines how justice will be administered. The
vast majority of the people, by and large, is not
bothered by what happens to the fringe elements
of society. In addition, although a separation of
powers exists in theory, in practice the Latin
American executive has usually functioned in an
autocratic manner. Judicial and legislative or-
gans, where they exist, do not have the independ-
ence that marks North American and some West
European models. Moreover, in their desire for
security and the preservation of their society,
Latin Americans have often acquiesced in strong
military rule and endured constraints on their in-
dividual freedoms.

Those who have had their rights abused tend to
come from all walks of life, and their political
views or activism seem to be the primary criteria
that make them subjects of government repres-
sion. In many cases, young people from middlc-
or upper-class families who have participated in
extremist movements or sympathized with leftist
causes have been jailed or tortured by security
services to obtain information about their associ-
ates and subversive organizations.

Among the military officers who now direct
the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Uruguay, there is a firm conviction that former
civilian politicians had failed to halt a drift to-
ward political polarization and violence in their
societies. The armed forces have equated this fail-
ure with the inability of the democratic system to
cope with the complex problems of Latin Amer-
ica’s “less developed” status. Their authoritar-
ianism has been improvised as a result and does
not follow the classic pattern of military dictator-
ship. Tlie old archetype of the military strong-
man as defender of the oligarchy and of elite
interests has been supplanted by a new image of
the military as catalysts of national development
and progress as well as defenders of national secu-
rity.

An important aspect of the trend toward mili-
tary dominance in the area is the impact of the
drive for modernization on the thinking of the
current generation of armed forces leaders. The
economic difficulties generated by political dislo-
cations have impressed them with the need to
channel their countries along a path of sustained
development and growth. While most of these
countries have been plagued at one time or an-
other by runaway inflation, a lack of investment
capital, or economic stagnation, their societies
have been strained by the demands of a rapidly
expanding urban p>opuIation and middle class.

After taking power, the military has sought to
guide the process of economic transformation by
imposing tough and sometimes unpopular poli-
cies. A concentration on assuring political stabil-
ity at any cost to guarantee a continuity of poli-
cies within a coherent modernization strategy has
frequently meant that concern for basic human
rights has had a very low priority.

The Southern Cone

Where the terrorist threat has subsided— in Bra-
zil, Chile, and Uruguay— we believe there has
been a gradual easing of the most offensive kinds
of violations, including torture, illegal detention,
and political kidnapings. Firm confirmation of
this sort of information is hard to come bv. but

EO 13526

inde-

the impression held byE
pendent international organizations tliat monitor
the human rights situation in Latin America is
that fewer violations in tliese countries have been
recorded so far this year than a year ago. In gen-
eral, there is no discernible pattern in the number
of human rights violations in the southern cone,
but as long as the repressive machinery remains in
place the chances of a resurgence cannot be ruled
out.

Repression by the military regime in Brazil has
been mitigated, in part, during the past year or so
by President Geisel’s removal of officials respon-
sible for illegal arre sts and tort ure. Military and
police organizationsl3|n9S^ have orders from
high-level officials to prohibit torture and other
forms of mistreatment. Detainees in security
cases have experienced improved conditions, but

CONriDC N TIAL

2

South America

VENEZUELA

BOLIVIA

WNOURAS

A .1 '.( '

ARGENTINA

FALKLAND ISLANDS ?
flSL^ MALVINASI ^
(Adniini«t»r»d by U.(C«
clslNi«d by Ai96fiGna)

1000 Kitoimtom

South Geo/gta

526

5(c)

FO

AzNTMftttal E<i«Ml*ArM Proj«eliQn
$C«te 107 , 000.000

Boundary repretonutlon is
not nocosurtly •uthoritativa

COMriDCNT I AL

there are still occasional reports of harsh treat-
ment and arbitrary detentions.

Although leftist guerrilla activity has virtually
been wiped out in Brazil and Uruguay, Argentina
is still suffering from sporadic acts of terrorism.
The zealous pursuit of the remaining terrorists by
Argentine security forces still gives rise to abuses.
Killings and disappearances continue to charac-
terize the antisubversive campaign, even though
many hardcore terrorist leaders have been elimi-
nated and their support apparatus gravely weak-
ened.

Argentina may now be at a crossroads. The
terrorists, although by no means out of business,
are clearly on the run. This is obvious to all Ar-
gentines, and the security forces take consider-
able pride in their achievement At the same time,
however, there are officers who believe that the
elimination of the guerrilla activists is merely the
beginning and that there must now be a grand
offensive against the intellectual authors of sub-
version to root out the basic causes of terrorism.

Should such an offensive take place, it could
occur in the form of purges of school and univer-
sity faculties, government bureaus, and journal-
istic, intellectual, and artistic circles to a degree
not yet experienced. In such an environment,
anyone even remotely identifiable with leftist or
merely liberal views would have reason to fear for
his job or position, if not his very life. Thus far,
the military government has not seemed inclined
to move in such a direction. From what we know,
President Videla and his supporters are opposed
to repressive tactics against these people.

The outcome hinges, however, on Videla’s
ability to control the so-called “hardline” offi-
cers, which he has been able to do so far. Some
moderate officers may now be alarmed at the
implications of a current investigation of promi-
nent citizens allegedly linked to subversion.
Among the hardliners, the more vengeful may
want to exploit the case by exaggerating it to
“prove” their contention that subversion is so
deeply imbedded that extremely harsh measures
are justified.

The case centers on the family and associates
of a wealthy financier who are under suspicion
because of the financier’s purported finanidalas*-
sistance to the Montonero guerrillas. The number
of persons implicated has grown steadily, but
firm charges of subversion have been leveled
against few, if any. Moreover, accusations against
the principal figures have yet to be substantiated.
Many of those implicated are Jewish; some occu-
pied key positions in the Peronist government;
some arc journalists. One is a former military
president. At least some Argentines are becoming
uneasy that anti-Semitism— always close to the
surface in Argentina— and political retaliation are
as much behind the investigation as a genuine
belief that real links to subversion exist.

Human rights problems in the smaller and
more backward nations of the continent, such as
Paraguay and Bolivia, have not aroused as much
international attention. These isolated nations
have experienced long periods of dictatorial mie,
and periodic episodes of abuse are not unusual.
The current lack of political turbulence probably
accounts for the slight attention paid to viola-
tions within these countries. On the other hand,
in cases such as Uruguay and Chile, where long
traditions of civil liberties existed, the worst as-
pects of military repression have triggered strong
protests abroad.

The military-dominated Mendez government
in Uruguay has grown considerably more con-
scious of its poor reputation on lmman rights.
Prior to the recent US aid cut.jUruguay appeared
to be making some effort to bring improvements.
In reprisal for US moves, however, military hard-
liners have put aside-at least temporarily-any
plans for further relaxation. The Council of State
earlier approved legislation reducing minimum
sentences for certain kinds of activities associated
with subversion but its effectiveness has not yet
been shown. In November 1 976, the US embassy
estimated that approximately 1,800 persons
were still being detained for political reasons.- In-
stances of torture and prolonged detention have
decreased, but the military retains a firm grip on
the government and has extensive powers in the
area of individual rights and guarantees. Most of
the violations recently cited by human rights

4

CONriDC N TW i:

eONflD C N TI A t

critics cover complaints dating back a year or
more.

In Chile, the experiment with Marxism under
Allende led to the end of a period of democratic
rule that had extended over neariy half a century.
The intervention of the armed forces in 1973
brought to power a military establishment with
little practical political experience, a strong dis-
taste for partisan politics, and no coherent pro-
gram to deal with Chile’s economic and political
problems. The result has been the imposition of
draconian measures that have made C^ile an in-
ternational pariah— although its human rights vio-
lations in many respects have been no worse than
those of its nei^bors. .

Early this year, the Pinochet government ap-
peared to be turning toward legal practice in
security cases. The procedural cleanup may have
been temporary, however, since new evidence of
torture, illegal detentions, and “disappearances”
is coming to light. This backsliding comes at a
particularly bad time for Chile, since West Euro-
pean governments were beginning to take note of
the substantial improvement in human rights
practices. A renewed wave of abuse by intelli-
gence organizations is certain to refuel the human
rights controversy and provide new ammunition
for Chile’s critics.

Meanwhile, the courts are pressing the govern-
ment on past cases, some of which are almost
certain to embarrass the regime. Perhaps tire most
positive advance made by the government in
moderating its hardline policy during 1976 was
the release of some 2,700 political prisoners, leav-
ing only about 500 still incarcerated on various
charges. Civil freedoms remain rigidly restricted,
however, and the outlawing of the remaining
democratic parties in March was a stark reminder
that open political expression is not tolerated.

The Legal and Humanitarian Aspects
While concern for human ri^ts has generally
been defined in terms of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights adopted by the UN, wide
differences of opinion exist about what are viola-
tions of human rights. International require-
ments of states in human ri^ts matters are, for

(

the most part, vague and nonobligatory. State-
ments of good intentions about achieving mini-
mum standards are more common than a willing-
ness to take concrete steps to uphold them.

Where military re^es have enforced state-
of-siege decrees, prisoners have been denied
access to civil courts and have been deprived of
such procedural safeguards as amparo'-thc Latin
American juridical equivalent of habeas corpus.
In some countries, summary courts martial have
dealt with internal security cases, normally the
most sensitive politically. These tribunals tend to
deal more sternly and expeditiously with cases
than the dvil judiciary, which is notoriously cum-
bersome and ineffident in much of Latin Amer-
ica. Adding to the problem are the dvil judges
themselves and their fear that either the subver-
sives or right-wing groups will take action against
them.

Some military regimes have rewritten or are in
the process of redrafting national security codes.
The aim apparently is to ensure that the military
has a significantly enhanced role in controlling
future situations considered inimical to national
security and stability. In spite of legal requisites,
in practice the armed forces are likely to act on
the basis of expediency rather than any firm dedi-
cation to obs^ance of legal principles. As long
as constitutional rule is in abeyance and no real
independent check on executive authority exists,
this situation is not expected to change dramat-
ically.

Deference to legal propriety has been disre-
garded most often by intelligence and security
services, which usually have wide-ranging powers
and virtual autonomy in their operations. This
broad mandate has been used at times to conduct
activities of an illegal nature— although ostensibly
designed to protect the national interest Acting
under the state of siege and other extraordinary
powers, prisoners have been held incommu-
nicado and without being charged. Authorities
have been able to detain, search, and interrogate
anyone at any time or place. Physical and psycho-
logical torture have been employed as devices to
extract information. Such practices have gene-
rated strident criticism abroad.

COMnDCNTIAl

5

CO N r i DC K T tAt-

Working against abandonment of these prac-
tices in Latin America is the fact that torture has
been found to be an effective tool in rooting out
subversion. Intelligence services have obtained in-
formation quickly that has enabled them to foil
insurgent operations, frequently by surprise. The
sophistication of torture technology today is
such that there are few individuals who cannot be
made to reveal information or to confess to
charges. Military regimes have also perceived the
utility of the tlueat of torture to intimidate op-
position political movements.

It is hi^ly probable that the leadership in
most instances has either condoned such prac-
tices outright in the past or at least turned a
blind eye to them. External pressures and the
reduction of an internal threat evidently are
having some success in compelling a few regimes
to halt the worst kinds of excesses, but there
will probably be no fundamental change as long
as these governments deem it necessary to
resort to extreme measures against their “ene-
mies.”

Obstacles to Reform

The new breed of military ruler in South
America has been slow to respond to charges of
human rights violations but quick to voice
annoyance with what they see as external
“meddling” in matters they believe fall exclu-
sively within their sovereign prerogative. Most
have insisted that if the rights of a minority
. have been disregarded, it has been to protect
the rights of the majority from internal subver-
sion.

Military and security forces consider them-
selves to be the front line of defense against a
relentless Communist offensive in which they
are also usually a prime target. Reinforcing this
siege mentality is the officers’ conviction that
wliat they are doing is in the highest national
interest. They also believe that their mission is
partly one of saving Western Christian civiliza-
tion from Communism, a task that they think
has been abandoned by a weakened and divided
US. They point to detente as evidence that US
accommodation with Communist countries is a

sellout and an invitation to infiltration of alien
ideas.

Another closely related factor contributing
to the military’s rationale that its ironhanded
methods are correct is the evident lack of strong
opposition on the part of a substantial portion
of the population. Most Latin Americans do not
view human rights per se as a domestic problem.
Indeed, the vast majority is unaffected by the
brutal treatment inflicted on a minority consid-
ered to be extremists.

The Latin perception of the human rights
situation is quite different from that of other
Western nations, where it is seen from a
different cultural perspective. In countries such
as Uruguay and Argentina, where rampant
terrorism has caused the most fear and appre-
hension among substantial elements of the
population, the restoration of order by other
than legal means has been viewed as a nasty but
unavoidable business.

The traditional inclination of Latin Ameri-
cans to accept authoritarianism may also in-
crease the tendency to overlook behavior that is
unacceptable elsewhere. Many Latin Americans
have been prone to dismiss criticism from
abroad as simply ill-informed or Communist-in-
spired.

In Chile, the violent and chaotic conditions
of the Allende years left a deep scar on the
nation, and internal support for the junta was
impressive, if not universal, at the outset.
Disillusionment has set in during the past
several years, but the absence of free opinion
makes it difficult to judge the extent of support
for the junta or its opponents. Many people are
not effusive about the methods of the austere
military regime, but have accepted the necessity
for it while expressing guarded optimism that
gradual improvement is possible.

For most of these governments, however, the
future of democratic institutions docs not
appear bri^t. Whatever form of government
evolves under military auspices, the authoritar-
ian infrastructure is not likely to change sub-

6

CO N F I DENT I AL

COHr i DCNTIA t

stantially. Because they have come to power by
extraconstitutional means, these governments
will probably attempt to compensate for their
lack of legitimacy by creating a new institu-
tional framework that reflects and reinforces
their own doctrines and ideas. This process
probably will offer a few openings for a
loosening of the present restrictions on human
rights.

Reaction to Foreign Criticism

Criticism by the US and the suspension of aid
to Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile have pro-
voked a sharp reaction. Much of the outburst
stemmed from a belief that Latin America is
being unfairly discriminated against by eco-
nomic reprisals since Communist nations receive
little more than a tongue-lashing. Indignation
rose even higher when Latins saw South Korea
and the Philippines being granted exceptions
because of their security value to the US. Latin
Americans resent the insinuation that they are
not important to the US.

Latin pique over the US position has been
manifested by a conspicuous cooling in rela-
tions and, in some cases, the rejection of US
aid. The Brazilians acted to terminate militarv
agreements with the US. Argentina made clear
that eradication of terrorism will be undertaken
by whatever means the military government
deems necessary, even if it entails a deteriora-
tion in relations with the US. Chilean leaders
signaled their displeasure by cracking down on
political opponents— particularly former presi-
dent Frei’s Christian Democrats— and by vowing
that no further concessions would be made to
world opinion, which the Chilean junta believes
it cannot appease in any case.

The irritation expressed by the southern cone
governments to US chiding on human rights will
subside eventually, but the issue seems likely to
remain an underlying source of trouble. As
tempers cool and militaiy leaders have a chance
to reflect on the situation, attitudes may shift
enough to permit renewed movement toward
moderation.

International censure has had a measurable
impact on the human rights situation, in large
part because of the efforts of the world press to
draw attention to the problem. In Argentina,
for instance, the much publicized habeas corpus
petitions filed by relatives on behalf of 425
persons whose whereabouts are unknown ap-
pear to have prompted the Supreme Court to
ask for an investigation by the government.

In addition, oiganizations such as Amnesty
International, the International Commission of
Jurists, and the human rights commissions of
the UN and the OAS have participated in
investigating or publicizing human rights viola-
tions. Other groups such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the Interna-
tional Committee for European Migration have
aided in resettlement of political refugees and
monitoring of humanitarian conditions. Tlie
Catholic Church has been an outspoken source
of criticism and has facilitated some improve-
ments in Brazil and Chile; in Argentina it
recently issued its first formal condemnation of
human rights abuses. In a number of instances,
the release of political prisoners, the reduction
of torture and illegal disappearances, and better
conditions for political prisoners can be attri-
buted to the cumulative efforts of these groups.

Political and economic pressures-such as
withholding loans or making arms sales— exerted
by other governments have also compeUed
change in the human rights situation, but the
results have varied from country to country and
are difficult to evaluate. Where such actions
have had a corrective influence, they have not
always been without unfortunate side effects.
As a quid pro quo for their steps to curb abuses,
the military governments expect some recogni-
tion of their efforts. The unfavorable image of
most of these governments abroad, however, is
such that the slow pace in restoring funda-
mental rights does little to appease their critics.

Private diplomatic persuasion has been used
with some limited success to influence the
course of human rights protection, but there is
no assurance that the device will work in the
absence of other means of leverage. Given the

€OHriDCNTrAL

7

c o N Pi DemiA t-

drawbacks of using the stick, however, the value
of using the carrot may be increasing.

An approach tailored for each country that
recognizes and applauds even small steps taken
to limit human rights violations may induce
concessions from governments that employ
murder, torture, and kidnaping as weapons
against their enemies. But southern cone re-
gimes will continue to be suspicious of US
motives as well as of initiatives for international
oversight that appear to interfere with their
sovereign national rights.

With the restrictions now placed on some of
these governments by the US in the areas of
economic and military aid, there may be a
limited amount of leverage available to achieve
substantial new improvements. The Latins have
balked at what they believe is a US plan to use
aid as a weapon, and they are certain to react
negatively to any further moves they consider
punitive. Chile, Brazil, and Argentina are al-
ready looking elsewhere for military hardware
that they cannot procure from the US.

To avoid being further isolated at the interna-
tional level, the countries of the southern cone
may find it prudent to take a new look at
possible policy adjustments. They will only do
so, however, at a time when it does not appear
that they are bowing to foreign pressures. An
easing of repression is more likely to result from
evolutionary forces within the society than
from external demands for change, which tend
to bolster a siege mentality.

An Inter- American Challenge?

All of the Latin American nations have
signed the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and most of them have incorporated it
in their respective constitutions. The Chapul-
tepec conference of American states, which met
in 1945 to lay the groundwork for the postwar
reorganization of the inter-American system,
adopted a resolution appealing for the interna-
tional protection of human rights. Since then
the Organization of American States has in-
cluded provisions on human rights, which are

further strengthened by amendments to the
Protocol of Buenos Aires concluded in 1967.
Noncompliance with these statements of princi-
ple has been the rule more often than the
exception.

Recommendations have occasionally been
made in Latin America favoring enforcement of
basic human rights, but misgivings over possible
encroachments on sovereign rights have pre-
vented agreement on any solution. As early as
1945, a Uruguayan foreign minister called for
“multilateral collective action, exercised with
complete unselfishness*’ to bring about the
“reestablishment of essential rights” in any
country suffering under dictatorship. The US
gave unqualified support to the idea, but a
majority of the American republics turned it
down.

The inter-American convention adopted by
the OAS Council in 1968 provided for the
creation of an Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. Compulsory judgment was to be op-
tional, however, and the court has never been
used to settle a human rights dispute because of
the special sensitivity of Latin Americans to the
question of intervention.

Despite the recent dismal record of Latin
American states in upholding human rights, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Riglits,
functioning under the OAS, has scored rela-
tively high marks in the past for acting on
complaints and undertaking investigations. It
has used its powers more boldly than most
other regional or international organizations. Its
observers have periodically exercised a close
supervisory role in monitoring and bringing
human rights problems to the attention of
governments in the Americas.

The commission has encountered obstacles in
fulfilling its objectives. Nevertheless, it is dedi-
cated to impartial fact gathering and to expo-
sure of the more flagrant violations of basic
liberties and might well be the most acceptable
and workable solution to the question of how
to effect action on human rights abuses. This,
of course, would depend greatly on the exteut

8

CO N r i DCNT h ft*

CO N r i DCNT I Al

to which political realities permit even the
present commission to operate evenhandedly
and to muster majority support for compliance
with adequate safeguards.

Members of the commission made an on-the-
scene visit to Chile in 1 974, but OAS inertia in
dealing with the group’s findings has done much
to immobilize it since then. In any case, Latin
Americans would probably prefer dealing with
the OAS than ,with the UN. Relations between
Chile and the UN Human Ri^ts Commission
have been strained since July 1975, when
President Pinochet reneged on a promise to
allow a visit by a UN fact-finding mission. While
the Chilean junta is hypersensitive to outside
attacks on its human rights record, it believes a
more sympathetic hearing can be obtained from
the American states than from radical third
world countries in the UN.

Multilateral representations on human li^ts
make the US less vulnerable to charges of great
power coercion. The OAS Secretary General,
for example, might serve as a moderating force
in encouraging greater hemispheric respect for
human rights.

Outlook

We expect that the South American govern-
ments singled out most frequently for human
rights infractions will remain authoritarian for
the foreseeable future. In the absence of any
realistic challenges, there is no current alterna-
tive to the military as arbiters of power.
Respect for human rights will be largely de-
pendent on the military’s judgments regarding
internal security conditions or local insur-
gency-not outside pressures.

Where progress occurs, it will be a slow
process. Ameliorative action to correct the
worst abuses of human rights will probably be
taken in the short term, but real movement
toward broader liberalization measures is less
likely within the next few years.

The ruling generals in most of the southern
cone share similar views on enforcing stability-
if necessary, by repressing any activity they
consider thmatening, particularly from the left.
The military’s mission, as the Chilean junta has
stated in its Declaration of Principles, is one of
“cleansing our democratic system from the
vices that facilitated its destruction.”

These countries will remain sensitive to inter-
national opinion and will weigh their responses
in terms of the potential costs, such as increased
isolation or economic and political reprisals. As
they comprehend the earnestness of the US
commitment on human rights, the principal
offenders may strive to alleviate some US
concerns, to contain further antagonism over
the issue, and to restore some balance to
bilateral relations.

On the debit side, it is evident that US-Latin
American relationships are apt to be strained
for some time over the human rights issue.
Continued resentment and defiance on the part
of some Latin American governments could
persuade them to side more actively in interna-
tional forums with third world initiatives that
run contrary to US interests. If pressures were
reduced, on the other hand, these governments
might continue to rely on repression and stall
on taking measures to liberalise their regimes.

C O NWDg l 'fft At

9

UNCLASSIFIED

17.

Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts

Washington, June 8, 1977, 0252Z

131774

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770203-0746. Confidential;
Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Einaudi; cleared in S/S-0 and in draft by Devine, Rogers, White,
Schneider, Feinberg, Bamebey, and Zimmermann; approved by Luers.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONriDCNTlAb

2 of 5

GONPIDEMTIA &

PAGE 01 STATE 131774

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO- 00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY ARA/PPC:LEINADDI
APPROVED BY ARArWHLUERS
ARA:FDEVINE (DRAFT)

ARA : SROGERS ( DRAFT )

USOAS;RWHITE (DRAFT)

D/HA:MSCHNEIDER (DRAFT)

S/P:RFEINBERG (DRAFT)

ARA/ AND s MRBARNEBEY (DRAFT)

ARA/ECA:RZIMMERMANN (DRAFT)

S/S-0 - SSTEINER

---080510Z 109075

P 080252Z JUN 77
FK SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
C 0 N F I D B N T I A L -STATE 131774
EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: SHDM, PA, AR, CO, BR, VE, BL, PE, EC, Cl

SUfBJECT; GUIDANCE ON SOUTHERN CONE BLOC INITIATIVES

REFERENCE: ASUNCION 2279

1. REFTEL REPORTS THAT THE PROSPECTIVE JUNE 3 MEETING OF
SOUTHERN CONE CHIEFS OF STATE HAS BEEN POSTPONED AND
DOWNGRADED TO A PRE-OASGA MEETING IN GRENADA AMONG
FOREIGN MINISTERS. THIS CABLE PROVIDES GENERAL GUIDANCE
ON OUR RESPONSE TO THIS AND SIMILAR EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE
AGAINST OUR POLICIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

GONPIDENTI ft fe

CONFIDBM T TAL

PAGE 02 STATE 131774

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DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

2 . WHILE THE DISRUPTIVE POTENTIAL OF A GEO-POLITICAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL BLOC CENTERED ON THE SOUTHERN CONE IS
CLEAR, THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE PROMOTERS OF A

CONF I DENWrf r

2 of 5

OONriDENT I A tr 3 of 5

CHIEFS OF STATE MEETING SUGGEST THAT PRACTICAL FEASIBILITY
OF SUCH A BLOC IS STILL LIMITED, UNLESS SOME CATALYTIC
EVENT INTERVENES, THEREFORE, WE SUSPECT THAT IF SOME
SOUTHERN CONE FOREIGN MINISTERS DO EVENTUALLY MEET IN
GRENADA, THEY ARE LIKELY TO DO LITTLE MORE THAN ATTEMPT
TO COORDINATE PRIVATELY THEIR VIEWS AND POSITIONS PRIOR
TO THE OASGA.

3 . AS THERE IS AMPLE PRECEDENT FOR LATIN AMERICAN CAUCUSES

PRIOR TO INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS, A SOUTHERN CONE MINI-
CAUCUS IN GRENADA DOES NOT IN ITSELF WARRANT ALARM. NOR
FOR THAT MATTER, IS IT SOMETHING WE COULD AT THIS POINT
DO MUCH TO PREVENT.

4. THE LONGER-RUN IMPLICATIONS OF A REGIONAL OR SUB-
REGIONAL COALITION AGAINST OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES
ARE CONSIDERABLY MORE SERIOUS, HOWEVER. CLEARLY, IT
WOULD SERVE ONLY PINOCHET'S INTERESTS TO INVEIGLE
OTHER COUNTRIES INTO IDENTIFICATION WITH CHILE.

CONVERSELY OUR INTERESTS WOULD SUFFER. ARGENTINE AND
BRAZILIAN MEMBERSHIP IN SUCH A BLOC WOULD TEND TO
PROVIDE MORAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED
HUMAN-RIGHTS ABUSES AND RENDER BOTH COUNTRIES LESS
AMENABLE TO OUR APPROACHES ON THIS SUBJECT. MOREOVER
WE HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF
PARAGUAY THAT IT WOULD INVUE THE TAHRC TO VISIT PARAGUAY
THIS YEAR. WERE THIS DECISION TO BE CHANGED NOW UNDER
PRESSURES FROM AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION OF MILITARY
HARDLINERS, THE RESULT WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO PROSPECTS FOR
MULTILATERALIZING THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONALLY
GOHPIDnNTIiar

CONFIDEWTIA I7

PAGE 03 STATE 131774

RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS. LASTLY, WE CANNOT DISCOUNT
THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A BLOC MIGHT
ATTRACT SUPPORT FROM, OR EXERT PRESSURE ON, SOME
COUNTRIES THAT ARE MARGINALLY INCLINED TO SUPPORT OUR
POLICIES AT PRESENT. IT WOULD ALSO INHIBIT ANY
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA MIGHT PLAY.

5. OUR RESPONSES TO FEELERS ON THESE MATTERS MUST
KEEP SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND. WE DO NOT WANT
TO OVERREACT IN WAYS THAT WOULD FUEL FEARS OF US
INTERVENTION, PROVIDE AMMUNITION TO HARDLINERS,

EMBARRASS OUR FRIENDS, OR OTHERWISE PROVOKE A NEW

CONriDENT tA t

3 of 5

OONr i DCNTIAL 4 of 5

WAVE OF LATIN AMERICAN "SOLIDARITY" AGAINST US. OF
EQUAL IMPORTANCE, WE DO NOT WANT TO TAKE SUCH A SOFT
LINE THAT WE APPEAR DEFENSIVE, CONFUSED, OR PREPARED
TO YIELD TO EXTREME NATIONALIST REACTIONS. IN
PARTICULAR, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE NOT APPEAR
DISPOSED TO RETREAT ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

S. ACTION REQUESTED. WE SHOULD NOT NOW APPEAR OVERLY
INTERESTED OR OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF A PRE-OASGA MINI -CAUCUS. IF ASKED ABOUT MORE
FORMAL INITIATIVES TENDING TOWARD BLOC FORMATION,

HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD RESPOND THAT, WHILE WE OBVIOUSLY

CANNOT OBJECT TO MEETINGS AMONG OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WE JUST
AS OBVIOUSLY HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT ANY MOVES ANTAGONISTIC
TO THE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION OF HOMAN RIGHTS OR, OF COURSE,

TO THE UNITED STATES ITSELF. WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO
WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY, BOTH BILATERALLY AND IN THE OAS
AND ELSEWHERE, TO DEVELOP HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES THAT WILL
BE SUPPORTED BY THE NATIONS OF THIS HEMISPHERE. WE
SEE NO VALUE IN NOT DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES OPENLY AND
IN A NON -CONFRONTATIONAL SPIRIT.

7. while THE ABOVE SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED IN RESPONSE
- CONFIDENTIAL

C ON F I D BWT IAL

PAGE 04 STATE 131774

TO ALL INQUIRIES, SOME ADDITIONAL TAILORING TO SPECIFIC
SITUATIONS IS ALSO DESIRABLE. WHEN AN INQUIRY COMES
FROM A GOVERNMENT THAT HAS TURNED DOWN SOUTHERN CONE
APPROACHES, YOU SHOULD STATE FRANKLY THAT WE ARE PLEASED
THAT THEY ARE NOT JOINING WHAT APPEAR TO BE ILL-CONCEIVED
EFFORTS TO FORM AN ORGANIZED FRONT AGAINST OUR COMMON
EFFORTS. WHEN AN INQUIRY COMES FROM A GOVERNMENT THAT
IS UNDECIDED OR FROM AN OFFICIAL WHO IS SUFFICIENTLY
OPEN TO UNDERSTAND THE POINT, YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE
EMERGENCE OF BLOC POLITICS CAN ONLY SERVE TO POLARIZE
RELATIONS. THIS WOULD COMPLICATE THE EFFORTS OF THE
U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES TO TAILOR AN EFFECTIVE
POLICY TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR BILATERAL LEVERAGE
AND DIFFERING NATIONAL PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS IN HUMAN
RIGHTS . VANCE

eOWFlPBN T IAL

e eNFIDEKTIAL

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UNCLASSIFIED

18.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Director of Central Intelligence
Turner

Washington, June 14, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58,
Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Confidential. For the origins of this document, see
Document 15.

UNCLASSIFIED

CQNHDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jvine 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping

In the President's speech to the Permanent Council of the Organization
of American States ; he signalled a new and more active approach by
the United States to international disputes in the Western Hemisphere .
He gave strong encouragement to tiie Andean countries to implement
the Ayacucho Declaration, and he said tiiat the United States woiild
support the efforts and initiatives of the Secretary General of the OAS
in finding solutions to longstanding disputes in the hemisphere .

Supporting the OAS Secretary General's initiative is only one option
we might want to consider in choosing an appropriate strategy for the
United States in dealing with disputes in the hemisphere . Please
provide by Jtily 7, 1977, a short paper discussing options which
the President might want to consider in dealing with the following
disputes:

• Belize - Guatemala.

• El Salvador - Honduras.

• The Andew countries (Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia) .

The review need not be limited to these cases. The State Department
should coordinate this review with the Defense Department . the National
Security Council, and the Central Intelligewe Agency.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

CONFIDENTIAL

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

UNCLASSIFIED

19.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter

Washington, June 16, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 29, Mrs.
Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, 5/30-6/13/77: 3/24/77-6/16/77. Confidential. Sent for
information. In the top right-hand comer of the memorandum. Carter wrote, “To Zbig, Cy. C.”
Pastor sent this memorandum to Brzezinski under a June 16 covering memorandum in which he
recommended that Brzezinski sign the memorandum to Carter. (Ibid.)

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIA t;

3801 /

d

June 16, 1977

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Follow-up of Mrs . Carter's Trip

We have compiled a set of checklists on those specific items raised ’’jv
each country which Mrs. Causer visited. I have sent follow-up memoranda
on all those items with an asterisk beside them.

The Venezuela checklist (pages 10 and 11) is of particular importance
because it represents a concise agenda of the items which Perez will
want to discuss during his State Visit. I will send follow-up memoranda
on all the items in the checklist , but if you could examine the list first
and suggest some direction that we might take in providing you with a
good response to these issues, we can ensure that vour dialoeue with
Perez will be as productive as possible.

The discussions with Perez will be of great importance to our overall
policy in the hemisphere since he is currently the most outstanding
leader in the hemisphere, euid more importantly, because his position
on the major issues which we care about in the hemisphere - human
rights, nonproliferation, and arms control — are identical with our own.
He wants to play a leadership role on these issues , and we should
probably encourage him and provide some direction. Furthermore,
we may need his help again on the Canal Treaty if we are going to be
able to complete it this summer.

We are presently worki ng on the drafts of letters for you to send to the
seven countries which Mrs. Carter visited, but we thought we would
wait until Secretary Vance returns from the OAS so as to take into
accoiuit his follow-up efforts before we forwar d the letters to you. We
have not yet heard from Colombian President Lopez Michels en on when

CONFIDENTIAt r

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

CONFIDENHA tr

2

or whether he will meet with Peter Bo\irne or Mathea Falco, and we

may not receive a response for a while. Perhaps , we should draft ,

a letter from you to him to reiterate your interest in this and other ^

matters , and later when Peter Bourne goes to Colombia, he could ^ F

bring a sepcirate letter , ^

There were several issues which were discussed in almost every country
Mrs . Carter visited. I have just asked State for a report which includes
options for your consideration on ways the United States can effectively
contribute to the peaceful resolution of both the Belizean problem and
the problem of the Andes . Other multilateral issues which we are
examining in the context of a report being prepared for you by State
and NSC on the follow-up of your Pan American Day speech include:
humw rights , nonproliferation (Treaty of Tlatelolco) , and political
refugees .

OONFlDEPmAL

CnflBlIUL

UNCLASSIFIED

20 .

Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
RPM 77-10168
Washington, June 28, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58,
Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Secret. No drafting information appears on the
memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

\

¥ 1

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The OAS General Assembly and the Huroan Rights Issue

. i

Delegates to last week's OAS General Assembly in Grenada
returned home convinced of the depth of Washington's commitment
to the defense of human rights. The conference, in fact,
turned out to be a battleground for the US human rights
policy and almost all of the discussions were devoted to it.

Even though the delegates have been thoroughly sensitized to
the issue, however, the outlook for progress in curbing
human rights abuses is still mixed at best.

The thirteen nations voting for the US initiative on
human rights were Pancuna, Jamaica, Barbados, Surineun, Grenada,

Costa Rica, Trinidad, Mexico, and Dominican Re public , Ecuador^

Haiti, Venezuela, and Peru, seven of these countries are
from the Caribbean. Five are countries visited by Mrs.

Carter in early June. The southern cone countries of Brazil,
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay abstained — a polite
"no" vote — as did Guatemala, Colombia, and El Salvador.

Honduras, Nicaragua, and Bolivia did not vote.

It has been apparent for some time now that US spokesmen,
including Mrs. Carter, Secretary Vance, and Ambassador
Young, have been getting the human rights message across to
the Latin Americans. The doubts about Washington's long-
term seriousness on the issue have given way in many cases,
in fact, to concrete action by several of the countries to
curb the worst abuses. For example, Chile claims that it
has freed its last political prisoner. While the OAS was in
session the Chilean government also negotiated a settlement
of a hunger strike, staged by families of missing persons,
that had been in progress at the United Nations ECLA

RPM 77-10168

iEO 13526 3.5(c)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 June 1977

.q W 1 " t? ff-T

Q E C R E -T

i

i

headqpaarters in Santiago. Argentina and Brazil have directed
security forces to be more circumspect when arresting suspected
terrorists. Paraguay is again talking about inviting the
Inter -American Human Rights Commission to make an onsight
inspection in Asuncion.

These positive steps, however, do not mean that the OAS
community will soon develop a unaminity of views on the
human rights issue. Although no country would ever voice
opposition to the defense of human rights intrinsically, the
reasons for the negative votes continue to be fear of
political and economic destabilization caused by communism
and terrorism. The psychological and real factors are
unlikely to go away in the near future. In fact, it is
conceivable that some of the countries voting with the US on
this issue may be faced in the future with a security problem
which could lead to systematic violations of h\aman rights.

Haiti, for example, already has one of the worst records in
the hemisphere on human rights. Politically- related violence
is already common in Jamaica, always threatening in Panama,
and never far from the surface in the Dominican Republic.

Haiti's vote for the US resolution is difficult to understand
except for Ambassador McGee's explanation that the Haitians
had decided to vote yes on eve^thincr that came up at the
meeting.

Although we do not have much hard evidence, the. posj-tive
vote b y Jcimaica, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela

could well h ave been influe nced by Mrs. Carter's visit to

these countries. More than likely, however, other considerations
were just as important. Even though Mrs. Carter reportedly
was assured by Jamaican Prime Minister Manley that he would
support the US on human rights, Manley was effusive in his
praise for President Carter on the human rights issue well
before Mrs. Carter's trip. Moreover, Jcunaica sorely needs
US financial assistance now. Costa Rica and Venezuela, two
of the few practicing democracies in Latin America, would be
expected to support the US, as would Mexico.

An Ecuadorean spokesman has said that his country's
vote for the US resolution stemmed from a sincere belief in
human rights. Another Ecuadorean said, however, that Quito
has an cimbivalent attitude toward the issue because it could
be construed as interference in internal affairs. He added,
however, that the government had decided to support the US

- 2 -

0 E C R E T

SECRE T

I

policy before Mrs. Carter’s visit and could not change its
position even if it wanted to. Both denied that the possibility
of acquiring arms from the US was a factor in their vote,
but the Ecuadoreans are again inquiring about US aircraft.

In the case of Peru, the positive vote was not out of character
with the Morales Bermudez government. Peru has generally
supported public declarations of human rights and it is
believed that the US declaration on human rights will be
incorporated into the new Peruvian constitution.

The support for the US position by Barbados, the Dominican
Republic, Panama, Surinam, Grenada, and Trinidad-Tobago was
not unexpected, but Jamaica had to put pressure on the
Grenadans in order to get their vote. Progress in the canal
negotiations certainly was a factor in winning Panama's
vote .

In the final analysis, the Grenada meeting of the OAS
may be remembered in the future as the beginning of a new
era of understanding between the US and Latin America or it
may do down as the final dissolution of the special relationship
most Latin American countries have long assumed they enjoyed
with Washington. Despite the US victory on the human rights
issue, the voting pattern raises disturbing questions. The
southern cone countries remain a solid intransigent bloc,
with Brazil emerging as a leader of this faction and exerting
its influence to a certain extent over Bolivia and Colombia.

The US is thus left with solid support from Mexico, Venezuela,
Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic cunong the Spanish-
speaking countries. Continued backing for US initiatives
from the English speaking Caribbean appears to be tenuous at
best and may, in the long run, be contingent on how forthcoming
Washington is in providing economic assistance.

UNCLASSIFIED

21 .

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tamoff) to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, July 19, 1977

1 Source; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of
Information/Legal, Box 25, Latin America, 2/68-12/78. Confidential. Pastor forwarded the
memorandum and attachment under a July 20 covering memorandum to Thornton, Tuchman,
Denend, Hormats, and Huberman. (Ibid.)

UNCLASSIFIED

r

s/s 7718938

mio

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Wtshincton, O.C. 30S20

July 19, 1977

GONFIDBNfTHa r

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Follow-up to President Carter's Pan American
Day Speech and Mrs. Carter's Trip,

i

The attached Memorandum was prepared on an inter-
agency basis under the chairmanship of the Bureau of
Int^r-American Affairs in response to various National
Security Council requests.

The Memorandum provides;

— an assessment of what we have accomplished so far;

— the approach we propose to further our objectives
in major policy areas;

— the status of key program elements in each area;
and

— certain issues on which we would particularly
welcome the President's further guidance.

As stated.

CONFIDENT lAb
GDS

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by John Fitzpatrick,

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UNCLASSIFIED

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State
Washington, undated

UNCLASSIFIED

THE PRESIDENT'S LATIN AMERICAN INITIATIVES:
Initial Assessment and Follow-up Strategy.

A precedent-setting OAS General Assembly and
Mrs. Carter's success have confirmed the new directions
the President set forth on Pan American Day.

We now have hard evidence that human rights concerns
have genuine support in Latin America — from a number of
governments as well as from many ordinary citizens.

To consolidate that support will require sustained
action and progress on some intractable underlying issues.

This memorandum reviews our evolving strategy to
give practical effect to the President's statements,
summarizes activities underway on major issues, and requests
policy guidance on some key choices.

The OAS General Assembly

At Grenada in June:

A new issue - human rights - dominated debate.

— After years of fighting alone on major issues
against a united front of other members, this
time half of Latin America, including the entire
Caribbean, lined up with us.

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— Our key resolution, which commended the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission and proposed
steps to facilitate its work, passed undiluted
with the backing of thirteen other governments.

The politics of success were delicate.

— Our coalition was difficult to assemble. The
Secretary of State met with eighteen Foreign
Ministers. Our USOAS delegation had to work
well and hard tO' the last.

— Opposition was strong and concentrated. Led
by Uruguay and Chile, and behind the scenes
by Brazil, the Southern Cone was backed by
most Central American states, and fell only
two votes short of blocking our resolution.

— Mrs. Carter’s trip was almost certainly

decisive in obtaining the support from Peru
and Ecuador that proved critical.

Latin American solidarity has broken over the human
rights issue. But there are disadvantages as well as
advantages ;

— The unconvinced, Brazil and Argentina in parti-
cular, have the power to hamper us in important
ways .

— Our human rights policy cannot be fully successful
unless we succeed in reaching countries where
major abuses exist. This will take time, skill,
persistence and patience.

Our conclusion is that we have made a major step
forward in obtaining regional support for human rights. The
direction is set, and set well. But we still have a
long way to go. We must now keep our coalition together
and find ways of broadening it.

The Months Ahead

The support we received for the aspect of human rights
we stress most — individual freedom — came from conviction.
This conviction, however, included. the expectation we
would also support the aspect of human rights emphasized
most in Latin culture — socio-economic well being.

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The Grenada Assembly put us clearly on notice that
we cannot escape the economic dimensions of human rights.
Our resolution on protecting the sanctity of the person
received one vote more than an absolute majority — but
a Colombian resolution calling for promotion of human
rights through economic cooperation was carried by
acclamation.

Giving substance to the President's new directions
from now on will require action more than rhetoric.
Progress on economic issues will be critical to allay
fears that we are defining human rights narrowly to
divert attention from basic North-South issues of
growth and equity.

Starting from a far lower base than we do, and less
able to cope with escalating oil and other import costs,
many nations of Latin America face a cruel -choice between
cutting deeply into economic growth — and thus the social
change it facilitates — and incurring increasingly
heavy external debt to sustain more moderate growth
levels. Like most other developing countries, they are-
not looking for handouts, but for ways to develop
effectively and in an ultimately self-sustaining fashion.

In moving ahead, we cannot return to a "special
relationship" with Latin America. Rather, we must apply
global policies with the kind of attention, effort and
individual sensitivity that will enable us to sustain
our current hemispheric coalition and give us some
meaningful chance for progress with the others.

Promoting Huiaan Rights

The development and application of our global human
rights policy, now under review in PRM-28, is a case in
point. One of its major dilemmas is sharply defined in
this hemisphere. It is: , . . rv. v-

OSCa. -TO

How can we best promo to- human rights
in those countries whose governments
have poor human rights records?

Attitudes toward this issue are as complex and
sensitive as the issue itself. In fact, the issue
presents a recurring dilemma more than a general
policy choice, for country specific criteria and
interests other than human rights have to be weighed
each time we move from abstract premises to decisions
on particular cases.

CONFIDENTIAL

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The President should be aware, however, that two
aspects of this issue have recently aroused considerable
debate and have serious implications for how many
Latin American governments will evaluate and react
to our initiatives on human rights.

The first is how .to help meet basic human
needs without endorsing a government's repressive
practices. We have to be careful not to appear to
be so rigid on political rights that we appear to
deny pressing socio-economic rights.

— The second is how to use available executive
discretion on military relationships, and specifically
whether to reduce further our already declining military
ties in countries where repressive military regimes are
in power. The pivotal role of military officers and
the uniformed services in the domestic and foreign affairs
of most Latin American countries — - and our own interest
in regional peace and cooperation — make the necessary
introduction of human rights conce.rns into our military
relationships a particularly sensitive issue.

In sum, just as we must seek to balance political and
socio-economic human rights, so we must weigh the appear-
ance of implicit support for repressive military acts
against the possibility of influencing military institu-
tions on a wide range of matters, perhaps including human
rights as well as regional tensions.

These two issues highlight a more general problem.

We have found it easier thus far to deny assistance on
human rights grounds than to provide it. Clearly, we
increasingly need to find ways of engaging individual
countries, including both governments and private groups,
in positive activities that recognize good performance
and stimulate improvements in human rights conditions.

In the weeks and months ahead we intend to explore
ways in which all available policy instruments can be
used, in all countries, to actively promote our funda-
mental commitment to human rights and peace. We need
carrots as well as sticks for the long haul ahead.

We believe this approach is the surest way to achieve
our objectives and would welcome the President's thoughts
on this matter as we move into a more active phase.

^ OWFIDEHTIAL

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CONriDCNg jBMr

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Action Areas

Tabs 1 through 10, prepared on the basis of extensive
inter-agency deliberations, summarize our approach and
action program by issue.

In addition to specific comments the President may wish
to make on individual items in the tabs, his sense of
priorities — and in some cases guidance — would
be particularly useful to us on the following:

1. Consultations (Tab 1)

In this critical area, we are acting to:

A. Embark upon a major program of visits by senior
officials to Latin America; and

B. Establish an inter-agency coordinating procedure,
under the Department of State, to assure that
these visits and contacts are mutually supportive
of overall Administration policy objectives.

il. Human Rights (Tab 2)

Assistant Secretary Todman cabled basic guidance to
all our Embassies in Latin America on June 17. Human
Rights Evaluation Reports, spelling out short and long
term strategies for every Latin American country, are
in preparation.

‘ We are acting now to:

A. Use our voice and vote in the international
financial institutions in support of human
rights objectives.

B. Strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission, possibly including visits to
Paraguay, Haiti, and other countries — and
to the U.S.

C. Intensify consultations with like-minded
hemispheric states on means to improve com-
pliance in offending states.

D. Explain, and mobilize support for, our human
rights policy among religious, business,
professional and ethnic communities in the U.S.

III. Economic Issues (Tab 3)

In this key area, we plan to;

CONFIDEHTIAL

CQW P IDENTIA tr

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A. Urge agencies to continue to use every appropriate
occasion to press both developed and developing
countries to adopt forthcoming postures on

trade issues in the MTN.

B. Assure that Administration studies now underway
on assistance 'policy r IMF facilities and inter-
national financial institutions clearly focus
on two questions essential to our relations
with the LDCs:

— the extent to which the U.S. should provide,
or support, more "fast disbursing, balance
of payments assistance" and which bilateral
or multilateral instruments we should use for
this purpose.

— the desirability of more flexible criteria and
conditions on the part of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in using its facilities,
particularly the anticipated $10 billion new
Witteveen facility, in assisting deveioprng
and other countries with balance of payments
difficulties.

IV. Cultural Affairs (Tab 4)

We strongly recommend that the President approve in
principle the development of a significantly expanded
high-visibility cultural exchange program reflecting
our emphases on human rights and on the role of the
individual citizen in foreign affairs. This effort
would require a supplemental appropriation for Fy-78
(of $6 to 7 million), and sustained increased funding
in future years. If the President agrees, we would conduct
further feasibility analyses and prepare submissions
for 0MB review.

V. Science and Technology (Tab 5)

’ We recommend that the President consider an expanded S&T
program for Latin America. Some of the benefits are
long range, possibly difficult to justify to the Congress
and relatively expensive; nevertheless, they are of
considerable interest and potential usefulness. Our
top priorities, described in more detail in Tab 5,
are:

A Technology Cooperation Package ($10-20 million
per year)

Remote Sensing Projects ($15-20 million per year)
. CONFIDENTIAL

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COHFIDCMyiftL-

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Advance Communications Technology

($20-25 million per year)

The President's general guidance on priorities and
possible funding would allow us to develop further feasibility
analyses and prepare submissions for 0MB review.

VI. Other Major Issues

Additional topics for review and guidance include;

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Tab 6
Conventional Security Issues Tab 7
Terrorism Tab 8
Narcotics Tab 9

Finally, Tab 10 gives a status report on those items
raised with Mrs. Carter not covered elsewhere.

Follow-up Procedures

We have established inter-agency working groups to
ensure that the initiatives taken in support of your April 14
speech are developed and implemented in a coordinated manner.

We will when necessary provide reports on progress achieved
and decisions required on individual is.sues. Reports already
planned or requested are listed in the tabs.

We are also beginning reviews of policy toward two
major subregional areas.

(1) The Caribbean — where sound development initiatives .
are required to promote human rights, sustain
democracy, and help manage the mini-state problem;
and

(2) The Southern Cone — whose countries are of fund-
amental Importance to us on human rights and nuclear
transfer issues and in the regional balance generally.

In summary, we have taken the initiative in Latin
America. And the inter-agency participation in the
follow-up process (listed in Tab 11) demonstrates that we
are beginning to coordinate in ways that will sustain
the momentum.

Attachments ;

1 - Consultations

CONFIDENTIAL

# %

2 - Human Rights

3 - Economic Issues

4 - Cultural Initiatives

5 - Science and Technology Initiatives

6 - Nuclear Non-Proliferation

7 - Conventional Security Issues

8 - Terrorism

9 - Narcotics

10 - Other items raised with Mrs. Carter

11 - Inter-agency Participation

UNCLASSIFIED

22 .

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter

Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 47,
Latin America: Bilateral Meetings Decision Memoranda, 9/77. Confidential. On a different copy,
the memorandum is dated August 31, 1977. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff
Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 65, Territorial Disputes, 4/77-12/78)

UNCLASSIFIED

- OQWFfB E W ' H A L -

MEMORANDUM

COHFID[HTItL

THE WHITE ^OUSE

WASHINGTON

u

MEMORANDUM FOR;
FROM:

THE PRESIDENT
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Peace-Keeping

[Omitted here are sections on El SaivklprrHpndums and Belize-Guatemala, which are scheduled
for publication in Foreign Relation, 1977-1980, Vol. XV, Central America]

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2

3. The Andes

There are three distinct though closely related issues subsumed
within State's paper on "Disputes in the Andes": (a) Bolivia's desire
for access to the sea; (b) reducing tension and military expenditures in
the region: and (c) Ecuador's quest for access to the Amazon. ^ Tjt.*?

(a) Access to the Sea

It is true, as State suggests, that Perez's support for Bolivia's
desire for access to the sea as the only way to solve the security
problem in the Andes is simplistic; there is more to the problem
than that. But resolution of Bolivia's long-standing grievance
would go a long way toward reducing tension in the area.

The key to this problem and to the other two is Peru, and that is
why we have scheduled your bilateral with Morales Bermudez first
among the major Andean countries . If Morales could be persuaded

GONFIDEfJTIAfc

OOMFIDENTIAIt

COIfiDEN M:

of the need for a mediation effort, and at the same time, learnof
ovir deep interest in seeing this dispute and that of Ecuador
(Amazon) resolved peacefully, then I think the probability of
reaching such a settlement would have increased quite dramatically .
Since Peru and most other Latin American countries have
recognized the legitimacy, at least in principle, of Bolivia's claim,
it would not hurt, and may be positively catalytic, if you told
Morales that you too considered Bolivia's drceim to be a fair and
legitimate one.

You may also want to subtly explore his reaction to having Perez
or his representative serve as m ediat or , and perhaps also esqjlore
Perez's proposal of developing and ^-militarizing the border
area. It's a sound approach which awaits someone's initiative, and
the U.S . may want to take it. Most countries in the region are now
very receptive to U.S. leadership. NSC therefore recommends a
variation on Option #2 .

(b) Reducing Tensions in the Area

Again, the key to this issue is Peru. If you could succeed in
extracting a pledge of n on- aggression from Pe ru or a statement that
Peru will not purchase any major new military equipmen t, these
actions would significantly contribute to i^ucing tensions.

Secondly, you might want to explore with Morales and with other
Andean leaders, whether — and if so, how — the U.S . could
contribute to the im plementation of the Av acucho Agreement t o limi t
air ms purchases by the eight Andean countries .

Thirdly, you might want to bring up the magic year - 1979 - the 100th
anniversary of the War of the Pacific, in the context of mentioning
your interest in the peace of the region. You might also want to hint
of an interest in traveling to the region in 1979.

(c) Ecuador: An Amazon Nation

The question of whether Ecuador will ever gain an o utlet to the
Amazon can only be answered by Peru, and they're not talking.
There is really little the U.S. can do here, other than encom ' gt
Peru to take Ecuador's claim more seriously.

nnNFlDEN'H Afc-

rt

UNCLASSIFIED

23.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter

Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File,
Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America 9-12/77. Confidential. Carter initialed the first page of
the memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

GONFIDENT tAb-

MEMORANDUM CONFIDENTI AL“

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHSah}
Stv -h

MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:

THE PRESIDENT

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Nineteen Bilaterals: The Significance of the

Treaty Signing for Inter- American Relations

Your decision to meet, with all fiie Heads of State who would attend the
signing ceramony was made to assure a good attendance. However,
nineteen bilaterals provide not only a show of support, but also a luiique
opportunity to make genuine progress on a number of important issues .

Never be&re have so many American Heads of State journeyed at one
time to Washington. (Coinddentadly, about 20 Heads of State went to
Panama in 1956 on the occasion of the 13.0th anniversary of the First
Panama Congress, and President Johnson met with 18 Latin American
President at Punta del Este in 1967 to disciiss the Alliance for Progress . )
In spite of the short notice and die problems each leader had in planning
for his meeting, many of the Latin American leadeirs are rushing to use
this unique opportunity to press certain multilateral problems closer
to resolution. Intelligence reports indicate that:

— Chile is trying to set up separate meetings with Peru and
Bolivia to discuss Bolivia's request for a corridor to the
sea and other matters .

— BoUvian President Banzer has requested that you meet with
him and with file Presidents of Peru and Chile to discuss the
question of access to the sea for Bolivia. G^hile we have
gently told him that such a quadri-lateral was not likely, we
have scheduled your meetings in such a way that would
permit it to occur if it looked as if it might be fruitful . Among
the three, Peru is the key, and you will be meeting with
Morales Bermudez first. If some progress is made with him,
then the chances are good that Pinochet, whom you will be

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meeting with next, will accept that. Then you might want to
consider inviting diose two lea ders to sit in on part of your
meeting with Banzer on Thursday}#

' Probably as part of a strategy to increase Chile's international

contacts , Pinochet has also requested a meeting with Argentine
President Videla to discuss the simmering border dispute in
the Beagle Channel , and he is trying to solicit the support of
Oduber and Perez for an inter- American conference of Latin
Chiefs of State to increase their influence in international
politics .

— Morales Bermudez has organized a meeting of the Presidents
of the Andean Pact countries (Venezuela^ Colombia, Ecuador,
and Bolivia) to try to resolve current problems (on
allocation of industries) , invigorate the organization, and
ejqiress strong support for the importance of regional
economic integration. (Our Ambassador in Lima suggests
that you use the opportunity of the meeting to issue a strong
statement supporting Latin American economic integration ,
and I agree that such a statement would be well received,
particularly since Perez, for example, still believes that we

are antagoxiistic to Latin American efforts at integration)

%

The good atmosphere g^erated by the signing ceremony covild conceivably
transform the flurry of multilateral activity into some concrete results . Ot
course, the reason why so many leaders are attending is not so much because
they want to help us on the Canal Treaty but because they want us to help
them on one issue or another. This is particularly the case with the
Southern Cone cotintries of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay, who
will want to explain the "real situation of siibversion" in their countries so
that we can better understand the harsh measures which they have taken.

From the perspective of U.S. interests there are several objectives which
can conceivably be achieved in the next few days and which would make the
19 bilaterals worth the effort. Our goals include;

(1) Peace-Keeping

(a) Bolivean Access . This is one of the most difficult and
long-standing boundary disputes in the Hemisphere; it is also
the most important since the problem of Bolivian access goes to

OONFlDENTrAh

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cariDOiTHL

the heart of the question, how can tensions in the region be
reduced? A strategy will be suggested below, but our goals
should be to escpress our agreement with the principle
accepted, in general, by all interested parties of gaining a
corridor to the sea for Bolivia, and our interest in contributing
to a resolution of the problem .

(b) El Salvador-Honduras . A clearly realizable goal is to
try to obtain from Salvadorean President Romero a public
assturance that his country would soon ratify the mediation
agreement.

(c) Guatemala-Belize . If President Laugerud acknowledged
that he had spoken to President Carter about the Belize issue
and had agreed that a quick resolution of the dispute on terms
agreeable to both Guatemala, Great Britain and Belize, was a
shared goal of the U.S . and Guatemala, that would be a
significant advance .

- C2) Human Rights

■The Southern Cone leaders will need to hear directly from you
of your commitment to human rights, yoiur willingness to
recognize real improvements (as opposed to announcement of
intention), and your preference for pursuing U.S . policy
. through a multilateral mechanism (e.g. , the Inter- American
Commission on Human Rights) .

(3) Caribbean Cooperation •

If you could reach a consensus with the leaders of the Caribbean

i .7 - ^ ..basin on the following points, then we could develop the policy

"cl::: v: in greater detail: "

~ The need to approach the problems of the region on a
comprehensive basis, involving multilaterad cooperation
on both the donor and the recipient ends .

The comprehensive approach should involve the sharing
of the burden of assistance. The burden-sharing fbrmtila
and the balance between bilateral and multilateral
r lie worked out in consultations between

donors and recipients .

-r The overall objectives of the program should be to promote
more economic integration among the English-speaking
countries, closer collaboration between them and such

OONFIDEimAL

OOMFIDEMTIAfc - 4

CONriDCNT I- AL -

other countries as Haiti and the Dominican R^ublic. and
closer cooperation between them and countries such as
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, the U.S and Canada.

— A meeting held at the World Bank, co-sponsored by the
Bank, the Inter- American Development Bank, and the
Caribbean Development Bank, and involving selected
representatives from the area , should be held to decide
how best to proceed in this comprehensive development
effort.

Strategy for Day 1 ; Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, and Chile

Rather than duplicate the points made in the brie^fing papers , let me just
focus on one issue — Bolivian acc&s to the sea/^ and suggest a strategy
£or the first day for pursuing our objectives in this issue. Our objectives
include: (1) reducing tensions in the area; (2) hoping Bolivia get
access to the sea a very popular international cause: (3) using the
resulting corridor as a kind of "cordon sanitaire" |o deter Peru firom any
possible aggression;" and (4) racouraging cooperation among the three
countries in the area.

In December 1975,. die Chileans made a secret offer to Bolivia of a 10 km.
strip of land, which gave Bolivia access to the sea but did not include an
area for a possible seaport (see Tab A) . In exchange, Chile asked for
some water rights and a similar amount of Bolivian territory . It is
obvious that Chile's major goal was to cultivate an alliance with Bolivia
against Peru and improve her security by constructing a "cordon
sanitaire." Bolivia, however, wants the corridor to include the port of
Arica and is opposed to giving any territory to Chile or to Peru.

By the Treaty of 1929, Chile cannot dispose of territory formerly owned by
Peru without Peru's consent. When confronted with the Chilean offer.

O O WFlDENTIA fr

OON^DE^^TlAI r^ 5

comiBW h-

Peru counter-proposed that Chile give the strip of land with a joint ,
Peruvian-Chilean-Boliviauj condominium zone at the Pacific end of the
corridor as well as a trinational port authority in Arica. Chile ixiunediately
rejected the proposal* as Pezv had probably guessed it would.

The key to a settlement is Peru, which probably has not yet given up its
hopes of reconquering the territory it lost in the War of the Pacific 100
years ago. Peru publicly sx:^ports Bolivia's claim, btzt its proposal was
so unrealistic that one can infer that it is not eager to settle .

A respectable compromise proposal might include the 10 km . corridor which
leads into a neutrsd free port at Arica. But we probably want to avoid
suggesting a proposal as specific as fiiat.

We are, however, in a position to exercise considerable influence.

Morales Bermudez sent you a long letter on August 27& with a rather
detailed analysis of the J’eruvian description of a proposed

fiscal program. He has said that he considers your meeting of "great
significance" and contrasts that with your other meetings . which he
described as "protocolary.” He has come to ask for your support in
getting an IMF stand-by loan, and believes U.S . support is determining
since in his mind we totally dominate file IMP. You might tell him that
Us observation is incorrect; the IMF is an international organization, and
we are only one -- albeit, a most powerful one, member. Since Morales'
economic program is quite sound, and he will probably obtain the kind of
stqiport hb needs even without our help, you might want to subtly link the
IMF issue to our concern over the corridor.

Cto the IMF issue, you might wamt to say that you luiderstand that
Secretary Blumenthal will be meeting with President Morales Bermudez,
that you look sympathetically on Peru's great conceam, and that you will
ask our representative to the IMF to convey our assessment of the
'sitiiation and our concerns for Peru . On the other hand , the IMF is not
our organization, but an international one. On the Bolivian access issue,
you might want to offer our good offices alone or wifii Venezuela.

If the Peruvians respond positively, you will want to discuss this issue
with Pinochet, although you will probably want to devote much of the
time to human rights .

CX)NCTDENTIAt 7

UNCLASSIFIED

24.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter

Washington, October 28, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File,
Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America, 9-12/77. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the
memorandum. Carter wrote, “Zbig — ok — except Bolivia — The verbiage is excessive. Did
Fallows ok them? (3 or 4 T was pleased’ in Suarez letter) JC.”

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDLM

- ee?IFH>BNTlAB —

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:

SUBJECT:

t5f

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

e^U^Sfi/e

October Z8

6621 . ^ Si.' ■"/ ' '

THE PRESIDENT
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Follow-Up Letters to Your Bilaterals
With Latin American Leaders

The memoranda of your eighteen conversations with Latin American
leaders during the Canal Treaty signing have just been completed.

For a number of your bilaterals. State and NSC felt it would be very
useful for you to follow up your conversations with letters which con-
firm the commitments made during the meeting and xuider score areas
where we have a continuing interest.

In certain cases — for example, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay — our
intelligence indicates that their Presidents may have gained an inaccurate
impression of your concern about human rights. Apparently Pinochet,

Stroessner, and Mendez felt that you were in agreement with them that
their countries were victims of politically-motivated and inaccurate pro-
paganda, and that the human rights policy which is being implemented in
your name does not really reflect your views. No doubt this may be
a result of wishful thinking on their part. Nevertheless, our Ambassadors
in the field. State, and NSC believe it would be useful for you to re- state
clearly your contiuumg commitment in this area.

Since the drafting of these letters had begun, you have received letters
from the Presidents of Argentina, Chile, and Peru, and we have included "

references in your letters. The letter from President Videla was de-
livered directly to the White House on October 18, and it refers to the ^

Deutsch case which you raised with him. '

There are a nximber of specific commitments made or repeated in the

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

Issues Or Points Which Are Noted In The Letters

1. While not deciding to invite representatives from human
rights organizations, Videla did say that he was not troubled by such
visits. Your letter repeats that point.

2 . Argentina and Chile are involved in an effort to try to curb

or prohibit the activities of non-governmental organizations particu-
larly hvuman rights groups ^ at the United Nations. '

3. Videla said that he hoped the problem of people being detained
by the emergency laws would be resolved by the end of the year. Your

mentioning this point will add an additional incentive for him to do it.

4. With regard to Videla‘'s statement that Argentina would ratify
Tlatelolco when the political timing was opportune, which he hoped would
be by the end of the year, there may have been some misinterpretation.
The Argentines are reported to believe that he only said that he would
"consider” the possibility of ratification at the proper time. Nonetheless,
we believe that it would be helpful to re-state our interpretation of his
statement so as to insure his awareness of our continuing concern on that
issue.

Bolivia

1. Your letter reiterates the continued interest of the U. S. in
the peaceful settlement of the problems related to Bolivia’s desire to
achieve access to the sea.

2. It states U. S. continued support for integration in Latin
America by congratulating him on the new Andean Pact agreement on the
automotive industry.

3. Most importantly, it reminds Banzer that he promised you to
give priority attention to seeking the release of those American prisoners
whose circumstances warrant special treatment. We have already given
the Bolivians the list of names.

CONriDENTlAir

Chile

1. The letter states that "friendly and close relations" between
the U. S. and Chile can only occur if there is increased evidence of
improvements in the human rights situation in Chile.

Z. On the question whether Chile would permit two UN human rights
observers to visit, the Chileans are currently negotiating with the United
Nations, and both parties may have some problems in agreeing to the pro-
cedures which Chile requires for their visit. We believe that Pinochet
promised to permit two UN observers to visit provided they do so "without
publicity" and meet with Pinochet before returning to the UN. The Chileans
(would like to) believe that they agreed to such a visit only "under certain
circumstances, " which might include comparable visits by the UN to Cuba
and the Soviet Union. Similarly, Pinochet worked out an agreement with
the UN on providing a report on the people who "disappeared, '* but his
report is not considered satisfactory. Your note of continued interest in
both matters should help.

3. Finally, you note Pinochet's pledge to bring “Tlatololco into
effect if Argentina ratifies the treaty.

Paragxiay

1. Stroessner's pledge to receive the Inter -American Commission
on Human Rights if they desire such a visit is noted, and you add that
U. S. officials would also like to meet with Paraguayan officials "should
that be helpful. "

On the loans from the Inter -American Bank and A, I. D, , you
re-state decisions which were made by the Christopher Committee 'to
approve a number of loans for the needy in recognition of Paraguay's
decision to permit a visit of the lACHR, but others are withheld until
the visit, in fact, occurs.

Peru

1. You repeat your interest in the Bolivian corridor issue, the
Ecuador ean-Amaz on issue, the limiting of arms purchases, and your
hope for the continued success of Andean integration. Morales needs to

COrfFIDENTIA -fr

hear of your interest in the first three, and will be glad to hear of the
fourth. I

2. You reiterate U. S. interest in Peru's economic difficulties,
and mention your hope that we can help Peru in obtaining food assistance.
This is currently under review, but our expectation is that we will be able
to give $5-10 million of food assistance.

1. You state the difficulty because of human rights considerations of
having close relations with Uruguay.

2. Mendez's assurance of removing the "special security authority"
and establishing an information commission, which will hopefully cooperate
with our embassy, are good decisions which necessitate the comment in
the letter.

3. You repeat your hope that Uruguay will invite a human rights
commission.

* ♦ # # ^5

These letters were coordinated and drafted by State and NSC, and cleared
by Jim Fallows.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

UNCLASSIFIED

25.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, January 30, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 11,
President, Latin America and Africa, 3/28/78-4/3/78: 10/7/77-1/31/78. Confidential. Sent for
action. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, “RP, give me a revised memo to Jim
Schl (copy to Vance) urging once more the Ven. talks. If he doesn’t react (and pt. out that I wrote
earlier) I will go to the P. ZB.” Inderfurth also initialed the first page of the memorandum. In a
January 24 memorandum to Pastor and Richardson, Brzezinski wrote, “With reference to the
forthcoming trip, I think it is extremely important that we now develop plans for specific and
concrete actions which could be associated with the trip: agreements to be signed, initiatives to
announce, joint statements, etc. Please develop an initial scenario and consult with me within a
week.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject
Files, Box 63, President’s Visit to Brazil and Venezuela [3/78], 1-5/78)

UNCLASSIFIED

i ‘‘006 Redo

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 30, 1978

ACTION

FROM:

SUBJECT:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

ROBERT PASTOR

*The President's Trip

Countries Selected

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ^

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT: ^^The President's Trip ^

Countries Selected ^ ^

V

Obviously, the first questions that need to be addressed in drawing up sceneurios ^ ,
for the President's trip are: (1) Which countries will he visit? and (2) How
much time will he spend in each country? ^

First of all, let me repeat the point that I think a stop in Trinidad and Tobago \
is very important 4 (Ul '•

1/1 '

— to show that we are not lumping the Caribbean into Latin America as
we have done in the past,

— to try to gain the cooperation of a very important leader in the Caribbean
which has resources as a donor, and

— to show a balance in our approaich to the Caribbean between Manley on
the one side and Williams of Trinidad on the other .

I understand that Secretary Vance agrees on the importance of putting a stop
in Trinidad on the trip .

Of importance, but secondary compared to a stop in Trinidad, would be a
second stop in Brazil to Sao Paulo, the center of Brazil's business and intel-
lectual life and a city which symbolizes the ferment and political dynamism
of Brazil in a most interesting period of transition.

In addition, you may want to resist two temptations as you consider the
schedule. First, there may be an attempt to make a "Latin America only
trip" and do Africa in the summer . I think this would be a mistake. Right
now, we are trying to encourage Latin American leaders to get involved in

ADP Declassification Review

DECU\SSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

I:O^TFmB^TTIA^=

(

international politics, particTilarly African politics ^ A trip only to Latin
America might tempt us into the rhetoric of the "special relationship" while
a trip that includes Africa will give him the opportunity* to make points about
global interdependence, die North-South dialogue, and "constructive" links
between Africa and Latin America.

I understand that some consideration is being given to doing the Africa portion
after the Summit in the summer. I think that is Ihe time for him to do his travel-
ling in the U.S. , campaigning for Congressmen, rather than abroad.

A second temptation might be to begin the trip in Panama to fulfill the President's
pledge of exchanging the instrximents of ratification there . I think such a trip
is an easy and discreet one-day or weekend trip which should occur after ratifi-
cation by the Senate . I think it would be a mistake to make the rest of the trip
contingent on the quidk and easy resoluti.on of the Canal Treaties . 1 know that
the Congressional people believe that we will finish the treaties in February,
but I continue to believe that it will take March and perhaps part of April as
well. I think the trip to Panama should be kept separate. With luck, he ceui do
it in a day before the global trip . Otherwise , afterwards^

VgNEZUlLA

Events

t As originsdly planned, the first major speech on North-South economic issues

* by the President should be made before the Venezuelan Congress . After meeting
witit Perez, ^e President also needs to meet separately with the two leading
Presidential can<£dates — Pinerua Ordaz of Perez' party, Accion Democratica;
Herrerra Campins of COPEI .

Finally, the President should meet briefly with the Venezuelan press., only one
of two entirely free press corps in South America. When I was travelling with
Secretary Vance in November, Pete Vaky took me to t 2 isk on the issue of a press
conference. He said the question we face in Caracas and Brasilia is not whether
to have a press conference, but how it will be handled. Either the press will
stirround the President when he arrives or after meetings — as they did with
Secretary Vance — or it is organized in a way so as to achieve maximum
impact — i.e. , questions on ^the major issues, translation, orderliness,
quiet, and a listening audience when the President answers. I continue to

I believe that a press conference in Brazil is essenti«d and critical, whereas
one in Caracas is just important. I would recommend both, however.

COJIFIDENTIAi r

COOTIDENT iAfc- (

I

3

Issues and Decisions

There are two broad categories of issues for the Perez-Carter discussions:
seeking cooperation from Perez on a variety of international issues and exploring
inodes for cooperating on research and development in alternative energy sources .

Consultations on Globid Issues. As a result of &e President's meeting with
Perez in June and again in September, we have tasked onr Embassy in Caracas
to consult with Venezuela on Tlatelolco and non-proliferation, human rights,
Belize, Bolivian corridor. Southern Africa, and the Caribbean. In each of
these sureas, we need to clearly define our objectives between now and the
trip and then decide how Venezuela can best contribute to those objectives.

If you approve , I will organize a meeting with State and Treasury people to do
that, and will send you a memo on it.

Approve

Disapprove

Energy Cooperation. In June, the President suggested to Perez that we
have Ministerial talks on energy. Since then, Schlesinger has shown little
or no interest in meeting with the Venezuelans in spite of the fact that working-
level groups have defined a full agenda . Provided that someone can persuade
Schlesinger to meet with Venezuelan Minister of Mines Hernandez, there will be
much that the two Presidents can talk about in this area.

Though Schlesinger has postponed the meeting three times , Hernandez has
come back again and asked for a meeting between February 20 andManch 5
(see Tab A) . That's already quite late if we want to use it as a preparatory
meeting for the President's trip. But unless you or fiie President persuade
Schlesinger to meet with Hernandez, I don't think it will ever come off, and we
will have lost an important opportunity . I have orepared a memo for you to
send to the President (Tab I) , but you may prefer to use it as background and
just talk directly with Schlesinger.

RECOMMENDATION:

In the light of Schlesinger 's failure to respond to your memo to him of January 10
(Tab B) , I would recommend that you send the memo to the President first
(Tab I) .

Approve Disapprove

or alternatively, phone Schlesinger directly.

Approve Disapprove

CONFIDEt f F fitt:

CONFIDEN'HAfc '

4

(

In addition , there are two other areas we may want to explore with the
Venezuelans:

Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (TCDC) . An idea
which has attracted a good deal of interest at the UN is to build scientific
research centers in middle-income developing countries, like Venezuela and
Brazil, to develop intermediate or ’’appropriate" technology for LDCs. In
addition to helping develop technology which is more labor-intensive and thus
better-suited to their needs , this program woiild help to create horizontal
linkages among developing coiuitries , permitting them to relate to one another
directly raflier than through industrialized countries. We could explore ways
to develop such a program in Venezuela (and in Brazil) .

Themes; A Common Responsibility to Help the Poor. One theme, which
was in fiie President's Pan Americein Day speech, but has not yet been elaborated,
is that "all of us have a special responsibility to help the poorest countries in the
world as well as the poorest people in each of our countries . " The stop in
Caracas, the capital of one of the "new rich," seems to be an appropriate place
to restate the commitment, which OPEC must share with the industrialized
countries , to help the poor countries and the poorest people. If you approve, I
will develop this concept a little more fully in the speech .

BRAZIL
Scenario

The single most important event in Brasilia which the President could do is
a press conference. Both Mrs . Carter and Secretary Vance have had receptions
for a broad cross-section of Brazilians , including people who have criticized the
government. The significance of these receptions was lost on the Brazilian
people. On the other hand, Mrs. Carter's press conference was the event which
made her stop in Brasilia so successful .

In addition to meeting with Geisel, the President should also meet briefly with
General Figueiredo, Geisel's appointed successor, and also with Magalhaes
Pinto, the first civilian of the post-1964 period to seek the Presidency. 1 think
the meeting with Figueiredo would be important since he is likely to be the
President from March 1979-1985. The meeting with Magalhaes will be of
enormous symbolic importance, underlining our interest in continued liber-
alization wifiiout being unduly provocative .

The President may also want to give a short speech on the role of law in the
Brazilian Congress ;

CONFIDENTIAL -

I

•,V -yuAt, y

Approve

Disapprove

5

I would also recommend a short stop in Sao Paulo to meet with Cardinal Arns
and with representatives of business, labor, professionals, and academe.
Given the traditional independence of "Paulistas" , you may want to consider
scheduling a small seminar of people like Fernando Henrique Cardoso and
Helio Jaguaribe to discuss Brazil's future. Even if the President didn't
participate, I believe you and Secretary Vance could really profit and would
definitely enjoy such a discussion.

Issues

I am ctirrently working with S/P in State on a proposal for US-Brazilian coopera-
tion in non-nuclear energy research and developmentj and we shovild have a
draft by the end of the week . This is one area we may be able to make some
progress .

State is currently trying to decide whether to issue a hxunan rights report for
Brazil because of OPIC. Given Brazil's open and strong distaste with these
reports — leading to their renunciation of the US-Brazilian military agreement,
I believe it would be a disaster to release such a report and woxild probably
expose our investments to possible arbitrary action. I understand that

Christopher is considering the decision at this time, and
phone him on this .

Cub a's^ presence in Africa is another subject for discussion. I am taskingH
an update on Brazil's policy toward Africa as a wav to probe for the
best approach to them .

sK/* Sap'S.

Wc Wr^» -U CaU *

UNCLASSIFIED

26.

Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs (Todman)
New York, February 14, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 84D241, Human Rights. No classification marking. Todman
spoke before members of the Center for Inter-American Relations.

UNCLASSIFIED

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY
PURPOSES AND PROSPECTS

ADDRESS BY
TERENCE A. TODMAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

CENTER FOR INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS
NEW YORK

February 14, 1978

I am pleased and honored to be here at the Center
for Inter-American Relations, which plays such a unique
and respected role in the life of this hemisphere. As
analysts and in many cases participants in the policy
process, you know that ^^decis ions are not made in a
vacuum. In fact, the policy process at its best is
based upon the creative interaction of public officials,
outside intellectuals, businessmen, and other community
♦members. Your contributions are invaluable; I greatly
appreciate this opportunity to share my own thoughts with
you .

This evening, I would like to discuss how I see the
evolution of our relations v/ith the peoples and govern-
ments of Latin America. My purpose, frankly, is to
gain your support for what President Carter last April
referred to as our need to "awake our institutions to
a changing world".

: of Basic Relationships

Since World War II, a succession of Administrations
jKave ^ acTtnowledged the importance of Latin America to the
United States, and sought policies that would adequately
reflect that importance* The results,, however, have
often been frustrating. Friends of the United States
in Latin America, and serious students of U.S. -Latin
American relations here, remain skeptical that American
policy truly reflects either the region's importance or
the many and varied interrelationships between our country
hnd Latin America.

President Carter came to office convinced that, if
our behavior toward Latin America and the Caribbean
reflects the values and priorities of the American people,,
it V70uld then be possible to look to a new era of coopera-
tion in this hemisphere. This Administration has not yet

- 2 -

dispelled the skepticism of the past. Indeed, because
the prevailing frustrations are frequently rooted in
our societies themselves , they cannot be resolved by
. governments alone.

Clearly, however, the traditional environment of
hemispheric relations has already changed fundamentally
in recent years. Traditional security concerns have
yielded to new human rights and trade issues. At
the same time, what was once unchallenged U.S. dominance
has evolved into a growing interdependence.

Latin American nations have grown in population,
economic weight and political power. The trade among
us provides a major market for U.S. exports and supplies
us with key imports. The countries of Latin America
and the Caribbean bring leadership and voting strength
to international forums.

I

t In sum, the other countries of the hemisphere affect

us increasingly — and they knov/ it. Having seen simi-
lar changes occur in Africa and Asia, I know that the
new self-confidence of Third VJorld leaders will require
readjustments on our part. But I also believe it
creates an opportunity for more mature and healthy rela-
tionships .

These shifts in global priorities and power have
also brought foreign policy issues into the everyday
lives of ordinary citizens, affecting their pocketbooks
and their consciences. Increasingly, people are

by 'foreign events, not

‘ Buit: as workers and consumers — as

coffee drinkers and car drivers.

These shifts are healthy for our relations with
Latin America. The importance of Latin America to the
United States has begun to make sense to the average
American. And I believe this growing public conscious-
ness offers the best hope in decades for developing a
consistent framework for addressing issues that really
matter.

The new awareness challenges us to move beyond a
preoccupation with government activities alone, and
to develop a foreign policy for Latin America that has
both public support and community involvement.

What do we consider to be the nature of such a
policy? First, it must speak to Americans where they
live.

-3-

-.uv

Events in Latin America and the Caribbean directly
affect American communities. -The strong ties between
our peoples are growing. Black and Hispanic citizens
in our communities are often linked by families and
friendships to the Caribbean and Latin America. The
Western Hemisphere, in fact, is unique in that the
drama of its recent history has been played out not
in the movement of armies or diplomats, but in the
mass movements of ordinary people. Each year millions
of U.S. citizens visit Mexico and the Caribbean nations,
coming back with lasting impressions and leaving a pro-
found imprint on the societies they visit. American
communities in turn feel the influx of several million
immigrants, most of whom come from Mexico and the .
Caribbean . ,

The importance of good hemispheric relations is
also brought home by our growing energy needs. Latin
^erica supplies 17% of our imported oil. Our dependence
on our neighbors for energy, including natural gas, is
* likely to increase.

Even narcotics have become a major aspect of foreign
affairs; the street value of narcotics -from Latin
America in the U.S. is said to be over $4 billion a
year; their traffic darkens millions of lives and
erodes thousands of communities .

. speak to Americans

wfa^re they work .

In the last ten years, our exports to Latin
America have more than tripled, from $5 billion to al-
most $18 billion annually. We now sell more machinery,
consumer goods and chemical products to Latin America
than to the rest of the Third World combined — as
much, in fact, as to the entire Eurppean Common Market j
and more than to Japan. In addition to petroleum,

Latin America, .in turn, supplies us with copper, bauxite,
other key minerals and a growing number of consumer
products. U.S. private investment in the area is $23
billion.

What these statistics mean is that the overall
growth of the U.S. economy and of employment in the
U.S. is, and I believe will increasingly be, influenced
by similar growth in Latin America, and by our relations
with its countries.

Requirements foj; Progress

Moving - to a more community-based policy toward
Latin America will require a major reorientation of
national thinking. It cannot be accomplished over-
night.

For too long the United States has assumed Latin
America could be dealt with as a single, monolithic
region* Too often, we have viewed internal social
and political struggles through a lens that distorted
Latin American realities and recast them in terms of
our own East-West concerns. Too often, we have viewed
Latin American efforts to reform their economies with
suspicion. At our best moments, we have acted as-
champions of Latin American development. At our worst
moments, our resort to militaty intervention has given
credence to Latin American fears that their territorial
integrity had less than our full respect.

* Only rarely have we recognized Latin America for

what it is: a grouping of nations with individual and
distinct goals, aspirations and importance to the world
community — and to us.

During the Administration's first year, we have
come far, I believe,, in recognizing the individuality
. ,gf^hg- ^ Iii an effort to
^^^^pW^®ow^®^®hHtriWTbetter~and to increase coramuni
cation, I have visited every nation in the region and
met with a broad cross section of leaders and citizens.
Mrs. Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary Vance,
Secretary Blumenthal, Ambassador Young and other key
Administration leaders have carried the dialogue to
many parts of the hemisphere; We have approached
each country with a readiness to listen and to cooper-
ate whenever we can.

/

The most dramatic example of this direct approach
was the individual meetings President Garter held with
the- hemispheric leaders who . came to Washington last
September to witness the signing of the Panama Canal
Treaties. With each, he took the occasion to listen
to their views and to convey in turn a strong sense
both of our concerns and of our desire for cooperation.

I am convinced that, as a result of these many
direct contacts, hemisphere, leaders share a high degree
of understanding of each other's concerns. The major

-5-

chailenge facing them -r and all of us here tonight —
is to translate that understanding into practical activi-
ties that improve the lives and prospects of ordinary
citizens.

The new Panama Canal Treaties are an important
beginning. They secure the future of the Canal. They
offer the opportunity to put behind us the kind of
one-sided and archaic relationship which the 1903 treaty
epitomized to the whole hemisphere.

U.S. ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties,
which 1 am confident, will take place in the very near
future, will establish more than any words our willing-
ness to deal with others as our sovereign equals, what-
ever their size or relative power.

Ratification will thus confirm a cardinal principle
of the Carter Administration's foreign policy; that
the United States recognizes and is determined to re-
* spect the national sovereignty and independence of
every state .

But non-interveniton alone is hardly a positive
basis upon which to build effective foreign relation-
ships. It is the first stage in a far more complex
process. Having accepted the individuality and sover-
eignty of Latin American countries, we must follow
through wi 4^ of that recog -

fildtions" :

During the past year, we have set in place a
number of building blocks in addition to the new part-
nership with Panama,. We have strengthened our working
relationships with Mexico, Venezuela and many other
countries. Recognizing the importance and needs of the
individual island states of the Caribbean, we have par-
ticipated in the creation of a hew multilateral group
to address the economic problems of the area and to
foster cooperation within the entire Caribbean Basin.

We have accepted that governments will not go
away just because we may not like them. Only govern-
ments can represent a nation's sovereignty in the inter-
national arena; only the people of a country have the
right to determine the nature of their government. Out-
side powers have no choice but to deal with existing
governments — whether they approve of them or not.

- 6 -

With this in n^ind, this Administration has tried
to place our policy toward Cuba in a more rational
context. Our problems with Cuba remain/ but we have
exchanged inflexible hostility for a pragmatic v/illing-
hess to negotiate issues which have some prospect. of
solution. This does not reduce our problems with many
of the Castro Government's policies, especially in
Africa. But, by talking, we have a reasonable frame-
work for dealing with our differences.

ultimately, the challenge is to develop a foreign
policy that responds essentially to human, not just
governmental, concerns. The basic dilemma is as straight
forward to state as it is complex to resolve: how to
encourage respect "for the dignity and freedom of the
individual, the development of democratic institutions,
and the fulfillment of basic human needs without inter -
f ering in a nation's intern ^,] af , an ^_ while ma in-
t ^hina the constructi ve working relations necessar y
to advance all biir BiS S

Promoting human rights is a fundamental tenet and
a cornerstone of this Administration's foreign policy.

It is central to our relations with all nations. I
know that this deep personal conviction of my own, is
profoundly held by the President and the Secretary of
State. . Moreover, because this commitment reflects uni-
versally recogn4.2.e4,..V:4lU^^^^^^^^^ binds us .rather than sep-
■ of this planet. It

On the conscience of all governments to live up
to their sacred obligations. It gives all people
hope for a better future knowing that we stand behind
their aspirations to share in the fullness of life.

That is why w e h ave mad e c^ar to_ all countr ies
that the n ature of~~our relati ons with them wiir"depend
:::gn^i^eir_pragfeicas,.,inli&e7.hww ihTtTtJtng*-

so we are not i nterferi ng in . their^-in£€rHal affa irs ,
b ut J9 elE6t‘miSIng- our own behavior in respo nse t o what
we se e.

And it explains v/hy President Carter's emphasis
Qn human rights _has struck such a responsive chord
throughout this liemisphere and the world.

Our efforts, of course, have done more than spark
people's hopes. They have provoked lively debates both
here and abroad. For us, the ^central issue i s not the
di rection of. our

ment. That is unwavering.- Rathe r ; i t i s. .. h.QH..^..au,3:^.bifeP

Our experiences over the past year have shown
clearly th at we must be careful in the actions w p.
s elect if we^re truly to hel p and not hinder th e
cause pt" promoting human rigHEs anci "alleviating
s uFferin^^ ' "

— We must avoid speaking out before learning
all the facts, or without calculating the
likely reaction and responses to our initia-
tives,

— We must avoid expecting oJ:he r aov-ernment,«f to
a chieve overnight fundamental ch anges .,in,Jbbeir
s ocieti es and practices in "response to our
bidding and without regard to historical cir-
cumstances.

— We must a void assuming that wp> can dpja. 1

without consider-
ing the conseguences"" for' ot^ier aspects of our
relationships.

— We must avoid belie ving that O nly the o pposi ti on
s^.sJ5^--idie_Jtriith.,..,then^HorerBm

but-,±JieL.:±:raith., ^abQ Utj^ in their countr y .

— We must a void presuming to know so much more

that v/e can prescribe actions for them without
bearing any responsibility for the consequences.

— We must avoid punishing the poor and already
victimized by denying them assistance to show
our dissatisfaction with their governments.

— We must avoid pointing to some and not to others .
Select ive morali ty is a contradiction in terms.

— We must avoid condemning an entire government
for every negative act by one of its officials.

-- We must avoid holding entire cou D. t , r . r . RA- up- to
public ridicule and embarrassjBen±.^«.J;£^iSEllng
on"" ^eir * naTio^nar^BI^qnTtv and pride. ' ~

— Finally, we must avoid being so concerned with
declaring the rightness of our course that we
lose sight of our true objective — to alleviate
individual suffering.

Ta ctical mistake s such a s these do hot promote hu man
right s. 'S'a'crTfic' commun'ica'troh and possibT7'’'jLii’i'i'u-

ence* and resurrect old issues of sovereignty and inter-
vention. And they can be avoided through good will,
common sense, compassion and 'careful diplomacy.

- 8 -

While taking care to avoid such mistakes, we will
not by any means retreat into. silence or indifference .

We must proceed on the conviction that I consider
to be the only basis for hope and optimism in our hemi-
spheric relations: that it ^ possible to advance the
rights and meet the basic heeds of individual human
beings while, at the same time, respecting the sover-
eignty of their governments.

We know we are not infallible. We know that we
have faults to correct in our own society. But we
will continue to attempt in every way to associate our-
selves with the promotion of basic individual rights,
the enhancement of political freedom^ and the allevia-
tion of those conditions of suffering that keep entire
social groups at the margin of existence:

— v/e will weigh . all of* our relationships to

t ensure that they contribute, not to the

restriction or denial , but to the promotion
of human rights;

— we v/ill use every possible means of public and
private persuasion to bring an end to abuses
of the person wherever they occur;

— we will work to increase support for inter-
nationally recognized human rights standards

¥ili ’ work with us ;

— we will work with the Organization of American
States and its Inter-American Human Rights
Commission to strengthen regional cooperation
to identify abuses and seek their remedy; and

— we will endeavor to promote the kinds of
economic, social and political development
required to enjoy all the rights recognized by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This last goal, promoting development, poses a
special challenge to our active support for human rights
Under present foreign assistance guidelines, for example
poor people in a generally impoverished country can be
helped; equally poor people in a better off country can-
not. If this pattern continues, by 1980 U.S. bilateral
assistance will be unavailable to most of the countries
of Latin America,

-9-

Vital human rights are at stake- Aggregate GNP
figures fail to reflect the poverty of high infant
mortality, disease > illiteracy and inferior housing.
More than 100 million Latin Americans are forced to
subsist on less than $200 per year.

Assistance policies that cut off help to the poor
because some of their fellow citizens live too, well,
like those that deny, help to the poor because their
governments are repressive, create an ironic paradox:
if we decide to confine our assistance only to those
developing nations that are at once desperately poor
and models of enlightened democracy, we risk crippling
our ability to contribute to socio-economic development
in Latin America.

In the developing world/ the predicament of the
"middle-income" country is often very much. like that
Of the middle-income American taxpayer. And Latin
‘ America is increasingly the region in the middle:
too "rich" to receive aid, not strong enough to
play a decisive role in shaping events.

Without, some degree of outside support in times
of financial dif f iculties ,. even the relatively advanced
developing countries of Latin America will be hindered
in carrying out reforms to narrow the gap between rich
and poor and meet the needs of all their people.

In. the long run, of course, the development issue
is not properly one of assistance as it has been tradi-
tionally defined. At least in this hemisphere, both
sides in the North-South dialogue agree that develop-
ment Both we and the

liltWi^^ffilriMiis l[e^3 expanding markets for exports,
stable prices, and a voice in international economic
decisions. We have made realistic proposals to help
stabilize commodity prices. We have encouraged greater
Utilization of thie Generalized System of Preferences for
developing countries. .

It is true that increased domestic demands for
import protection have increased concern abroad that
hew trade restrictions may limit future growth. However
few petitions for import relief under the Trade Act have
resulted , in actions adversely affecting Latin American
products. Moreover, to regain momentum toward increased

- 10 -

trade/ we are vigorously supporting the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. The Tropical Products Agreement
with Mexico/ worked out in the context of the MTN
this past year, is a model of mutual benefit.

In the last analysis, our ability to pursue a
credible course on the whole range of developmental
and economic issues will depend, not on the intentions
of any one Administration, but on the commitment and
priorities of the American people. The growing impact
of foreign policy on local communities often means
in the short term that domestic and foreign policy
objectives will be perceived to be more sharply in
conflict.

Increasing public understanding of the full impli-
cations of issues such as these is one area where all
of you in this room can be particularly helpful i ■

I This need to increase public understanding of how

foreign policy affects local communities brings me to
the last point I want to discuss with you tonight.

It is the importance of making governmental relation-
ships a coherent part of a much wider spectrum of
cooperative private relations among our societies .

During the past year, we have, of course, continued
to deal with many of the traditional problems of inter-
American relations. For example, to preserve the peace,
we have increased our support for the dispute settlement
efforts of States in Central

' trouble-spots. And we
helve made nuclear non-proliferation and conventional
arms restraint key elements of our hemispheric policy.

Our decision last spring to reverse past policies and
support the Nuclear Free Zone in Latin America and the
Caribbean gives us new credibility in seeking peaceful
nuclear cooperation with other hemispheric nations.

It is nonetheless increasingly apparent that the
nev7 issues. — such as the flow of narcotics — ^ are ones
in which many more citizens have a direct interest
than in the past. To reduce . the narcotics, traffic
that destroys so many young American lives, we have in
recent years sought the cooperatioii# of many Latin American
governments. To ease the human costs of foreign imprison-
ment, we have implemented a prisoner exchange program
with Mexico, and are developing similar programs elsewhere.

- 11 -

To resolve differences over migration, v;e are working
with Mexico to relieve unemployment pressures on both
sides of the border.

As these few examples demonstrate, our society
and those of Latin America now interact in too many
ways for government to monoplize the message. This
trend is increasing. It is foolish to deny it and
Unnecessary to fear it. '

The new challenges are ones that an open, multi-
dimensional society like the United States is best
equipped to meet. And they are challenges I am con-
vinced most Latin Americans are prepared to meet with us.

Already we are seeing many U.S. companies and
multinational enterprises respond to changing realities
in Latin American societies, sometimes faster than
either governments or intellectuals. Most American
businesses abroad now maintain healthy and constructive
* relationships with their host countries, contributing
to the development of the entrepreneurial skills and
productive, activities essential to our mutual well-
being .

It has not been generally noticed, but in provid-
ing for a generation of partnership based on increasing
Panamanian participation in the management of the Canal ,
the new Panama Canal Treaties reflect a practice that
is already widely followed in the inter-American busi-
ness community, where joint ventures and local managers
are increasingly common.

The times call for similar creative and responsible
problem-solving at all levels of our communities. They
call for intellectual dialogue to strengthen common
institutions and to encourage broad-based leadership in
all our societies.

Drawing fully on the hemisphere's basic wealth —
its people — is a major challenge to bur press and
our universities, and to institutions — like this
Center — ^ which already understand that writers like
Borges of Argentina, Fuentes of Mexico and Vargas Llosa
of Peru are also giants of our own culture.

As our own society changes, government too must
awaken. Government can move far beyond present efforts
in facilitating academic, technical and cultural ex-
changes, including in them minorities and other groups

- 12 -

not previously tapped for such programs. It can build
on the many contacts that take place in the v/orld of
business. It can* in sum, help bring the many persons
dedicated to improving.hemispheric relations together
with the even greater numbers dedicated to resolving
local community problems. It is time they met.

I am encouraged to know that 'you will be an •
active partner in that effort.

Thank you very much.

UNCLASSIFIED

27.

Editorial Note

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman’s February 14, 1978,
speech (see Document 26) engendered reaction and commentary from inside the Department of
State, from governments abroad, and from the press.

In a February 17 memorandum for the files. Director of Policy Planning for Public and
Congressional Affairs Luigi Einaudi wrote that the speech was followed by a question-and-
answer (Q&A) session, which the memorandum for the files reconstructed. Questioners asked
Todman about Nicaragua, Brazil, Argentina, Belize, the Beagle Channel, Panama, Cuba, and
Chile. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 84D241, Human Rights) Einaudi’s reconstruction of the
Q&A session was transmitted to all American Republic diplomatic posts as telegram 44242,
February 21 . (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780078-0295)

The Embassies in Managua, Montevideo, Asuncion, and Buenos Aires reported on local press
and government reaction to the speech. The Embassy in Managua reported on February 15 that
the “Somoza family newspaper Novedades'’ published a “banner headline ‘Sandinistas Provoke
Violence, Todman Says,” and quoted the translation of Todman’s answer to a question on
Nicaragua as printed in the newspaper. The Embassy requested that the Department send “text of
Todman comment (which, article indicates, was in response to question) and any clarification
which we may use here ASAP.” (Telegram 786 from Managua, February 15; National Archives,
RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780070-0397) The Department responded on February 16
that the quotes attributed to Todman “are incomplete and garbled, evidently intentionally.
Todman did not enter into detail about who did what or how.” In addition, the Department
advised, “Embassy should avoid being drawn into polemics.” (Telegram 41418 to Managua,
February 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780072-0462)

On February 15, the Embassy in Montevideo reported; “All Montevideo media gave prominent,
heavy play to Assistant Secretary Todman’s speech at the Center of Inter- American Relations,
stressing his advocacy of ‘a more moderate, balanced, and realistic’ U.S. campaign on human
rights.” The Embassy also noted, “Not surprisingly, the pro-government media has picked up and
emphasized these and other aspects of the Todman statement which serve to prove the GOU’s
arguments on human rights and have been similarly selective in their use of human rights
comments Todman made to the press following the formal address.” (Telegram 533 from
Montevideo, February 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780070-
0236)

The Embassy in Asimcion reported on February 17: “The speech of Assistant Secretary Todman
to the Center for Inter-American Relations has had a great impact here. A morning headline

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

reads ‘Todman severely criticizes human rights policy of Carter.’ The government is jubilant.”
Ambassador Robert E. White reported, “All government officials with whom we have spoken
are unanimous in their praise of the Todman speech.” In addition, he stated, “Those in Paraguay
who have supported our position on human rights have expressed themselves in the strongest
terms. An internationally known scientist said the speech was a ‘tragic event.’ An opposition
leader who faces a prison term on a trumped up charge came to the Embassy and told us that ‘if
this is the new policy of the United States, there is no hope.’” White concluded, “If the
Department has any guidance which would assist me in lessening the disastrous effects of the
interpretations being placed on this speech, I could make instant use of them.” (Telegram 679
from Asuncion, February 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780076-
0674)

On February 24, the Embassy in Buenos Aires reported: “Assistant Secretary Todman’ s Latin
America policy speech received wide coverage and editorial comment in the local press, with
initial emphasis placed on ten points cautioning US response on human rights. Subsequent
distribution and publication of full text largely cleared up misconceptions that speech meant
other than firm commitment to existing human rights policy. Human rights groups were
distressed that speech could be and was used to suggest US backing away on human rights.”
(Telegram 1406 from Buenos Aires, February 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign
Policy File, D780088-0064)

In telegram 45684 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, February 22, the Department
advised: “In some areas press is distorting speech as change in criticism of President Carter’s
human rights policy. Distortion has occurred where listing of types of action we should avoid has
been misinterpreted as criticism of the conduct of the policy. There has been no — repeat — ^no
change in human rights policy,” and “there is no basis for construing speech as criticism of the
human rights policy.” The Department instructed, “Where press, official or private opinion has
picked up line that there is change in human rights policy or criticism of such policy you should
move forcefully to counter it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File,
D780082-0791)

On March 2, The Christian Science Monitor reported that the speech “has sparked controversy in
the State Department over how the administration should pursue President Carter’s human-rights
policy,” that “a number of State Department officials have criticized the speech,” “arguing that it
put too much emphasis on restraint and amounted to a brake on implementation of the rights
policy,” and that it “may have sent the wrong ‘signal’ to some Latin American countries.”
(Daniel Southerland, “Rights Policy Speech Highlights State Department Split,” The Christian
Science Monitor, March 2, 1978, p. 3)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

28.

Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of
State Vance

Washington, February 26, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780046-0321. Secret;
Limdis. Drafted by Feinberg on February 24. A stamped notation indicates that Vance saw the
memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

D^FAftTMEriT OF STAF^

BRIEI^frOa MEMORANDUM

«B-0321

MSHOIUUiDDM

• c FESm

To: The Sec^^ary

From: S/P - Anthony L a1^

Country Priorities in Latin America

S0l>0<ARY :

Six Latin American coiantries appear especially to warrant
our attention over the next year; g^gtzij^ - Argentina ,,

Jamaica y Nicaragua and^^Gh^e. Th^ "^RaTT^ges and dilemmas
ot each relate to the global conc^irns the Administration
stressetd in the first year. The problems raised in this
memo could provide for a lively discusaion. should vou de-_ ..
cide to attend an ARA staff meeting. i4 •^ifk4 hi «4
•Cnt 4tJL AXtt chitfl •/ W/F<*rti ctv'/MTfrt^VF w»<»ef

Our Latin American policy during the first year fo-
cused, as elsewhere, on issues su<:?h as human rights, non-
proliferation and arms restraint. Our priorities in terms
of issues were relatively well elfthorated, but less clear
was the importance we attached to the various countries of
the hemisphere. Partly in reaction to the apparent crown-
ing by the previous administration of Brazil as a "sub-
hegemonic" power, we publieally emphasized the individual-
ity of each Latin state, and eschewed establishing priorities.

The internal setting of priorities — as opposed to
public signals — need not imply that selected countries re-
present our interests in their geographical area; but it
can help to clarify our thinking, place developments in con-
text, and order our own time.

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

CECnET/ L IWP^ S-

BY S/S-l

- 2 -

Criteria

The criteria for deciding which countries deserve
attention is sc^e^diat arbitrary. If we consider, how-
ever, the extent of OS interests; the pace of change
{ettid the US ability to influence it); and the country's
regional weight, six countries appear especially to
warrant our attention over the next year; Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, Jetaiaica, Nicaragua and Chile. Of coarse, ■'Panama.
will remain the nua^ber one dcxnestic issue. Ctba's African
policy is of increasing concern, but Cuba's importance
in a hemispheric context will depend on progress in normaliz-
ing relations.

Other countries will demand our attention frcan time
to time;

— We will want to encourage the democratization
processes in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, and press for
improvements in basic human rights practices in Uruguay
and El Salvador;

— Should the Peruvian financial crisis worsen, we
may weint to discourage the seizure of power by a severe
"Pinochet- style" regime or the temptation to default;

— Venezuela will be preoccupied by its presidential
election, but its stance on NIEO and OPEC issues will be
important. The President's trip will permit even greater
cooperation and coordination on issues — non-proliferation,
human rights, arms restraint — where perceptions are
shared;

— And we will want to monitor regional tensions, in-
cluding Guatemala/Belize, Peru/Chile/Bolivia, and the
Beagle Cheuinel (Argentina/Chile) .

Mexico

Two difficult issues — • immigratio n and energy ' —
are complicating the bilateral relationship. Perhaps
20% of Mexico's labor force works from time to time in
the US, and the receipts from energy exports could double
Mexico's foreign exchange earnings; while from the US
perspective, immigrants from Mexico could reach 10% of
our l^d>or force and Mexican oil could support 30% of our
import needs by 1985.

Mexico is unhappy with the Adwinistration's pro-
posal on limiting illegal iramigration, and our refusal
to agree to pay $2,60 per thousand cubic feet for their
natural gas. Agreement on smaller issues — tropical
products, prisoner exchange — cannot compensate for
the deterioration in relations caused by these two
central issues.

We are, however, talking to the Mexicans about re-
ducing the iaimigraint flow by increasing rural develojxaent
credit which goes to the root of the problem and serves
the human rights of unemployed Mexicans: but we may
need to go further. The Mexicans would like to see us
reinstate a nHsdified bracero program. The Mexicans also
seek assurances that the OS market will be open to an .
increasing quantity of Mexican manufactured goods.

The bargaining process on natural gas pricing may come
to a friendly compromise: but if it does not, our energy
relationship that holds great promise for substantially
reducing our dependency on OPEC will have gotten off to a
sour start. Should that occur, we ought to reconsider
our "hands off" approach toward Mexican energy development,
and, perhaps, design a program for bilateral cooperation
on energy.

Lopez Portillo's first year has generally been suc-
cessful largely because of the economy's fulfillment of
IMF- recommended performance criteria but at the cost of a
decline in industrial employment when 700,000 young Mexi-
cans are entering the job market each year. Mexico's 65
million population will double in 20 years at current
growth rates. The Mexican economy will have to sustain
an impressive period of growth to avoid rising unemployment
which could generate social and political tensions of great
consequence to the U.S. Our long-term interest in Mexico's
economic success may dictate a more forthcoming attitude on
certain issues including trade, aid and energy, than our im-
mediate economic interests would seem to warrant.

Brazil

The US will want to give Brazil top priority next year,
as Geisel's successor defines himself on human rights, in-
ternational economic issues and non-proliferation. The
President will arrive in Brazil just when the official
ARENA party will be chosing its candidate for the presidency.
Geisel's choice, and therefore the almost certain winner.
General Figueiredo, is a relative unknown. Nevertheless, he

is under increasing pressure from the candidacy of
Hagalhaes Pinto, a civilian businessman, to ccwflimit
himself to preserving and continuing the liberalizing
reforms begun by Geisel, But hardline military elements
continue to see threats frOTi ^internal stdjversion, " and
some fear losing their high-level jobs in government-run
enterprises. Should they "capture" Figueiredo, or re-
place him by force with one of their own, repression
could begin anew and the liberalization process be set
back.

We should try to encourage the moderates in the
military to see the reassertion of democratic traditions
as aiding Brazil's rise to greatness, and entry into
the "club" of industrial nations. A democratic Brazil
could be a counterweight to the hardline Southern Cone
regimes, at a time when our own leverage in the region
appears to be on the decline.

The Brazilians are ambivalent about their status,
demanding the concessions granted LDCs, while seeking
the attention worthy of a nascent global power. Brazil
finds itself bumping up against rules designed to regulate
relations among developed countries — despite being, in
many respects, underdeveloped. Brazilian aspirations for
"grandeza" center on rapid economic growth, which is
linked to export expansion. The success of the MTN, es-
pecially in liberalizing trade in labor-intensive manu-
factures, is vitally important for Brazil. But if Brazil
is to become a global power, it must accept the accompany-
ing responsibilities; in the context of the GATT, this
translates into a willingness to offer reciprocal tariff
reductions, and to discuss such trade-distorting practices
as export subsidies.

We are currently drawing up a plan for possible
non-nuclear energy cooperation that would apply to LDCs
generally, but which the President might announce in Brazil,
The proposal is being conceived with Brazil first in mind,
to refute the charge that our non-proliferation strategy is
actually aimed at crippling Brazil's industrialization by
depriving it of energy- Progress on non-proliferation
itself, however, will probably have to wait until the
rigid Geisel leaves office in early 1979.

- 5 -

Argentina

Your presentation of the list of 7500 "disappeared"
helped jolt the Argentine military into releasing series
of lists of names of prisoners, and movestent on the
Deutsch case (although not on Tiraerraan) is anticipated.

But a pattern of gross violations, including disappearances
and torture, continue. Absent significant improvement
in the humctn rights situation, congressional restrictions
will prohibit sales of military equipment and training
beginning next October 1. In the interim, we will want
to leverage available military transfers (with non-lethal,
non-internal security applications) to maxirami advantage.
The issue is tdiether the Argentine military will more
likely respond to blunt, categorical sanctions, or to
the gradual release of appropriate items in response to
tangible human rights improvements. We are also examining
how best to orchestrate our entire range of possible in-
struments of influence.

The dependence of the liberal economic model of
Martinez de Hoz upon foreign capital mauces it highly
unlikely that the Argentine government would retaliate
against US business interests. Of greater concern is
the failure of the Argentines to follow through on their
repeated indications that they will sign the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. Their decision will ultimately hinge on their
perceptions of their own national security and the threat
posed by the Brazilian nulcear program. However, our
nuclear interests in Argentina are the most powerful
reasons for maintaining a working relationship with the
Argentine government.

The Argentine political scene is showing the first
signs of rebirth since the March, 1976 coup. The ap-
parently ineffectual Videla is being openly challenged
by junta member Massera, who is seeking to appeal to
dOTtiestic and international opinion by calling for human
rights improvements and more equitable social policies.

The traditional political parties are beginning to re-
group and pressure for more political "space." Many of
these voices are uneibashedly pro-American — clear indica-
tion that our principled stance on human rights may have
a handsome political payoff in the future.

i>

SIXrRi:T><^LlMPtl?-

- 6 -

Jassaica

Jasiaica is increasingly important to the OS for
several reasons. Manley's attempts to pursue a basic
human needs development strategy within a democratic
framework places Jeimaica, almost uniquely, among LDCs,
exactly in tune with two central thrusts of our foreign
policy. Jamaica will also be important to our Carib-
bean initiative. But Jetmaica's preference for iirmediate
balance-of-payments relief conflicts with our longer-
term development assistance approach, and could inter-
ject a Sh^trply discordant note into the Caribbean Group
before it can get off the ground. And since Jamaica is
the chairman of the G-77 this year, maintaining a working
relationship with the Jamaicans will be central to our
efforts to move the North- South dialogue in a more con-
structive direction.

We greatly improved our relations with the Manley
government during 1977, but Manley is not convinced that
we are pieinning to do enough for him to resolve his fun-
damental problems. Undoubtedly, his expectations are un-
realistic and he has not been sufficiently willing to
confront hard trade-offs at home. Nevertheless, we will
need to convince Manley — the leader in the Caribbean,
after Castro, with the greatest regional and international
image — that the West can provide his struggling island
with sufficient opportunities. We need to keep the broad
range of our relationships with Jamaica under review,
to see where and how, these opportunities can be enhanced.

Nicaragua

Because of our long association with the Somoza
regime, the political changes underway pose a considerable
challenge to the U.S.: a harsh outbreak of anti-Americanism
is possible — unless the US can demonstrate to Nicaraguans
our absolute neutrality. Our human rights policy has begun
to improve our image, but Congressional approval of FMS
credits, the physical presence of American military advisers
to Somoza.' s armed forces, and our ongoing AID mission (for
basic huqian needs, a distinction difficult for Nicaraguans
to grasp) has made the US position vis-a-vis the Somoza re-
gime less clear than it is, say, in the case of Pinochet in
Chile.

i,>^'^;^VA<''\''‘:''^*'N'“ViH"-'--T^‘‘‘“

SECRBT/LIMPIS
- 7 -

In a recent policy review, we decided that we would
try to avoid being seen to be propping up SooKJza by re-
maining as aloof as. possible from internal political
maneuver ings. At the same time, the apposition must
comprehend that no deus ex machina (i.e, , the U.S.> will
find solutions for them. Our underlying assumption is
that Nicaraguans can only build a viable and lasting
democracy if they undertake and complete the task them-
selves. Continuing entreaties for support from the various
political groupings will test our resolve to stick to
our private and public policy of non- interventionism.

Chi le

Our energetic human rights stance has gone a long
way to undoing, in a remarkably short period of time,

US identification with the Pinochet regime. During the
last year, Pinochet may have gone as far as he felt was
consistent with his regime's security, in reducing the
worst forms of human rights abuses. Disppearances
and torture are much less frequent now. Whether Pinochet
will lift the state of seige and remove other decrees
that impinge on the rule of law may be determined in the
course of this year. Pinochet's banishment of twelve lead-
ing Christian Democrats indicates that he will not yet
tolerate opposition political activity.

The dilemma we face is how to continue subtly to
press the GOC to improve its human rights practices with-
out jeopardizing the major points we've gained in domestic
2md international opinion by separating ourselves from the
Pinochet regime. If the human rights situation actually de-
teriorates, as Pinochet's speeches following the plebesite
suggested, we will have to find ways to show our displeasure
without eliciting further repressive measures that would
jeopardize dissenters within Chile.

Should the recent decisions by Exxon Minerals and
Goodyear to invest in Chile be echoed by other US firms,
a new domestic constituency favoring more sympathetic
treatment for Chile would develop. Highly visible US

- 8 -

investasents may generate a second difficulty: Chileans
will wonder at the apparently divergent concerns of
private and official OS citizens.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, these priority countries will not
be easy to deal with in the coming year. Indeed, they
beccHne priorities because of the challenges they pose.

In each case, the central issues involve gl(rf>al concerns:
Mexico, energy; Brazil and Argentina, human rights and
non-proliferation; Jaunaica, balance-of-payments financing
and other North-South issues; Nicaragua and Chile, human
rights. This indicates that our general foreign policy
priorities are right. Our ability to implement them in
these concrete country cases will determine their
ultimate success or failure.

One of your next meetings with bureau staffs might
be with ARA. The problems raised in this memo would
provide for a lively discussion.

Drafted: S/P : RFeinber^Vrym
X20822: 2/24/78

UNCLASSIFIED

29.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, May 8, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1980, Box 38,
PRM-17 [2]. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Erb, Mathews, and Denend.
Inderfurth and Hunter initialed the memorandum. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski
wrote: “Good memo base PRC discussion. ZB.”

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 8, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR; ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

SUBJECT;

ROBERT PASTOR

Beyond Panama:
Caribbean?

A PRC on Latin America/

The most difficult and Important Issue in Inter-American relations — the
Canal Treaty — is now behind us. Your question wbettier a PRC meeting on
Latin America /Caribbean (LAC) would be a useful way to take stock of
where we've come and chart a course for the next year(s) is timely. The
President's trip to Panama provides us me perfect opportunity to set
in motion the next steps. In our policy.

In this memo, I propose to summarize what we have achieved in the last
16 months, analyze where we have failed, and suggest those areas where
we should begin to work. In the final part, I will make some recommenda-
tions on the next steps we should take.

I. The First Sixteen Months; What Was Achieved

I think we can take great pride In the accomplishments of the Carter
Administration In Its policies to Latin America and the Caribbean.

Indeed, It wouldn't hurt to get the President out talking about It
since there are few regions where we have done more or been as success-
ful. At Tab A Is a brief summary which I prepared describing these
accomplishments .

II. Our Failures

I There Is no question that the major area of failure for the Carter Admlnls-
I tratlon Is In the economic area, and It threatens to undermine our success
I primarily because it Is this area which is of highest priority to LAC.

* Though some might argue that our most serious problem Is lack of progress
In the North-South dialogue, I would disagree. We have been criticized
most vigorously not for what we have failed to do, but for what we have ^
done. Specifically, the decisions which hurt Include; the doubling of
the duty on sugar; ^;he support of legislation to dispose of 50,000 tons of
tin; the failure by Congress to appropriate funds for the International
Development Banks as pledged by the USG; the failure to significantly
Increase the proportion of meat quotas for the Latin American meat producers
(as opposed to Australia and New Zealand); and the decision to countervail

DtI0LA0 Sff (E & /R ELEASEP

by NARA on the recommendation ofw

under provisions of E.0. 12958

- 2 -

agalnst export subsidies by Brazil. These decisions do not seem terribly
Important to us, but each has provoked a bitter response In Latin America,
and they have a cumulative effect.

Previous administrations have, at times, analyzed similar decisions and
established coordinating and monitoring devices to prevent such adverse
decisions, but these mechanisms have proven Ineffective and naive. The
problem Is that, at times, other Interests — either domestic or diplomatic —
do prevail and sometimes should prevail. Perhaps, all we can reach for is
a deeper understanding and sensitivity to the likely impact of such
decisions on LAC by people like yourself, Stu Elzenstat, Secretary Vance,
Bob Strauss, etc. Perhaps the mechanism warrants another examination.

In the other North-South economic Issues — the Common Fund, development
bank replenishment, trade policy, etc. — progress has been slow and our
position exceedingly cautious.

III. Opportunities Lost or Not Yet Taken

Let me suggest four areas where we should focus our attention:
(1) Consultations on Global Issues

In my opinion, the one achievement in the first 16 months with
the greatest potential importance Is the decision to view Latin
America In a global as opposed to a regional context. But "globalism" —
as a strategic approach to eliciting support and advice from the
hemisphere's leaders In addressing global problems — has scarcely
been explored, though there have recently been a few excursions Into
this new area. My memo on gaining Latin American support In the NAM
as a way to pressure Cuba Is one such excursion. Anotner example
Is the amount of time and effort the President spent with Perez and
Gelsel on Issues like Africa and the Middle East.

The strategy of extensive consultations on a wide range of Issues
Is based on the premise that we will Increasingly need Latin
America's support for a wide assortment of Issues — not just North-
South Issues, but also East-West, African, non-proliferation, etc.

To obtain support for positions we consider important, however, we
need to be prepared to be forthcoming on Issues which they deem
important. One could distinguish between the Input and the output
parts of consultation:

— Input. We need to not only touch base, but to solicit reactions
and be genuinely prepared to alter our position If a reasonable
case Is made.

— Output. Once our decision is made, we should be sensitive to
Informing the governments, to solicit their reaction, and if
possible, their support.

- 3 -

Organlzatlonal Problems. State should be asked to prepare a paper
explaining how it would organize Itself internally to undertake a
large number of consultations with a great many goveriunents on a
great many Issues not always the responsibility of the area.

ARA is not only unable to deal with this approach, but there seems
little interest in exploring it. Of course, the strategy is as
important as the organization, and I would recommend that the PRC
discuss both within the context of the other Issues considered
below. In addition, a thorough review of the North-South economic
issues of bilateral and multilateral concern to Latin America is an
essential element in our overall review.

(2) A Fast-Disbursing Balance of Payment Support Fund

In the past 16 months, we have had to stand defenseless, unable to
respond to a problem which keeps repeating and threatening to get
worse. As a result of the leap in petroleum and food prices in
1973 and 1974 and a decline in concessional assistance to the LAC,
the region is falling under a more and more severe debt burden.
Peru, Jamaica, Bolivia, and Guyana are the worst cases now, but
most of the countries in the region suffer from varying degrees of
the problem.

We have found ourselves totally unable to respond since our aid
Instruments have been phased down and out. The problem becomes
a doubly troublesome one when the governments are democratic or are
trying to become donocratlc. Then, inevitably, people question the
sincerity of our human rights policy — ^why we fail to follow our
words with dollars.

There are several options available to us including: an expansion
of security supporting assistance to the region; creation of a new
fund for democratization, financed by aid re-flows (which currently
exceed aid loans to the region); or an expansion of Treasury's
Exchange Stabilization Fund.

(3) Arms Sales and Restraint

We have a two-edged problem in this area as well. On the one hand,
we will not have any military relations with Brazil, Argentina,
Guatemala and Chile as of October 1978. In effect, we will have
a total arms embargo with these countries, which is really unpre-
cedented in relations between allies. Obviously, DOD is having fits
about this prospect, and they have a point. Of course, any change
in military relations with these countries would require new legis-
lation, and that is not likely to be easy.

We need to simultaneously approach this problem from a different
direction: we need to seek support for an arms restraint agreement
in the region. We have held discussions with the Venezuelans, and
they are extremely enthusiastic. Perez asked us for detailed papers.

- 4 -

and we have forwarded th^ to him. He, In turn, has asked that we
undertake simultaneous discussions with arms suppliers. In another
two weeks, we'll be In a position to evaluate the chances of moving
towards a genuine arms restraint program for the region which would
be as unique as the Treaty of Tlatelolco is for nuclear weapons.

(4) Caribbean

Since the December meeting at the World Bank establishing the
Caribbean Group, the Bank has been preparing papers for the May 26
Donors Meeting and the June 20 meeting of the Group. The Bank's
analysis of the economic problems of the region and its recommenda-
tions for ways to raise the level of structural and human development
are excellent, and the DSG will have to make some hard decisions
between now and then. In particular, the Bank has drawn up two
proposals:

(a) A Caribbean Development Facility for channelling $125 million
annually for three years to the region to serve as local counter-
part costs for projects financed by the Development Banks. With
rigorous stabilization programs, most countries have had to sharply
curtail their Investment programs, and this facility would enable
them to continue these programs.

(b) A Caribbean Technical Assistance Fund (about $12 million/per
year) to develop regional project proposals.

In addition, it is necessary to develop a strategy of consultation
with other governments to Insure that our goals in the Caribbean
are shared and the proposals can be implemented.

IV, Next Steps

I have focused on four issues not because I believe they are exhaustive,
but because I think they represent areas worth pursuing at this time. In
particular, each of these areas contain initiatives for the U.S. to take
in tandem with the other leaders — particularly the democratic ones — in
the hemisphere.

Torrljos has invited the Presidents of Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and
Jamaica to Panama for the ratification ceremony, and President Carter will
have a 1-2 hour meeting with these Presidents there. That seems like a
perfect opportunity to discuss these Issues and try to obtain a common
view.

If I had to circle a theme for the correct approach to Latin America in
the next 16 months, it is that Latin American nations are important actors
in the world. We need to demonstrate our respect and responsiveness to
gain their cooperation in dealing with the global problems which face all
of us.

- 5 -

The President should reiterate this theme in his speech In Panama. (The
main thrust of the speech should he to place the Canal Treaties In the
context of his other foreign policy accomplishments In the hemisphere.

I will prepare a suggested outline for you this week.) But Instead of
just having the President state this theme and our position and goals on
the four Issues outlined above> It would be appropriate and extremely
effective If we could translate our positions into a Declaration of
Panama, which could be Issued by the five democratic leaders at the
ratification ceremony. That would embody In a document the theme of a
multilateral, cooperative approach. For too long, the President of the
U.S. has been asked to state his policy to Latin America. When President
Carter stated his approach last year and explained why It no longer made
sense for the U.S. to have a policy, few understood what he was saying.

The way to get the message of multilateralism and globalism across Is to
Issue a multilateral statement. And there Is no more legitimate vehicle
than the five Democratic Presidents Invited to Panama. This Idea also dove-
tails with Hamilton's desire to turn the Panama ceremony to our advantage,
underscoring the new era which the Treaties will bring.

The PRC should consider policy options for each of the four Issues described
above. To permit us sufficient time to consult with the Five to gain their
support for our positions and to negotiate a "Declaration of Panama", a PRC
meeting should be held by t he third week In May.

We may also want to consider at the PRC meeting whether the US6 should
support Panama's request that the O.A.S. move Its headquarters to the area
near the Canal. I think the Idea Is ripe, but 1 know there are many In
State who prefer the status quo. Therefore, a position paper would be In
order .

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, I will draft a PRM which follows the outline of this memo,
consult with ARA, and forward 1 .% to you for signature as soon as possible.

^ APPROVE DISAPPROVE

cc: Guy Erb

Jessica Mathews
Les Denend

UNCLASSIFIED

30.

Memorandum of Conversation

Panama City, June 16, 1978, 7:30-9:30 p.m.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36,
Memcons: President, 6-7/78. Confidential. The meeting was held in the El Panama Hotel.

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

* M H BffMI:

GONF IDBNTIALy X G Qg

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: SuRmary of First Multilateral Meeting

in Panama

PARTICIPANTS: President Jimmy Carter

Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the U,N.

Dr, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary of State
William Jorden, U.S. Ambassador to Panama
Jody Powell, Press Secretary

Robert A. Pastor, NSC staff Member (note taker)

President Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela
Simon Consalvi Bottaro, Minister of Foreign
Affairs for Venezuela

President Alfonso Lopez Michel sen, Colombia
Virgil io Barco, Colombian Ambassador to the U.S.

President Rodrigo Carazo, Costa Rica
Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier, Minister of
Foreign Relations for Costa Rica

Prime Minister Michael Manley, Jamaica
P. J. Patterson, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Trade and Tourism for Jamaica

Omar Torrijos, Chief of Government, Panama
Nicolas Gonzalez Revilla, Minister of Foreign
Relations for Panama

Other members of other governments' delegation
attended but are not identified.

DATE , TIME

AND PLACE: June 16, 1978; 7:30 - 9:30 p.m.

El Panama Hotel, Panama City, Panama

CONFIDBNTIAL/XGDS

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED

CO N F I DElim

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

- 2 -

• cancmrinL

Torrijos opened the meeting by noting that it was a timely
and propitious occasion to exchange ideas frankly. There are
problems which cannot be postponed, in discussions among the
six countries' leaders, we should hope to find a design which
will eventually lead to a solution to these problems.

Human Rights

Carazo said that all present had governments which aspired to
a full application of the concept of human rights. Carazo
referred to the Sem Jose Pact (the American Convention on Human
Rights) which was signed on November 22, 1969 and would, when
it enters into force, establish a supreme court on hxunan rights
matters. At his inauguration, he proposed to the whole hemis-
phere the need to con^lete ratification of the Convention and
establish this body. He expressed concern that only eight
nations have ratified the convention, with three more needed to
bring it into effect. He suggested that there are three countries
represented by their leaders around the table who had not rati-
fied it. Finally, he proposed his country as the site of the
future court.

Perez jokingly suggested that we look to the countries to the
north of Costa Rica for future ratification of the Convention.

Carter said that we have signed the Convention, but not veb
ratified it.

Myiley said that Jamaica had signed and was preparing legisla-
tion that would secure its ratification.

Carter said that he would be delivering the opening address to
the Organization of Americem States General Assembly, and he
planned to ask other nations to expedite ratificatioii. 'He
promised to do the same but doubted that the US would ratify
this year.

Perez suggested that we draw up a list of all those countries
that have signed and ratified, as well as those that haven't.

Torrijos said Panama had already ratified it, but had not yet
deposited the instrument of ratification.

Carter suggested that Torrijos help him to persuade U.S. Sena-
tors to ratify it since Torrijos knows the Senators better than
Carter does. Carter also noted that Chile had invited the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights to visit their country.

• fYunrinniii

ufrujiiML

Perez said that we would celebrate the 30th Anniversary of ,
the Universal Declaration of Hxmian Rights this December. He
suggested that December would be an ideal time for a ceremony
to bring the American Convention into force, and the ideal
place would be Costa Rica. He suggested again that we would
do well to start the human rights activities on the northern
border of Costa Rica. Perez then suggested that instead of
issuing a formal declaration by chiefs of State at the end of
the two multilateral meetings, a press statement which sum-
marized those points on which agreement was reached, could be
issued. As the first point, he suggested that we should urge
that all countries in the hemisphere ratify the Convention on
Human Rights, that it should be on the 30th Anniversary of the
universal declaration on humeui rights, and that San Jose should
be the site of the next inter-American Court on Human Rights.

Carazo volunteered to prepare a draft for consideration.

Non-Proliferation

Carter suggested that another item to be considered in this
press statement would be the completion of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco on non-proliferation. Argentina had proMsed to
ratify the Treaty and should be pressed to do so. He said that
making Latin America a nuclear free^zone would be a perfect
example for others, in other regions and in other areas. He
bad referred to it in his conversations with Indian Prime Minis-
ter DesaTy*”

Perez suggested that one of the problems in bringing Tlatelolco
into effect is that Brazil is afraid of Argentina. He then
suggested that each of the Heads of State around the table
address themselves separately and privately to President videla
and urge him to sign (sic) Tlatelolco,

Carter asked Prime Minister Hanley whether he could induce the
Cubans to sign the Treaties.

Manley said that he was unsure.

Perez said that he had read a statement that Castro had said
Cuba did not feel obligated to sign, but if others did, they
might .

Michelsen changed the subject and said they were talking e^sout
very sensitive matters and it was very Important that certain
things be kept secret. He argued that the right of information
is a human right, just as not to -give information is also a
right. Confidential matters should not be publicly disseminated.

CO N FB B fflil

• -eeNRGBffHt

We should all be extremely careful that this doesn't hapfien.

He was very concerned about leaks that came from the U.S.

Lopez said that he was particularly disturbed that the political
campaign in his country was affected by the divulgation of con-
fidential matters. He said that this case was not the only one
and Colombia was not alone in this regard.

Perez jokingly interjected, "Don't look at me."

Michelsen said that diplomatic documents should not be within
the reach of the press. This is extremely destructive of good
inter-American relations. He offered this as a "last testament",
since he will be leaving office shortly.

Lopez said he thought that the Soviet Union could induce Cuba to
sign Tlatelolco. Lopez said that he would be in Cuba on July 26,
the anniversary of Cuba's revolution, and that he would be happy
to bring this issue to the attention of Castro at that time.

President Carter said that he didn't know the origin of the
doctuhents to which Lopez Michelsen referred. He explained that
the press in the u.S. had absolute freedom, and we cannot have
as much secrecy as we would like. He expressed his deepest
apologies to President Lopez and also to President Perez for
any embarrassment that the press may have caused them. He also
thanked President Lopez for offering to convey the concerns of
the others on Tlatelolco to Castro.

President Carter said that we now have communication with the
Cuban government, and he will repeat the request for ratifica-
tion of Tlatelolco through these channels. This Is a very
important message.

Arms Restraint and the Southern Cone

President Carter said another important issue is the sale atid
acquisition of conventional weapons. He explained the U.S.
policy to try to reduce the total sales of arms. He complimented
President Perez for his work and his initiatives in this area.

President Perez said that what Lopez Michelsen said is of great
importance because we live constantly fearful of manipulation
by the news. There are strange hands in the U.S. that go into
the file cabinets and leak the secret information they find there.
He said 'that, for example, someone from the State Department once
came down to speak to him as well as to President Lopez, and to
ask them not to hold a meeting that they were going to hold
with Cuba. When the incident leaked to the press, Perez and
Lopez had to hasten the meeting. This kind of leak is bad
because it affects our relations with one another, makes one
cautious about what is said, and also greatly affects our
actions, often making us do things we would prefer not to do.

CONT I DCNT l A b

-5-

• cantimnAi

He said that he was not hurt, but anguished.

Referring to conventional weapons sales, he said that it
affected the economy of countries concerned. The problem of
weapons sales has more to do oftentimes with the seller than
with the buyer. He said he was astonished to hear President
Giscard's representative had asked in a major speech at the
United Nations for the countries of the world to shift their
funds from arms to economic development, and then one week later
he read in the paper that France had sold $10 billion to Saudi
Arabia.

It is not possible to wage this battle against arms sales
alone. If we can get the right attitude from salesmen, that
would be extremely helpful. He spoke of a respected Venezuelan
industrialist, who had been visited in Puerto Rico by U.S. arms
salesmen, asking him to be the arms representative in Venezuela.
The Venezuelan was told that he would be given a 5 percent com-
mission, 3 percent for himself, and 2 percent to use as he
wished. Perez summed it up by saying that the LDC's are being
manipulated in this business. A way must be found to put an
end to the permanent stimulation of weapons sales, because
whatever poor countries do, they will fail unless the sellers
agree not to sell.

Perez said that at the OAS meeting, the members of the
Ayacucho group will sign an agreement on arms control, and then
try to expand this agreement to include all the countries of
Latin America. But the efforts of the U.S. are needed with
arms producers for if there is no agreement among the producers,
then there is little that the buyers can do.

President Carter said that we have not only taken actions on
our own, but also have talked with the USSR. The French have
not been willing to participate up till now, as they are waiting
to see how we do in our discussions with the Russians. But he
is determined to hold down the sale of arms internationally. He
explained the process by which arms are sold abroad, and said
that permission must be obtained from the State Department first
and that he is personally approving all sales. It is a slow
process. He had hoped that the Special Session on Disarmament-
would be able to find a program that would work. To President
Perez, Carter said that he would certainly follow up on his
advice. However, he believes that the initiative should come
from Latin America, because we do not want to appear as if we
are preaching to the Latin Americans on this issue.

General Torrijos referred to two causes of this predicament.

The apparent cause is that nations arm for expansionist or
for defensive purposes. Why are they doing it? How much of
their budget is being spent on defense matters? How much is
being used to serve the people? We must also look for the

OTENTttt

- 6 -

• CONFIO E NTML -

real causes behind arms races. Certain armed forces magnify
the problem in order to justify themselves. If the cause of
war disappears, then the military government cannot justify its
purchases to Its own people or to the world. Could we Impose
certain kinds of sanctions or deny loans as an incentive to
get milit2iry governments to stop their purchases of weapons?

The real effect of arms sales is to negate development.

Torrijos then commented on the fact that Panama is often the
bridge through which many outside groups can travel. He has
talked with leaders of such groups, and they complained about
the excessive military burden of their governments.

President Lopez Michelsen said that it is very difficult to
condann the countries who deal with weapons because the arms
business is part of their own* defense system; arms exports are
used as a way of subsidizing domestic defense. This won't be
solved at this meeting. In inter'American relations, this is
not a problem for the countries represented at this meeting.

The problem is south of the equator, and that is because of the
War of the Pacific, and of differences with regard to Bolivia's
desire for access to the sea. Lopez suggested that they discuss
ways to "cure the infection" by mediating specifically with
regard to Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Bolivia. We should call for
patient action, because that would eliminate all the problems.

President Perez said that he was in total agreement. The crisis
in the Southern Cone is becoming more serious. He said that the
problem of Bolivia is at the center of the problem of weapons
purchases in the region. Peru has just bought some Soviet air-
planes, and he had read of .the severe criticism in the United
States because they used U.S. airports for refueling. He said
that Venezuela had encouraged Peru to stop purchasing weapons,
and he had said the same to Chile as well. He said tliat we
should offer not mediation, but cooperation. He proposed that
representatives of the six governments around the table send
confidential communications to the three nations — Bolivia, Peru,
and Chile — telling them that we would be willing to offer co-
operation to settle their dispute. In the case of the Ayacucho
countries, all the parties accepted the fact that the problem
existed, and that would be an advantage.

Perez suggested that all of the Presidents attempt the
same approach with regard to Belize, so that independence
would not have to be delayed. The problem, as he saw it, was
to help Guatemala and Belize find a solution which would permit
Belizean independence, while at the same time allowing some
room for Guatemala to save face and accept independence. Perez
was concerned that a solution to the Belizean problem was neces-
sary to avoid severe repercussions in the Caribbean.

CONFIDE N T S:

-7-

President Carazo spoke as the leader of a country with ho arms
purchases. He was anguished to learn that since World War II,
conventional weapons have caused more than a hundred wars.

The purchase of weapons was disastrous on a country's economic
development program. At the heart, he believed It was a problem
of attitudes and of military governments. In other words, the
demand factor. He was disturbed that Illicit trade In arms
had been found in Costa Rica. He proposed that regional agencies
be established to wage an intense campaign to stop the purchasing
of weapons. The only way not to do something, Carazo said, is
not to do it at all. Don't buy any weapons. Thirty years ago,
Costa Rica took this decision, and he would hope that other
countries would do likewise.

President Carter referred to the problem of illicit payments
which President Perez had noted. The United Nations is
presently discussing this Issue, and the U.S. would like sup-
port for negotiations for a new treaty. Carter thought Costa
Rica had good luck In not purchasing weapons. This Is an
excellent example for other countries and regions and he
congratulated Costa Rica. However, the U.S. has different
responsibilities in the world. Yet the big objective of the
United States Is to prevent the spread of all weapons.

Prime Minister Manley noted that this was an enormous and
complex problem, tliat Jamaica has tried to use its Influence
to dissuade buyers and sellers. He said moderation In arms
purchases should be rewarded by the transfer of more economic
resources. If there could be a significant shift of resources
to development, then countries would see the real Importance
and benefits of slowing arms purchases.

President Carter said we would do all we could to support the
^ribbean Group, which has 30 nations and 15 international
institutions and will be meeting in Washington next week. We
should do all we can to help it. To the extent that there is
restraint on arms purchases, we would try to be helpful in the
economic area. He noted that President Perez and Prime Minister
Trudeau of Canada had tried to be helpful. He hoped we could
get the Federal Republic of Germany to do likewise . He felt
that progress was being made in this area.

President Perez suggested that this would another good
subject for the press statement. He suggested that the leaders
say that armamentlsm was of great concern to all the countries.
An' Important effort was .being made by the Ayacucho countries,
and it was hoped that this effort could be broadened to Include
all of Latin America. He said that although not for the com-
munique, the leaders should extend their cooperation not
mediation to Peru, Bolivia, and chile and to Belize and
Guatemala. The idea of contributing to finding a point of
agreement between Guatemala and Belize is an important one.

If we offer our cooperation/ we can find a solution. He
thought something could be offered to Guatemala, which would
not humiliate Belize.

- 8 -

Caribbean

Perez referred to President Carter's mention of the Caribbean
Group. He confessed that he was indignant to learn in the
press that the West was planning to establish a Pan-African
force and a $2 billion Pan-African fund, while at the same
time it was impossible to get money for the Caribbean Group.

He warned that small nations in the Caribbean would fill the
vacuum with political or economic mafias. He noted that Vesco
was thinking of settling in Grenada. This could happen if we
don't assume a responsibility to work for a Caribbean plan and
to contribute oiir resources to it. He said that President
Carter has taken this issue up with enthusiasm, and has been
trying to gain support from other countries, but few have
helped. If there are not enough funds contributed to this
group, then it might be better not to have it at all. Perez
said that he had offered $30 million to this new fund, provided
that it be 10 percent of the total value of the fund. He sug-
gested that there be $300 million per year over five years —
a total of $1.5 billion. This would change the present condi-
tions in the Caribbean. The only important thing is that the
plem should point to the economic integration of the region .

The problems are very serious, and all of us need to contribute.
However, he was not optimistic.

Carter said that the press has erroneously reported that the
United States was considering a Pan-African force. It was not
true. All that the United States did was to transport soldiers,
food and equipment to Zaire and .he.ln stabilize the situation in
Shaba. We have not asked for a Pan-African force, and we would
not participate in one which did more than just this effort.

in arms control, the United States has a firm policy, we do
not introduce new types of weapons or permit an escalation of
weapons sales. We sell a smaller percentage every year, and we
hope others will join In our effort. We are now in fifth place
in anoB sales to the region. It is very important also that
Tlatelolco be concluded. We think, furthermore, that the
example should be expanded and extended to other areas.

Carazo said less investment in anas permits more investment for
development . However, once a country advances, then the terms
for securing loans and other assistance becomes harder than for
those who invested in arms and did not advance. So a country
is punished for focussing on development instead of on arms.

/

Miohelsen complimented Carazo for his approach to the problem.

He added, however, that conflicts often come from asnas sales
rather than purchases. Colombia supports the Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank, but the problem is not of aid, but of market and
price for commodities. What the Caribbean needs is the market
for the sugar. Coffee producers have a similar problem. When
the economic situation is not dealt with, we will not have a
problem of arms purchases by governments; the problem will be

CO N TIDDfnA Ir

• -fiafffimt

one of smuggling in weapons to the peasants as a result o£
growing political instability. Take the case of coffee. If
there is a frost in Brazil it will create an unprecedented
rise in the price of coffee; if there is no frosty then there
will be a severe drop in the prices. The price shoul<^ not be
allowed to depend on whether or not there is frost. Because
of such violent swings in commodity prices r the situation in
Latin America could become as bad as that of Africa. You don't
have to be a Marxist to recognize the relationship between
economic instability and weapons purchases. He had asked
President Carter in September that we not wait until the
economic situation grows so badly that a catastrophe occurs^
Let's try to agree now to establish a fair price. The coffee
agreement is temporarily suspended, but we should not wait.

If the U.S. would implement the coffee legislation, and apply
quotas and stcibilize prices at a timely date, he was sure that
if the group met again in one more year they would spend much
less time discussing weapcns sjid eccncmic assistance. These
agreements would restore this kind of stability. The situation
in these countries, in Lopez's words, "is not correctable by
just warm washcloths.”

Perez said Lopez Michelsen had mentioned a most serious point.
He referred again to the press statement, and suggested that
another item to be included in it should be the Caribbean Group
meeting which would be held on the 19th in Washington. We
should state our full support for the Caribbean Group. He
added two additional items which he believed should be in that
press statement. First, the Coffee Agreement which was one of
the few good things which began with the Alliance for Progress,
has remained, emd should not die. If the Senate does not
ratify the Coffee Agreement soon, the whole agreement will die
because over 50 percent of the coffee exports go to the United
States. Perez said that the press statement should express our
great concern over this Coffee Agreement. A second problem, of
course, is the International Sugar Agreement emd the ' extremely
low price of sugar, and the signs of protectionism in the U.S.
We should mention our concern about this as well.

Carter responded by saying that he would not be disturbed for
the group to express its concezm eibout the stabilization of
market prices. He noted, however, that the U.S. is a large
producer of sugar and U.S. producers had to be protected. He
repeated his concern 2 d>out the in^rtance of the multilateral
trade negotiations as an effective vehicle for reforming world
trade; and noted that many of the countries represented aroiind
the table are not members of GATT.

nfurtnnmi l

uiriJdlllllr

- 10 -

sV •

• CO NF ffi l TM.

Responding to the more specific points made by President Perez,
Presid^t Carter explained that we have intense feelings within
the United States among the farmers of sugar and the ranchers
of beef, and their Congressmen are deeply committed to protect-
ing the cost of production. We have tried to get the Inter-
national Sugar Agreement ratified, and the President has
resisted efforts to raise the price of sugar. He concluded by
saying that he has no objections to the expression of concern.

Manley noted that it would be very useful if the International
Sugar Agreement could be ratified soon and asked what were the
prospects .

Carter said that Senator Church, who is accompanying the Presi-
dent, is extremely active in sugar policy, and is a firm advo-
cate of higher sugar prices, perhaps as much as 17 cents. He
said that he would be meeting with Senator Iiong next week, and
Senator Long represents sugar cane producers, which are not
always the most efficient. He pledged, in conclusion, that he
will do the best he can to get the International Sugar Agree-
ment ratified ajid to keep sugar prices down. By the time of
the O.A.S. meeting, he said ^at he might have a clear picture,
and he would try to relay that to the nations. He said that the
problem Is that the Senate is far behind its schedule right now
as the result of the Canal Treaties, and he is uncertain whether
they will have time to look at these additional agreements.
Nevertheless, he reiterated his complete commitment to ratifica-
tion without delay.

Michelsen put the discussion on commodity price stabilization
in a broader context. He said that producing countries hurt
themselves in the long term by excessively high prices because
housewives inevitably reduce their consvin^tion or ch2mge to
substitutes, for example, from coffee to soft drinks, from sugar
to com sugars. Therefore, it's important not to force too high
a price; indeed, it is in both Interests to try to establish
fair and reasonable prices.

Perez agreed with President Lopez Michelsen. Since President
Carazo would be leaving after this session, Perez suggested a
few additional iteios to be included in the press statement so
that Carazo could agree with it today. On the Dominican Repub-
lic, he said that we should express our satisfaction with the
electoral process in a very discreet way which would make It
easier for Balaguer to resist the pressure which he is feeling
from those who would like to reverse the elections.

Carter interjected that he believed that the certification of
the final election results would be coming in one day.

r trn n nf w m

unmjiiiAtr

-ijr* ■

• • -eaWBBMlr

Perez said that a discreet statement would help overcome any
difficulties that night arise in the near future.

Carter agreed, saying that we should encourage the completion
of the electoral process in the Dominican Republic as well as
elsewhere.

Manley said that the meeting they were holding presented the
leaders with a historical opportunity to try to press along
several outstanding disputes. He suggested that the group
offer cooperation which might lead to a resolution of the
Guatemala-Belize problem. He suggested that the leaders
develop a simple plan to offer cooperation on this. This could
be one concrete accon^lishment of this meeting. It would be
preferable not to pviblioize the means by which the group would
cooperate to help resolve the dispute, but it would be useful
to begin to do that.

perez said the decisions on Belize and the Andean tensions
should be kept confidential.

uunmiir

UNCLASSIFIED

31.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Secmity Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter

Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58,
Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Confidential. Brzezinski wrote “6-20-78” and
“10:19 pm” in the top right-hand comer of the memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

C0NFIDEHTIA6 — "DS

MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR;
FROM;

SUBJECT;

back from th^ 'resident

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

THE PRESIDENT
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Your OAS Speech

Attached is your OAS speech which Jim Fallows and Bob
Pastor worked on- It incorporates comments we received
from the State Department today, and I think you will find
it a useful description of the state of our relations with
Latin America at this time.

Under Secretary of State Newsom has raised just one point
in dissent, and I wanted to bring it to your attention.

He is concerned, on pages 4 and 5, that we may be
over-extending ourselves in the peacekeeping area, pledgina
our involvement in three extremely difficult disputes.?. He
is concerned that we may be raising expectations that could
not easily be satisfied.

Of course, you have made all of the points in those two
pages either in private conversations with each country's
leaders, or in letters to them. I believe there are
several important reasons why you should publicly state
your position;

— First of all, all of the countries in the region
are looking for our leadership and have asked for
our help.

— Secondly, for the first time, you make clear that
the "hard decisions can only be made" by the
parties concerned; we will only be helpful to
that effort.

— Thirdly, these issues, particularly Bolivian access,
are among the Hemisphere ' s most important since the
Canal Treaties were ratified. Bolivia has obtained
a seat on the United Nations Security Council and
plans to take its case to the United Nations in
every possible form, just as Panama had done. It
would be to our interest to be put on the record
at this time.

CONFIDENTIA fe- - GDS

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

CONFIDENTIMr - '^DS

. 2

— It would enhance your moral standing in the

Hemisphere since everybody acknowledges the goal
of Bolivia's getting access to the sea; they only
disagree on how to do that.

Lastly, the 100th anniversary of the War of the
Pacific has been causing anxiety tremors throughout
the region for the last two years, and this is
likely to increase as we approach 1979. Your
public statement of concern — like Mrs. Carter's
visit — will be a sign of U.S. interest in
stability in the region and peaceful resolution
of that dispute.

State is concerned that our offer of help is open-ended,
and is therefore reluctant to make it. I believe that the
time is ripe for such a statement, and it would be viewed
as perhaps the most important part of your statement. I
therefore recommend that you keep the relevant passages
in; if you find Newsom's concern warranted, you could
accommodate it by merely deleting the final sentence on
page 4 and the first full paragraph on page 5. I do
hope, however, that you will retain that portion of the
speech, since I think it is one of the most valuable
parts of the speech.

CONFIDENg»IA - Ir - CDS

UNCLASSIFIED

32.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 22, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File,
Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America, 7-10/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Mathews.
Inderfurth, Bartholomew, and Denend initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand crossed out
Aaron’s name in the addressee line. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “v.
interesting. ZB.”

UNCLASSIFIED

memorandum

5094

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

OmON FiLE y,
CHRO * -t

August 22, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR;

PROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT;

ROBERT PASTOR

Conversations in Santo Domingo

With Andy Young and. others, I had conversations in Santo
Domingo with General Torrijos, Former President Oduber of
Costa Rica, Foreign- Minister Cohsalvi of Venezuela, and
Armando Villanueva of the Peruvian APRA ^eurty. Copies of
the memoranda of conversation are attached, but I thought
I might summarize a few overall impressions.

I

In discussing individual country's political affairs and
particuleLTly return to democracy, the theme that kept recu-
ring is the probl^ of polarization. In Peru the activities
of the ultra left and ultra right are threatening the efforts
of the Constituent Assembly. In Ecuador the outspoken leftist
Bucaram threatens to alienate the military eind provoke them
into fixing the election to ensure that Bucarcim's nephew,
Roldos, cannot' win. Oduber volunteered that leftist emd
rightist terrorist groups in El Salvador were both strong
enough to make political accommodation impossible. Torrijos
even opined that in Bolivia opposition, leader Siles was as
responsible for provoking the coup as Pereda was for making it.
All of the people we talked with seemed aware of the need to
help those who seek to develop the broad consensus necessary
for functioning democracies: Consalvi is going to Peru at
Perez' request to talk to leaders there; Oduber *s party is
rendering technical assistance to Torrijos' new party and to
Samudio's liberal party.

Andy correctly observed that he sensed a new idealistic
pragmatism among the leaders we met: an inner confidence
that the direction of political change in Latin America was
towards more democracy, and that the best guarantee of arriving
there would be by small steps which reassure the military.

There is a different variation on this theme in Nicaragua,
where efforts are directed to finding a democratic alter-
native to Somoza. Consalvi once again urged us to "twist
aimns" on behalf of change in Nicaragua.

ADP Declassification Review

■ CONFIDFMT-j AIr - ‘ DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

. CONFIDfiNT - lAI r

Other interesting items:

On Belize: Torrijos was very excited by President Carter's
reference in the OAS speech, but there was general agreement
that the new Guatemalan government would have to settle internal
differences between the Vice President and the Foreign Minister
and that the ball is in the Guatemalans' court.

On Mrica: in response to Andy Young's briefing, Torrijos
promised to provide troops for a UN peacekeeping force in
Namibia .

On Colombia; Consalvi expressed concern that the U.S..
had not given Gol^ombia sufficient attention and that a special
effort should be made since Lievano, their Foreign Minister,
will be assuming the presidency of the UN General Assembly.

Andy Young is considering a trip there, and I am following up
on this issue.

cc: Jessica Mathews

Attachments :

Tab A “ Memcon with Torrijos

Tab B - Memcon with Oduber, Consalvi et al.

Tab C - Memcon with APRA Leader, et al.

CONFIDENTIAL '

UNCLASSIFIED

33.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Seeurity Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, October 4, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45,
Latin America, 8-12/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Mathews. Inderfurth and Denend
initialed the memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

' 39?8

CODTFIDENTI - AI r

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 4, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR;
FROM:

SUBJECT:

ZBIGNIEW EZ INSKI
ROBERT PASTOR

Impact of U..S. Human Rights
Policy in Latin America

( After our discussion at the staff meeting last week, I tasked
the CIA to do an overall assessment of the impact of our human
rights policy in the Southern Cone. No one questions mat the
sensitivities of certain government and military officials have
been affected by the human rights policy; the important ques-
tions are whether our long-term relationships will be strengthened
or harmed by the policy and whether the policy has led, and
will continue to lead, to improvements in the human rights
Situations in those countries and in others.

While the human rights policy may be a good instrument of
ideological diplomacy in other areas , I don ' t think that
ought to be one of our purposes in this hemisphere. I was
working under the impression that the goals of our human
rights policy include: to contribute to a climate in which
human rights are increasingly respected and the costs of re-
pression have increased as well; to identify the United States
with a universal cause, which you have described as "the
increasing self-assertiveness of man on behalf of his own
human rights"; and to project the U-S. as an idealistic^ moral
nation actively working toward a better world.

If our overall human rights policy is to be effective and
credible, one aspect needs to be that we have warmer and
closer relationdiips with those governments which share our
ideals and cooler and more distant relationships with those
governments that don't. This necessarily means that our
relations with the military governments in the Southern
Cone should range from being cordial and correct — as in the
case of Brazil, where we have a wide range of consultative
mechanisms — to being distant, as in the case of Chile, where
the Letelier investigation currently prevents us from taking
any other position.

CONFIDENTIjVL

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

COinFIDEWTIMf

Another element of our policy should be a willingness, at
appropriate times, to back up our rhetoric with actions,
many of which are mandated by law anyway. At the same time,
we need to continue to distinguish between the three different
"baskets" of human rights in implementing our policy. For
example, with respect to Argentina, we have infoirmed the
government that our concern with human rights there is
focused on basket #1 (integrity of the person) , and we
recognize and accept the government's assessment that demo-
cratization is a long-term goal.

I am sending you a couple of articles that were in the
New York Times in the past year, which deal with this
subject. I would be very interested in your comments on
these articles and on my perception of our human rights
policy.

cc: Jessica Mathews -

COMFIDENTIAEi

UNCLASSIFIED

34.

Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State

Asuncion, October 13, 1978, 1905Z

4451

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asuncion, 1969-1979.
Confidential; Roger; Immediate. The Department repeated the cable to Santiago as telegram
265779, October 20. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Chaimel, Santiago,
1963-1979)

UNCLASSIFIED

PACE 01 ACUMCI 04411 1321371

ACTION IN«D-0t

INTO OCT-01 CCO-00 iSO-00 /000 V

020624

0 131S0SZ OCT 70

FK AHEHBASSY ASUNCIONE

TO SECSTATE VASHDC IIWEOIATE 4260

0 0 NT I D C H T l IH: ASUNCION 4451

ROCER CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: 00$

TAGS: POOV, SHUN

SUBJECT: SECOND ICETINC VITH CHIEF OF STAFF RE

CONriDCNTH tir- INCOMING

epartment of State TELEGRAM

2630 ASUNCI 04451 1321371

ATTNEDEO. APPEARENTLY TUO BILATERAL HEETIHGS WITH CHILE
AND ARGENTINA TOOK PLACE ONE AFTER THE OTHER AND SOHE
32,4n /45 ■ SESSIONS RAY EVEN HAVE OVERLAPPED. ^

S. RECOnNENDATION: THE TWO FBI AGENTS HERE ‘TELL HE ^

THERE IS LIKELIHOOD CONDOR HILL SURFACE DURING LETELIER

TRIAL IN THE U.S. IF GENERAL FETES. OAVALOS IS ACCURATE

IN DESCRIBING THE COtCKINICATIONS IT USES AS AN

ENCRYPEO SYSTEH WITHIN U.S. COIWUNICATIONS NET lAHO I

NAVE NO KROULEDGE WHETHER THIS IS TRUE), IT WOULD SEER

advisable to review THIS ARRANGEHENT TO INSURE THAT ITS CONTINUATION

IS IN U.S. INTEREST.

WHITE

LETELIER CASE

REF: ASUNCION 4375

1. ON OCTOBER 11 I CALLED AGAIN ON CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL
ALEJANDRO FRETES DAVALOS. AFTER PRELIRINARY COURTESIES, HE
READ HE THE ACTA OR SUHHARY HINUTES RESULTING FROH THE VISIT
OF GENERAL OROZCO, CHIEF OF CHILEAN INTELLIGENCE, TO ASUNCION.
THE OOCUHENT ITSELF HAKES HO DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE
LETELIER CASE. FRETES SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD AUTHORIZED

NIH TO BRIEF RE ON THE ACTA BUT HE PREFERRED TO READ IT
VERBATin.

<

2. THE OOCUHENT IS BASICALLY AN AGREEHENT TO COOROINATS ALL
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN ORDER TO CONTROL AND ELIHINATE SUB-
VERSION. IT SPEAKS OF EXCHANGE OF INFORIIATION, PRORPT USE OF
COHHUNICATION FACILITIES, ROHITORING Of SUBVERSIVES AND THEIR
DETENTION AND INFORHAL HAND OVER FROH ONE COUNTRY

TO THE OTHER. IT REPEATS OVER AND OVER THE NEED FOR FULL
COOPERATION AND HUTUALIY FACILITATIVE ACTS IN THE CON-
TEXT Of A FIGHT TO THE DEATH AGAINST SUBVERSION.

3. IN RESPONSE TO HY QUESTIONS, FRETES DAVALOS SAVE
THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING BETWEEN CHILE AND
PARAGUAY. IT WAS'SIHPIY ANOTHER IN A REGULAR SERIES OF
MEETING WHICH TAKE PLACE ANNUALLY AMONG THE CHIEFS OF
INTELLIGENCE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHERN COME.

THIS SYSTEH OF CONSULTATIONS CAME INTO BEING MAINLY AS
A DEFENSE AGAINST THE THREAT OF ARGENTINE SUBVERSION
SPREADING TO OTHER COUNTRIES. BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, CHILE,
BOLIVIA, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY HAKE OF THE NET, ALTHOUGH
URUGUAY IS NOW ALMOST OH THE INACTIVE LIST. FRETES DAVALOS
SAID THE MEETINGS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY USEFUL ANYMORE, IN
NIC JUDGMENT, BECAUSE THE MAIN THREAT IFROH ARGENTINA) HAS
BEEN ELIMINATED. THEY KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ONE ANTOHER
THROUGH AU.$. COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATION IN THE PANAMA •
CANAL ZONE MIICN COVERS ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. THIS U.S.
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY IS USED MAINLY BY STUDENT OFFICERS TO
CALL HOME TO LATIN AMERICA BUT IT IS ALSO EMPLOYED TO
CO-ORDINATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AMONG THE SOUTHERN

CONE COUNTRIES. THEY MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
THEIR COMMUNICATION TKROU THE U.S. FACILITY IN PANAMA
BY USING BILATERAL CODES. IN HIS VIEW THE WHOLE
NETWORK IS PRACTICALLY USELESS AND SERVES MAINLY TO
PERMIT CHIEFS OF INTELLIGENCE TO EXAGGERATE THEIR
OWN DIMINISHING IMPORTMCE.

4. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY THIS IS THE COHDOR NETWORK
WHICH ALL Of US HAVE HEARD ABOUT OVER THE LAST FEW
YEARS. ALTHOUGH FRETES DAVALOS TOLD HE HE HAD ONLY
MENTIONED TO PRESIDENT STROESSNER THAT WE WERE GOING
TO TALK ABOUT THE MEETING, I SUSPECT THE PRESIDENT
VETOED FRETES' STATED INTENTION OF PROVIDING ME WITH A
COPY OF THE ACTA AND INSTEAD TOLD HIM TO READ IT TO ME.

EITHER I MISUNDERSTOOD OR FRETES MISSPOKE IN OUR PRE-
VIOUS MEETING BtEFTEL) WHEW HE SATO ARGENTINA HAD ALSO

. fuJ-

&/S

f

6D

no

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

conn DENT I # :

UNCLASSIFIED

35.

Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

RPM-78-10410

Washington, November 6, 1978

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A, Box 4,
Folder 49, Southern Cone Perception of U.S. Policies. Secret; [handling restriction not
declassified\. Prepared in the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political
Analysis. Requested by Pastor.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRE T

lEO 13526

. . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE., AGENCr a;-;

. - y .. National Foreign Assessinent Center

y s^ NoyCT^er ■.19f78 ■■•

5 • ■ '.V- f ^ *.-» - • ~i ^ ‘ y *** * . *./• .

•«. ,-*-•»♦.*•.> '••. /.’-w : •»; • ■' • • . ' . • ••.••«■ • •,•/• • f. V 'U’ i. -.Ty •.'» V*** i.,,

•INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDElt T

SOUTHERN CONE PERCEPTIONS OF US POLICIES
Summary ;

The Southern Cone governments of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have a somewhat cynical view
of DS policies toward Latin America. Their perspective
is shaped by the conviction that Washington's preoccu-^ •
pation since the mid 1960s with other parts of the world
has left the US. out of touch with Latin American re-
alities. They view US policy toward their region as
inconsistent, incoherent, and unreasonably punitive.

There is a strong feeling that in the broader arena the
,DS has been outmaneuvered by the Soviets and is losing
its ability to lead the West.

ADP Declassification Review

"declassified

> by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

Th'is memorandiin was pTspaved by the Latin America
Division cf the Cffioe of Regional and Political Analysis ,
It. was requested by the NSC Staffer for Latin America.

EO 13526 3.5(c)

RPM-78-10410

Copy No. ^

OCCRET-

EO 13526

SEeitE T

of the differences between the US and the
,' Sout^rh Cone nations have historical
present time, however r each country ift ithe area has ;

, spejCific- grievances ^ agiainst^fhe US , wrtiit the^mqsfc conane^^^
■ problem:, being human‘- righ±s, :.,The jniLlitary^^ I^

. ■ region : believe - that!, secuf ityj against^^Ieftist' terrofis^-;^'^'-'
and' xhternat'ionaL Conmniaisia ' takes preced^ce over - p^rsohai:
well-being and individual freedom. Most of these! .leaders '
are convinced that intervention by the military prevented
a leftist takeover. They tend to identify economic de-
velopment and a slow, incremental approach toward demo-
cratic processes as the requisite therapy for accumulated
national weaknesses. For the countries that have ex-
perienced a struggle against terrorism, the fight for
national survival has been vei^ real. All of the Southern
Cone countries are obsessed with the threat of subversion,
and herein lies the basic conflict with US human rights
policies.

The Southern Cone governments bitterly resent their
poor image in the world press and in international forums,
where their militaiy leaders are commonly described as
"totalitarian" and "fascist." Government spokesmen often
complain that exiled Communists and terrorists are allowed
to criticize openly without rebuttal. One Brazilietn
official lamented two years ago to US Embassy officers
that the Israelis were praised for staging a raid into
Uganda against terrorists, while counterterrorist ac-
tivities in Brazil were denoxinced by the US press.

Leaders in the Southern Cone fcTelieve that investi-
gations by unofficial aind official organizations such as
Amnesty International and the UN Commission on Human
Rights are over zealous and misguided,: and that tlS policy-
makers accept' these findings uncritically. They deplore
the United States' selective attention to Latin America
while it ignores human rights violations in Communist
countries.

.. . This does not mean that US hxaman rights policy has

had a ccCTletely negative impact on the area. On the

- 2 -

sscns T

EO

contrary, police and military officials in these countries
are now sensitized to hiiman rights considerations . Eve^
chief of. state in the area claims to have made clear toU, v.

: his- subordinates -that .tortiire^ and. arbitra^ af rest- ■ wi.ld;?/ ■
no longer, be tolera.ted. JSIl of these?, .countries^ hayet- ^Ii^J^

. shownl - g^e^al improveaehtr during' the ;'past . year ^ion. 'tfaei:r
^treatment -.of., prisonersi^

; From their perspective, however, 1diese improveirien.ts.
go \mackaowledged by Washington, and moreover, the torrent
of criticism, adversenry treatment, and antagonistic US
legislation has continued. Their conclusion is that the
US is playing a game with them-using hxuaan rights as a
way to dictate the timetable and ultimate shape of the
political mode the US wants them to adopt. If, indeed,
return to "democratic government" is the real issue,
their answer is that competitive politics is not possible
in the near future. This stand will not be negotiable
until the various military regimes are convinced that
they have established economic progress and ensured the
permanence of political changes they have brought about.
Continued US pressure to speed up the process will pro-
bably only increase the bitterness and recrimination.

Public Views of US Policies

It is much more difficult .to get an accurate reading
of public reaction to US human rights policy. Most
citizens seem to support the military governments; the
rest are either vmconcerned with politics or belong to a
declared opposition. The Chilean ^vemment probably
enjoys the greatest backing in the Southern Cone; the
plebiscite vote held there earlier thrs year> even though
rigged to a certain extent, is a good indication of this
support. > '

Judging from newspaper commentary and personal
conversations, US human rights policy has had little
impact on the general populace. Some political groups
that have long opposed the various governments and other
groups representing civil and human rights causes have
used the policy to air their own specific grievances.

- 3 -
SECRET

EO 13526

IsfalkfcWS

Liberal clergy have also cited the policy as being similar
: to their own programs.. , . . • , '

Argentina -y-yy.

X . The human rights issue-is . the; major point: ccm--

~ tention.: between . Argentina "and the US, senxor Argentirne: .

' officials view human rights " abuses . aS; an. unfortunate but -
inevitable consequence of their efforts to eradicate
leftist terrorism. Under these circumstances, they
resent attempts by foreign critics to portray the
Argentine Government as an oppressive dictatorship.

Current US policy is perceived . by the Argentines as a
sign that, the US considers good Hi i a-t-flu-y-ai r-j^l af i r>n« to be
expendable. Tney bexieve that this policy is selective
and biased against Argentina, that they are marked for
"punishment" regardless of their internal problems.

Seeing themselves as victims of a conspiracy, they often
say that if the US understood the terrorist problem, it .
would also understand the government’s tough measures.

Now that the terrorist threat seems to be abating,
the government is attempting to wind down its massive
security operations and exert tighter controls over
police and military units, it has ordered the release of
many prisoners to the custody of their relatives during
daylight hours. The Interior Minister has warned police
chiefs to stop bullying the public and restore normal
procedures, and the government has strengthened require-
ments for proper police identification. In an effort to
appease its critics, the government has piablished several
lists of those arrested or xinder detention and is making
a concerted effort to locate missing persons. The Inter-
American Exnnan Rights Committee has been invited to visit
the count iry, possibly between March and May 1979.

The basic problem, as far as the Argentines are
concerned, is that their efforts to deal with the human
rights issue have not been noted by Washington. The
Argentine Government is discouraged by the reduction of

_ 4 _

SECRET

EO 13526

■5 ECRE. '' X '~

EG 13526

foreign lailitary sales , the reduction in the size of the
US military mission, the nonapprppriation of training.,
funds, and the lack of. auidiori ration for. Argentina, t^^^
pajr for militctry; trai^^ itt..'the\ ilS:;^ BuehosiAir^'
-^.beep^-coff^rned - aboufr thel.-recently -impiem^te^Sumg^
f^KdbiiAdj^cuiu^dnieittE^thatr^^ f orevQh^ miri^ar ^-p i^ ‘ '

:?chasei^jt export: tlicenseA ) 'and-i trairiing^^^^ ..The^State he:;.-..;^
'partment*’s fecehfc decision to "authorize’ aV's^ri ’mfliticy*
training contract for noncoinbatan€s''alleviated some of ;;
the tension, but Senator Kennedy* s letter to President
Carter protesting the decision is stnre to rankxe Sttenos
Aires.

Another problem is the Argentine plai^fo^ai^*ex|^^
perimental" plutonium reproce ssing plant,

vThe decision runs counter

3 >26 3.3('b

to President Carter's desire. to curb the spread of pro-
liferation-prone facilities. Argentina steadfastly
refuses to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty,
contending that it discriminates against countries with-
out nuclear weapons. Admiral Raul Castro Madero, the
head of Argentina's Nuclear Commission, says that all
countries will have to use reprocessing in the future and
the US will have to relent in its current policy. Mean-r-
while, Argentina wants to have the technology so it can
independently decide whether or not to reprocess.

The Argentines are also concerned about Cuban-Soviet
e3g>ansion in Africa and cite US inactivity as "Western
weakness." They have recently discussed taking a more
active role in the nonaligned movei^ient to counter Cuban
activities. The hardline attitude is. taken by Army
General Agosti, who commented earlier \his year that
Argentina's "armed forces wiped out a Marxist bridgehead
without anybody's help or advice" and that something
should be done cibout Africa.

There recently was an emotional outpouring in Buenos
Aires against the US over the Export- Import Bank decision
not to finance ecuipnent exports for the Yac^ta Dam
project- The Sxport-xmport Bank's change of iiiina on this
issue has lessened the hue and ciy, but many milita3cy men

- 5 -
SECR ET

EG 13526

think that the financijtg turnaround, i&^ somehovr
' the. visit by the Inter-Amerlcaa. Human - lights Conur^sidn^fc-

: j)rdhId[as^-mth'.,ti^:^S ,hi Il^hY^ Argehti^j^^^
-^eeifi^d^tdpZbdcfih^redirectln^^exi^f^iurtxy^s
• policy " Eoreighil^'nister Mdittesr foie exato?I«iif
argehtina*s potential as a nuclear supplier' during his

recent trip to Eastern Europe. Military officers,
meanwhile, have hinted that they are thinking of abro-
gating the Rio defense pact and expelling the US military
group.

Brazil

Brazil* s foreign policy reflects its very real great
power aspirations. It wants to develop new markets and
to expand existing ones for Brazilian exports, and it is
working to achieve and demonstrate independence of ths US
in foreign affairs. These are not new attitudes, but
resentment of US hxnaan rights and nuclear proliferation
policies has heightened Brazilian sensitivities and
evoked dramatic reactions such as Brasilia's severance
last year of military ties with Washington.

Brazil is particularly concerned over the US position
on human rights, which it attacks as an unwarranted in- .
trusion into Brazil's domestic affairs. This truculence
masks a very real fear that the US, deliberately or not,
will encourage civilian dissent and increase domestic
demands for basic changes. T'Qiile President Geisel emd
President-elect Figueiredo seem to favor gradual liberal-
ization, they do not want the pace to be pushed by social
forces. Nevertheless, the government has now formally
ended press censorship and committed itself to restoring
habeas corpus in many political and national security
cases and shelving the decree law that gives the regime
sweeping dictatorial powers.

Brazilian officials are also acutely concerned that
the country'* s econoinic well-being is still fragile and

- 6 -
SECRET

vulnerable to outside forces. Thus, the Brazilians tend

?to view certaui. US trade positipns-rsuch as counter-i.
vailing duties--as harmful, to their. developmentJdrivei v ;
fueled ..as it is ever-ggpanding expoerts..; ia.

: especially true- tliis yeau:; because poor a^ibultural -
performance has- forced the government to Concentrate' bh 5
alleviating the baleince of payments probli^ -by promoting
more exports of manufactured goods to developedL nations.
One observer has noted that the intense focus on rapid
modernization tends to lead Brazilian policymakers to
perceive almost all foreign policy conflicts as potenti-
ally threatening to basic Brazilian interests ^

The Brazilians view US nuclear nonproliferation
concerns in a similar context, /often saying that US
opposition to the Brazil-West ..German nuclear accord is
merely a veiled attempt to constrain Brazilian growth.
They point out the critical importance to them of non-
fossil fuel as a source of energy because of the high
cost of imported oil. Argentina’s decision to develop
reprocessing technology will almost certainly prompt
Brazil to follow suit.

Added to these specific problems with the US is the
growing opinion in Brazil that the US has lost or is
losing its resolve and even some of its capacity as a
world power. The sizable conservative sector in Brazil
sees the US limited in its capacity for action abroad by
an excess of permissiveness, an aura of decadence, and
the aftermath of its experience in .Vietnam, The situ-
ation in Africa is perceived as the best current example
of this development. t.

The US is viewed from an environment in which there
is a tradition of a very strong executive, with power
wielded by an elite that distrusts and fears the masses.
At present the government is controlled and supported by
a conservative military that is strongly anti-Communist
and convinced that Brazil is a prime target of the inter-
national Communist movement, ■

- 7 -
SCCRB T

EO 13526

i

The general populace is somewhat more sensitized to
. .. the issue of human rights than people in the rest of the
Southern Cone because of the low incidence of terrorist
i .UCtiyity in tixe country and the growing; civil rights ; .*1 ;X

mOy^^t among the black population; * The -Braz£iiah. ”X’^’—^ ; -'-'-1, 2

churcfefias also been a factor- throuc^jits; Ibn^ .champi-#' 'X ; ' ' jSX:
bning'. of the • human f ighte cause and Mts' psnj tests: agaittst I - " “ ' , ,
government policies » Nevertheless , like other Latin^^^^ v^ ^ J
American countries, Brazilians^ in. general, adhere to
authoritarian, paternalistic cultural patterns and are: . ■ .

much more tolerant of limitations on the individual than ' ^

North Americans. In a recent conversation the chief of
the Brazilian National Intelligence Service' rhetorically
questioned which posed the greater threat to Brazil — the
US or the Soviet Union? The intelligence chief went on
to wonder why the US did not understand Brazil ' s problems
and why Washington would not assist a gradual move toward
democratic government rather than engage in constant and
unproductive criticism.

Chile

Chilean leaders have long been convinced that US
policy on human rights has been aimed specifically at
them. The Pinochet government is bewildered by tbis ^
because it believes that it has made substantial progress
in eliminating human rights violations, but it has yet to
hear any favorable_coin ment from Wa shington. President
Pinochet is i3SB38EHHi disappointed by the

lack of US recognition of the improving situation in •

Chile. He believes that he is being criticized with the
same intensity as before he tried to make improvements.

The Chileans will be interested in the US vote on the UN
Human Rights Committee ' s attempt to provide funds to
"victims” of Chilean human rights violations.

Among the human rights advances the Chileans cite
are: a relaxation of press controls and an end to the
state of siege; a reduction in the curfew; an amnesty for
political prisoners and official consent for most exiles
to return; a sweeping reorganization and reform of the

8

EO 13526

intelligence service, which had been resconsible f'vr much
of the abuse of human rights; civilian appointments to
the- cabinet, including the key Interior Ministry, which
" ir responsible for the intellig^ce service;; accelerated
• completion o£ a new constitution and: advancement ..in^ th^;^.
-.timetablerfor ah elected^ government; preparation; pi;a -new;

. labor; code with plans tot reinstitube^epllective- b^gaihing
next year; and the visit of the UK -H.T#an- Rig^ Ccrnmittee
delegation. ^ .2 2.' 2 '

The Chilean military sees itself as a traditional
ally of the 'US and. believes that Washington "encouraged"
the coup against Allende. Once Allende was overthrown,
however, the military believes' that the US was forced by
domestic political concerns to become strongly critical
of the new govesmment and to deny any part in the coup.

The Chileans are now convinced that US-ChilecUi
relations will never be the same. They believe that
there is a small coterie in Washington that is actively
working to undermine the Pinochet regime. They find it
incomprehensible that the US does not realize that the
stringent government controls in Chile were a necessary
course of action after the overthrow of the Marxist
Allende regime. They also think that the US is being
overzealous in its prosecution ' of the Letelier case > me
Chilean media have contrasted this enthusiasm with what
it describes as a lack of interest in finding out the
"truth" in the Kennedy assassination. Anti-US nation-
alism is easily aroused. For excimple, a Washington Post
editorial in June calling for Pinochet to resign and be
replaced by a Christiein Democratic goyerninent was de-
nounced in a series of man-in-the- street interviews and
was described by nearly everyone as am unwarranted in-
trusion in Chilean affairs.

The opposition political parties, meanwhile, view US
human rights policy as made to order for their own cam-
paign against the government. The Christian Democrats,
in particular, hope that the fallout from the Letelier
case will bring down Pinochet.

- 9 -
SECRE T

EO 13526

While the Chileans believe they are being unfairly
treated by Washington, there is stilJL a strong, prp-DS / y;
feeling in the country^; I:Iiiita^ officers and'pivili^ i 1;
£ admire^ tiie and, votid- liKe ytl^ir jponnfc^^
' eventually- to Evolve al<3ng' US 'ilnes\;>'-De:spi
= pei:i;:epti-Qn ’-dist rus t - rdf the' US the* Chiid'ani^ £g^db^uron^;^

between the^ two countr ies
The Chileans ' appear

cerii.'is that the poor f-elations
will deteriorate even further^

determined to refrain from any hostile act or statement
against the US and continue tp hope for better treatment.
For example. Foreign Minister Cvibillos.' recently devoted
most of a meeting with Secretary Vance to setting forth
the Chilean position the Beagle Channel negotiations
with Argentina. Despite the poor irela.<irlcns with t±te OS 7
Cubillos clearly hoped that Washington would use its
influence to soften Argentina J s' position in the dispute.

Cubillos went on to explain the evolutionary process
of the return to democratic government in Chile. He
acknowledged the Chilean belief that civilian goveriiment
is impossible now, but pointed out that political insti-
tutionalization is under way. Cubillos' remarks and the
general atmosphere in Santiago suggest that even though
there are strong feelings in Chile favoring an accommo-
dation with the US, there is little chance of a quick
return to civilian rule. Not only has the government
been successful in solving the country's chronic economic
problems, there are strong memories of the political and
economic chaos of the Allende years--in sum there is
little desire to return the country* to the politicians.

Paraguay £

President Stroessner has been in' power since 1954,
and there appears to be little chance for any change in
the policies that, in his view and in the view of many
Paraguayans , have brought the. country internal peace,
stability, and economic progress. The Stroessner regime
has a poor human rights record, but there is some evi-
dence that improvements are being made and indications

- 10 -
SECRE T'

EO 13526

X"

that combined Western diplomatic pressure is beginning, to
;;.have an effect, however slight.^ ...

toe ^recOTt.exan^Ie;^^ - 9^ Air^^sbed liu®an;-/^::i^

r i^t^'-activis tv Itoiaingo iiaiTio:r dn? ;the • ;cdnibine^cjr"' .

>ef forts -ibf - the VS/Mest Germany.,' the ‘United ‘ kingdom, and
France 'resulted in Laino *'s release from piri son . ' ' 'Indeed / ” •
largely as a result of DS pressure, Paraguay has released
almost all of its political prisoners from jail. Human
rights, however, will probably continue to be a problem
because of the subservience of the judiciary to presi-
dential authority and the lack of control over police
interrogation methods.

The US Ambassador in Asuncion noted as early as last
May that the Paraguayans were improvinq their human
rights performance. He called the; move by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to cut expansion credits euad
the military training program for Paraguay from the
fiscal year 1979 Foreign Assistance Bill too harsh in the
face of improved conditions. He argued that Washington's
continued ignorance of improvements played into the hands
of hardliners who urge suppression of all dissidence.

The Paraguayan Government's public response to the
US human rights policy has been negative. President
Stroessner often cites his staunch anti-Communism as well
as concern over terrorism and subversion as reasons for
strict controls. Many members of the Paraguayan po-
litical elite are plainly worried by what they see as the
US failure to meet the Soviet-Cviban challenge in Africa.

They see the US as a weakened ally that can no longer be
counted upon to fight against Communist aggression. They
regard US criticism of their country as naive and an
invasion of their domestic affairs.

Because of the extent of media censorship in the
country, it is difficult to determine what the populace
thinks O— Stroessner regime. The President appears
to.be personally popular, however, and his travels about
the country^ are enthusiastically received by the citizens.

- 11 -
SECRhT '

EO 13526

A return to civilian rule any time soon is highly unlikely

Uruguay

--i vt

/ seme steps during the past’ 'year ^'tp'",
-improve human rights conditions, ^ aittaugh the overall
situation remains poor. The goyemment retains extensive'^
statutory powers of control that it is reluctant to give 1
up. On the- average, fewer political arrests have been
made in 1978 than last year, and there have been far
fewer instances of mistreatment of political prisoners.
Although the judicial system is hamstrung by executive
controls and is far from independent, military courts are
reducing the backlog of political and subversive cases
and are ordering the release of , increasing numbers of
detainees. The local press is beginning to advocate more
freely—if cautious ly--an expeditious return to civilian
government.

Among the positive measures taken by the government
cure: ; permission for an America!^ Bar Association visit in
April? plans to puolish a list of prisoners released
since 1 January 1978; an intention to invite the Inter-
national Red Cross to visit Uruguay and to open talks
with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission on ground
rules for a visit? and curtailment of prisoner detentions
under emergency powers. Most indications are that the
regime would like to improve its image abroad cind will
move steadily to change its huiaan rights practices.

Once South America's most liberal democracy, Uruguay
may now be the region’s most highly controlled society.

To explain this , Uruguayan leaders point out that
Washington has no appreciation for the intensity of the
struggle against the Tupamaro guerrillas. The Uruguayan
military* sees this battle as a defense of its national
moral values, patriotism, and honor. For this reason, it
remains adamantly opposed to US human rights policies and
has attei-pted to discredit the US through a well-managed
media esr^aign.

- 12 -
SECRET

EO 13526

jEO 13526

Many rightist military officers oppose the US and
want to follow the Brazilian political mode. On the
'other hand^ General Gregorio Alvarez^ the cosmander ;in
chief of the Army \rtio wants, to be President some dayr^ '^Vv'
^supports a new evaluation of the human fights . situation
:^ 2 qid is raoying cautiousiy tO; compel military off icersf to'^'V^
accept his . reform iaeaLsures . ‘ . The strength of the" rightisti;
officers, however, should not be xinderestimated, however.’
Their recent pique at remarks of the US Army attache and
subsequent campaigns to have him recalled are instructive.

Moreover, even if General Alvarez is successful in
his campaign, the Uruguayan military has no intention of
ending its control of the gove3cnment until 1986. Mean-
while, Uruguay's poor human rights performance, together
with US legislative and policy restrictions on ecoiiomic
and militajiY assistance > are inpadiments to better
relations . Uruguayans hope that a new , more positive
attitude toward human rights will result in better re-
lations with the US, but they insist that Washington
should have no illusions about the prospects for an early
return to civilian government.

- 13 -
3ECRS?

iEO L3526

Distribution List;

Original - Robert Pastor, NSC Staff Chief, Executive Office Bldg.

UNCLASSIFIED

36.

Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
GC 78-10220

Washington, November 1978

1 Source; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 11, Beagle Channel. Confidential. An unknown hand
wrote “Country File 1 1/29/78” in the right-hand margin of the first page of the paper. A
December 1978 version of this paper, with document munber GC 78-10224, is identical except
for a corrected map detailing the Antarctic claims of Chile and Argentina. (Central Intelligence
Agency, [text not declassified], Job 79T01050A, Box 2, Folder 6, Argentina-Chile Dispute at the
End of the Earth GC 78-1 0224)

UNCLASSIFIED

Confiden t ial -

BMOW TMWUW 3W. IV oaorwoacflb

National

Foreign

Assessment

Center

Argentina-Chile:

Dispute at the End of the Earth

A Research Paper

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

Coiifideiitia t

GC 78-10220
November 1978

S3«OMV TVNOUVN 3Hii.V(B3nQ0tka«

^ O N F < DENTIAL

Argentina-Ghlle: Dispute at the End of the Earth

Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center

November 1978

The current dispute between Argentina and Chile
over the Beagle Channel and related territorial
claims has a long and complex history. It is typical of
many other South American boundary problems
that stem from early, ambiguously worded agree-
ments and treaties that were formulated before
accurate maps were available. This paper addresses
the major issues in the Argentina-Chile dispute.

The Beagle Channel lies near the southern tip of
South America and serves as an alternate route
between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to the Strait
of Magellan and to the course around Cape Horn. A
treaty negotiated in 1881 stipulates that the bound-
ary between Argentina and Chile should run north-
south through Tierra del Fuego, dividing Isla Grande
into two parts, with Argentina getting the eastern
part and Chile the western part. All islands along the
Atlantic coast were to belong to Argentina: those
south of the Beagle Channel as far as Cape Horn
and all along the Pacific coast were to belong to
Chile.

Differing interpretations of the treaty soon arose.
The Chileans claimed that the north-south line divid-
ing Isla Grande was to stop at the northern shore of
the Beagle Channel, so that the channel itself as well
as all territory to the south belonged to Chile. The
Argentines countered that the north-south line
reached midchannel and that a portion of the chan-
nel, belonged to them. The Chileans also held that
the channel extends eastward as far as Cabo San
Pio, making the small islands of Picton, Lennox, and

Note: This oaoer was prepar ed by\

Offi ce of Geo-
graphic and Cartoaraphic Research.]

EO 1 3526 3.5(c)

Nueva theirs; whereas the Argentines claimed that
the channel turns southward to the west of Picton
and Lennox, and the islands are therefore Argentine.

Picton, Lennox, and Nueva. ownership of which
has become a matter of nationai pride to both
countries, have no more than a dozen or so
permanent or seasonal Chilean residents and no
Argentines; goid placers once exploited on them
have tong since played out, and with the possible
exception of some nitrate deposits, they contain no
known mineral or other resources of significance. In
recent years, however, the importance of Tierra del
Fuego as a whole has grown, both economically and
strategically. Oilfields and enormous sheep ranches
occupy the northern part of the region. In the south.
Ushuaia, Argentina, has grown from a mere outpost
to a town of 6,000 inhabitants. It has an airfield, a
naval base, port and petroleum storage facilities, a
radio station, a hydroelectric piant, and a road that
allows overland communication with the north. Chile
maintains a small naval base at Puerto Williams,
south of the Beagle Channel on Isla Navarino.
Puerto Williams has an airstrip, a radio station, a
hotel, and a civilian population of about 700.

A series of incidents, including one in which a
Chilean PT boat entered Ushuaia Bay and was fired
at by an Argentine patrol ship in 1967, led Chile to
unilaterally seek British arbitration. Argentina re-
jected the idea at the time, but signed a treaty in
1972 whereby the International Court of Justice
would study the problem and submit its verdict to

■ CONriOENT I AL

[Omitted are iiiaps and photographs of the Beagle Channel and its islands.]

the British Crown for approval or disapproval. In
May 1977 the Court dedded that the Beagle Chan-
nel should be divided between the two countries and
the disputed islands awarded to Chlie; implementa-
tion of the dedsion. which was accepted by the
British, was set for 2 February of the foOor^ng year.
But in December 1977, Argentina, which had al-
ready indicated it would not accept the Court's
ruling, began a press campaign and a rHimber of
economic and mHItary moves to prompt concesdons
from Chile. Preddents Vkjela of Argentina and
Pinochet of Chile met in Mendoza. Argentina, in
January 1978, and iri Puerto Montt, ChHe, in Febru-
ary, and signed agreements creating a joint commis-
sion and outlining a phased negotiation process.
The first phase ended in April without any si^ificant
progress.

As the second phase of negotiations proceeded,
the focus of attention shifted away from the islands
in the mouth of the Beagle Channel to a number of
smaller islands to the south. Including Evoiit,
^mevelt, and Homos. Argentina wants a boundary
that would link these islands before it turns south
along the Cape Horn meridian, or, better yet, an
alignment that would place orre or more of the
islands entirely in Argentine territory. Intrusion of the
Chileans into the Atlantic is resented by the Argen-
tines, who feel that it breaks a gentlerhan's agree-
ment between the two countries that Argentina

should be an Atlantic power and Chile exclusively a
Pacific power.

Argentina is also concerned about the affect the
Court's awards to ChHe might have on control of
ocean resources; both countries claim sovereignty
over resources within 200 miles of the coast Owner-
ship of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva may bear on the
location of the boundary between the two respective
200-mlle zones and could give Chile a dzabie slice
of the South Atlantic. Continental shelf petroleum
and coastal fisheries are the resources of greatest
interest, but the value and the ektent of these In the
area are unknown. The shelf east of Nueva Island,
however, is quite narrow, about 15 miles wide,
beyond which the bottom drops rapidly to abyssal
depths. It is. therefore, much less attractive for
development than Argentina’s broad shelf on the
northeastern side of Tierra del Fuego, which has
rich, relatively untapped fish resources and potential
oil deposits that may rival those of the North
Sea— although the latter will take many years of
exploration to determine.

- An additional Argentine concern is that the Inter-
national Court ruling will adversely affect their
Antarctic claim which overiaps that of Chile: Pre-
suinably, they fear that any extension of Chilean
territory eastward into the Atlantic will lend weight to
Chilean claims to territory directly to the south on
the Antarctic Peninsula

CUNt-IUhNTIAL

3

UNCLASSIFIED

37.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, November 27, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45,
Latin America, 8-12/78. Secret. Sent for information. Inderfurth and Denend initialed the
memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

BECRET -

^NFORMATIOlj
MEMORANDUM FOR:

7"4

I

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

2

U> I

27, 1978 j

t

/ i

ADP Declassification Review

FROM:

SUBJECT:

ROBERT PASTOR

Beagle Channel Update

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

since November 2 when the special Argentine-Chilean commission
adjourned without having reached an agreement on the juris-
dictional dispute in the Beagle Channel, several diplomatic
messages between the two countries' Presidents have been
exchanged. The Argentines agreed to a Chilean proposal that
a mediator be chosen to resolve the dispute only if boundary
questions could be discussed first. The Argentines want
exclusive maritime claims in the Atlantic, and three islands
in the Beagle Channel under Chilean jurisdiction threaten
these claims. The Chileans have resisted the idea of setting
such terms of reference for a mediator.

Intelligence reports indicate that the GOA has been hastily
purchasing arms: patrol boats from Israel, France, West
Germany, and South Korea; aircraft from Israel (30 Mirage III
jets) and France (parts for Alouette helicopters) ; ammunition
from France (the Exocet naval missile), U.K., West Germany,
Belgium, Italy; and communication egtiipmeat f - r-mn. R ranof* and
Isra^. Hardliners in the Argentine military believe the
time has come for a show of force. One of the leaders of
this group, the commanding general of Argentina's I Corps,
told our Ambassador that if the dispute is not resolved by
the first two weeks in December, Araentina would take th^
initiative and fight Chile. Reinforcing this message, the
admiral who commands the Argentine Coast Guard told an
American Embassy officer last Friday (November 24) that
Argentina will occupy the disputed territory and will break
diplomatic and trade ties with Chile unless negotiations are
resumed in ten days.

We have just learned from the Chilean Foreign Minister that
he is pleased by the conciliatory nature of Argentina's latest
note, which is reported to have recommended the modalities of
the December 11 Foreign Minister's meeting in Buenos Aires,
and he will recommend that Pinochet accept it. it's not cle'aT
yet whether this means that the Chileans have accepted
Argentina's definition of the issue.

Our position has remained one of talking to both sides (and
others — e.g., the Brazilians) without getting in between. I
continue to believe that is the best course. Trying to
mediate between the Argentines and the Chileans would make
Camp David look easy, and we just don't have the same kind
of stake in the Beagle Channel that we have in the Middle
East.

UNCLASSIFIED

38.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy

Washington, December 8, 1978, 2343Z

310384

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780507-0584. Confidential;
Flash; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Buenos Aires, Santiago, Bogota, Brasilia,
Caracas, Montevideo, Mexico City, and Lima. Drafted by Ruser and Bumpus; cleared by
Guzman and in EUR, lO/UNP, and S/S-0; approved by Vaky.

UNCLASSIFIED

Document View

Page 1 of ^

ceN P ip ew TO tt:

EXDXS

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PAGE 01 STATE 310384

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INFO AHEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

AMBMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE

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REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 09558 -IB)

1. -fe- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. DEPARTMENT IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT
CONFIBBHTIAL

OOMDIDnNTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 310384

HOSTILITIES MAY BE IMMINENT IN THE DISPUTE BETWEEN
ARGENTINA AMD CHILE OVER THE ISLANDS SOUTH OF THE
BEAGLE CHANNEL AND THE RESULTING CLAIMS TO MARITIME
ZONES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. MEDIATION BY THE POPE —
A POSSIBILITY IN WHICH ARGENTINA IS INTERESTED --
MAY BE CME OF THE FEN REMAINING POSSIBILITIES OF
AVOIDING BLOODSHED. AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO
APPROACH VATICAN, EXPRESS OUR GRAVE CONCERN THAT
ARGENTINA MAY RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION IF THE
DECEMBER 12 FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IS NOT
SUCCESSFUL AND ENCOURAGE VATICAN MAKE A FIRM OFFER
TO MEDIATE THE DISPUTE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. ARGENTINA AND CHILE HAVE CARRIED ON AN INCREASINGLY
ACRIMONIOUS DISPUTE OVER TERRITORIAL RIGHTS TO ISLANDS

AND ISLETS SOUTH OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL FOR NEARLY 100
YEARS. THE DISPUTE WAS SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION IN
1971 AND THE AWARD WHICH HAS HANDED DOWN BY THE BRITISH
CROHN FOR THE THREE MAJOR INHABITED ISLANDS PRINCIPALLY
FAVORED CHILE. ARGENTINA DECLARED THE AWARD VOID IN
JANUARY 1978. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
SINCE THAT TIME HAVE BEEN LARGELY UNSUCCESSFUL AND

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EVEN BEFORE FORMAL TALKS ENDED ON NOVEMBER 2, ARGENTINA
BEGAN SABRE RATTLING EXERCISES INTENDED TO CONVINCE
THE CHILEANS THAT HOSTILITIES WOULD RESULT IF A
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE AGREED UPON. CHANGING
POLITICAL REALITIES IN ARGENTINA HAVE PROJECTED HARD-
LINERS WHO FAVOR A WAR WITH CHILE INTO INCREASINGLY
POWERFUL POSITIONS.

1. OUR AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES HAS HAD SEVERAL
CONVERSATIONS WITH PAPAL NUNCIO TO ARGENTINA, LAGHI, WHO
eONPIBBHTIMr

e eiWFiaEi ff iAL

PAGE 03 STATE 310384

HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE POPE MIGHT BE WILLING TO MEDIATE
THE DISPUTE IF HE FELT THAT SITUATION WAS SUFFICIENTLY
CRITICAL AND THAT FURTHER BILATERAL PROGRESS COULD NOT
BE MADE (REFTEL A) .

5. THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT CRITICAL POIN^

IN THE DISPUTE MAY HAVE BEEN REACHED (REFTEL B) IN
FACT, LATEST INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE SITUATION MAY
BE EVEN MORE CRITICUUj THAN WE HAD PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT.

6. YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT HIGHEST RANKING
CURIA OFFICIAL AVAILABLE AND MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- USG BELIEVES THAT POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN
ARGENTINA AND CHILE IS IMMINENT.

-- DEMARCHES TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA BY THE US, THE
EC- 9 AND NUMEROUS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE NOT
DIMINISHED THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR; THE TWO COUNTRIES
MAINTAIN THEIR APPARENT COLLISION COURSE.

--IF THE DECEMBER 12 MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
DOES NOT REACH SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT, AMD THIS APPEARS
INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF THE CHILEAN INSISTENCE
ON LIMITING THE QUESTION TO MARITIME BOUNDARIES WHILE
ARGENTINA DEMANDS THAT ALL TERRITORY IN THE FAR SOUTH
BE CONSIDERED, WAR SEEMS LIKELY.

-- HO?»BVER, IF THE POPE WERE TO IMMEDIATELY OFFER

HIS (300D OFFICES TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT, THIS

MIGHT POSSIBILY AVERT CONFLICT. ONLY THE MORAL AUTHORITY

OF THE POPE NAY BE ABLE TO AVERT WHAT APPEARS TO

BE A SLIDE INTO WAR.

-- PAPAL EFFORTS COULD BE EXPRESSED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS,
INCLUDING: PERSONAL MESSAGES TO BOTH PRESIDENTS, PUBLIC
GOHPiDiarraAB -

OONPIDUHTIAB

PAGE 04 STATE 310384

STATEMENT URGING PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND/
OR AN INVITATION TO PRESIDENTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO
MEET WITH HIM TO REVIEW SITUATION IF THIS IS
APPROPRIATE .

--IF THE S,TUATION IS DETERIORATING AS IT APPEAR- TO US
THAT IT IS, WHATEVER IS DONE MUST BE DRAMATIC ENOUGH TO
GIVE ARGENTINA SERIOUS PAUSE . VANCE

OOMPIDmrPIAi r

UNCLASSIFIED

39.

Memorandum for the Record
Washington, December 8, 1978

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job
81B001 12R, Box 15, Folder 41, DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos/ Agendas of Brzezinski/ Aaron
Meetings, August-December 1978. Secret.

UNCLASSIFIED

8 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary Vance,
Secretary Brown and Mr. Aaron, 8 December 1978, ori
Covert Action Finding (U)

1. I raised the issue of a possible covert action finding on the
Beagle Channel in order t-o^let iis usp our influence to keep the situat-ion-
calTii. There was instant and vehement rejection of this in view ot tne
fact that the United Stat
oin

2 . I think we should send a cable ^QISBSSIffllfflDHHHHthat it
is the US open position to oppose military con flict over the Beaole Ch annel
issue and that they can support that position

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

UNCLASSIFIED

40.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter
Washington, December 13, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21,
Evening Reports (State), 12/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum. Christopher was acting
for Vance, who was in London, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem December 9-15.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRCT

if II

d.

December 13, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM; Warren Christopher, Acting La7. c.

Beagle Channel . The meetings in Buenos Aires
between tte Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Chile
on the Beagle Channel dispute were not successful.

The Argentines rejected a Chilean compromise package,
including Papal mediation, by insisting that the two
countries first resolve the issue of sovereignty over
the islands. The Chilean Foreign Minister returned
to Santiago this afternoon. Senior T^gentine military
commanders are expected to meet tomorrow morning to
consider further steps. Chile put its military forces
on full alert early this morning, matching actions
taken by Argentina several weeks ago.

Yesterday I called in the Argentine and Chilean
Ambassadors to warn them against using force to re-
solve the dispute. Both reco^ize that it is a
dangerous situation, but I am not at all confident
that their countries will show the restraint I urged
on them. Right now, the risk of armed conflict seems
high.

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

[Omitt e d - h e r e ar e it e m fr unrelat e d - to Latin Ameriea]

RDS-2/3 12/13/98

UNCLASSIFIED

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Latin America.]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

41.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and Chile

Washington, Deeember 15, 1978, 0118Z

315625

1 Souree: National Arehives, RG 59, Central Foreign Poliey File, P840139-1813. Confidential;
Niaet; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to USUN. Drafted by Bushnell;
eleared in ARA, 10, and S/S-0 and by Brzezinski; approved by Christopher.

UNCLASSIFIED

Dbcmnent View

Page 1 of 2

eo w w D eNT M t:

eOMPIBB CTI M.

PAGE 01 STATE 315625

ORIGIN NODS -00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /OOl R

DRAFTED BY ARA: JABDSHNBIli.-NLF

APPROVED BY D - MR. CHRISTOPHER

ARA:R6UZMAN

NSC: OR. BRZEZINSKI

IO:GHELKAN

S/S-0:SVAI.ERGA

010421 150131Z /62

O 150118Z DEC 78 ZFF6
FH SECSTATB MASHDC

TO AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

e e MPIDEWllAL STATE 315625

NODIS

E.O. 12065: 60S 12/14/84 (BUSHNELL, JOHN)

TAGS: POIP, PBOR, AR, Cl

SUBJECT: BEAGIiE CHANNEL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT VIDELA

1. -fC'-ENTIRB TEXT)

2. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES: YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE SOONEST TO PRESIDENT VIDELA FROM PRESIDENT CARTER
(EMBASSY SANTIAGO: THIS IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IN MAKING
SIMILAR APPROACH SET FORTH IN SEPTEL) :

BEGIN TEXT:

CUNDlUtiMTlAL

GOMFIBE WT iia ;

PAGE 02 STATE 315625

AS YOU KNOW, FOR SOME DECADES ONE OF THE GREAT
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE COUNTRIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE IS
THAT DISPUTES HAVE BEEN MANAGED PEACEFULLY. IN THIS
SPIRIT, MY COUNTRY NEGOTIATED WITH PANAMA A HEW TREATY
ON THE CANAL TO DEAL WITH A LONGSTANDING SOURCE OF TENSICBI
BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. I AM CONCERNED THAT THE CURRENT
MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN ARGENTINA COULD RESULT IN EVENTS
GETTING OUT OF CONTROL WITH HOSTILITIES COMMENCING AND
ESCALATING. I KNOW THESE CONCERNS ARE SHARED BY MANY OF
OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE HEMISPHERE AND IN THE WORLD. WE
ARE WORKING FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD AND HAVE ALWAYS BEEN
FORTHRIGHT AND CLEAR IN QUICKLY CONDEMNING AGGRESSION.

IF AGGRESSION HERB TO OCCUR BECAUSE OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL
DISPUTE, WE WOULD SPEAK OUT STRONGLY AGAINST IT.

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT WANT TO INJECT ITSELF INTO
THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS COMPLICATED MATTER AND WE HOPE EARLY
PROGRESS CAN BE MADE BUILDING ON YOUR TALKS THIS WEEK,
PERHAPS INCLUDING A MUTUAL MILITARY STANDDOWN. HOWEVER,

HE WOULD BE PREPARED, IF BOTH PARTIES WISHED, TO CONSULT
WITH OTHERS TO HELP DEVELOP A PROMPT MEDIATION BY SOME
OTHER PARTY.

GIVEN THE PEACEFUL TRADITION OF OUR HEMISPHERE,

I BELIEVE OPEN AND CLEAR COMMUNICATION OF OUR POSITIONS

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IS CRITICAL FOR ALL OUR EFFORTS TOWARD A PEACEFUL WORLD.
PLEASE ACCEPT MY MESSAGE IN THIS SPIRIT.

I AM ALSO INDICATING MY CONCERNS TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF CHIU;.

END TEXT.

e P UF i D EMTl M. -

eew KPE i mAL

PAGE 03 STATE 315625

3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT AND WOULD
PREFER GOA FOLLOW SAME PRACTICE.

4. FOR USUN: YOU MAY INFORM WALDHEIM THAT THE PRESIDENT
HAS ENCOURAGED THE PARTIES TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

5. PLEASE DELIVER TEXT IN ENGLISH, SINCE WE WISH TO AVOID
ANY DIFFERENCES IN TRANSLATION NUANCES.

CHRISTOPHER

eONPIDBWTtA I f

NNN

CO W FI P e W TtA f

UNCLASSIFIED

42.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, December 21, 1978, 1754Z

321148

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528-0313. Confidential;
Flash; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Santiago and Rome. Drafted by Bumpus;
cleared in ARA/ECA and S/S-O and by Guzman; approved by Vaky.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Page 1 of 2

eO N W Oe W TI AL

EXDXS

eowPlP B W T Bar

PAGE 01 STATE 321148

ORIGIK SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY ARA/ECA: JBUMPITS :TR
APPROVED BY ARA:VFVAKY
ARA/ECA: CANORRBD
S/S-0:SVAliERGA
ARA:RGUZKAN

096792 211802Z /42

Z O 211754Z DEC 78 ZFF4
FM 8ECSTATE HASHDC
TO AHEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES FLASH
INFO AKEMBASSY SANTIAGO IHMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RONE IMMEDIATE

e e N P IPEW TI H It ' STATE 321148

EXDIS, RONE FOR VATICAN OFFICE

E.O. 12065 ;GDS 12/21/84 (CANORRED)

TAGS: PDIP, AR, Cl

SUBJECT: BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE

REF: BA 9958-

1. -te-- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOR AMBASSADOR CASTRO: YOU SHOULD SEEK IMMEDATB INTER-
VIEN WITH GENERAL VIOLA TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE.

--ESSENCE OF HIS MORNING CONVERSATION HAS REPORTED TO USG,
WHERE IT CAUSED DEEPEST CONCERN.

-- USG DOBS NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT PRESENT SITUATION IN
OOHPIDBNTIAL

CONriDBlTIAL ■

PAGE 02 STATE 321148

ANY HAY JUSTIFIES MILITARY ACTION BY ARGENTINA AGAINST
CHILE .

-- WAR IS DEFINITELY NOT RPT MOT THE ONLY OPTION AVAILABLE
TO ARGENTINA. THERE IS THE REASONABLE OPTION OP
AVOIDING HOSTILE ACTION.

-- IF ARGENTINA HERE TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION, AND HE
WOULD UNDERSTAND OCCUPATION OF UNINHABITED ISLANDS IN
DISPUTE TO CONSTITUTE MILITARY ACTION, THE USG AND THE

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WORLD COMMUNITY WOULD BE FORCED TO VIEW SUCH A MOVE AS
AGGRESSION.

-- IF SUCH AGGRESSION TOOK PLACE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE
BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES.

— THE USG WISHES ONCE AGAIN, IN THE STRONGEST TERMS,
URGE THAT ARGENTINA SETTLE THIS TE BRITORTA T. DT.qpUTE WITH
CHILE IN A PEACEFUL MANNEk. CHRISTOPHER

UNCLASSIFIED

43.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter
Washington, December 21, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21,
Evening Reports (State), 12/78. Secret. Christopher was acting for Vance, who was in Geneva
meeting with Gromyko concerning SALT. Carter initialed the top right-hand comer of the
memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OP STATE
WASHINGTON

December 21, 1978 ^

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting IfcC-

1. Beagle Ghannej. . The Pope toiia^ decided to
send a special emi s s ar jr to Argentina sanp Chile to
assist them in reaching a negotiated settiefflent of
the dispute. Argentina has accepted the i=>™vssarv,
and y?e expect Chile will do the same, uanger of
conflict is still present. Basic differences over
boundary lines remain. Hardline Argentine military
officers who pushed Videla toward war retain their
commands and could undermine the peace effort at
any time.

Late this evening (December 21) , Chile has
called for a special OAS meeting tomorrow under the RIO
pact. We hope this will not derail the Pope's effort.

[ Omitt e d h e re ere items unr e lat e d to the B e agle Chann e l - disput e ]

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

RDS-2/3 12/21/78

UNCLASSIFIED

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Beagle Channel dispute.]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

44.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, April 25, 1979

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46,
Latin America, 2-5/80. Confidential.

UNCLASSIFIED

(

' COtlFIDB N^^Mr

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT:

THE WHITE HOUSE

wash I n gton
April 25, 1979

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Consultations with Latin American and
Caribbean Governments on Global Issues (C)

An important new direction which the President set in his Pan
Americcui Day speech of -1977 was his pledge to consult more fully
with Latin Americein and Caribbean governments on global issues.

This new policy direction rested on three premises: (1) that the
cooperation and support of Latin AmericcUi cuid Caribbean govern-
ments are necessary to deal effectively with a wide range of global
issues; (2) that Latin American governments view world affairs from
' a combined western and Third World perspective, and thus their
advice could be useful to us as we formulate our policies; and (3)
that regular consultations on global as well as bilateral issues
will demonstrate our trust and attention to these countries and
help us achieve more balanced and mutually respectful relation-
ships. (C)

There is a great need today for such global consultations. Many
of the governments in the area play important roles in global fora
yet they often lack the infonnation with which to make reasoned
judgments. Other governments sometimes fill the information gap
and gain the kind of trust which genuine consultations can bring.

We risk too much by remaining idle in this area. (C)

Let me suggest that we begin to implement a comprehensive plan
for consulting on a wide range of global issues on a regular basis
with selected governments in the region, ooviousiy, one wants to
tailor the briefings to the particular coiintry, and one wants to
allow the Ambassador discretion as to timing, audience (Foreign
Minister or President) , and even whether a particular briefing
should be given. (C)

With respect to Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, we should try to
be sensitive to consulting on virtually all important issues or
informing these governments of decisions, very much like we do
with NATO countries. In addition, our Ambassadors should consult
with the Foreign Ministers (or perhaps Heads of State) of other
countries in the area with influence in international affairs.

CONriDENT TRl:

Z. Brzezinski

. - . L ‘X '-3 April 10, 19 8 5

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DECLASSIFIED

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- 2 -

r

including Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana,
Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad, Barbados, and Costa Rica. Issues for
routine consultations could include: Southern Africa, the Middle
East, Cuba, international economic issues of particular concern
to the developing world, energy, and SALT. (C)

UNCLASSIFIED

45.

Memorandum for the Record
Washington, May 10, 1979

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job
81M00919R, Box 6, Folder 12, B-303 President 1 Jul-31 Dec 1979. Secret.

UNCLASSIFIED

S>»cutjT«

23L~//yy

10 May 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation,'^ May 1979

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1. I discussed the briefingsSE^SE dur respectiv e Ainbassadc
conducted for the Presidents of Brazil and Venezuela.

2. A brief discussion took nla

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

_ The Vice President endbrsedi

■■■that Herrera was a likable personality, and said he thought the
President woald enjoy working with him.

3. I mentioned Argentina and briefly noted that the war against
terrorism had been won, but in the process a number of innocent people
had been killed. Nevertheless, Argentina's human rights performance is
now Improving.

4. In connection with human rights. I recalled the President's
statement to the Cabinet a year ago <that while we must continue to press
our human rights policy, we also needed to understand that many of these
countries are our friends and that they have real problems. I said I
didn't think Argentina and Brazil perceived our policies as being
implemented in that sense. In particular, I found three areas of
concern:

a. The public report card aspect. This is particularly
grating to the Brazilians who consider themselves a great power.

b. A lack of flexibility in our policy when a country does
improve its performance. We seem to be unable to provide
incentives.

'j (j L‘u O Ij viz li ITu u

a . 6-3^

SUBnjzx-

|EO 13526 3.5(c)

c. The training of military people in the United States.
Much of the merit of these training programs has been in
exposing them to U.S. values, including our human rights
values. Yet, in the name of human rights we are cutting them
off from this exposure. In addition, we are creating a new
generation of military people in key countries who will be
oriented in other directions, and may possibly even be bitter
toward the U.S.

5. The comment was made that most of these are statutory provisions.
I said-yes, but I thought some flexibility existed. The comment was also
made that these were all good points, which should be conveyed to the
Congress.

UNCLASSIFIED

46.

Aide-Memoire Prepared in the National Security Council
Washington, August 9, 1979

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 17,
Ecuador, 1/77-1/81. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the aide-memoire.

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINSTON, O.C. 20506

CONFIDEtmMr

CD M TO tti fe

August 9f 1979

Aide-Memoire

SUBJECT: Secretary Vemce's Trip to Ecuador, August 10, 1979

The Secretary's trip to Oui-*-'^ comes at a portentous moment in
inter-American relations. The approach to narin America which
the Carter Administration has articulated over the last two
and one-half years represents a significant and positive de-
parture from that of previous administrations, but it is
seriously threatened at this time. The Secretary's trip
presents us with a unique opportunity to not only preserve the
integrity of our approach but to enhance it. -tGf
>

The Carter Administration has approached Latin America, guided
by three fiindamental principles:

— A commitment to non-intervention in the internal
affairs of other countries ^ -iGf

— A pledge of support for democratization, human rights,
and social justice, -fej-

— A commitment to multilateral consultation, and to the
extent possible, action. -(€}■

In practice, our policies have distanced the U.S. from the
status quo and from authoritarian regimes of the right. (We
had already found ourselves at such a distance from the one
leftist dictator in the hemisphere that the impulse for communi-
cation necessarily led us towards him. ) Our commitment to human
rights and social reform not only led us to withdraw support
from historical "friends" like Somoza, but it also changed the
power equation in many countries — increasing the cost of
repression, encouraging opposition groups, and in a sense de-
legitimizing the arbitrary use of power. Our pledge of non-
intearvention prevented us from direct involvement when our
interests were jeopardized, but it didn't stop the Cubans and
others from intervening. Our preference for multilateral con-
sultations often meant that we would lose critical moments
seeking support from others when independent action could have
been decisive. (C) '

CONFID B N - TI Afe-
Review on August 9, 1985

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED

. COltFIDEM g^Mr

These are the drawbacks of our approach. Critics claim that
we have de-stabilized Latin America without providing an
alternative. This is a weak argxament, attributing too much '
importance to U.S. influence and too little to indigenous
factors, but it is one that has been made. Nonetheless, there
have been important and to a great extent unanticipated changes
in inter-American relations these past two and one-half years,
and unless we take them into accovint and maJce some basic changes
in our approach, we may find ourselves trailing in the wake of
the Cubans.

The Heads of State and/or the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela,
Coloxnbia, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, and Paneuna will be in
Quito. These countries and a few like-minded countries from
the Caribbean like Barbados, Dominican Republic, and perhaps
Trinidad could form a nucleus of a working group to deal with
the problems gripping Central America and the Caribbean. There
are three objectives which could be set for the Secretary's
talks: (C )~

(1) To seek a common perception of the problems facing
Central America and the Caribbean . The problems in Central
America are different than those of the Caribbeeui; the only
thread that connects these divergent problems is Cuban policy
which seeks to aggravate emd exploit local situations for their
purposes, as they serve the broader geo-political aims of the
Soviet Union. In Central America, El Salvador, Honduras and
Guatemala are all troubled, though to varying degrees, by gross
inequalities and a rigid and closed socio-political system.

The masses are increasingly alienated from the governments;
political polarization is growing worse. In the Caribbean, a
new and young generation of leaders are looking to Cuba for
answers to the economic dilemma posed by non-viable mini-states, -(e)

(2) To seek common action among as mcuiy of the leaders as
possible . In Central America (including Nicaragua) we must
actively seek to strengthen the moderate democratic process .

In the Caribbean, we must make the Caribbean Group work, and
demonstrate to the new leaders that a moderate democratic path
can be more just and successful than a radical Ciiban model.

We must also seek to contain Cuba as a source of revolutionary
change, and try to deny Cuba the legitimacy it desperately
seeks — from Latin America, perhaps as much as from the U.S. -tCT

(3) To develop a mechanism to insure good coordination
and immediate action on the problems that face us . We should
not look to the O.A.S. at the beginning because it is too slow
and too open. We need to develop an ad hoc mechanism to deal
with the crisis that stands in front of us . Turbay of Colombia
may want to deal in abstractions, searching for the "new dimen-
sion" in in ter- American relations, but he, like Herrera, is also
a problem- solver, and they are beginning to sense a problem.

They need to be encouraged to act. i:Gf

CONF I DENTtAl .-

CONFIDENTIAL

The success of the Cubans in Nicaragua has had a paradoxical |

impact on Latin America. On the one hand, it has raised the |

level of concern about Cuban motives and capabilities. On the f

other hand, it has raised the level of respect by Latin |

America for Cuba as a political force of global importance. |

Undoubtedly, there are probably some leaders in Latin America \

who are questioning our strength and resolve as well, and it

will be important to make clear that our policy in Nicaragua !

was not a reflection of weakness, but of strength. At the

same time, we should make clear to them that the C\]bans are 1

pushing us to the limits of our tolerance. “fO 1

These Latin American leaders have a stake in the Carter Admin- |

istration's policies for four reasons, which could be used as \

instruments to weld a new coalition of like-minded American

democracies. (C -^- ‘

i

I

First, the principles which guide our policies are |

Latin America's, particularly non-intervention and multilateral |

consultation. (G) - !

— Secondly, events in Central America and the Caribbean
will affect them as much, if not more, than they will affect
the U.S. -fef

— Third, the U.S. made good on its pledge to replace ;

Somoza; our credibility with these countries ought to be high. (C) '

— Fourth, Cuban expansion and Cuba's military build-up
should be sources of growing concern for Latin T^rican I

leaders. Cuba now has one of the largest, if not the largest, ^

Latin American military forces; it has submarines; it has an
offensive capability. It has recently increased its subver-
sive political activities through legitimate (Caribbean) groups
cmd illegitimate guerrilla (Central American) groups. (C -)-

What specifically should be done? A lot, of course, depends on
the extent to which agreement can be reached on the three objec-
tives described above; and a lot will depend on what the Latins
have to say. The Cubans have set us and our democratic
colleagues off-balance, if not on the defensive, and I suspect
this will be evident in the conversations. The Venezuelans,

Costa Ricans, Panamanians, and others are all afraid that the
child -- Nicaragua — that they thought they had fathered may
actually be Fidel's. They need to stand together now- We
should encourage them to raise their voices in praise of
Ecuador and the democratic process and in condemnation of Cuba
and the violent revolutionary path. We should share intelli-
gence information more and consult regularly. (The Panamanians,
for example, have a lot more information on the Cubans in
Nicaragua than we do.) We should all agree to help El Salvador,

4

Honduras / and Guatemala by the formula we have agreed to;
reforms fc«r assistance. If the conversations are productive,
we may want to consider a summit meeting along the lines sug-
gested by Colombian President Turbay, only much more soecific
and only after full staff preparation. We may want to try to
develop the idea of a multilateral military assistance program
for Nicaragua eind for other Central American countries. CC) -

The Quito meetings have certain similarities with the Common-
wealth Summit in Lusaka* If we can emerge with a unified per-
ception and approach, we will have succeeded in enhancing our
policies and retrieving the initiative from the Cubans. (C)

^ ?r-f|

UNCLASSIFIED

47.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia,
Peru, Bolivia, and Nicaragua

Washington, August 13, 1979, 2221Z

211262

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 84D241, Vance EXDIS memcons, 1979. Confidential;
Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts
except addressees. Drafted by Bamebey; cleared by Pastor and Bremer and in S/S-0; approved
by Vaky.

UNCLASSIFIED

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED

- WNF I DEMT I AL

by John Rtepairiok, 4/24/2017 Department of State

D

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f4GE >1 OF R
OOtCIH SS-2i

state S11262

STATE 211262

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM
7914809

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Fi) SECSTATE WASHOC
TO AflENtASSY OUlTO tIUlEOIATE
AilElltASSY CARACAS IWIEOIATE
AflElWASSY lOGOTA ItmEOfATE
AHENCASSY UHA llUtEOIATE
AflEHSASSY I A PA2 IHNEOIATE
AicriBAssY Hanagua IHKEOIATE

ikFO All AHERtCAN REPUBlIC OIPIOKATIC POSTS IIIHEOIATE

XtlT AfiEHtASSY QUITO

AhEHSASSY CARACAS

ADEriBASST BOGOTA

AKilBASSY llltA

AiCIteASSV I A Paz

AHEHBASSY HANAGUA

-e- O- N f ■(■0 t <1 T 1 A t STATE 211262

^XOtS

E.O. 12Bt6 GDS-t/13/lS IBARREBEY. RAlCOlli R.t

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TAGS: Hass, xr,

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S HEETING VITR ANDEAN FOREIGN
flINISTERS: II. HIUTARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA

1. ENTIRE CONTENTS O BN U B ERT I AL.

2. SUWIARY. DURING HIS AUGUST 11 HEETING IN QUITO
WITH THE FIVE ANDEAN FOREIGN NINISTERS, SECRETARY VANCE

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xto wE m CONliBiRlNG HOW TO
AESPONO., ECUADOREAN FORIIIN PAREJA AM) OTHERS SAID THEY

Nad not been approacheo for such aid, and reiieveo andean
EFFORTS AT THIS STAGE SHOULD INSTEAD BE FOCUSSED ON
ROKARltARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTtOH AID. END SUINIARV.

3. THE SECRETARY, ACCOHPANIEO BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
VAXY and ROBERT PASTOR, COHTIHUED HIA DISCUSSIONS HITH THE
ANDEAN FOREIGN IIINISTERS B EE SEPTEli IN A DISCUSSION OF
POSSIBLE HlllTARY AHO/OR POLICE ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA.
THE SAHE ANOEAN FOREIGN HlRlSTERS HEHTIONED IN SEPTEL
PARTICIPATED.

4. THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT
iililTARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA. EXPLAINING THAT USG HAD
BEEN APPROACHEO INFORNALIY TO PROVIOE SUCH ASSISTANCE.
ECUADOREAN FONHIN PAREJA SAID THAT THE ANOEAN GROUP HAD
NOT BEEN Approached by tne gnr for such Assistance, and
ASKEO IF other LA COUNTRIES HAD BEER APPROACHED. THE
SECRETARY REPLIED THAT PAHAHA HAD BEEN ASHED FOR ASSISTANCE
AND KAO RESPONDED VITN A HOOEST PRDGRAN. RE SAID USG HAD
COIIE TO NO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OUR RESPONSE TO THIS
NICARAGUAN INQUIRY. HE ADDED THAT RE BELIEVES THERE ARE
GOOD REASONS TO BE RESPONSIVE, AND THAT OTHERS SHOULD
CONSIDER PROVIDING IMAT THEY CAN UEEPS OR tUllOOZERS,

ARHS OR UHATEVER A DONOR COUNTRY NIGHT DECIDE UPON). HE
SAID USG CONSIDERS THIS A SERIOUS ISSUE AND HE WOULD WEI-

CONE VIEWS OF TNE ANOEAH FOREIGN HINISTERS OH THIS SUBJECT.

6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY SAID THAT TNE PROBLEH HAS A
BEEPER OINEHSION; THE GNR NUST REFORK ITS HlllTARY FORCES
AND POLICE, AND TNE tlANNER IN HHICH THIS IS ACCONPLISNEO IS
OF INTEREST TO THE ENTIRE HENISPHERE. VAKY SAID THAT THIS
BEQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WOULD MEET A LEGITIKATE NEED. AND IN
THE CASE OF POLICE ASSISTANCE THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR USG
IN VIEW OF OUR LEGAL RESTRICTIONS. HE ASKED WHETHER,

SINCE USG IS THUS IHPEOEO FROK CERTAIN RINDS OF ASSISTANCE,
tfOULD IT NOT STILL BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF HENISPHERE
DENOCRATie COUNTRIES TO HELP, SO THAT GNR NEED ROT RESORT
TO SOVIET AND CUBAN SOURCES.

6. ECUADOREAN FONHIN PAREJA SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFI-
CULT TO GIVE AN IHHEDIATE ANSWER. HE COKNENTED THAT TO

Rid an arhy is a political act, in this case recalling

ASSISTANCE IN THE CREATION OF THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL
GUARD. HE SAID THAT PUBLIC OPINION WOUIO RECALL THE
CIRCUHSTANCES OF THE FORHATtON OF THE GN (READ THE USG ROLEI.
HE SAID THE HATTER IS A SERIOUS ONE WHICH SHOULD BE STUDIED
BY THE ANDEAN GROUP, BUT HE DIO NOT SEE ANY HAY IN WHICH
THE 606 FOR ITS PART COULD RENDER SUCH ASSISTANCE.

3. Assistant secretary vaxy stressed that he was noV

SUGGESTING FORCING ANY AID UPON NICARAGUA, BUT RATHER
ASKEO BOW LA COUNTRIES NIGHT RESPOND TO THE GNR'S OWN FELT
NEEDS. PERUVIAN FONHIN GARCIA BEOOYA REPLIED THAT GNR
MUST EVENTUALLY RE-EQUIP ITS ARNED FORCES IN ORDER TO HAVE
A STABLE ARNY, ANO WILL ORGANIZE ITS HlllTARY FORCES 10
THAT END. RE SAID THAT TO HEET THESE NEEDS, IF OEROCRATIC
COUNTRIES CANNOT PROVIDE THEN, GNR 'NIGHT HAVE TO GO EISE-
NNERE.* GARCIA BEDOYA LISTED VARIOUS UNKNOWNS: WHETHER THE
FSIN WILL BECOKE A REGULAR ARNY, WHETHER NEW UNITS WILL BE
FORHEO, WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPKENT THEY WOULD NEED, AND WHETHER
THEY WOULD SEEK EQUIPKENT FROH USG OR OTHER SOURCES. HE
ASKED IF NICARAGUA'S ARKEO FORCES WOULD ONLY COKPRISE THE

GUERRILLAS AS AT PRESENT, OR THAT GROUP PLUS OTHERS IN
SOME NEW INSTITUTIONALIZED SYSTEH. HE ASKED IF USG NAD
m>|I^IBA£OZf^;¥’;fH^»aeRETARY^^^ WE HAVE NO
lilT RAfH» MLY a REQUEST IN THE HOST
GENERAL TERNS FOR USG ASSISTANCE. THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED
THAT A USG DECISION IS IHVOIVEO IN THIS CASE, BUT SUCK A
DECISION AFFECTS TNE ENTIRE HENISPHERE AND TNE VIEWS OF
OTHERS ARE IHPORTANT TO US. FINALLY RE ASKED IF A NULTI-
LATERAl EFFORT NIGHT BE HADE TO PROVIDE EQUIPKENT, IF THAT
WERE FOUND TO BE NICARAGUA'S PRINCIPAL KEO.

B. AT THIS POINT COIONBIA FONHIN URIBE DWELT ON A LIST OF
DIFFICULTIES IN HENISPNERie RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT
BEHOCRACIES ARE IN DANGER DUE TO EXCESSIVE ARHS INVENTORIES.

RE SAID THAT ANNS PROCURENENT NAS CAUSING PROBIENS, AS IK
THE CASE OF TNE NIGH PRICES COUNTRIES HAVE TO PAY FOR THEIR
ESSENTIAL ARHS. BE SAID THAT TO OFFER ARHS IN CENTRAL
AHERICA WOUIO GO DIRECTLY ATHWART HEHISPRERIC AND WORLD
IHITIATIKS FOR OISARHAHENT. HE SAID THAT LA OEHKRATIC
COUNTRIES CANNOT BECOHE POLICEHEN, BUT SHOULD STRESS
SOCIAL ICASURES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OEHOCRACIES. HE SAID
IT WDUID BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR LA OEHOCRACIES TO HOUNT
A nillTARY ACTION WHEN IT IS PRECISELY TRIS WHICH THE
BEHOCRACIES NAVE OPPOSED FOR SO HANY YEARS. HE SAIO THAT
TBIS IS THE GOC POSITION, BUT EACH COUNTRY IK CENTRAL
AHERICA ANO ELSEWHERE WILL HAVE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF ON
THE SUBJECT. HE CONCIUDEO BY SAYING THAT NEHISPHERE SHOULD
NOT OVEREHPHASIZE ‘TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS' IN NICARAGUA BUT THE
LARGER SOCIAL ECONDHIC PROBLEHS OF THE HENISPHERE.

B. ECUADOREAN FONHIN PAREJA COUNTERED THAT HE HAS SOHE-

COHFIDEIITIAL

NOT TO IE REPfiODUCEO VfTNOUT THE

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Tihts "HAD TO UAlK WITH TOE OEVIl.’ IIE SAID THAT A CASE
♦llGHT ARISE, SAT IN AH UHMAJIED MEIGHflOR OF HICARAGUA,

HMERE FORMER OR PERSOMMEl MIGHT TRY TO INVADE NICARAGUA, AND
THEREBY THt GNH HAY NEED HEIP FOR ITS DEFENSE. HE SAID
ANoEaN group fore I om Ministers womo have to cohsimt among
IHEHSEIVES and UITN GNR Ik THAT EVENT. HE SAID NO DECISION
COOlB Be taken TODAY AND TNE MATTER IS NOT PRESSING, AND
THAT INSTEAD NUMAKITARIAN ASSISTANCE SHOULD DE REIIEO UPON
TO HELP ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA. UHEN GNR SEES
HUMANITARIAN AlO PBOVIOEO WITHOUT CONDITIONS, PAREJA SAID,
TNE CNR REACTION Will BE FAVORABLE, AND OECISIONS ON ARMS
CAN BE DELAYED UNTIL MORE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE.

PAREJA THEN SUGGESTED A HIGH-LEVEL COMMISSION, POSSIBLY TO
IE SET UP IN SAN JOSE WITH ANDEAN GROUP AND OSG PARTICl- i
PATING, to analyze developments in NICARAGUA. HE SAID THAT
THIS IS MERELY AN IDEA WHICH HAS NOT YET BEER ELABORATED.

10. THE StCRETARY ASREO NMAT TNE PURPOSE OF SUCH A GROUP

WOULD BE. PAREJA REPLIED THAT HE DIO NOT KNOW, BUT THAT A
SPECIH COMMISSION TO STUDY THE AID NEEDS Of NICARAGUA
MIGHT BE USEFUL. BOLIVIAN FONMIN FERNANDES SPOKE UP,
INSISTING THAT ALL ACTIONS REGARDING NICARAGUA SHOULD BE
coordinated THROUGH THE ANOEAN GROUP FOREIGN MINISTERS,

AND ANY SUCH COMMITTEE AS SUGGESTED BY PAREJA WOULD BE
■MISINTERPRETED" IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES. PERUVIAN FONMIN
GARCIA BEOOYA AGREED, ASKING WHY SUCH A GROUP SHOULD BE
IN SAN JOSE, WHAT ATTRIBUTES WOULD IT HAVE, WHY COUNTRIES
OTHER THAN THE US WERE NOT INVOLVED, ETC. PAREJA PER-
SISTED That his suggested commission would avoid delays
IN Andean group consultation and provide flexibility in

andean GROUP DEALINGS WITH THE GNR. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
COORDINATION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN OTHER WAYS AS WELL.

10 . iOLIVlAN FONMlK FERNANDES STRESSED THAT THE ANOEAN
CROUP PRESIDENTS' RECENT AGREEMENT AT CARTAGENA PROVIDES
THAt ONLY tHE FOREIGN MINISTERS CAN CONSULT ON POLITICAL
OUESTIONS. HE SAID THAT AS THERE IS A NEED FOR DAILY
IHFORMATIO* ON THE 'EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION* IN
NICARAGUA, ANDEAN TECHNICAL ORGANS COULD PROVIDE THIS
INFORMATION. PAREJA SAID HE 0ISA6RE5P 'A L.ITT.LE.: JN THAT

CDHr i DE I ITIAl

Department of State

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11 AN ANOEM^^BROUP DECISION, BUT THAT RE THOUGHT

THIS IS AN interesting IDEA AND THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO
FOLLOW IT OP IF TNE ANDEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS GO THIS ROUTE.

11. VENEZUELAN FONMIN ZAMBRANO URGED THAT THIS IMPROVED
liaison COULD BE OBTAINED BY ASSIGNING -- AS VENEZUELA IS
DOING — HIGH-LEVEL, EXPERIENCED AMBASSADORS TO MANAGUA TO
ENSURE CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE GNR AND A FLOW OF INFORMA-
TION Back to the andean countries.

11. PAREJR THEN CONCLUOED THE MEETING BY URGING NIS
COILEBGOES TO KEEP TALKING ABOUT THIS PROBLEM OF COORDI-
NATION. HE SAID That the andean group countries' ambassa-
BORS Might be A workable substitute, ne then tHANKEb the

SECRETARY AND OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS FOR ATTENDING THIS

Meeting, with the secretary's in turn thanking the chair-
man, tHE IMeting Adjourned. Nance

OUTGOING

TELEGRAM

•i

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CONFIDENTIAL -

NOT TD BE REPGDOUCED VITKOUT THE
AUTKORIZATIOK OF TSE EXETUTIVE SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

48.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, August 13, 1979

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 20, Memos to/ffom Tamoff, Wisner, Perry 1979.
Secret. Drafted by Vaky. In an August 9 memorandum to Vance, Tamoff and Lake indicated that
they had solicited input on Vance’s goals and objectives for the next 18 months. The
memorandum is printed in Document 123, Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. I, Foundations of
Foreign Policy. Copies of the other bureau submissions are in the National Archives, RG 59,
Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box
20, Memos to/from Tamoff, Wisner, Perry.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WachlivcWV. O.C. ma

August 13, 1979

gge HE T

MEHORMTODM

The Secretary
ARA ~ Viron P.

<

SUBJECT: Coals for Latin America

rei^ested, the following are the goals and objec-
tives I see for Latin America during the next eighteen
months.

As zm overall preliminary commeht, let me tuvderllne
the point made to you during the Quito consultations: we
need to refurbish o ur relationship and improve the reg ion’s
Uel) p erception- df us. Bss enteiaxiy. this wlli mean being s^ST-

by i;nege ks releva nt to their Drobletas a nd in**

t ei^d&tli'. '‘"!lS'adlS.* cteveiflMli4H1!?^SS^fflTc§?^BOT5CTTV-lthes'^
are all major parts of our total relationship. We cannot
be effective in them, however, without a) attention; b)
resolution of conflicts with domestic interests, to jjh e
e xtent possib le 2 uid, c) applying reasonable resource in-
pntsr:? ■ ■ ' -

Goals and Objectives
1. Central America

Deal with the regional crisis in ways that will a)
prevent the consolidation of extreme left regimes in the
region; b) contain Cubah/Soviet influence and control; .
c) prevent armed conflict within or among countries in
the region; and d) promote broader political systems,
equitable economic and social development and observzuice
of human rights. The unl^eness of the Hicaraguan situa-
tion is the key to this area, but this in turn can probably
only be managed in a context of stability in Honduras and
controlled cheuige in El Salvador and Guatemala. Specif-
ically, we should: .

^ EC R ET -
XDS-3 3713/99

. SECREJ...

- 2 -

— Sieek non-ooBattunist t>olitlcal develoiwnient In
yTcaya^gtta as veil as (and through) economic
recovery from great devastation.

— Seek to redoce toe potential for violent confron-

^ Si' Salvairoy eund '^ateilBarla’ by promoting
freer political .processes, development and
elimination of repression.

— Support Hoinduyas’ sceanar io of return to consti-

tutional government
ment.

economlc/aocial develop-

»/a- — ■ Help costa Rica stisiatln Its denoieratic system

2. Caribbean

Improve political and econosiic stability in the region
imd reduce vulnerabilities to Cuban expansion. Specif-
ically, •

— provide appropriate eoonCTidc and security assis-
pl*' tance to ute Eastern Caribbean to reduce vulner-

abiiifclea; en^ig^aae gnb-reniQBal cooperati on
■ -■a mong the mirt-states? and create a sense of O .S.
interest ana concern that afiborfl's a d^fidMftlvmplo-
matic trameW^rk' fbf "oiir on-g oi5jf‘?4'l^Tioftg7

wean Jamaica and Guyana away from radical inter-
naticnal line ; Md'

— preserve recent democratizing g ains in th e Do-
##6- minican Republi^^

Seek to :

— anite or counter Cuba’s aggressive resolutionaury
drives; discourage Soviet/Cob 2 Ui military ties;

— contain Cuban power and influence in th^ NAM; and

— reexamine and probe for ways to ease OS-Cuiban

tensions and find a modus vlveteii that might

Ib/C^ promise a way to affect and moderate Cuban objec-

. tlves and intentions toward us.

‘ - 3BeR B « P-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <i~l

BylOwARAl^tej^/,:2i|j(

- 3

4. Mexico

Establish a constructive, effective working relation-’
ship to handle the complex, difficult set of issues that
comprise that relationshiip. Specrxicarly:

ffft, — confirm and inclement purchase agreement on gas;

^( 4 . -- resolve tomato and winter v^etable problems; '

•b*£-

resolve tuna issue; and

secure Mexican accessicm to GATT and bilateral
agreement within MTH framework;

•At- “

strengthen working relationship, under standino
and exchange on migration and b^der issues.

«r^

5. Brasil

Develop a closer co<^eratlve relaticmship with this
largest and significant I<atin Americm country, drawing
it into closer assoclatiiM id.th our hemisphere and global
policies. TO do this, we will need to reach a' modus'' Vi-
vendi on .a myriad of trade pri^lems and nuclear policT^'

6. Andean Region (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,

Bolivia)

The Andean region is becoming: an economic (Andean Pact)
and political force (through coordinated foreign policy
actions) . It is also an areai where democratization is
well underway. He should recognize both its specific
gravity as a useful force and the trends toward democracy.
^Is will involve:

9t*^

— cooperation with the Andean Pact C<nnmon Market
including resource assistance, luod dealing with
it as a multilateral institution;

— extending assistance and supportive bilateral

relations with each of the countries, e.g.,
economic aid to Peru, trade policy Issues such
as tin with Bolivia; narcotics aid to Colombia,
etc.; and ‘‘

— developing a systematic consultative procedure
with these countries oh multilateral political,
issues, e.g. Central American cooperatloh.

■G BCBBT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By^ NAKA Date^jn\\{i

1 . Airqien’til'ia

i3ig»\»myi

- 4 -

Find ways to deal with (and hopefully improve) the
human rights situation, without at the sane time cutting
* ourselves off from a large and important coimtry whoso
role and weight can affect our global policies.

8. Chile •

Seek to luuidle the tinlgue. problem of the Letelier
extrzidltlon and our anti- terror ism policy in a polltlcallv
charged situation, 'Without a.t the 82me ume acting so
severely that we endanger peace in the area by Indirectly
encouraging Arg^itina, Peru or Bolivia to pursue territorial
demands against what they may perceive as eux isolated
Chile. Nor do %>e wish to destroy the basis for some future
relationship with the (^lean nation (as distinct from
the Pinoehat government) .

9. Panama Canal

^Di^lement the treaties beginning October 1 in a peace-
oL- ful, oonstructlve way and use the period ^ reaffirm,
strengthened joint Canal defense posture.'

10. As an. overlay to our country-specific policies we
need to pursue certain rea’ibnaT policies ;

1 -^

1 -^

— Ccaiventional arms restraint— ^stimulating multi-
laterai efforts such as Mexican CAT talks.

“ Stoengtheninq the reglCTal instltutlona— OAS ,
zOb, Human Sights Commission — by ia^roved con-
sultations with aK>roprlBte resource support,

— Pursue reasonable ecwiomic and trade policies to
reaped to widespread— and largely l^itimaie—
demands for open markets and international co-

mutt** operation in CamDoditles. In particular, to

* * find ways to deal with the disproportionate.

severe impact on one country of broad policies
such as sugar and the Ocuainican Kepublic.'

“ Strengthen otir human rights approaches , sepklng
to reduce sanctions as human rights improvement
and rewarding good performance in addition to
sanctioning bad performance,^

- CBOnBO*
- 5 -

»•'*' ‘"(Si

Iteciotiic^fcaalize our Military assistance pr*o<rram
to relate it more to objectives, to the role
l it can uniquely perform in our policy and to
I reasonable levels of effectiveness, oar pfoqrau
aovf is the result of accretions and asiendiaents
over several years responding to ad hoc stimuli,
and bM lost much coherence and intrinsic logic.

ARAiVPVakytlif

— SBGHBg -

UNCLASSIFIED

49.

Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State and the White House

Panama City, October 4, 1979, 2239Z

8114

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790456-0061. Secret;
Immediate; Exdis.

UNCLASSIFIED

Document View

Page 1 of 5

S EC Rer

EXDIS

“'OOUIOST^

PAGE 01 PANAMA 08114 01 OF 03 042257Z

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W

020597 042313Z /70

O 042239Z OCT 79
FH AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO SECSTATE NASHDC IMMEDIATE 5190
HHITEHOUSE HASHDC IMMEDIATE

E E C K E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PANAMA 08114

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY V3UCY

WHXTEROUSE FOR NSC/PASTOR AMD FOR DENIS CLIFT

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/4/87 (BLAKE, MELVILLE E.,JR) OR-H
TAGS: PEPR, US, BL, CO, EC, PE, VE, PN
SUBJ: DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF VICE PRESIDENT MOHDALE'S

MEETING WITH ANDEAN PACT PRESIDENTS

1. ( SKCRE r - ENTIRE TEXT)

2 . PARTICIPANTS ;

HALTER GUEVARA ARCS, PRESIDENT OF BOLIVIA

JULIO CESAR TURBAY AYALA, PRESIDENT OF COLOMBIA

FRANCISCO MORALES BERMUDEZ, PRESIDENT OP PERU

LUIS HERRERA CAMPINS, PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA

ALFREDO PAREJA DIEZCANSECO, FOREIGN MINISTER OF ECUADOR

AND PRESIDENT ROLDOS' REPRESENTATIVE

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALB (ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY VAKY, AMBASSADOR POPPER, ROBERT PASTOR

AMD DENIS CLIFT)

3. PLACE AND DATE; EL PANAMA HOTEL, PANAMA CITY,

PAGE 02 PANAMA 08114 01 OP 03 0422S7Z

OCTOBER 1, 1979, 6:10 P.M.

4. SUMMARY: THE VICE PRESIDENT CONVEYED A LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT CARTER TO THE ANDEAN LEADERS OUTLINING THE
PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 1 MESSAGE ON SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA.
THE VICE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED THE BACKGROUND TO THE
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND REVIEWED RECENT TRENDS IN CUBAN-
SOVIET RELATIONS WHICH WERE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE ANDEAN PRESIDENTS DIO NOT ADDRESS
THE SOVIET TROOP ISSUE IN SUBSTANCE. HERRERA REGRETTED
THAT NEWS COVERAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WOULD
OVERSHADOW THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF THE TREATY DAY
CEREMONIES. THE PRINCIPAL THEME OF THE ANDEAN
PRESIDENTS' PRESENTATIONS WAS THE THREAT TO DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS FROM ECONOMIC DISORDERS, ESPECIALLY IN THE
CARIBBEAN AREA, AND THE NEED TO ATTACK THESE ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS THROIX3H JOINT EFFORTS. GUEVARA ARCE OF BOLIVIA
APPEALED FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO
SELL 35,000 TONS OF TIN FROM THE STRATEGIC RESERVE AND
MORALES BERMUDEZ ASKED FOR SPECIAL CONSIDERATICM FOR
PERU IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CANAL TOLLS. END SUMMARY.

5. THE VICE PRESIDENT OPENED THE MEETING BY EXPRESSING

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017

//O A O /O A O ,43,^ C A C

A /I nr\\ A

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Page 2 of 5

HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE
ANDEAN PACT, A GROUP WITH WHICH THE CARTER ADMINISTRA-
TION HAD SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH A HIGH-LEVEL AND SIGNIFICANT
DIALOGUE. IT WAS PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY THAT THIS
MEETING SHOULD OCCUR ON THE OCCASION OF THE ENTRY INTO
EFFECT OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES, AN HISTORIC
EVENT FOR ALL OF LATIN AMERICA.

6. AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE PRESS, THE VICE PRESIDENT
INFORMED THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS OF THE RECEIPT JUST

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MINUTES EARLIER OF A LETTER TO THEM FROM PRESIDENT
CARTER OUTLINING THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE THAT EVENING ON THE SUBJECT OF RUSSIAN TROOPS IN
CUBA. THE VICE PRESIDENT RECALLED THAT THE ADMINISTRA-
TION HAD LABELED THIS A SERIOUS MATTER AND STATED THAT
THE STATUS QUO VAS NOT SATISFACTORY. THE VICE
PRESIDENT THEN REVIEWED THE FACTS OF SOVIET MILITARY
INVOLVEMENT WITH CUBA, ITS ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES AND ITS
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR CUBA'S WIDE-SPREAD FOREIGN
INVOLVEMENTS. HE ENDED HIS REMARKS TO AWAIT THE
ARRIVAL OF THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

7. BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT GUEVARA ARCE RAISED THE PROPOSED
SALE OF 35,000 TONS OP TIN PROM THE II- S. .S TBATRGIC
RESERVES. HE SAID THE U.S. ACTluN COULD Nur BE UNDER-
STOOD IN VIEW OF THE ADVERSE IMPACT SUCH A SA^ WOULD
HAVE ON BOLIVIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. HE MENTIONED
THAT HE HAD RAISED THIS DIRECTLY WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT
DURING THEIR ENCOUNTER AT THE STATE CEREMONY THAT
MORNING, BUT WISHED TO EXPRESS THIS CONCERN WHICH HAD
THE SUPPORT OF THE ANDEAN PACT MEMBERS.

8. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD FULLY
REPORT THIS CONCERN OF BOLIVIA AND THE OTHER ANDEAN
COUNTRIES. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS VERY SENSITIVE TO
THE CONCERN AND DID NOT WISH TO PLACE A BURDEN ON
BOLIVIAN SOCIETY AS IT PURSUED AN OBJECTIVE WHICH HAD
FULL U.S. SUPPORT. HE REITERATED THE U.S. POSITION THAT
THE PRESIDENT INTENDED TO CONSULT WITH THE INTERNATICXIAL
TIN AUTHORITY IN CARRYING OUT LEGISLATION FOR TIN SALES,

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WHITEHOOSE FOR KSC/PASTOR AND FOR DENIS CLIFT

AND WOULD HAKE THE SALES PRUDENTLY AND IN AN ORDERLY
MANNER IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH BOLIVIA. HE CONCLUDED
THAT HE APPRECIATED THAT THIS ANSWER, WHICH HAD BEEN
GIVEN TO THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT BEFORE, WAS NOT
SATISFACTORY TO IT, AND WOULD MAKE THAT POINT TO
PRESIDENT CARTER.

9. GUEVARA RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR
POSITION ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASIONS WHEN TIN SALES WERE
MADE. WHILE HE DID NOT ATTRIBUTE ILL WILL TO THE USG,
EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT PAST SALES HAD BEEN HARMFUL.

HE ASKED THAT THE MESSAGE BE TAKEN NOT CHILY TO THE
PRESIDENT, BUT ALSO TO MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS.

10. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO DO SO
AND WOULD REMEMBER THE FIGURE GIVEN BY GUEVARA THAT
EVERY ONE-CENT DROP IN THE PRICE OF TIN COST BOLIVIA
ABOUT ONE MILLION DOLLARS.

11. PRESIDENT HERRERA OF VENEZUELA BEGAN HIS REMARKS

OEonar

PAGE 02 PANAMA 0S114 02 OF 03 0423OSZ

BY CALLING ATTENTION TO THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF POOR
MARKET SITUATIONS OF A WHOLE SERIES OF RAW MATERIALS
OF INTEREST TO THE HEMISPHERE. HE THEN MADE TWO
PRINCIPAL POINTS IN HIS PRESENTATION: THE FIRST
CONCERNED THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING DEMOCRATIC FORMS
OF GOVERNMENT IN POOR COUNTRIES. ECCEIOMIC. PRESSURES,

HE SAID, FORCED THOSE COUNTRIES TO TURN TO GOVERNMENTS
OF FORCE. THESE PROBLEMS PARTICULARLY AFFECTED THE
CARIBBEAN WHERE PROSPECTIVES WERE POOR. GOVERNMENTS
THERE NEEDED SUPPORT AMD VENEZUELA WISHED TO HELP THEM.
HERRERA TURNED SECONDLY TO THE ISSUE OF THE SOVIET
TROOPS. HE SAID THE PANAMA TREATY CEREMONIES HAD BEEN
A CAUSE OF REAL JOY AND SATISFACTION. THE NEWS OF THE
EVENT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE DISPLACED BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S
STATEMENT ON CUBA. WHILE RECOGNIZING U.S. INTERESTS,

HE WISHED TO EXPRESS THE PREOCCUPATION, EVEN ANGUISH HE
FELT THAT THE IMPACT OF THE SUCCESS OF THE TREATY WOULD
BE MARRED. HE ASKED THAT HIS REMARK BE ACCEPTED AS THE
PERSONAL CONCERN OF A GOOD FRIEND.

12. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT
AGREED WITH HERRERA'S ANALYSIS THAT THE SUCCESS OF
DEMOCRACY WAS AFFECTED BY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. THE
U.S. HAD TRIED TO BE HELFPUL IN THIS REGARD IN MANY
HAYS, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF NEW DEMOCRACIES.

TURNING TO HERRERA'S SECOND POINT, HE SAID THAT THE
TREATIES WERE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION AND HERE A VIVID EXPRESSION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO A FOREIGN POLICY "BASED
ON FAIRNESS, NOT FORCE." IT HAS NONETHELESS NECESSARY
TO DEAL WITH THE RUSSIAN TROOP SITUATION. CUBAN
INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA AND THE HORN HAD BEEN VERY
DESTABILIZING: THE CUBANS HAD CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED

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THE CAUSE OF VIOLENCE AMD BLOCKED MODERATION. IT HAS
THE TREND OF CUBAN-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS WHICH
CAUSED CONCERN. FURTHER, THE MATTER HAD NON BECOME
CAUGHT UP WITH THE SALT II RATIFICATION. HE SAID THE
PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT FAILURE TO RATIFY TREATY COULD
INTRODUCE A DANGEROUS PHASE IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE

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SOVIET tJNION. TO AVOID THIS, THE U.S. HAD PROPOSED MANY
THINGS BUT THE SOVIETS DID NOT COOPERATE; THEY HAD MADE
CONCESSIONS, BUT HONE WERE SIGNIFICANT. VICE PRESIDENT
CONCLUDED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAS MOVING, IN HIS
ADDRESS THIS EVENING, IN A RESTRAINED HAY. HIS ADDRESS
REFLECTED OUR DEEP OBJECTICRIS BUT SOtXSHT TO CONTAIN THE
SITUATION BY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS NO THREAT TO THE
U.S. AMD THAT THE TROOP PRESENCE SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO
SALT RATIFICATION. (AT THIS POINT PRESIDENT CARTER'S
LETTER WAS DISTRIBUTED.)

13. COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT TORBAY AYALA BEGAN A DISCURSIVE
PRESENTATION BY EXPRESSING BIS SUPPORT FOR BOLIVIA WITH
REGARD TO U.S. TIN SALES, BUT THEN NOTED THAT COLOMBIA
HAD MANY PROBLEMS, NOT JUST ONE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE
THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA HAS A HATTER FOR
CX)NCERN, HE FELT THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF WORLD ARMAMENTS
SHOUU} BE KEPT IN MIND. WORLD PROBLEMS SHOULD BE
DISCUSSED AT THIS MEETING, HE FELT.

14. TORBAY IDENTIFIED INFLATION AS THE FIRST OF THESE
PROBLEMS, A COMMON ENEMY. LIKE OTHER WORLD ISSUES, IT
COULD NOT BE TACKLED BY NATIONS ACTING INDIVIDUALLY;
RATHER, A JOINT EFFORT OF LATIN AMERICA AMD THE UNITED
STATES HAS NEEDED. SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WERE
CREATING SOCIAL PRESSURES ALL OVER LATIN AMERICA,
INCLUDING THE CARIBBEAN. THESE PRESSURES HERE DIRECTED
AGAINST LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
ANTI-AMERICANISM COULD GROW IN A SOIL OF ECONOMIC
DIFFICULTIES PROMPTED BY THE PRICE OF OIL, UNEMPLOYMENT,

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ETC. THE USG FACED SIMILAR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
TENSIONS, BUT THERE THE ALTERNATIVE WAS A DEMOCRATIC
ONE. IN MANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES THE ALTERNATIVE
HAS THE LOSS OF DEMOCRACY.

15. TUBBAY CONTINUED THAT A JOINT EFFORT HAS NECESSARY
WHICH COVERED NOT ONLY THE CARIBBEAN BUT ALL OF THE
HEMISPHERE. IT SHOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT ON THE U.S.

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ALONE, BUT RATHER "WE ALL HAVE TO HELP." HE PROPOSED
FOR CONSIDERATION A "FUND FOR PEACE" OR "FUND FOR
DEMOCRACY" WHICH WOULD BE USED TO FIGHT "DIFFICULT
SITUATIONS" . IF THE DEMOCRACIES OF LATIN AMERICA
COULD BECOME PARTNERS, HE ARGUED, OTHERS WOULD BE
STIMULATED TO JOIN THE FOND OR TO TAKE DRAMATIC ACTIONS.
IN CONCLUSION, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER
MIGHT SEE THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA AS
MAKING THE SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN MORE SERIOUS.

HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE EXTENSION OF "THESE MOVEMENTS"

IN THE CARIBBEAN AFFECTED THE ENTIRE HEMISPHERE.

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16. THE VICE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE ACKNOWLEDGED THE
IMPORTANCE OF SUCH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS INFLATION.
THE U.S. HAS WORKING VERY HARD ON ITS DOMESTIC PROBLEM,
AWARE THAT, AS A LARGE ECONOMY, IT AFFECTED THE WELFARE
OF OTHERS. HE SAID TUBBAX'S APPEAL FOR JOINT CONSIDERA-
TION OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS SHOULD BE PURSUED.

17. IN CLOSING, PRESIDENT MORALES BERMUDEZ OF PERU
THANKED THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO
EXPRESS THEIR INDIVIDUAL THOUGHTS AND PREOCCUPATIONS
AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. IN SUMMARY, HE STATED THAT,

WHILE APPRECIATING U.S. INTERESTS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF WORLD PROBLEMS, THE ANDEAN PACT MEMBERS PELT THAT
THEIR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS COULD NOT BE SOLVED WITHOUT A
HEMISPHERIC APPROACH. TO A GREAT EXTENT, THE HEMISPHERE
SHARED IN GLOBAL CONCERNS. IN URGING A HEMISPHERIC
APPROACH, THE ANDEAN PACT COUNTRIES DIO NOT SEEK A
RETURN TO PATERNALISM BUT RATHER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

HE THEN ASKED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TOLLS OF
THE PANAMA CANAL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT A
LARGE PORTION OF PERUVIAN TERRITORY CARRIES OUT ITS
TRADE THROUGH THE AMAZON IN ADDITION TO THE PRINCIPAL
COMMERCE OF THE PACIFIC COAST.

18. NOTE; ECUADOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER PAREJA DIO NOT
SPEAK.

BLAKE

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EXOIS

A

UNCLASSIFIED

50.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, October 29, 1980

1 Source; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country
Files, Box 27, Latin America, 1-12/80. No classification marking. Sent for action.

UNCLASSIFIED

r Si!

r- .

ACTION

MJilOgANDDM I^:
PSOli;

an

Attached at A is the first installment on the papers yrtilgb X
promised yon^ I have tried to Jcdep it brief, but we have covered
a lot ot territory in a short time. Ths third section identifies
the new agehda which we will need tfo .face in the second term. Ky
next paper will 'provide some proposals for answering the ^estions
mu

i also recommend that you send a copy of the assessment to Secre-^
ttry Hnskier as he will be imdertaking his trip to Latin America
without mhc h of an idea of what we have tried to do in the last
four yeetfsTv^wnxie X have some reservations about the timing aS?
the itinerary of his trip, nonetheless there is no question that
his oonverSations could be extremely useful in sounding out some
of the most ispportant leaders ^ in the hemisphere on the central
issues which we will try to address in a sebond term. I have
cheeked with ARA, and they are also a bit confused on the trip,
and have not provided him much focus. Z think the assessment at
Tab A could' help, I would also like if yc^ Could ask him whether
X would he" ahle to accompany him and sit in on .the meetings. Xt
.would he enormously useful to try to deveidp some ideas on what we
•should do in a second term, and X also ekpect that X would be of
help to £iu^ie as the "historical memory’* of the Carter Administra"*
tion's ^prli^dh to Latin Amerida. tsince 1977, there have been
three Assistant Seciretariet of ARA and about fifteen Deputy
Assistant Secretaries.)

I^CONtNPEgjroATXON : I look forward to discussing this assessment with
you to ''see ii' you would like me to modify it in any way for the
President. X have provided a memo at Tab X, if you should decide

it’as 'k' -.1 '"-■

\ovi.C w-n ^

■Thht' .^hvSr*^ ' the memo at '.Tab X..,;'; ^

That yph speak to Muskie

about my accoji4>anying
.: -V Disapprove

him on his trip.

\k -IfliN

]us.u_ V. ^

JL tu.

UNCLASSIFIED

Tab A

Paper Prepared by Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff
Washington, October 28, 1980

UNCLASSIFIED

October 28, 1980

THg CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND LATIN AMERICA; ASgEgSiagN3'

: Introduction i h Brief bC four years

Dtiring the lait €ottr 8ave more tiroe

to Latin America and the Caribbean and f>ursued a more active, coher-
ent, and consistent approach to Latin America tha;n any previobh Adiain-
. ‘;4.htration. f ' v.' ; : \ -- '.C

— In 1977, you gave a new direction to 0.8. pdlicies to l^e
r<^gion* The foundation was set by youir decision to give a high
priority to negotiating new Canal treaties. After a tometimes
difficult interagency review CPRM-i7) , you enunciated a unique ..new
approach to La^n_ America.' in vour Pan Amej^ican g^ Speech to the
U.A.S^, wnxon described the tnree central principles tnat nave gjiided
our policies : a recognition of the individuality and a respect .for
the sovereignty (priaciple of non-intervention) of each nation, a
commitment to try to improve respect for human rights and extend
democracy, and a willingness to consult oh the global economic issues
of central concern to the area. Rather than a slogan to mask the
diversity of the region, you suggested a flexible approach more
attuned to the important Changes that have occurred in the Americas
in the last two decfideS/ specifically to the self-assertiveness of
nations interested in shaping a new world rather than being satisfied
.as just members of an inter-American system. Through Mrs. Carter's
trip and your personal meetings in, 1977, you personally engaged twenty L
^ads of state in the region, explaining your approach, especially
yqur personal commitment to human rights and democratisatlon, and.
becoming convearasant in the gamut, of bilateral, regional, and global
issues^ of concern to our countries. , We began a dialogue with Ctiba
and opened interest Sections to 'permit regular coiramani cation. You
beghn to define special approa^Jh. t© the Caribbean, and, initiated
what' has since become known as the Caribbean Group for Cooperation
in Economic peveXopment, led now" by the, World Bank with 31 nations
a?Sd fifteen international institutions involved. You signed the >
American Convention on Human Rights and Protocol I of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco; both ^tiii await ratification in the Senate. The amount
and the quality of 'attention which you and your Administration gave
to Latin America in 1977 probably exceeded that of any other Adminis-
tration’s first year, including that of Kennedy and the Alliance for
■ Progress.

— 197^ was largely spent implementing the initiatives taken in ^
1977. The <^|nal T^atdes^^;g,re. ratified ,and..jexchan 9 ed during your ^
trip to Pana^.""^ You trained to Venezuela, where you “gave an l[m-
portant speech on North-South- relations Ccalling for shared responsi-
bility to implement a new ecqnomic .order) and announced 'the Humphrey
North-South Scholarship Program, and to Brazil where voja lent addi-
tional credibility to your human r^gh-ts policy. Also, we moved to
strengthen U.$.-Maxio 2 ui relations through the Consultative Mechanism,

In consuitations with Mexico and the Ayacucho countries, arms control

COPf CARTERUBftAlfY

initiatives began to be seriously considered. The Caribbean Group
took shape. ^

“ In 1979 > we faced pur mos^s aerious crises aivd challenges —
Nicaragua ^ Grenada^ and the Cubah bf^ade and wp distinguished
ourselves only in that we d^ veer too far fro® pur originai
objectives.. 4ii three toiced us to fpcus on the aepurity dinension

■ of ■ '4nter-hwerican.' relations . in -a ht ;

the 'saH|B. tiroe-^we','were .wreeitiing.'iifith'^these:- tluree^isiues^ . we alhf.;

were/"strenfthehihg', our ,reihtiwP^3^S.:#it.h :the: ''Andeah/E*aot' ■aS''':h.; "|Frp'up
;(particuiariy ;becanse'.'Ot :the\ tr^|(^/tPward .deiiw in .ijcuad^^’Pld
Peru) and with Vehezneiar i^ericoi Vour twQ_meeiinee^iW^^^

iiopez PortiiiOii ; tne strengtnenigg tne Qonsuitative ^chanisiftr^
appointment of a Special 5jrabaSs.^or to coordinate u. S.-Higxrcan
relations within" the U, S. governments and to ensure that it be given
the deseryed priority, the conclusion of a gas agreement and ah
extensive spio^oe and tePhntlogy pact as a re Suit of Frank Press's
efforts — all those led to more attiantioh and results than the reia-
tionship. has seen for a long time. V^ice President Mondale's trip to
Venezuela and Brazil «ind t*rahk/Press^s follow-up trip also served to
deepen our reiationship with the two k®y GountrieS in South America .
The Brazilian Foreign Minister was say in 1979 that

U.s.-Braziliah relations were "excellent. "

— In 1980, your attehtion has largely been focused on the.
hostages, Afghahlsta'', hhe Persian Gulf , the . economy , and the esm-
paign. to Latin America has been

focused oh the Caribbean basin — instability in Central America and
the Gar ibbeahi Cuban and Haitian ref eg[oee> and Cuban subversion.

After Grenada, we have managed to turn tdie tide back in favor of
democracy in the Eastern Caribbean’ and to halt the revolution in
Central America by fostering moderste change in El Salvador and
Honduras and by trying to play a positive role in Nicaragua. Through
your personal initiative', "Caribbean/Central American Action,"
a unique experiment in people-to-people diplomacy^, was launched to
improve the quality of our peoples' relationships in the aren. We
hdvc done a good deai , but; hardly enough ^ The Caribbean Basin is
one area in need of your attention in 1981.

In svumnary , you have ssf «i eoursc in 1977 and kept to it even
through the trying times in 1979, W^e have made remarkable progress
tbwaid our goals. Stiil, there is that reit^ihs to be coB^ieted,

and many new issues thSt remain to be confronted^ me disCuSs

these within ■the ■dohtea£t"'of'':ctn..as^bssment.’ ' , .

II . An Assessment

This ass^sment will proceed by examining the goals associated
with each of tie three basic principles.

(1) ■ Peace , lecognitiop of the individuality of each relation^
ship. Re^ject for non-intervention.

bbinr CARTERlIBRAitir

A. Overall Approach — ~ . STogaiiSy Globa^ Consultations »
The Garter A<toiinistratldn has avoided the tejii^tatiQh to reduce
its relations with I»atin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to a
slagi^/ but that has a. dc^nside: our flexibie, global^ apftroach
is not easily grasped; our approaoh has therefore l>ocOi^ hhoym
not by its principles but by its TOost salient features; human
rights and democracy by those who like oUi policies; Nicaragua,
Grenada/ and Cuban refugees by those who don’t.

Recognizing the increasing international role of
many of the region’ C goveriunents, we eet a clear Objective of
consulting on a regular basis on globai and fegiphal political
and economic issues. We have prbb^iy done mbfe of this than
any previous Administration/ but we haven? t done enough# arid we
have :npt-‘ yet built';- a- systematic, mechariisn- j,;- ■ ■
for enSuririg Such Corisultatlons on a tlie

region *s i^ in^oriajriCe in fhe bw/ the and^^^S^

iriternatiorial (Sl) # it, is essential that we Cohsult fiegulariy
on policies and on developments in controversial 2ireas like
southern Africa, Middle East, East-West reiations— issues
where our briefings arid consultations ere likely to produce a
corifluence of perspectives.

Despite nuiny efforts to forge a coalitipn of
likB-^ninded democracies (especially yenezuela, Menieo, GOlonbla
and Brazil) to pursue a coimnon policy, to Central America and
the Caribbean# we have not been successful. Mexico views the
region's turmoil from a totally different perspective. Brazil
is focusing on its borders end believes the Caribhean is our prob-
leffl#v . not Venezuela,

which is playing the most constructive rple in t^^ area, enjoys
eonSultation, but prefers parallei rather than a common policy.

During the Nicaraguan crisis, we were pulled
into playing a more direct role in an internal matter , than what
we had ori#inailyipref erred, but we have still clearly maintained
the integrity of our pledge of non-intervention during the past
four years, unlike many Other in Latin natioris.

B, Non^^Brolif eration . The Senate has hot yet

ratified Protocol I Of the Treaty Of Tlatelolco. It is not
clear whether our efforts to diseoUrage Brazil and Argentina
from obtaining a full fuel cycle wii^^ fUll^scope safeguards
has had much effect# but it is clear that both goveriunents have
scaled down their initial nuclear progfams considerably. At
the sainetime, both rtations established a cooperative program in
nuclear power. This is just one more indication that the
longs taridingrlvaliy between Argehtlna and Brazil may have-
passed into his tofy, thereby f educing our coheOrns about the
explosive implicatioris of a possible nuclear arms race.

■ teswcAimaitiBBAfty

L .j n_

C. Arms Control . We lent strong support to two regional
arms control initiatives Cby Mexico aud by Venezuela) , and we made

a preliminary effort to discuss the issue with the Soviets; all
. three initiatives got nowhere. NonetheleSSr we haye exercised
unilateral restraint, and this conceiyably could have helped restrain
overall arms expenditures in idle hemisphere. At ^e same time,
the US was byertalcen by five other nations in. arms sales to
region. Despite your explicit decision Cin"2DTb;2j. to reverse the

• deciine of the amount of PMS allocated to Latin America as a
percentage of the global amount (from 2% to 4%) ,> thiS: has hot .
been done. State is once again recommending a level Of 2%. for
Latin America in FY 82. We need to take' a hard look at this issue
again; perhaps the Secretary of State can initiate, consultations on
this issue during his trip.

D. Pea,ceful Settlement _0f Disputes . Before your Pan
American Day speech, the US had refused to pilay jnuqh of a role

in settling the irmuiy territGrial disfOtes in heiaisphere. Since
then, we have played a very active rble, trying to stimulate the
negotiating process from the side While keeping a mediator in front —
the Pope bn the Beagle Channel, a fOmter Peruvian President on the
HonduranrSalvadoreah dispute, and the British on. Belize> We have
aiready raised other disputes, including Ecuador’s dGSire for access
to the Amazon, Bolivian acceSs to the sea, and we have encouraged
dialOgne Where only silent coitfrontation had existed before.

E. Central America . We tried to find a poaceful path
through mediation in Nicaragua, but failed for several reasons ;

Somoza was too intransigent; tite middle class too ready to accept
the pt°“d.ses Of the Marxist left; ai^ most importantly y our friends,
Venezuela, Coast Mca and panama were so obsessed in getting rid of
Somoaa and pre'^empting Castro that they thmittingly pl^ Castro ' s
gamei successfuily insulating him from us. We are having a little
more success in El Salvador, but it's by ho means clear that the
middle will ’^#re;vail there.. Honduras is maki^ transition

. fr<xa military to civilian governiimtnts, but t^^ pettiness of the
politicians, the arrogance of the military), and the machination
of an emerging left- could derail that i Guatemala is polarizing
very raE^idly as the rightists assassinate nnyOne. who suggests there
is a middle way. We are pursuing a dellente e>periment by encouraging
peaceful democratic reform in a region of violence; obsolete socio-
politioai structures, and gross ihequalities . The Marxist left have
dressed themselves in our human rights banners, and Ifldel Castro
has concentrated his ehergies on helping them seize We are

still intifaniSit. The problem of helping tb; nmtintSin dem^ the

Caribbean has proved easi®^ Greating it in Central America.

The eubans succeeded in subverting Grenada, but the same strategy
failed in Suriname; and more importantly, Cuba’s radical allies
were decisively beaten in free eleGtions by moderate , prb-uS groups
in Sti Vihcent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, ^d St; Kitts. The
Caribbean Group has added stability to the region. Still, we
haven’t done nearly enough to enhance the security of the region or

' ■::N • ■

to assist its developinent. Despite ypur promise to inersase
aid to the area in your . Dctoberri, 1979 Soviet :^riggtap speeph.

We maintained aid at the same level as the previous year, we need
■' an ■.i|^fihati^\;new;'^apsao.achv'to, 'the' areia..vdii<3h/taj^a^,,ihto aGoount
its ai^ial in^prtance in,6eourity as well as in immis^ration
matters.'' -v;'' '

p. . Cviha . While >e have had gteat success in the hw
rights area ih: je^a^ we are further away from our geopolitical
goals than in 1977. Cuba has. > more troops in iiK>re countries and
is more actiyeiy pursuing its revolutionary today than in

1977. This is euiother area in he®^ pi a

G. Sumiagy . With the eKception of Central Araerioa,

LAC iSr by amd large, a more peaceful and less militarized place
than in 1976. Panama Canal is safer; the border areas in

dispute are subject to heated negotiations; South America is
focused on development rather. than internal Security *

(2) Human Rights and i^mocracy

A. Oyer^l ; Approach. effective pursuit of human

rights is clearly the most successful achieyem^t of your
Ad^nistration. You have finally, and with some cost, imprinted
ypdr obmmii^ent to;^^ rights on the conscioushess of all the^^
leaders in the hemisphere. Repression is now much more Costly,
and there are fewer disappearances and political prisoners and
less torture. You have restored the image of the US as a natioh
that-standO for human rights, social justice, and de^cracy.

B. Regional Norms Institutions . When yoti sicmed
the American Convention on Huipan SLigKts on i3rune I, 1977, wbxle

V Mrs. Carter was in San Jose, only two nations, had ratified it.

Even though the Senate still hasn't acted, at our urging, 14 Rations
have ratified the Convention, bringing, it into force, and establishing
a. new. institution, the In ter-iSaerican Court of Htmian Rights. In
addition, we have significantly strengthened the Inter-AiBerican
Coitmdssdon on Hiunan Rights which has done five important Gountry
\ ,■ reports.

C. ^ Refugees. We have bOrn ihe burden of the refugee
problem largely oh our own. We have net hpen successful in get^
other nations or ^e 0A& to play an ij^rtaht role. This is ^0
of the "hew" sety issues which we will have to address early ip
the second term.'

D- Democratization . We have tried to tise every
opporttinity to show that democracy pays, and the trend is clearly
in a positive direction — the first time in at least two decades.
Brazil# Ecuador/ Peru, fionduras, Dominican Bfepublic — all have , c
made the transition. We have also engaged the Andean Pact in trying
to help facilitate this democratic prbeess. Our success is due to

' ' •‘GOPYGARTERlffiftAi^

letting people Hnow whete the U'.S. stands rattier than from
helping to build poll tioal parties or train young leaders or
fund private initiatives ^ However, when a young political leader
in Nicaragua ashed Us td /help hi® a politidal party ,

we lafek i^ans to iieli>.; approach is strict neutrally

respect tdpoiiticai parties and candidate^, but we are partial
to free electioiiB, yet we haye no either training

pec^le to Conduct free diectibns^^^x^^^^^^ and the OM

has-^Bh®w^;--no ■interest;in>tbia*'' ■' ThisXa worth'

. pursula^^v: '

•E*. New Forces 1 V-New. intethatiohal, political forces,
have emerged recently and ate having? an iti^aGt

though not very favorably from the perspective. of our interests.,
The Socialist International, the Conference of Latin American '
Political Parties (COPPAL — MexicCin the lead) , the German
SPD and CDU Foundations, the Non-Aligned Movement -- ail
organizations seem to have accepted as their working premise
that the d.S. is the problem; some of them think Cuba may be the
Solution. We have tried dialogue with them add should Continue,
but wo also should reassess our approach, to each of thoso ©rgan-
izations to see whOther they will listen, op just speak, and to
try to comprehend Why we are so often the whipping boy,

(3) Economic Cooperation

A. Aid . Yoa promised to double foreign aid,^ b^
Congress and your intention to balance the budget prevented you
from fulfilling that promise. During the 1970 's, we have been
gradually phasing out our bilateral aid programs to the laiddle-
income developing countries <most of LAC) , and with increased
priori ty^ to Africa, Egypt, and Israeli the overall levels to LAC
have declined markedly. At the same time, we heve' been reason-
ably successful in shii&ting these declining resources to the
sub-region of highest political priority. Central America and
the Caribbean, although, even there, w6 are talking Sbout
funding leVels which were much smaller .than during the Alliance.
We have improvised by eliciting additional support from the
IFI's and from other western donors.

Trade . The MTN in Geneva was primarily a nego-

tiatlQU^'soEiong industfialiaed ,coiuitrieS',:‘'uud,.,-last'. ®ihute''-e^fbrts ■
to encourage the LEC'’ participh^ ndb dibg^se-thst
fact ■':T:he:';ove’ra:ii’ redUcticn' of' .brude bnxriers. .will ;<se:;rbainly.
help all''',hations-, ‘but"' bUt" as- much ■■ as a -seb of ; arrange^nfcs, '

designed speeificaliy assist the LDC's. We consult
frankly did not take them too Seriousiy .

C. Coimpoditjes . We have been able to negotiate
agreements on coffee , sugar , coc6a, r^llJbef^/ and a Goanmon Fu^^^
but in almost all cases we were the most conservative and
inflexible. More importSntly, none of agreements SeSm to

?— .

■ A ■

I '

'eS^CARTER^IBfUflhr

D. Sciengs and TecfanQlogy * Frank Frass's efforts
tinye hieen exc^tronai# particularly when one realize^ he had eo
little to offer in aidi He has helped to establish a fratnework

and to build linkages which will serve our interests in collaborative
relatibnsh%is in this f ield very well

E. North-gouth Relations i h &q»pit ♦ iEhe resurgence
of East-West relations coffibined with Congrea^ipbal constraints
placed the North-Soutii dialogue on the back burner. Unfortu-
nately, we have little econbjnic aid to offer and so we should
begin to examine political and symbolic options, particularly
because these often have a greater importance than we think and
perhaps than they should. A North-South Suasnit is definitely-
one way to demonstrate continued U.S. interest in a dialogue;

it would be a terrible mistake" if we were to sit that out.

iili'. Second sDemm Agenda

I believe the objectives and the course we set to lAjC in
the last four years is the correct one, and we have made great,
progress . We have consulted often with the nations in the
rillfidn and. encouraged them to play a more active role in international
affairs, and while their policies have often diverged from our
p#n, we are; gene^^ well served by this new assertiveness.

re-election will, in and of itself, strengthen our
ability to enhance human rights and extend deniocracy in the
hemisphere asrAeaders who had hoped our commitment would dissipate
will find the^elves having to adjust to its institutionalization. '
Secretary Muakie's trip and /the OAS General- Assembly (opening
in Washington . on Novanber 19 ) offers an opportunity to begin a
major new "effort to enhance huauin rights and facilitate th®
extension of deanocraoy in the hewf sphere- We should try to
develop a nusiber of specific, ii^as for the Secretary to suggest
in his consdltations, and if the response is positive, peiThaps
you could develop them in C speech to open the GAS General
Asseni?ly. in- that forum, you could also announce a renewed
effort to obtain Senate ratification of the hTsAan rights conventions
(and also Frotoeol i) . ' .

A major new initiative to Central hmeric§ and the Caribbean
is urgently needed, and we have a number of opportiinities to
enunciate such an approach; ^e signing ceremony on November
19 of the Honduran-Salvador^ Peace Treaty, which could initiate
a new effort tovrard Central' American integration and Caribhean/Central
i^Uii^rican Action’s important conference on November 23 in.Biami
which a large number of h^eads of state from the region will-
attend. We will send you a paper on this soon.

Another ’’now issue* Which .we need to address concerns "the flow
of people for economic and.- political reasons, most of it illegal,
to the US. ■ other areas in need of work include: .MexieO, Cuba, ,
a new approach to the military regimes in the region, and
North-South relations. n

UNCLASSIFIED

South America; Latin America Region, 1977-1980
South American Regional Compilation

Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV
Argentina

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

51.

Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter
Washington, February 12, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 17,
Evening Reports (State), 2/1 1-2/28/77. Secret. In the top right-hand comer of the memorandum.
Carter wrote, “To Cy. J.”

UNCLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
From: Cyrus Vance

^Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentii^

ADP Declassification Rewew

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

( (

6BCBET -2-

2. Human Rights ^ Argentina ; The Argentine
Ambassador has returned to Buenos Aires, where the
government is ctirrently reviewing U.S. -Argentine
relations. To insuxe mat uur concern over deterioration
of h um an rights in Argentina is fully appreciated in
Buenos Aires, Warren called in the Argentine Charge
d' Affaires this morning. He Cold Che cnarge that
although we recognize Argentina's serious terrorist
problem, we are deeply concerned about torture, witch
hunts and other gross violations of human rights.

Warren stressed that a continuation of such abuses would
have an adverse effect on our relations with Argentina.

Our Ambassador in Buenos Aires conveyed a similar message
at high levels last week.

The Argentine Charge argued that "barbaric terrorism"
was rampant in his country before last year's coup.
Violence is now decreasing and prisoners are being
released from jail. He pleaded for American understanding
of Argentina's "special case" and promised to report
our views to his government.

gB G R ET

[Omitted here is material mirelated to Argentina]

UNCLASSIFIED

52.

Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

RPM 77-10030

Washington, February 22, 1977

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00071A, Box 7,
Folder 17, Argentina: Prospects for the Junta. Secret. Prepared by the Office of Regional and
Political Analysis and coordinated by the Office of Economic Research and the Directorate of
Operations.

UNCLASSIFIED

/7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 February 1977

INTELLIGENCE BIEMORANDUM

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIRED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

ARGENTINA:

PROSPECTS FOR THE JUNTA

Argentina's ruling generals have made substantial
pjpogress in dealing with the problems of leftist sub-
version and eaonomio disarray that led to their take-
over nearly a year ago. Terrorist oapabilities have
clearly declined and economic signs^ such as a reduc-
tion of the inflation rate and last year's reversal of
the trade deficit are encouraging. Although the ini-
tial crisis is overt the divisive forces that have com-
plicated life for both military and civilian governments
in the past are rapidly reemerging. Ultimately y the
success of the funta is at stake; the regime will find
it increasingly difficult to govern unless it can restore
unity or at least stave off widespread disaffection.

There are already sighs of restiveness in civilian
ranks t especially in the pivotal labor movement. More-
overt tensions within the junta itself have developed
because of personal rivalries and differences over how
to proceed.

Background

, In theory, the regime has virtually unlimited powers
and can enforce its dictates by exercising tight military
control over the government at the national and local
levels. In reality, however, the situation is much more

This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Re-
gional and Political Analysis and was coordinated by the
Office of Economic Research and t
tions. \

RP M 77-10030

SECRET

complex and the military's control is far from complete
as a result of Argentine political practices and behavior
of the military.

Argentina's politics are marked by intense competi-
tion among political sectors , who are extraordinarily
jealous of their prerogatives, even by Latin American
standards. Although competition is keen, the interested
parties — including the military — are bound together by
a complex set of interrelationships.

Key sectors compete directly with each other largely
unfettered by formal institutions that smooth over dif-
ferences in other societies. The legislature and the
courts, for example, are viewed as entities that are
unable to mediate impartially the competition for power.

In Argentine society political parties serve more to ad-
vauice personal ambitions than to promote ideologies or
philosophies. The limits of political activity are
set by how much an individual or group can get away with
before an opponent reacts.

The key political sectors are acutely aware of each
other's every move. Each group nearly always interprets
any gain by another as an automatic loss for itself. Com-
promise is not valued; instead, it is considered as a sign
of weakness. A certain amount of violence, while not
formally condoned, is regarded as within the rules of the
gcune .

No sector has ever completely dominated the others
for any length of time. Alliances and loyalties tend to
shift too readily for any group to maintain its hold in-
definitely. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to
envision a durable totalitarian regime in Argentina, even
though the executive branch traditionally is granted ex-
tensive putative powers. Only with the greatest difficul-
ty can a particular approach to a problem gather the
necessary consensus to become firmly established.

Civilian Pressures

The chief source of potential trouble for the junta
is the labor movement, the most formidable civilian group-
ing since it achieved political maturity under the tutelage
of Juan Peron in the 1940s. There is considerable hostility
between labor and the military, much of it stemming from the

- 2 -

6 ECRET

GBefflg -

days of Peron. The military, first spawned, but ultimately
rejected Peron. Workers, however, still retain a strong
loyalty to the man who for decades dominated Argentine
politics. They see the military as unalterably opposed
to Peron 's populism and to the gains they perceive he made
for them. For example, every attempt to limit wage in-
creases or rein in the activities of unions is inter-
preted in this light. Many officers, on the other hand,
blame the Peronists for virtually all the ills Argentina
has suffered for more than a generation and consider it
their duty to extirpate all vestiges of Peronist influ-
ence. Many generals believe leibor's ascendancy under the
-former government nearly destroyed the nation's economy.

The military are no less politicized than their civil-
ian counterparts. Disputes and rivalries abound, but most
officers prefer not to risk a breakdown of military unity
by pressing their differences too far. The safeguarding
of military unity frequently means that crucial decisions
are deferred and important policies watered down.

Ironically, disputatious officers often seek the
backing of civilian groups in an effort to outmaneuver
fellow militauy men. Thus officers regularly scheme with
representatives of various groups, even the unions. Ci-
vilians do their best to exploit the officers' differences
by joining whatever side has the most to offer them. The
lineups change often, at times inexpliceibly.

Further ccxaplicating the political scene is the pro-
pensity of the regime to undermine its own claims of author-
ity by failing to act promptly on policy matters . Whether
or not because of internal divisions, the government has
acted inconsistently on several major issues, displayed
serious lack of coordination on others, and failed to
act at all on still others.

Under these circvimstances, civilians feel more or
less obliged to test the government at every opportunity.
This testing process is in full swing and manifesting it-
self in a number of ways. The unions are at the forefront
of the activity because they have so far been the most af-
fected by junta restrictions to date. Despite the govern-
ment’s takeover of major unions and confederations and the
ban on all strikes, workers have repeatedly challenged the
junta by staying off the job, staging slowdowns and com-
mitting sabotage.

- 3 -

SECRET

Labor's defiance reflects a mix of economic and
political concerns. Workers have in fact lost considerable
purchasing power due as a result of inflation, while pay
raises have been limited in the name of austerity. At
the same time, labor leaders bridle at the continuing
limits placed on their authority and activity. Union
leaders are in a particularly difficult situation.

Stripped of their ability to demand benefits for workers,
there is little they Ceui do to retain the already waning
loyalty of the rank and file. They must try to deliver
something tangible for union members, if they are to re-
build their support.

We believe that the labor bosses will continue to
press the government by encouraging labor protests but
only those that stop short of provoking serious retalia- -
tion. Only in this way can the leaders strengthen their
credibility among those they purport to represent. The
junta's relatively mild reaction thus far to labor pro-
tests probably has encouraged union leaders to pursue
this tactic.

Other civilian sectors bring pressure to bear in
whatever way they can. Currently, a vigorous debate is
going on regarding restructuring the executive authority.
The question revolves on whether the presidency should
continue to be held by a member of the junta or should
go to a "fourth man." Most of the arguments suggest
that the present government setup worked well during the
initial crisis and subsequent consolidation of the junta's
authority, but that it does not give the presidency
enough authority to direct longer term policies and plans.
Some commentators contend that to leave the presidency
within the military junta increases rather than reduces
the potential for crippling military rivalries.

The debate not only raises substantive issues but
also presents another opportunity for Argentines to put
pressure on the regime. It is difficult for President
Videla to ignore the debate, which is at least tacitly
approved by some potential military rivals eager to ad-
vance their own ambitions. He clearly will need to devote
an increasing amo\int of his time to protecting himself
politically. As a result, it will be hard for him to
address the policy isisues he is expected to deal with
as chief executive.

- 4 -

6 BGRBT

OCeRTO-

How far civilians can go in pressing the goverianent
depends on their tenacity and on the tolerance of key
generals. The outcome hinges on a complicated series of
relationships between Videla and other officers as well
as between civilians and the military. The efforts of
civilians could be counterproductive.

Military Opposition

Videla is committed to a form of military rule
that is moderate in all areas except counterinsurgency,
and he seems to value open dialogue with a wide variety
of military and civilian groups, Videla 's conciliatory
approach has caused him problems, however, particularly

from rival officers,

>.3(b)(l)

■■■■■■■■I A sizable nuidser of officers reject
Videla 's policy of conciliation and have called for
greater restrictions on civilians and an even more ruth-
less campaign against the terrorists. Videla and his
military supporters have spent a good deal of time work-
ing to block this concept.

Navy chief and fellow junta member Admiral Massera
has been especially strident. in his criticism of the
President, apparently in order to gain the support of
officers opposed to Videla *s moderate ways. Massera 's
tactics are brazenly opportunistic and self-serving ; he
is reported to be in contact with certain civilians in-
terested in seeing him move up.

The planning minister. General Ramon Diaz Bessone,
could pose a more serious threat to Videla. hast year
Diaz Bessone engineered the establishment of the post he
now occupies, and he is now next to Videla in the line of
succession. This was acconqplished over the President's
objections. Diaz Bessone, who enjoys a reputation as a
hard liner, obviously has his eyes on the presidency.

At some point, Videla *s military critics may muster
enough support to force him to abetndon his moderate ap-
proach or step aside. The argtunents of such officers
would take on increased importance if in the interim,
under the leadership of Videla, the government should
suffer a major reverse either in the anti-terrorist
fight or on the economic front.

I

- 5 -

•N -V

SECRE T

Outlook

The military clearly do not intend to give up power
in the near future. The problems they intervened to
tackle are not subject to short-term solutions , and the
officers are committed to their solution. As a practi-
cal matter, moreover, there is no alternative to military
rule in sight.

The eradication of subversion will continue to pre-
occupy the regime. The military are encouraged by the
very real losses they have inflicted on the terrorists,
but they know that the war is still not won. Many be-
lieve the Peoples Revolutionary Army has been all but
destroyed, but there is less optimism regarding the urban-
based Montoneros. Although the Montoneros have been
hurt by the counterinsurgency campaign, they retain the
ability — ^and the will — to carry out attacks on businessmen,
police, and others. It is possible that changes at the
top will take place within the next month or so. Rumors
to this effect are rampant in Buenos Aires. Should Videla
lose either the presidency or his position in the junta,
it will be taken as a decisive defeat for his moderate
policies and a corresponding gain for his hard-line op-
ponents .

Real or perceived pressures from the US on human
rights may have an important influence on Videla abili-
ty to retain the upper hand. If he is seen as caving in
to the US , the hard-liners can hope to use nationalistic
arguments to strengthen their case against him. Videla
must, therefore, make it clear to his detractors that he
is willing to stand up to Washington.

Whether ot not Videla remains in office the human
rights problem will persist in Argentina. It will con-
tinue to be a troublesome factor — and a potential cause
of friction with the US- — as long as the Argentine military
believes it faces a serious subversive threat.

':'6 —

SECRET

I

L

UNCLASSIFIED

53.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, March 4, 1977, 0126Z

48062

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770074-0443. Confidential;
Immediate. Drafted by Zimmerman; cleared by Luers and in S/S; approved by Christopher.
Repeated to Santiago, Brasilia, and Montevideo.

UNCLASSIFIED

Document View

Page 1 "2-

eONFIPE N TIAL —

ooMPiparPHtB

PAGB 01 SThTS 048002

ORIGIN ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 &S-15 DHA-02 CIAE-00 IHR-07 NSAB-00

PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SSO-00 NSCE-OO li-03 IGIV-02 TR8B-00
OMB-01 INRB-OO ( ISO ) R

DRAFTED BY ARA:BCA:R1fZZMMER>IANN:IiK
APPROVED BY THB OBPDTY SBCStBTARY
ARAsWEUIERS
S/S - SBANEDB

040224Z 014216 /14

0 040126Z HAS 77

SH Estate hashdc

TO »fEKBASSY BOBNDS AIRES IMMEDIATE

0 0 H F I ' ""D B ' H ^ g ' -A r-a - STATE 048062

E.O. 11652 :6DS
TAGSiPFOR, SHUN. AR

SDBOBCT: CAUL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY BY ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR

1. DEPUTY SE»2RETARY CHRISTOPHER RECEIVED ARGENTINE
AMBASSADOR AJA ESPID MARCH 3.

2 . THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OPENED BY NOTI^'G HE HAD.

EARLIER TALKED NITH THE ARGENTINE CHARGE > HE SAID HE WAS
PLEASED THB AMBASSADOR HAD COMB IN AS THE USG IS ANXIOUS
THAT THB CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATKHI BE KEPT OPEN.

3. AJA ESPIL. REFERRED TO THE LONG HISTORY OF GOOD
RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AMD THE U.S. BASED ON MUTUAL
ONOBRSTANDING AND RESPECT. ARGENTINA ASSUMED THAT THE HEW
OS ADMINISTRATIOM WOULD TAKE THE SAME VIEW. BUT THB
GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAS NOTIFIED OF THE DECISION OF THE
NEW AI»(INISTRATIOH TO REDUCE FHS CREDITS THROUai THE PRESS
■ eONg l PEMT IWL

CONPiDBNTXAS

PAGE 02 STATE 048062

WHICH QUOTED THB SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY AMO INOUYB'S REMARKS
DURING THE HEARING OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON FOREIO>

OPERATIONS OP SENATE APPROPRIATIONS OMHITTEE. THAT IS NOT,

HE SAID, THE REAL PROBLEM, HOWEVER. THE PROBLEM IS THAT
BY THIS DECISION ARGENTINA IS ACCUSED OF PERPETRATING GROSS

VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS - A CHARGE THE GOA REJECTS.

THBREF(»B HE BAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO
PRESENT A HOTS SmTING THE DECISION OF THB GOA WOT TO nfig
1978 FHS CREDITS.

4 . AJA ESPIL THEN PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING FIRST PBRSCW
NOTE: BEGIN TEXT: MR. SECRETARY: I HAVE THB HC»)OR TO
INFORM YOU, ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTKRIS RECEIVED FROM MY
GOVERNMENT, THAT THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC HILL NOT MAKE USE
OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDIT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1978.

ACCEPT HR. SECRETARY THE ASSURANCES OF NY HIGHEST
CmSIDERATION. END TEXT.

5. DEPUTY SECRETARY ACCEPTED THE NOTE OH BEHALF OF THB
SECRETARY. HE SAID THAT THE OS RECOGNIZES THAT THE
DECISKNI MOT TO MAKE USB OF FY 78 MILITARY CREDITS HAS
ENTIRELY THE PROVINCE OF THE GOA, JUST AS THE DECISION TO

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

http://smartarcliive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 6/19^013

Document View

Page 2 of ^ ^

EHJOCB THE FIGORE WAS APPROPRIATELY A DECISIOH FOR THE
U.S. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT RELATKXtS HOUU3 CONTINUE
ON THE BASIS OF HOTUAL UNDERSnUIDING AND RESPECT AS IN THE
PAST. THE U.S. IS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE SECURITY PROBLEMS
FACING THE GOA BUT IT HOUUD SEEM THAT THE POINT HAD BEEN
REACHED IN REESTABLISHING CONTROL NHERB IT SHOULD BE
POSSIBIf TO COMBINE FIRMNESS WITH RESTRAINT.

G. CHRISTOPHER NOTED THAT HE HAD PERSONAL
EXPERIENCE NIIH SITUATIONS SIMILAR TO THAT FACING ARGENTINA,
ALTHOUGH CLEARLY HOT AS SERIOUS. IT IS SSSWTIAL IN TRESS
■eeW F I B EWT M ttr

e e^IBB HT IAb

PAGE 03 STATE 048062

ccmmass to combine firmness with restraint, othsrnisb

STABILITY NILL NOT BE ACHIEVED.

7. SAYING HE LIKED THE AMBASSADOR'S USE OF THE WORDS
mmiAL UNDERSTANDING, CHRISTOFHER AFFIRMED TEE OS DESIRE
TO CONTINUE 6000 RELATIONS. HE St^ASIZED. HOWEVER, THE
US BELIEF imT THE FUTURE DEPOmS ON RESPECT FOR THE RULE
OF LAM AND PROTBCTICEI OP HUMAN RIGHTS. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO
MAINTAIN COMHUNICATICWS AND IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS,
CHRISTOPHER SAID. AND IT IS IN THAT SPIRIT THAT HE NAS
RECEIVING THE AMBASSADOR.

S . AJA ESPIL RESPONDED THAT BIS GOVERNMENT FULLY AGREED .
WITH THAT PORTION OF THE SECRETARY'S TESTIMCMY REGARDING
THE NEED TO FOSTER A CLIMATE OF COQPBRATICBI BETWEEN
NORTH AND SOUTH. CHRISTOPHER SAID THE U.S. WOULD DO ITS
BEST TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS BETWEEN NORTH
AND SOOTH AMD BKMEEN ARGENTINA AMD THE U.S. MB WOULD
ALSO, KB SAID, SEEK TO MAINTAIN CXmSISTENCY OF STANDARDS

IN OUR APPROACH TO PROBLOtS. AUA ESPIL REPLia} THAT THE
LAST POINT NAS VERY IMPCKTANT.

9. AIMOSPHSRB WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. THE
JUffiASSADOR AMD THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THEY HOPED TO SEE
ONE ANOTHER SOm UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCBb.

VANCE

TWtfFlDBNTJLAL

NNN

http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_.,.

6/19/2013

UNCLASSIFIED

54.

Telegram From Secretary of State Vance’s Delegation to the Department of State
Grenada, June 19, 1977, 1830Z
52

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, OAS meeting June 14-17, 1977, Grenada.
Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Vance was in Grenada for the OASGA. In telegram 6019 from
the Secretary’s delegation in Port of Spain, June 17, summarized the conversation. (Ibid.)

UNCLASSIFIED

ADP Declassification Review
■ DECLASSIFIED
I by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201

tment of State

INCOMING

TELEGRAM

PUE 11 MEMO I0j$2 lltillE

ECTioa ss-as

IKFO OCT-11 ISO-II SSO-00 /KS *

-fffilll tJUiaz /45

0 IJIUn JUR 71
EH USIEl CREMO*

TO SECSTRTE MSHOC IHIEOIATE ffli
t, 0 RE I 0 E'H r IT T CRERROA 1052

fOI S/S RUST OEUINC FROM MRK OIOR
FROM USOEl OASCA
USOAS SEE 3(

E.O. USS2: 60S

TA6S: PORT, OAS, OVIP (TARCE, CTRUS)

SVSi: SECRETARY'S BIUTERAl RITN ARSERTIRA fJURE li)

1. rAITtCIPAMTS: US: SECRETARY YAHCE. AUASSADOR TOOHAR.
UOERSECRETARY HABIB, AMBASSADOR UCCEE. W$ VAR REI6ERSSERC
lIRTERPRETERI MR S ROGERS IROTETARERK AIOERTINA: UIRISTER
MORTES, VICE HIRISTER CUATTER OSCAR ALIAIA, HIRISIER iUAR
GARIOS ARltA, lOSE I CARCIA CHIREILI, ATIIIO flORBERTO UOTrERI.

2. SUBIECIS: IIIATERAI AT 0AS6A WITH ARCERTIRA; HUUR RiCHTS;
HUCHLEAR ROR-PIOllFERATfOR.

}. AFTER BRIEF REMARKS ABOUT FORMER FOREICR HIRISTER CUEIETII'S
MEOtCAl YISIT TO THE UNtTEO STATES. ARO THE SECIETART'S
COHMERT that he has ABOUT TO CONFER WITH PRIME MINISTER
fILUAHS IN TRIDIO, THE CONVERSATION RENT OIRECTIY TO HUMAN
RICHTS.

4. THE SECRETARY INFORI«» THE ARGENTINES THAT THE US MUID
ABSTAIN OR THE TM LOANS TO ARGENTINA IN THE MeLO BANK BUT
HAKE A REFERENCE TO THE PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS THAI HAD
TAKER PLACE. MONTES NODDED BUT SIAO NOTHING AT THAT POINT IN
RESPONSE. THE SECRETARY ASKEO MAT MONTES THOUGHT RQULO GOIrE
OUT OF THE general ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

I. MONIES REFEIREO TO HIS S TATE MENT IN TH E INFORMAL

oialoguL- nr theit lines IBEB M situation and vieibit

ARGENTIA AT CONSIERAILE LENGTH. THE ISIS ARMY TAKE-
OVER MAS A RATIQRAl REORGANlEATIOn. HOT A REVOLUTION.

THERE HAS BEEN NO POLITICAL PERSECUTION. THE COMMUNIST
PARTY, FOR INSIARCE, REMAINS LEGAL AND PUBLISHES ITS NEKS-
PAPER FREELY. THE PROBLEM IS TERRORISM, NOT POLITICAL RICHTS
CERTAIN GUARANTEES ARE INDEED SUSPENDED BUT THE
CONSITITUTION PROVIDES FOR SUSPENSION IN A STATE OF SIEGE.
ARGCRTIRES ARE BEING GOVERNED BY THE LAN. THE CONSEGUENCES
OF THE STATE OF SIEGE APPLY ONLY TO TERRORIST CRIMINALS.

IE COULD NOT SAY PRECISELY WEN THE STATE OF SIEGE HOULD
BE LIFTED, BUT SO MUCH lil>IOVEHENT HAD TAKEN PLACE THAT
TERRORISM MIGHT EFFECTIVELY BE ENDED BY THE END OF U77.

i. ALLARA DESCRIBED THE TERRORIST THREAT AT THE TIME
THE ARMED FORCES TOOK OVER. MONTES THEN RETURNED TO THE
OUESTION OF THE nORlD BARK LOANS. HE SAID HARTINE! OE
HOI RAD REPORTED ON HIS CONVERSATION HITH SECtEURT
ILUMCNTHAL ANO DR BR2EI INSKi. ST SAID 'ARGENT INA iS TERT
CONCERNED THAT TECHNICAL MATTERS ARE BEING SUBORDINATED
TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIOflS. HARTIHEI DE HOI HAD REPORTED
THAT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES HERE NOT HELL-INFORKD
FOR IHSIATNCE CONCERHINC THE NUMBER OE PEOPLE NHO NAD BEEN
REALESEO.

7. THE SECRETART RESPONDED THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO
DECIDE TO ABSTAIN INSTEAD OF VOTING AGAINST. HE MOULD
HATCH FOR FURTHER PROGRESS TO SEE IF HE COULD SOON VOTE

GRENAO $mi IB 19101

IN FAVOB OF LOANS FOR ARGENTINA. ALLARA THEN PROPOSED A
COLLABORATIVE EFFORT TO BEGIN WITH A PERMANENT,

FRANK AND THOROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE US ANO ARGENTINA
ON ALL MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN.

B. IN ANSNEI TO UNDERSECRETARY HABIB'S OUESTION, MONTES
DESCRIBED ARGENTINA'S VULNERABILITY TO TRAFFICKIRG IN ARMS
FOR GUERRIllAS. MABIB NOTEO THE SENATE ACTION OF THE DAT
BEFORE TO CUT OFF ALL ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA AFTER
SEPTEMBER SI, IB7A, IF NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BY THEN '

ON HUMAN BIGHTS, INSltiD OF U UStOlATF CUT m *S PJflPflSFN
8V SENAIOI KENHEOT. ’THE SLwETAky SAID THIS
REFLECTED THE UNDOUBTED PROGRESS ARGENTINA HAD HADE.

9. COMING BACK TO THE PORPOSAL FOI COOPERATION, MONTES
SOCGESTEO A GROUP OF US ARMY OFFICERS VISIT ARGEHflRA TO
SEE THE REAL SITUATION. ALLARA THEN EXPLAINED Af CENGTN
WT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ODES NOT FEEL THAT’ IT IS
VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS. BETTER KNOWLEDGE ROULO SHOW THE US
THAT ARGENTINA HAS MERELY OEFENDING THE WESTERN, I^T OF LIFE.

If. ARLIA THEN NAMED FIVE 'SUBVERSIVE ACTIVISTS^fHO
HE SAID WERE PROVIDING THE HOST ABUNDANT iHFORI|tUDN ON
AIGENTINA IN THE US; lOBERT GUEVARA (CHE'S BROTHEIl,

LUCID GARZON-HACEDO ANO GUSTAVO ROCA, BOTH LAHVEjl WITH
THE P£M>LE-S REVOLUTIONARY ARMT. PEORO DUALDE, m
HIS LILY HAZEAFERRO. HE SAID GUEVARA ARO ROCA HtpVOHKEO
HI IK BRAOV TYSON ON THE US SJWHENI AT THE UN HUNM
RITITS COWISSiOh. HE SAID THAT THESE PEOPLE NEK
FREQUENTLY SEEN WITH FATHER DR IRAN. RDCA. HE SAI
HAD iSUT BEEN ARRESTED IN OENMARI FDR ROBBING SltfPiiARKETS
AND FOR HAVING FALSE IDENTIFICATION PAPERS. HE
DISeuSSED'TRIS HITH MS DERIAN.

11. THE SECRETART DESCRIBED MS DEBIAN AS COWIET
DEDICATED AND VERT KNOHlEOCERBlEi MONTES AND ALL
AGREED SHE HAD BEEN VfRY USEFUL TO THE ARl ^NIINEl
VISIT TO THEIR COUNIIY, THEY ADDED. SHE MIGHT BE
FIRST LINK IN THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORT THAT ARCE
HANTS. IN ANSWER TO THE SECRETARY'S OUESTION, AR
ARGENTINA FAVORED STRENGTHENING THE INTER-AMERIC
RIGHTS COMHISSlOH BY BIVING IT MORE PRECISE TER
REFERENCE. ITS REAL TOB HAS TO COOPERATE IN THE
OF RIGHTS CENERAlir, NOT iUST FOCUSSING ON COVER
ACTIVITIES.

12. AMBASSADOR TODMAH HAD EARLIER ASKED HKT ARGE
HOT ACCEDE TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOCO. ARLIA SAI
ARGENTINA'S POSITION HAS HELL KHOHN - THAT TLATE
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY OiSCRIHINAT
COUNTRIES THAT NEEDED TO DEVELOP THEIR NUCLEAR E
CAPACITT, SUCH AS ARGENTINA. . ARGENTINA'S NEEDS A
ENTIRELY PACIFIC. ARGENTINA NEEDS TO DOUBLE ITS
CAPACITT BT 1952. NUCLEAR POWER IS INOISPENSASLE.

U. THE SECRETARY ACCEPTED THAT ARGENTINA NEEDED
POWER BUT SAID THAT NOTHING IN THE TREATY IHFRING
RIGHT OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR CNERGT. IT WOUIO
ENTIRELY CONSISTENT FOR ARCENTINA TO SIGN TKHE TL
TREATY. ALLARA SAtO THE ARGENTINE COVERNMENT HAS
ITS ATTITUDE TOHAROS TLATELOCO AND THE NPI, BUT S
GUARDS HERE A MORE LIKELY APPROACH. AMBASSADOR TO
STRESSED THE INTERNATIONAL FSTCMOLOCiCAL IMPORIAN
ARGENTINA'S SIGNIRG TO ECNOURAGE THE FEW lEUAINIH
TO 00 SO.

14. IN CONCLUSION, THE SECRETART SAID THE HOULD AS
NS DERIAN TO CARRY ON HER CONSULTATIONS HITH THE ili
ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ON OTHER HATTERS, HE MOULD HOIK f
OUR AIBASSADOR AND SPECIALISTS. HE HOPED THAT HE A'I
MONTES COULD CONTINUE THEIR OISCUSION. MONTES ACRE
MCGEE

NOT TO DC KEPm
AUTHOAlZATIOfl OF THE

IJHOUY THE

SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED

55.

s

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 27, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office Fil
Country Chron, Box 3, Argentina, 1977-1978. Secret.

UNCLASSIFIED

p *•

sechet

THE WHITE HOUSE

Y/ASHINGTON

'm6817

June 27. 1977

ACTION: ARA and D/HA
COPinS:

MEMORANDUM FOR . •

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: Human Rights in Argentina

RF:vhd

The President noted that the Argentines have recently announced a
series of actions designed to improve their human rights image.
These actions include:

D

P

S/P

S/S

S/S-S

TMB

TMC

-- releasing of 342 persons from custody;

-- processing in the courts the cases of nearly 1,000
persons awaiting trial on charges of subversion; and

-- hinting at the reinstatement of the individuals'
constitutional right to leave the coimtry.

The President would like you to acknowledge this Argentine commit-
ment to human rights.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

SECRET—

UNCLASSIFIED

56.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter

Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File,
Country Chron File, Box 3, Argentina, 1977-1978. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed
the top right-hand comer of the memorandum. Pastor forwarded this memorandum to Brzezinski
under a July 7 covering memorandum and recommended that it be ^nt to Carter. A handwritten
note indicates that Brzezinski discussed the memorandum with Carter on July 9. (Carter Library,
National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina,
2-12/77)

UNCLASSIFIED

V

MEMORANDUM

|y ai "A" " —

INFORMATION -
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:

SUBJECT:

OECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASIIINCTON

THE PRESIDENT
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Yoxir Remark That Argentine Improvements
in Human Rights Should be Acknowledged

The State Department has prepared a short report (Tab A^’ assessing
the significance of Argentine Presid^t Videla's recent steps (on
June 14) to improve the coiaitry's human rights image. Our mission
in Argentina and the Department suggest that these steps — the release
of 342 persons, the processing of 1,000 cases, the reexamination of
the right of exile — should be "viewed cautiously." Nonetheless, the
Department has sent a cable which instructs our Embassy to acknowledge
and esqpress our continued interest and encouragement for these and
other steps which improve the human rights picture in Argentina. The
State Department also requested further information on whether the
announced steps have been taken.

A recent cable summarizing President Videla's trip to Uruguay appears
to reinforce the conclusion that we should be more cautious about
accepting announcements of reforms by the Latin American military govern-
ments at Lice value. At his press-conference at the conclusion of his
visit, Videla backed away from recent statements on democracy and
instead said that his government has no fixed timetable for the installation
of a democratic form of government.

I

SECRE T

SECRET

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

UNCLASSIFIED

57.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, My 9, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4,
Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. This memorandum is also printed as Document 66 in
Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol, II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASH I NGTON

5601-

GQNFIDENTfAfc

ACTIOKAKV&S/PRS)

J^3ly 9, 1977

ODPIES TO:

S

D

P

S/P

D/HA

S/S

S/S-S

2MC

TMD

RF(rs)

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT; Recognition of Improvements in

Human Rights

The following is based on a conversation I had with the President

this mornings

1. As you know, the Argentine Government has stated its
intention to release 342 political prisoners* The President would
like you to acknowledge this and express his gratification to the
Argentine Government when they have released the prisoners.

2, At the same time, the President would like the State
Department, on backgroxind to the press, to acknowledge this action
by the Argentine Government and express the President's gratification.

3, The President would like it to be a matter of policy to
acknowledge and express gratification for improvements in human
rights once it has been determined that these improvements are
real rather than cosmetic. This shoiold be done zu>t only with the
Government concerned but, on background, with the press.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

coi > ?FiDENTiA"fa - ADP DeclassificsJion Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

UNCLASSIFIED

58.

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
(Todman), the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian),
and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, July 22, 1977

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights — ^Argentina I. Confidential. Sent
through Benson and Habib. Drafted by Rondon, O. Jones, L. Brown, and Borek; Titus,
Robinson, Feinberg, Cutter, and Thomas concurred. Rondon initialed for Jones, Brown, and
Borek. Keane initialed for Todman. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that
Vance saw it. An unknown hand initialed for Derian. Rondon initialed for Feinberg, Cutter, and
Thomas. Titus initialed for himself and Robinson. Anderson initialed the first page of the
memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

a^l^^igWY»^iHlJW<K)«oo»^<sa

i/PADRC
Jcjpies to:

CONFIDENyi .AL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

ADP Dedassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

PROM: ARA - Terence A, Todman

D/HA - Patricia M. Deri
PM - Leslie

n

SUB J ECT : . Restriction 'o F Win's" Sairs "tS^'Ar qefiri'ha^crfr’^Ke'^llq t
of Human Rights situatibn

an pp ^ ^

t

M

)/4lA

!P:njs

TO:

THROUGH:

The Secretary

P - Mr. Habily^
T - Mrs. Benson

Vv»^

ISSUES FOR DECISION

How'Testrictive ’ shoaid''we' be'ih'lJeny^iiTg' pen IngTCoininercial
and Foreign Military Sales (PMS)- under cash and f inane ing..prjp,-
cedures to the armed forces and police of Argentina, in- light of
the. s.et ious ,jihuses o^ Jruiaan r ights in ^that .country?

ESSENTIAL FACTORS .

In Argentina, there is no question that human rights
are being violated including arbitrary detention, torture
and summary executions. V?hile there have been some recent
signs which may be a cause for : hope , the*devel»of'-violations
remains highi This led us to abstain in June on two World
Bank loans. .

As the second largest country in South America in population,
area and per capita GNP, Argentina is and will remain an
important political influence in the region. It has substantial
uranium reserves and an ambitious nuclear power program. It
has the most advanced nuclear capability of any Latin American
state and the greatest potential for an autonomous fuel cycle.
U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation in Brazil, and Latin
America generally, depend critically- on Argentina's acceptance
of full-scope safeguards (which it has shown a conditional
willingness to consider) and deferral of its fuel reprocessing
program.

. gQHpiDBNTIAL

CONPIDENTIAL

U.S. is

Argentina's largest trading partner (we currently haveLi^'^lK)
mj^lipn-trad^^ . U4^*^;£'Ank'Ss3iolia:5iir3’^J5il

Argentina * s de ^s ■a nd^:Uj S . industry has sonie..-^$L,2«.-^b>illiJ0W
f^^^ted -in^^Se'-gouritr^ Argentina is a major food exporter
and may have in its extensive continental shelf large reserves
of oil. Although the country has recently suffered severe
economic troubles, it is a generally self-sufficient
industrial and economic leader in Latin America;

Oy(af.*;iS:0 '^I^Tica'tTona^^lor -^Slfitt^r^Ta]?^

A^g e,njt iuna;^-are -pending . The most urgent of these cases is a $15
mxllTon commercial order from Bell-Textron for eight armored
helicopters, equipped with exterior ,gun mounts and wiring. Two
of them are for Presidential use and the rest for Argentina's
Antarctic activities. If we approve this "major" sale, routine
Congressional notification is required. There are alSdii^cfil^

Attachment).,

aTfre' DepeLf tment^ has- been deny t•rtg‘*e6mme^^C'lal’"€xpo'^e2i3Loen6e
a6B:l:l;cations.;for...Jdefense'‘article^ and services for police and
other civil law enforcement use, and FMS purchase requests for
articles and services which- could be diverted to such use. The
extension of PY 77 FMS financing is also being withheld. The
conference report on the FY 78 security assistance
authorization bill contains a provision prohibiting all FMS
sales and financing, grant training, and licenses for the export
of defense articles and services to the Government of Argentina,,
beginning, however, only in FY 1979.

Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
expresses a policy of promoting human rights and of not pro-
viding security assistance to any country engaged in a consis-
tent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights, except in extraordinary circumstances. It is
not necessary at any time to characterize expressly the human
rights practices of a recipient governmeht. Moreover, the
annual human rights report required by that section has been
submitted to the Congress with respect to Argentina. Neverthe-
less, the Congress .may:;:at3Sny 'time ,regu,e5.t:i;f rQro'yQaria:v.s;uppl.emen-
ta'fy'-tepof't on Argentina. To continue such assist angg^^t-thSTi
would .be-necessary for ..yo.ui,to. .state your.,op inion th at .ex tr
ofd inar:y--G ir cumstances^^exist -So;.that>wOn..aI l .the -fact s.:-^^^^

■CONFiriFNTIAL

- CeNPIDEH«PIAi:i

- 3

ngJ^auaX^iiteres t-. WhileHnjOumSuch*»£^por-t-»has“beerf®reqaest^d #

to

meet the requirements for continued assistance under Section
502B (c) }fj4©wSgisc'i®tf.

TlSg|?mON5 *

There is ge‘nere3s?vagr ee»e«t^^l:hatr=?we-Bhouldrn:crt^|SBlli«pr
14 £#.nsg.~ 3 ;he(?aaxport of-defense articles .and services. 'df Puseful-
^(gss'rto, pplice-K^nd - other- c ivi 1 1 aw -enf dr ceiiieri&o'rqaniz a t4^
Argentina, The presettt«^4's«aev" then;“;is,^.,wheji;iiiej£«4wa«^^
such r estr lctldh8^'^t&SS^.iici^ea3iifeEaiale8;i;ajadsa
a|ui«iifc^;sp.fr;a«hich i'

There are three options, all of which would be subject to
review dependent upon the human rights situation:

1 , con^^owe :#ouc5^pies;feTMg®“dri'ei^Xdfn^
s^cutlty^jsalesj^allowlhg, on a case-by'^case'*basis>'*PMS^eraIe^
gnid'’^lSfw(ief Ciaf' expbr!f§ for the Argentine military. No new
extensions of FMS financing would be contemplated, but dis-
bursements against prior years' financing to meet payments
for previously approved purchases would continue. Under this
option, some of the pending 40 cases would be approved,
including helicopters, armored vehicles, periscopes and
torpedoes.

D#Toys?^l^i;.-new^FMS-S|^etw#l-Pd2at*?seiis@Sa3ffiC£^^

This would ^aeny^'pjjadAh^gL^xequeatiS.

3. witht:theTfeiceptibn'^¥^^si^f§^artsx^iri^quip^^

PROS

particularly those involving nuclear non-proliferation.

— the Argentine armed forces

- a dominant institution in Argentina - in a period of political
instability.

€0NPIDEHTIAL

— n s latent •/ith our policy toward other rountrir^:

g it^hrnc - ri>f!nrf.B.» f^.a. Korea, Iran, Philippines).

— Pr%\fflSelS*^tJwe^lrrc^nt1ve '"for -the <i>overnfiM»nt to-Aapivve
its. human rights practices before the anticipatoi leg ir,] ar i ve
embargo takes effect.

eONS^

— IJill mean that weaoona- and other cquioment will bc-,i-ro-
v^ded. tO»the Argentine military fnrres which ate directly
il^Alved^ao human rights violationB*.

— Will be opposed by a significant number of Congressmen
and by other influential groups as inconsistent with the spirit
of Section 5028,

— May encourage the Argentine Government to assume the L’.S.
Government's policy is hortatory only* and that there is no cost
involved in continued repression.

i)ption 2 - Temporary Embargo

PROS

— layjtoOfiSiStent with < the spirit of S02B«

— Sends a clear message to the Argentine government
that we cannot provide arms while human rights conditions remain
as they are.

— WliULlPXObablyihavelWlde >ublid and Congressional support.
— Other instruments can be used to foster U.S. interest.

CONS

-- Will'cantagonize the' Cover nmeftt and the airmed forces a^d
sellrioany damage such leverage as we have, both ion the- iwportafht
nut!leasHP^vollferatlon problems and on. human righits.

' I

c

force Argentina to look elsewhere £^c arms#- possibly
i USSR . thus complicating U.S. efforjts to develop^

few.

mBHliVCaSOQQXcBtl

- 5 -

Sli9» pursuant to tiko now araa

^tsanafor policy.

a^Cojcoa. f or -H^kd Or ayion

' ''if’"

t!.'-j>^>^s%>-.v . ,'j ' . ..'"

; ■*'

UNCLASSIFIED

59.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, July 27, 1977, 2151Z

5522

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770269-0610. Confidential;
Priority; Limdis.

UNCLASSIFIED

Document View

Page 1 of 3

C eWWPlW T XAL

UMDIS

eowf i PSwri M.

SmB ox BUSHOS 05S22 272232Z

ACIim ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14

3(b)(1)

ISO-OO DHA-02
SP-02 THSl-00

P 272151Z JOIi 77
m JUIBMBASSY BOiarOS AIREB
TO SBCSTATB KASHDC PRIORITY 1518

NSC-05
/040 W
-102869

NSCB-00 ZNR-05
272249Z 775

C O N F i fl B N T 1 A L BOSTOS AIRES 5522
IiIMDIS

B.O. 11652: SOS
TAGS: SHDM, PDIP, AR

SOBJECT; US INTEREST IN HUN2W RIGHTS IMPROVSiSNTS
REF: (A) STATE 162292, (B) BUENOS AIRES 5309>

1. REF A INSTRUCTED THAT AH APPROACH BE HADE TO THE
GOA AT AN APPROPRIATELY SENIOR LEVEL TO MOTE THE US6
INTEREST IN RECENT GOA STEPS TO IMPROVE RESPECT FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS. THE INSTRUCTIOI ALSO PROVIDED THAT,

IF THE STEPS ANNOUNCED RY THE GOA AMD REPORTED IN
B.A. 4638 HERE REAL RATHER TRAN COSMETIC, XHB ARGEHTINBS
SHCRJLD BE MADE AHARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN THESE
AND CCarriMUING steps TOMARO the RESTORATION OF THE
RULE OF LAN.

2. REF B CmCUlDSD THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A DETECTABLE
TREND TOWARD IHPIU3VBMENT IN RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT
DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE POINT OF WHETHER THE
i3(» MEASURES CITED WERE REAL OR COSMETIC. AFTER
ATTEMPTS BY ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM TO FOLUW-UP
ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE HSASURBS ANNOUNCED BY THE
CO WFI PE N PYMJ

reWfIPEW tI AL

PAGE 02 BUENOS 05522 272233Z

GOA ON JUNE IS, HE HAVE NKNT CCNCLUDIOa THAT THEY DO
HAVE SCmS SUBSTANCE, BUT SHCRJLD NOT BE TAKEN QITXRELY
AT FACE VALUE. WE BELIEVE THAT SCME RESTRICTED FORM
OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WILL BE
FORMALLY REESTABLISHED (PERHAPS AS THE OPPORTUNITY
TO ■PETITION" TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AS NOW EXISTS IN
PRACTICE IF NOT IN LAW.) THE SUPPRBSSKW OF CABILDO WAS
NOT AS ExrnrsivB as it sgraiBD, since one the two
SUPPRESSED EOniCEIS HAD ALREADY BEEN DISTRimnHD. WE HAVE
STILL BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THE RELEASE OF ALL OF
342 PEHSCWSLI^^^SRBIRWED BETWEEN MAY 27 AND JUNE
14. BOTH IgNMWK fcMBflH sAY THAT IT SEEMS LIKELY
THAT MANY OF THESE PBRSCWS NBRB RELEASED. HE HAVE
CONFIRMED FOXHi CASES ACTUAUiY RELEASED AMD ASSUME, AS HAS
OCCURRED WITH OTHER RELEASE LISTS, THAT MANY OF THOSE
LISTED AS NO LC^GBR BEING DETAINED UNDER EXSCTOIVE
POWERS HAVE BEEN FORMALLY CHAINED WITH SOME CRIME. (THE
GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROVIDE A LIST OF PBRS(»IS DETAINED
OURINa THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE 342 RELEASES.)

3. IN THE APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS SINCE JUNE 14, THE
GOA HAS ISSUED THREE LISTS OF DETAINEES AND RELEASEES
UNDER THE EXECUTIVE POWER. THESE TOTAL 199 DETAINED AND

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

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77 RELEASED. SOME OF THOSE RELEASED CE( THE JULY 23
LIST HERE SHOHN AS HAVING BEEN APPRJraENDED (»I THE
JULY 2 LIST. INQUIRIES OF THE PERMANENT ASSOCIATI(»7
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ICRC AND THE NUNCIATURA
ELICITED NISTHER REJECTION NOR CONFIRMATION OF THE
LISTS. THEY OBSERVED THAT MANY OF THE PERSONS
OS THE JUNE 14 LIST HAD BEEN IMPRISCXIEO BY THE
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THERE HERE MANY NAMES ON
THE LIST FROM OUTSIDE BUENOS AIRES. THE LISTS OF
APPARENT RELEASES SINCE JUNE IS DO NOT SHOH ANY
ee WFIPB WT IAD

eOW PlB ENT IAL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 05522 272232Z

PARTICULAR TREND. THE LACK OF A CliEAR POSITIVE TREND ON
PRISONER RELEASES. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF HIDALGO SOLA. AMD
THE HARASSMENT OF LABOR LEADERS COMBINE TO ARGUE AGAINST
A CLOSE ASSOCIATICW OF PRESIDENT CARTER WITH ANY
SPECIFIC FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT.

4. THE ECONOMY MINISTER, MARTINEZ DE HOZ, HAS THE
OBVIOUS HIGH-LEVEL CHANNEL FOR EXPRESSION OF

USG INTEREST. IN A MEETING HITH HIM ON JULY 22 THE
CHARGE EXPRESSED OUR CONTINUING DEEP INTEREST IN
STEPS TOHARD RESTORATION OF RULE OF LAN AND OUR
INTEREST IN KNOHING ANY FU RT H ER DETAILS
RELATING TO THE STEPS ANNOUNCED JUNE IS. THE
MINISTER SAID HE NAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GO INTO DETAILS
ABOUT NUMBERS OR NAMES. BUT THAT HE HAS CONFIDENT THAT THE
PROCEDURES ANNOUNCED W JUNE 15 HERE GOING FORHARD.

HHBN PRESSED FOR DETAILS, THE MINISTER SAID THE MATTER
HAS OUTSIDE HIS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND INDICATED THAT
HE DID NOT NISH t6 BECOME INVOLVED IN SPECIFICS';

CHARGE NOTED THAT THE USG NAS PREPARED TO GIVE RECOGNITION
TO FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BpON RIGHTS AREA,

AS MAS DONE BY OUR DIRECTOR AT THE NORLD BANK. AND
HE HOPE THAT THE MINISTER MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE US
HITH MORE SUCH INSTANCES. AS A FURTHER EVIDENCE
OF OUR INTEREST AND HILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE FAVORABLE
DEVELOPMENTS, CHARGE PROVIDED MINISTER HITH TELETYPE
COPY OF PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AT YAZOO CITY H HICH
MENTIONED RELEASES OR ARGENTINE PRISONERS. lOUiTINBZ DE
HOZ APPEARED INTERESTED BUT LIMITED HIS COMMENTS TO
OBSERVING THAT IN ARGENTINA THOSE DETAINED ARE NOT
CALLED POLITICAL PRISCKIBRS.

5. THOUGH MARTINEZ DE HOZ HAS UNHILLING TO DEAL IN
SPECIFICS, HE DID EXPAND ON THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE
DIALOGUE BBTHEEN THE THO COUNTRIES AND DO MORS IN THE
HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD HHICH NOULD FURTHER THAT END.
CUNFIUKNTIAL

CUNFIUBN T IAL

PAGE 04 BUENOS 05522 272232Z

HE SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE SOMETHING SUITABLE FOR
ANNOUNCEMENT PRIO R TO THE ARRIVAL OF ASSISTANT
SECRETARY TODMAnYhE THOUGHT SOMETHING SPECIFIC ON
THE RIGHT OF OPTION MIGHT BE READY SHORTLY, BUT HAS
UNSURE. HE THEN CHANGED THE SUBJECT TO ASK FOR
CLARIFICATION OF A PUZZLING CABLE HE HAD RECEIVED FROM
THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY IN HASHINGTON REGARDING THE
STATUS OF THE RRUSS AMENDMENT TO THE BILL PROVIDING
FUNDING FOR IFI'S.- ' '

6. ON THO Other occasions embassy officers have

RAISED HITH AN OFFICIAL OF THE PRESIDENCY THE DEEP'

US INTEREST IN FURTHER SPECIFIC STEPS TOHARD THE RULE
OF LAN. THESE EXPLORATORY OBSERVATIONS HERE MET HITH
LITTLE MORE THAN POLITE INTEREST.

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7. amiEm': the argbhtihe risi>onse ik ■i«ese ihstances

IS NOT PARTICDIASLY ENCODI»an«3. THE TACTIC OF
BXFRESSING INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES DID NOT
SXiICIT POSITIVE RESPONSES, FOR THIS IS AN AREA WHERE
FEW WISH TO TAKE THE BIAHE OR SHARE CREDIT.

CHAPLIN

OJMHDKN'i'lAC

NNN

COW FIDE N TI jtt.

UMOZS

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UNCLASSIFIED

60.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, August 15, 1977, 1758Z

192822

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770294-0106. Confidential;
Immediate; Stadis; Limdis. Drafted by Bova, approved by Derian. In telegram 6644 from Buenos
Aires, September 7, the Embassy forwarded the corrected text of this cable for information to
Asuncion, Brasilia, La Paz, Montevideo, and Santiago. (National Archives, RG 59, Central
Foreign Policy File, D770345-0462)

UNCLASSIFIED

I)ociiment View

Page 1 of 4

cow rapC N T tfli:

UMDIS, STADXS

cawymEHTim '

PAGE 01 STATE 1S2822

ORIGIN DHA-02

INFO OCT-01 lSO-00 A8A-06 SS-14 SSO-00 INR-OS INRE-00

L-Ol SP-02 /031 R

CRAFTED BY D/HA/HR :MBOVA;Dl
APPROVED BY D/SA:PDERIAH

0423B5 1S1903Z /SO

O 1S17S8Z A0G 77

FM 8BCSTATB KKSBDC

TO AMEKBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

e eWP I PENTI A C STATE 192822

STADIS///////////////////////////

UMDIS

B.O. 11SS2: QDS
TAGS: SHDH, PFOR, AR

SDBiTECrr: DIKIAN VISIT WITH ADMIRAL MASSERA
fOR CHARGE CHAPLIN
BEGIN SUMMARY

1. AT HIS REQUEST, U.S. OXIRDIBATOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
PATT DERIAH MET WITH JUNTA MEMBER MASSERA m MORNING OF
AnniST 10. THE ADMIRAL STRESSED THAT ARGENTINA NAS IN
THE PROCESS OF RETURNING TO NORMAL LBGMi PROCEDURES AND
THAT KIKS PSfWRESS SID BEEN MADE SINCE MS. DERIAN • S . LAST
VISIT. MRS. DERIAN EXPRESSED HER HOPE THAT NOiHALIZATICJN
COULD BE ACONIPLISHBO SOON »SID IN SUCH A NAY THAT ALL
LEVELS OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS NOULD UNDERSTAND IT.

END SUMMARY.

2. THE ADMIRAL STARTED THE aWVBRSATICW BY STRESSING THAT
‘ OONFIDE H nAL ' "

OONFID Bi rmC '

PAGE 02 STATE 192822

PROGRESS NAS BEING MADE IN CONTROLLING THE SITUATION.

NHILB NOTING THAT FALSE INFORMATION CIRCULATES, AND SOKE
INCIDENTS CONTINDS TO OCCUR C*SOHE GROUPS STILL ESCAPE
US") HE STRESSED THAT THE END HAS IN SIGHT. MRS. DERIAN
EXPRESSED HER HOPE THAT THIS HAS THE CASE AND NOTED
TWO THINGS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE USG: (1) THE

LARGE NUMBER OF DISAPPEARED AND (2) THE CONDITIONS OF
BSI^ HELD INCCNIDNICADO NHERE PEOPLE ARE TREATED TOO
HARSHLY. SHE SAID SHE HOPED NBH PROCSWRIS HILL BE
INTRODUCED.

3. ADMIRAL MASSERA SAID HE DID NOT KNOH HHAT NUMBERS
PRESIDENT VIDBLA OR ADMIRAL ALLARA HAD PROVIDED
REGARDING THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CHARGED OR TAKEN
ILLEGALLY BUT HE SAID THE LAST FEN MONTHS SHONED RAPID
PROGRESS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ARGENTINB ARMY HAS
SC»$EHHAT DIFFERENT FSm OTHERS IN THAT ITS ORGANIZATICM
CONTAIN CORE CCPWANDERS HHO HAD SOME INDEPENDENCE

IN ADMINISTERING INTERNAL S^IRITY BUT SAID THAT THIS
DID NOT MEAN THAT PRESIDENT VIDBLA MAS NOT IN CONTROL.

HE ADVISED THAT THERE COULD BE A DIFFERENCE BETHEEN THE
IMPRSSSICHI RECEIVED OP THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Rfepatrick, 4/24/2017

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ACTUAL REALITY.

4. HRS, OERIAH EXPRESSED HER COKCBRH 0VBR THE NUMBER
OF PEOPLE NHO DON'T KNOW IF MEMBERS OP THEIR FAMILY
ARE DEAD OR ALIVE. SHE MENTIC^IS THAT LABOR LEADERS
AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN IN ^AIL SINCE 1975. SHE SAID THAT
THE SYSTEM. SEEMS TO HAVE GROUND TO A HALT. E.G.. PEOPLE
HERE PICKED UP AND NEVER CHARGED, SOME HERE HELD WITH
m EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM, SOME HERE TRIED AND FOUND INNO-
CENT BUT STILL DETAINED. Sm EXPLAINED THAT AFTER A
■ CONFIBE WT Ii ar

UJNFIUKNTUSE”

PAGE 03 STATE 192622

PERIOD OF TIKE THE GOVERNMENT, HAVING UtOS mS FI(^
AGAINST TERRORISM, SHOUID SHOHH ITS STRENGTH BY SAYING
TO THE PEOPLE THAT IT HAS HOI BUT IT MEEDS HELP IN
THIS MOP-UP PHASE. SHE SAID THE TERRORISTS ACHIEVE
THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE OF DESTROYING TBS LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
OF THE STATS IF THE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T AIMIT IT HAS HC»I
THE tIAR AND MUST NOW RETURN TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM BY
BRINGIHS THOSE DETAINED TO TRIAL. SHE CITED THE CASE
OF JACOBO TIHMEIUIAN AS AH BXAMPI2. AODIHC! mt HAS BStai
MISTREATED HRILE UNDER DETENTldT. ^ilRAL MASSBRA
HE DIDN'T BELIEVE TIMMEINON HAD BEEN MISTREATED ALTHOUGH
HE MAY HAVE SAID HE BAS BEEN.

5. RETURNING TO THE GENERAL SITUATICHf, MRS. DBRIAN SAID
THAT MANY PEOPLE IN THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD
USG REKSSENTATIVES THAT THE NAVY IS RBSPCETSIBLE FOR
ABUSES NBICK OCCUR NHEN P^PLE ARE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY
AND INTERROGATED BEFORE THEY ENTER THE SYSTEM. ADMIRAL
HASSERA RSSPOMDED THAT, NKILB HE DOESN'T WISH TO GIVE
THE APPEARANCE OF •MASHING HIS HANDS OF THE MATTER, •
INTERHAL SECURITY IS NOT THE NAVY'S RESPONSIBILITY. THAT
THE NAVY HAS NOT TBRRITtNUAL JURISDICTICS AND WHEN IT
DOBS DO SCBISTRING IN THIS AREA IT DOBS SO WITH THE
KNDHLaSGB OF THE ARMY. HE SAID THAT THC»E MHO SAY
OTHERWISE ARE TRYING TO DECEIVE. MRS. DBRIAN SAID THAT
ON HER PRIOR VISIT SHE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT ONE OP THE
HORST INTERROGATION CENTERS HAS THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL
IN BUENOS AIRES. THE ADMIRAL DENIED THIS, SAYING THAT THE
NAVY'S ENTIRE ANTI -SUBVERSIVE ROLE HAS CARRIED OUT BY

NO MORE THAN THIRTY PEOPLE.

6. MRS. OERIAN SAID THAT HHSN SHE NAS IN ARG^TINA BEFORE
THERE MAS A GENERAL ATTITUDE THAT THE WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM ?(AS COMING TO AN END BUT HAS HOT REALLY OVER.
THIS TIME SHE GOT THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT BVBRY<»IE
CONCLUDES THE HAR IS NOH OVER AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOH
UUNFlUbNTIRi:

■e OWFIP BN TmB

PAGE 04 STATE X92822

REACHED THE EQUALLY DIFFICULT PHASE OF GETTING BACK TO
NORMAL DQ40CRATIC PROCEDURES. SHE ADVISED THAT THE
PEOPLE BECOME IMPATIENT IF THIS PHASE TAKES TOO LONG
TO CARRY OUT. SHE MENTICEIED THAT SHE HAD DISCUSSED
THIS PROBI£H HITH THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND THAT
HE GAVE HER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE, TOO, HAS WORRIED
ABOUT TIKE. SHE REFERKTO TO THE LEGISLATION PASSED IN
THE U.S. C<»«SRESS WHICH SETS A ONE YEAR TIME LIMIT ON CC»I-
TINUING CERTAIN HBLATIflHSHIPS fffilCH HE HAVE HITH AR-
GENTINA. SHE SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL OP1MXOH-TB5B
BECCEfING MORE AND MORE CRITICAL OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUA-
TION IN ARGENTINA AMD SAID IT WOULD BE DEVASTATING IF
ARGarriNA became the next chile in the eyes OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMUNITY. MRS. OERIAN EXPLAINED THAT SHE
THINKS THERE ARE PEOPLE OF GREAT INTEGRITY IN THE

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(X)VSRNMEH7 HHO HOI<D XHB SAME VAIiUES THAT BCmi OOR
CQMSTITUTIC^S INSCRIBE FOR OOR ClTXZ^S AND ‘TRAI' SHE
FEELS VER^r lAlRAPFY THAI THERE IS SUCH A DIFFERENCE BETHEL
THEORY AND PRACTICE.

7 . THE ADMIRAI. RESPONDS THAT. WHILE HE COOLDN'T TALK
OF A TIME PERIOD, THAT HE HAD NO CRYSTAL BAU< WITH
WHICH TO PREDICT, ARGENTINA HAS ON THE ROAD TO
NORMALIZATION. BE ADMITTED THAT IN THE ROt»H BATO^
AGAINST TERRORISM SOME THINGS GOT ODT OF BAND, BUT
that THERE HAS BEEN REAL IMPROVEMENT SINCE MARCH. HE
REFERRED TO ONE OP HIS OFFICERS ESPECIALLY DESI^aTED
TO RBOSIVB PEOPLE LOOKING FOR THEIR RELATIVES AND
SAID HIS CASE Le»D HAS OIU3PPEO MARKEDLY.

8. HRS. OERIAH REFERRS) TO THE RECENT CASE OF THE LAWYERS
mo THEIR HIVES MHO HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED »Hn THE PAfiSJW
THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR TO VEMBZOBIX. ADMIRAL MASSERA
ee W F IP ENT IAL-

e o NPiBa iT iAa

PAGE OS STATE 192822

SAID THE AMBASSADOR'S CASE WAS CLEARLY POLITICAL, THAT MB
KNEW SOME PEOPLE BLAMED THE NAVY FOR IT, BDT THAT
SOMBTHINO ELSE WAS INVOLVED. PERHAPS, A LEFTIST GROVP
TRYING TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR THE OOVERNHENT. HE SAID
HE DOESN'T BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FORCES
<»rr OF CCaiTROL is rbsponsiblb, as this HOUU} go against
THE GOVERIRfBNT AND DOESN'T MAKE SENSE.

9 . MRS. DSRIAN SAID THAT BECAUSE OF THE DISORDER SO MANY
CAN OPERATE THINKING THEY HAVE THE APPROVAL OF BITR^ THE
GOVBRNMraiT OR THE PEOPLE, THAT THE LEFT WING BAS BEEN
LICKED BUT A HONST^ CREATED. ADMIRAL MASSERA SAID HE
DIIRI'T SEE XT TSAT WAY. HE SAID THE RnST WING IS VERY
SMALL IN ARGENTINA AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN STEPS,

LIKE THE CLOSING OF THE lOGAZINE CABILDO. HE SAID THE
RIGHT EXISTS ONLY AS A POLITICAL FORCS. MRS. DERXAN
MENTIONED THAT THE INCIDENT AGAINST THE LAWYERS CCNILDN'T
HAVE OCCURRED HIIKOUT 8(ME OFFICIAL SUPPORT. ADMIRAL
MASSERA ASKED WHAT PRESIDENT VZOELA HAD TOLD HER ABOUT
THIS INCIDENT A im. WHEN SHE RESPONDED THAT THEY HADN'T
DISCUSSED 1T, ''hB SAID THAT INClBatTS SUCH AS IT COOM) BE
COUNTED ON THE FINGERS OF YOUR HAND.

10. MRS. DERXAN ASKED WHAT THE CHANCES HERB F(» BITiOSl
A COMPLETE OR PARTIAL REINSTATEMENT OF T HE RIGHT OF
OPTICS . ADMIRAL MASSERA EXPLAINED THAT T1IXS~t!aRSTr^
TOTIOKAL RIGHT HAD BE^ SUSPENDED FOR SIX MQUT^. THAT
THIS TIME HAS NEARLY OP, AND THAT THE TiKlUGHT WAS TO
REINSTATE IT. HE EXPLAINED THAT IN THE BEGINNING MANY
PEOPLE MERE UNDER EXECUTIVE OUDatENT AND IT WAS DIFFI-
CULT TO CLARIFY CASES. HE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO GET
CASES MOVING AND BROUGHT TO TRIAL SO THAT THERE COULD

BE RELEASES AND A RESTORATION OP THE RIGHT OF OPTION. HE
ASKED MRS. DERIAN TO MAINTAIN AN EQUILIBRIUM REALIZING
THAT WHILE THESE CASES WERE IMPORTANT, THEY HERB OLD
AND FEW AND THE JUNTA HAS ON THE ROAD TO NORMALIZATION.
UUHn ' OEN ’ XIR ir

COH ' FIPBWTIAC

PAGE 06 STATE 192822

11. HRS. DERIAN SAID SHE HAD THE SENSE BUT HAS WORRIED
ABOUT UNCTOTAINTY AMONG LOWER GRADE OFFICIALS AND 1«»DBRED
WHETHER WHEN THE CHANGES COKE THEY HOUU3 BE DIRECT AND
a£AR SO THAT PEOPLE WON'T PEEL THEMSELVES IN JEOPARDY
AND THE PROCESS OF LOCATING THE DISAPPEARED HILL BE
ENHANCED RATHER THAN HURT. ADMIRAL MASSERA SAID THE

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GOVERNMEIIt COULD, AT LEAST, PUBLISH A LIST IH THE
NEWSPAPERS OF ALL THE PEOPLE IT HAS STATING IT DOESN'T
KNOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO OTHERS . HE SAID THE LIST
HOUUSN'T BE LONG, THAT SOME LISTS ARE BEING PUBLISHED
AND THAT WHILE MANY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL HE
l^ALIZES THERE ARE SOME IN A GREY Z(»IE AND THAT THIS
HURTS THE GOVERNMENT.

12. MRS. DERIAN ENDED BY REFERRING TO THE HABEAS CORPUS
PETITICRIS SUBMITTED TO THE EXECUTIVE BY THE SUPREME
COURT SAYING IT HAS MUCH ON PEOPLES MINDS AMD THAT SHE
WOULD BE GLAD WHEN ALL THIS NAS OVER. SHE SAID THAT THE
REINSTATEMENT OF LEGAL PROCEDURES WOULD CERTAINLY HELP
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AMD STRESSED THAT HE
HERE ANXIOUS TO RETURN TO NORMAL GOOD RELATIONS.

13. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADO COMMENTS AMD
SUGGEST DISTRIBUTION. VANCE

eew FiB Ew raM i

CUNKUbNIlAL
UNDIS, STADIS

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UNCLASSIFIED

61.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, August 24, 1977, 1545Z

6281

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770306-0198. Confidential;
Immediate. Sent for information to Asuncion, Montevideo, and Santiago.

UNCLASSIFIED

Pocumedt View

Page 1 of 4

e ow woewT t At

■ee wweB wr wu.

PAGE 01 BOEKOS 06281 01 OF 02 241937Z

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 GIAl-00 DODB-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-O?

1,-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 PES-01 SP-02 SS-15 DHA-OS

TRSE-00 MCT-01 EROA-OS OBS-07 10-13 NSCB-00
SSO-00 USZE-00 INRE-OO /081 W

03B46S 243003Z /73

O R 241S45Z AOQ 77
FK AMBHBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATB MASHDC IffiffiDIATB 1903
INFO AMSfflASSY ASUNCION
AKEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMBMBASSY SANTIAGO

CUNFlUKNa i"A ~C SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 6281

B.O. 11652: ODS

TAGS: PDIP, SHUN, AR. US

SUBJECT: ASST SBC TaENAN'S MEETING WITH

PRESIDENT VnSLA

REF: BUENOS AIRES 6127

1. TRS ASSISTANT SECRETARY CALZ£D ON
PRESIDENT VIDBUl AT 1030 AM ADGOST IS.

2. PRESIDENT VIDBLA EXPRESSED HIS HARM
HBUXmS TO ASSTSEC TOOMAN AND ASKED IF HE
HAD BEEN ABIiE TO TALK WITH ALL TB08B MHOM
HE HAD HOPED TO SEE IN ARGENTINA. VIOELA
WANTED HIM TO BE AWARE OF THE VIEWS OT A
HIDE RANGE OF ARGENTINES. HE HOPED AMD
BEDINVSD THAT BIS GOVERNMENT HAS FAIXHFUUY
INTERPRETING THE DESIRES OF THIS lARGE GROUP.

3. AS A BACKDROP TO CURRENT EVENTS, THE
PRESIDENT SKETCHED OUT RECENT ARGENTINE HISTORY- -THE
OOHPIDmra ' IAIi

omyxuiflMTXAi ;

PAGE 02 BUENOS 06281 01 OF 02 241937Z

PROGRESSIVE DETERIORATION OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN THE 1969-75 PERIOD. BY THE END OF
1975 THERE WAS A POWER VACUUM AT THE CENTER OF
OGVERNMBNT, BUT THERE WAS ALSO GREAT RELUCTANCE BY THE
ARMED FORCES TO INTERVENE IK VIEW OF THEIR PREVIOUS
EXPERIENCE. FINALLY, PACED WITH IMMINENT ECONOMIC COLLAPSE
OF THE COintTRY WHICH WOULD HAVE THROWN THOUSANDS OF
WORKERS ON THE STREETS, PREY TO PREVIOUSLY UNSUCCESSFUL
RECRUITING EFFORTS OF THE TERRORISTS, THE MILITARY HAD
TO TAKE OVSR tOlEH THE POLITICAL PARTIES ADMITTED THEY
HERE INCAPABLE OF RESOLVING THE SITUATION.

4. THE ARMED FORCES TAKEOVER HAS NOT JUST ANOTHER
PALACE COUP. IT WAS THE ASSUMPTICRI OF POWER BY THE
ARMED FORCES AS AH INSTITUTION. THEY DID SO RELUCTANTLY,
AND THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS BXCUJSIVBLY TO GET THE COXHJXRY
BACK ON THE TRACK. THEY HAD {TO SECTARIAN OR PERSCRfAL
AMBITIONS. THEY WERE COMMITTHJ TO RETDHHXNQ THE
COUNTRY TO A THOROTISHLY REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY. THEY
HAD MADE MUCH PROGRESS IN THE INTERVENING 16 MONTHS AND
HOPED WITHIN A SHORT TIME TO MAKE MORE AND TO DEMONSTRATE
SPECIFICALLY WHAT THIS GOVERNMENT WANTED TO ACHIEVE.

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

5. ASSTSEC TCNRGUI NOTED THE PIUX3RSSS MADE, THE
EC<®<WHC RECOVERY. MTO THE VIRTUAL ELIMINATION OF

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TERSmiSM— GREAT ACBIEVEMESTS. HE STATED THAT THE
BASIS OF THE TENSION BETWEBf OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS
WAS THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATICSI'S CONVICTICaJ THAT THE
HOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF A GOVERNMENT'S PERFORMANCE—
INDEED ITS SOI£ PURPOSE- -NAS HOW IT TREATED ITS OWN
PEOPLE. WHERE IT APPEARED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS HAD BEEN
VIOLATED, WE FELT IMPELLED «> SPEAK UP. WE HAD RECEIVED
MANY REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GOA'S
eaSFIBEMTPBB—

■TOMFIPEN T IM '

PAGE 03 BUENOS 06281 01 OF 02 241937Z

CAKPAIOI AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE ADMiNISTRATICW AND
CONGRESS WERE STRONGLY MOTIVATED TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST
ANY SUCH ABUSES. THE USG APPRECIATED THE CRIK:IAL
SITUATION WHICH THE GOA FELT IISELF TO BE IN BUT COULD
HOT BE SUPPORTIVE WHEN SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM VIOLATED
THE RIGHTS OF THE INNOCENT. HE SAID THAT THE POLITICIANS
HE SAN SAID T^T THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO DO WHAT IT DID
TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND THEY GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE
GOVHJNMKNT AND FELT TOE SITUATION IS GREATLY IMPROVING.
THEY CCRITSND THAT TEE IMPROVEMENT IS SUCS THAT THE
GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOW RELAX RESTRICTIONS OH POLITICAL
ACTIVITY.

6. PRESIDENT VXDELA SAID HE WOULD NOT BE PICTURED AS
ONE WHO IS UNOONCERNED ABtHJT.THE RIGHTS OF HIS CITIZENS.
HE FELT THAT MAN, AS GOO'S WORK, MUST BE RESPK^SO AND
VIEWED AS THE PURPOSE OF SOCIETY. HE ARGUED THE
GREATEST GOOD FOR THE GREATER NUMBER AND CHALLENGED
ASSTSBC TOOUKS TO FIND AN ARGENTINE WHO OISAIStEED WITH

{XaiflEtBHTM

NNH

eO W flDB WT Htt.

P»3S 01 BUEIM3S 06281 02 OF 02 241937Z

"Action ara-14

INFO OCT-01 lSO-00 CIAE-00 DODB-00 PM-OS H-01 IHR-07
L'03 NSAB-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-IS DHA-05 .
TRSB-00 MCT-01 ERDA-OS OBS-07 10-13 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-OO lNRE-00 /081 W

038473 242004Z /73

O R 24154SZ AUG 77

FM AI»<BASSY EUSNOS AIRES /

TO SECSTATE WASKOC IMMEDIATE 1904
INFO AHEHBASSY ASUNCION
AMBMBASSY MONTSVIOEO
AMraiSASSY SANTIAGO

' COW F ' T" DEN T I ifC SBCTIOI 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 6281

RIM. KB SAID ^AT HE WOULD IRIT PRETEND THAT imRE WERE
NO EXCESSES BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN THEIR FIGHT AND
PERHAPS EVEN SOME SCORE- SETTLING . HE SAID THAT WHAT HAS
MOST IMPORTANT WAS THE GOVERNMENT'S OSJECTIVE: PEACE UNDER
THE LAW AND A IKJNOPOLY OF FC»CS UNDER GOVEHWOIT
CONTROL. WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT SEVERAL RECENT DRAMATIC
DISAPPEARANCES, HE FREELY ADMITTED THAT AT THIS STAGS OF
THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM THE PROBLEM HAS OF EI^NENTS
OF THE SECURITY FORCES WHICH- -FRANKLY- -WERE BBYCEID
THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL. THEY HERE WORKING HARD ON
THIS AND SUCCESS WAS INDISPENSABLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT
OF THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVES. BUT SO FAR THEY HAD NOT

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Page 3 of 4

SOLVED -THE EROBIiBK.

7. ASSTSBC TCmm SAID THE COA CAHHOT EXPECT IMTER-
EATIOKAL RESPECT AHS SUPPORT WTII. ZHTBRKATIONALLY
RECOOSIZSD Etn^S OF BEHAVIOR ARB OBSERVED. HE HOPED
HE CODliD mSK COOPERATIVELY WITH IHE GCA TO THIS END,

BUT VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WOUIB raiDERMINE ANY EFFORTS
TO STRBI8THEN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE GOA
HAD MADE SUCK IMPRESSIVE STRIDES IN DEALING WITH
CCIHPIDEM T IBB

CONFIBBN T'I Kg

PAGE 02 BUENOS 06281 02 OF 02 241S37Z

TERRORISM THAT IT WOUU} NOW BE SEEN AS A DEHONSTRATICai
OF STRE^STH IF THE (XA TOOK MEASURES WITH PRISONERS AND
OTHER DETAINED PERSONS miCH REFLECTED THAT STRENGTH.

SUCH NEASroSS MISfiT INCUIDB LISTS OF ALL PRIS(»ERS HOW
BEU3, REINSTATEMENT OF niE RIGHT OF OPTION TO LEAVE THE
COUNTRY OF HBIHSTITOTiaN OF THE RIGHT OF HABEAS CORPUS. .
THERE fTERB SOME CASES IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL OPINION
BECAME ESPECIALLY CONCERNED, HE CITED THE DETENTION OF
JACOBO TIHBRMAN WHICH HAD AWAKENED MUCH CONCERN BECADSE
IT INVOLVED PRESUMED ANTI-SBMITISn..

e. PRESIDENT VXDELA SAID HE THOROUGHLY REJECTED AMY
IKPUTATICW OF RACISM TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND SAID HE HAS
THOROXBILY DEDICATED TO PRINCIPLES WHICH DID NOT
TOLERATE IT. TIMERMAM WAS NOT A VICTIM OF RACISM; HE IS
SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT OF BCXBIOHIC CRIMES WITH GRATVER,
WHO IN TORN HAS INVOLVED WITH TERRORISTS. TIHERMAN HILL
BE DEALT WITH BY JUSTICE, BUT THIS DOBS NOT INVOLVE
ANTI-SEMITISM.

9. ASSTSBC TODMAN EXPLAINED PRESIDENT CARTER'S CONCERN
ABOUT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND ASKED IF PRESIDENT
VXDELA MIGHT GIVE HIS MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF GOA REATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF
TLATELOLCO. SUCH ACTION WOULD BE AN EXAMPLE FOR THE
HEMISPHERE.

10. PRESIDENT VIDELA SAID THAT THE GOA HAS ACCEPTED
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, WHICH IN PRACTICAL TERMS ARE MORE
EXTENSIVE CCRTTROLS THAN THOSE OF THE HFZ TREATY WHICH
HAS POLITICAL LIABILITIES FOR THE GOA. HE SAID QUOTE
HE WILL LOOK AT THE SITUATION, HOWEVER, AMD SEE IF
ACCEPTANCE MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. END QUOTE
eo MFiP B NT i iar

COWFIPBMTIAL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 06281 02 OF 02 241937Z

11 . ASSTSBC TCOXGUf NOTED THAT THE GOA HAS EXPRESSED
ITS SUPIK3RT FOR HIRUN RIGHTS IN A VARIETY OF OOCUEtffiNTS
AND STATBMKTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE HOPED THAT THE

GOA mmc DO SO tmas by signins the ihtbr-american

CXHiVENTTON CRr RWAN RIGHTS. THIS, TOO, WOULD GIVE
IMPETUS TO THE HEMISPHERIC CONCERN WITH THE ISSUE.
PRESIDENT VIDELA SAID THAT RATIFICATION HAS UNDER
CONSIDERATION AND HE WOULD SEE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE.

12 . FOLLOWING AH EXCHANGE OF EXPRESSIONS OF
FRIENDSHIP THE 65 -MINUTE CCRIVERSATION ENDED.

CHAPLIN

e eMFT C BfglAfc

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UNCLASSIFIED

62.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter

Washington, August 31, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4,
Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. Sent for information. Carter initialed the memorandum in
the top right-hand comer.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

OONFIDEI^TIAI;

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM

FROM;

SUBJECT:

I, Hopeful Developments

— Prisoner releases, WMle the awnnnncfiment of th e r^lease-of-^

342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that
we can only confirm tlmt there have been four releases , and
that we do not yet know what proportion of those released
have actuaUy been freed without charges and what proportion have
been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks
since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and
77 releases.

-- Right of optioau It seems likely that the Argentine government will
restore a limited form of the "right of option", wherebv state of
siege prisoners may seek v olimtary exile . This will be an
important measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases.

— Political tolerance and the courts . There are signs that President
Videla may be gaining support from other generals for a greater
ventilation of political ideas with civilian leaders. This has
prompted Argentina's oldest party, the Radicals, to criticize the
government's human rights record. The Radicals were accused of
engaging in politics by the government, but rather than summarily
punish the politicians, the government took the case to the courts.
The lower courts rtiled against the government, and the matter is
under a^eal. An Argentine goveriunent ban against the Jehovah's
Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope that the
court will declare the ban unconstitutional.

n. Negative Developments

Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at a sea resort near
Buenos Aires in mid- July; one subsequently was found murdered
brutally. It appears the others were later released- It seems
likely that the security forces were responsible.

GONFIDENTIAD/em

FOR;

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 31, 1977
THE PRESIDENT
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Ti?-

An Update of H^xman Rights
De^lopments in Argentina

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

CONFIDENTISU

2

Ik mid-Jtjly, Argentiim's Ambassador to Venezuela was
kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet.

It ai^ears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military
resentment against President Videla, who made a very
successful state visit to Venezuela in May. •

The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper,
which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of
htunan rights, is being held by the government on economic
charges at a secret place of detention; he was tortured.

-- At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to
leave Argentina.* Earlier this month a prominent Jewish
leader fled to the United States after being threatened.

HL Conclusion

Most serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now
taking place in the Buenos Aires military region. The com-
mander of the region. General Sviarez Mason, is a notorious hard-
liner, and is viewed as one of Videla's principal rivals for power.

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the
very uncertain nature of recent human rights developments. Embassy
Buenos Aires recommends tha t we . ahauld await develonments beforeJ
further public comment. State will continue to keep you fully
informed as events vinfold.

CONFIDEHTIAL/GDS -

eeNFiBEiffl/t

UNCLASSIFIED

63.

Draft Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, September 9, 1977, 9 a.m.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights — Argentina 1. The meeting took
place at the White House. Drafted by Chaplin. A typed note at the top of the memorandum reads,
“Text has not been revised by the NSC.” No other record of this meeting has been found.

UNCLASSIFIED

a(\ilSwTW«)avN3Hiiyo3onaoa«a» •

J- ■ * -'r:.!- HAS NOT BEEN REVISED BY THE NSC

T

: CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 9, 1977
TIME: 9 :00 am
PLACE: White House

SUBJECT: President Carter/President Videla Bilateral

PAKTICIPANTS :

ARGENTINA '

Lt. General Jorge Rafael Videla
Pres indent of Argentina
Oscar A. Montes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Worship
Jorge A. Aja Espil, Ambassador
to the United States
Julio Cesar Carasales,
Ambassador to OAS
Enrique Quintana
Chief of Protocol
Cdr. Eduardo Alberto Traid,
Aide-de-camp

US

President Carter

Vice President Mondale

Secretary Vance

Dr, Zbigniew Brzezinski

Assistant Secretary Todman

Robert Pastoyi, nsc

Charge Maxwell Chaplin

President Carter opened the conversation by expressing
his pleasure at the attendance of the Argentine President
and emphasizing its significance as a demonstration of hope
for the Panama Canal Treaty. He was also pleased that it
provided an opportunity for the hemispheric leaders to have
conversations about issues of common concern. '

President videla expressed his satisfaction over the
opportunity to witness an event of such major importance as
the Canal Treaty Signing, as well as the opportunity to have
a face-to-face discussion with the President. He observed that

conf i d e ? ;t ial

CDS T ADP Declassification Review

■ DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

COMFIDCHTIMr

‘WNOiiVN 3Ktiv aBonootw^

«

«

- 2 -

the signature of the treaty not only denotes the end of
one era but opens a new one in which the United States
has demonstrated its sincerity and goodwill toward Latin
America. He added that the Argentine presence was his
government's effort to establish its goodwill in response.
He observed that while US-Argentine relations have had
their ups and downs throughout history, the temporary
circumstances which impeded close relations have always
been overcome by the basic identity of interests of the
two nations.

■ f

As a parenthetical comment. President Carter observed
to Videla that his Spanish was the clearest and easiest
to understand he had ever heard - the President either
chose simple words or had an unusually clear manner af
expressing himself. He found this typical of the Argen-
tina which he and his wife had visited some years pre-
viously. President Carter also added his thanks for
the hospitality that President Videla had shown to Assist-
ant Secretary Todman during the latter's recent visit to
Argentina.

President Carter said he hoped to have a frank -dis-
cussion of two major issues with the objective of optimiz-
zing relations between the two nations.

coHriDDNTrar

s«oayT«ixivH3HiivtBanac»«3M

COWFIDBNTIM i-

f "

- 3 -•

Non-Proliferation .

President Carter considered the threat of nuclear

explosives the greatest problem facing the hemisphere.

Because Argentina leads the Latin American nations in

nuclear technology - which is a great credit to Argentina „

he hoped that Argentina could also lead in the establishment

of a nuclear free zone in the area and the prevention of

introduction to nuclear explosvies. He observed that all
* ■

hemispheric countries but Cuba and Argentina had signed and
ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Chile ^nd Brazil
had conditioned their approval of' that treaty upon Argentina's
ratification and acceptance of it. He expressed the hope that
Argentina would ratify this treaty which would provide
unrestricted use of nuclear energy for power but no introduc-
tion of nuclear explosives.

President Carter said that the United States, the
European community, Canada and Australia were now evolving .
a study of fuel cycle from ore to reactor wastes and safe-
guards. On October 19 there will be a three-day. meeting on
this subject, and it would be helpful if the GOA could be

represented at this meeting. He envisaged establishing common

% '

policies with regard to the export of nuclear technology,
heavy water and enriched uranium. He said- this policy
envisages restriction of sale of these items to countries
which do not cooperate in the non-proliferation effort.

CONriDDNTIAf

Sa»OaVTM«XiW3HlW<HOfnCShS8

CONFIDENgl - M r -
- 4 -

President Carter said he understood that Argentina was
cooperating with Canada with respect to limited safeguards
but stressed the importance the United States places on
* the NPZ and the NPT.

President Videla responded by observing that tbe two
countries' coincidence of interest was mirrored by tlie fact
that the two Presidents' agendas were the same. He did not
perceive these issues as problems but as opportunities for
progress. He reviewed Argentina's 25 years* work i» devlopitig
the peaceful use of nuclear energy, noting that ode power
■'reactor is currently in use, a second under construction
and a third in the planning phase. He understood President
Carter's concern over the misuse of nuclear energy and said
Argentina had offered to establish safeguards beyond those
which were really needed. However, he understood that even
this may not be sufficient reassurance for Latin America and .
the world.

President Videla said the GOA had considered ratifying
the Treaty of Tlatelolco but stressed that President Carter
must be aware of the great need for proper political timing,
of such an action. Argentina was only 18 months away from ' ‘

its gravest national crisis, so the government must be
particularly careful not to disturb the progress toward
normalcy. He stated that as soon as political conditions permit

CONFIDBMTIA - L-

53(*oaV TWOUWt *®*'*®^*‘^

. COMFIDBNTMir -

;

' - 5 -‘^ ■

- perhaps before the end of the year - he would give proof
of the GOA goodwill with regard to non-proliferation by
ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked if this re-
assured President Carter. , .

President Carter said it did, and stated that if the . ^ *
GOA decided to send a delegation to the fuel cycle conference^
it would be particularly exciting if it would be possible to
anounce intended ratification of the treaty at that time, Iwthe
would de'fer to President Videla on the best political timing^.
With Argentine ratification, the treaty would be in effect for

f '

all countries but Cuba, and the United States would be raising
this issue with the Cubans. The President added that Argen-
tine ratification would also remove our concerns about
technology and heavy water supply to Argentina from the United
States and other suppliers. The President had discussed this
very issue the previous day with Prime Minister Trudeau in
the interest of establishing a common export policy.

Human Rights

The political changes in Argentina have been given care-

✓

ful study by the American government, and recent developments
there said President Carter, have impressed me as much as the
natural beauty of the country. He stated his admiration for the
achievements of President Videla’ s government in dealing with
the problem of terrorism and the reconstruction of the

COHFIDDHTIAL

^/WSJJV'NNOU.VM 3Hi iV {SSOQOktS!)

■ COHFIDEMTlM r

- 6 -

Argentine economy. He said the study of the achievements of
President Videla's government led to the conclusion that the
GOA had achieved great strength, stability and influence. He
hoped that the security and the strength of the government
■would lead to the alleviation of concerns expressed by many • -

about the observation of human rights in Argentina. The Pres’ir-
dent stated he did not have a way to assess the many charges
of human rights violations and noted the particularly high press
interest in this subject in the United States. Certain cases

4 '

drew particularly intense interest here, such as that of editor
Timerman and the Deutsch family, who have many..rq^atives in the
-California area. He said that a Washington group concerned with
- the subject of human rights had provided a list of 3,000 people
being detained in Argentina without public notice of their arrest
or charges against them.. The President acknowledged that some of
these allegations may be false or exaggerated, but be felt that
in the privacy of the room he could express our concerns about
the state of human rights in Argentina. He would make the list
available so the State Department could provide it to President
Videla's government for its use. President Carter felt that the
friendly bilateral relations of over a hundred years were of
great value, and he was concerned that this issue could come
between the two countries. He felt that more progress in this
area would be welcome. In summary, he said he personally admires
and approves of what President Videla has been able to do for his
country and asks what can be done to alleviate the concern in the

COMFIDEHTI - Air

a»owTwouvHm«<B3nQ^

• . CONFIDDHTIAfr

United States ( which r 'indeed, may have been exaggerated)
about the state of human rights in Argentina.

President Videla recounted the situation in which
Argentina found itself in March 1976, with an economic,
poltical and social crisis aggravated by terrorism, which
led the armed forces as an institution reluctantly to take -
over to fill the power vacuum and protect those enduring
values and human rights of which President Carter spoke..
Those who recognised that man was created in God's image, most
recoignize his dignity . as an .indjlvidual. Terrorists wanted
..to change that view of man, and Argentina had faced what
amounted to a war over the issue. All wars have their unde-
sirable consequences, and President Carter as a military . ..
man would know of this. Argentina has suffered all of these
misfortunes of war.

President Videla said that the war, while virtually. .
over in a military sense, continued in the political '
arena, both domestically and internationally. The ■
terrorists wish to isolate the GOA from, a civilized world,
but their charges were not true; the people of Argentina
opposed terrorism and the system it advocated. They were
dedicated to democracy. Argentina faced the intentionally
exaggerated publicity abroad of admittedly unfortunate inci-
dentsi President Videla said there were incidents for which

COMFIDEMTIAtr

S3AKSW

COMFIDEHTTrP,ir

- 8

the government was responsible, and he accepted that responsi-
bility for them and stressed his efforts to control abuses
of power. He said, however, that he could not accept the
image of a brutal and uncivilized Argentina and the attempt
to isolate his country from those other nations which shared
its basic values. He stressed that he would do his utmost- • •
to reestablish order and control, and meanwhile he needed the
understanding of Argentina's friends, especially natural
friends such as. the United States. ...

With the war almost over. President Videla felt that the
need lot repressive action was less. He felt tha^ within
»a short period the negative consequences of the repression
would be eliminated.

He agreed to accept the list of names of those who were
reportedly detained in Argentina and welcomed the opportunity
to comment on the Tiraerman case. He assured President Carter
that Timerman was detained under due process, charged with
dealing with subversive elements. He was not detain^ because
of his name - there was definitely no anti-Semitic connection
to this detention. The same was the case of the detention of
the Deutsch family: they were detained for investigation of
possible connection with subversion, not for racial reasons.

President Videla stated that 1,990 persons had been de-
tained under the national executive power in the first year
of his government and 2,020 in the subsequent six months.

COHPIDDHTI-Mr

g^,H0aVW«UVH3HiiV(B0fW^ ' . .

- 9 -

Since March 1976, 300 of these cases had been tried in the
civilian courts with 73 found guilty, and. 370 in the military
courts with 187 found guilty. In the last two months, 300

• • t

persons detained on suspicion of terrorist activities
have been liberated. President Videla was most reluctant to
give a date, but he hoped and wished the problems of the
detainees might be resolved by Christmas 1977. He would make
a major effort to achieve this and meanwhile hoped for US
understanding.

Prersident Carter ventured a question about the Argentine
judicial system, noting that one of the great concerns
expressed in the United States is the fact that there ate
"no announcements of the arrest of Argentines or the -charges
on which they were being held. He asked if this is customary
President Videla responded that the Argentine courts ace inde
pendent institutions and operated beyond the control of the
executive. . In cases dealing with subversives and their deten
tion as a preliminary security measure, no anpouncements of
the detentions were made. As soon as the case was
investigated, it was turned over to the military or civilian
courts or the individual was released. While for security
reasons it is not convenient to provide public information

^ *

on detentions at the initial stage, the GOA has an office
charged with providing information to relatives about the
possible detention and charges against family members.

COMFIDBUyffttr

S3«HDWWNQlJ.'(N3HilV CBOnOOStSM

CONFIDSNTIAL -

President Carter expressed his desire to help restore
world appreciation of Argentina and what its government
stands for. He .hoped that President Videla would give the
United States the opportunity to do so. As President/ he said
he knew how much opportunity he had to preserve the liberties
of the US citizens. He asked if, at sometime in the future
after Christmas, it might be possible for representatives of
the OAS or the UN to visit Argentina, not in the sense of
investigating events there, but to confirm the progress made
by the GOA.

President videla said he was« pleased to respond with
"the same frankness shown by President Carter and observed
that facts were infinitely more important than words.

The visits of Mr. Todraan, Mrs. Derian, the Congressmen
and the Senators is the best way to show that Argentina is
not ashamed of its record. .He thanked President Carter for
sending these groups and for providing lists of detainees.

He admitted that there were disappearances in Argentina
for four reasons: first, when an individual joins the sub-
versive underground, second, when a terrorist is killed by .
his associates who may suspect betrayal, third, terrorists

" t-..

were killed in battle and fourth, people were killed by
excesses committed by forces of repression. He said this
fourth case is under our control, and it is his responsi-
bility to eliminate it. He said he was not concerned about

CONFIDEMTfAti -

5aMC»wiw«uvN3HLiv (Banoottaa

GQNFIDEHg ^jtfr
- 11 -

visits or lists or any future visit made in goodwill which
can testify to the facts in Argentina.

President Videla regretted that it was necesesary to
to devote the short time available to discussion of the
two fundamental issues raised. Since there were a number ...
of important remaining bilateral issues which should be
covered, he wished to invite Secretary Vance to visit
Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete the consul- •
tations.

President Carter and Secretary Vance both accepted the
invitation for Secretary Vance to' visit Argentina. President
Carter said he regretted that the two items had dominated
this discussion, which would have to be ended because the
President of Uruguay was arriving shortly. Should President
Videla wish, he said that Vice President Mondale could meet
with him now, or the conversations could be continued during
the Secretary's visit. President Carter expressed his
hope he could return to Argentina before long and presented
President Videla with his book and a collection of satellite
photographs of the world, The meeting terminated with ex-
pressions of mutual goodwill.

Drafted: Amembassy Buenos Aires - Charge Maxwell Chaplin sjc

eeMPlDENTlAD

UNCLASSIFIED

64.

Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, September 15, 1977

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 27, Human Rights — ^Argentina 11. Cdnfidential. Sent
through Benson. Drafted by Titus on September 8. Cleared in ARA/RPP/PM, PM,
ACDA/WEC/ATE, and PM/MC and by Bumpus, L. Brown, and Lake. O. Jones was informed.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTM6NT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

SIS

- COMPlDBtroiAIi
TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: T - Lucy Wilson Benso:

FRm: PH - Leslie B

Arms Transfers to Argentina

jw8

September 15, 1977

Issue for Decision

Whether to authorize the sale to Argentina of MK-44
..torpedoes, submarine periscopes, 3 Boeing CH-47C
“Chinook" helicopters, 2 Lockheed KC-130 aerial tanker
aircraft aM various types of ammunition.

Essential Factors

On July 25 you approve! a recommendation to limit
denials of arms transfers to Argentina to those articles
and services which could be used by police and other
civil law enforcement ageiKsies. Tou added, however, that
you would review all proposals on a case by case basis.

We are submitting for your decision several sales
proposals by U.S. firms and requests to purchase by
Argentine military organizations. With the possible
exception of ligltt mortars, none of the items listed
is known to have been used against urban or rural
guerrillas, to have been otherwise involved in human
rights violations in Arg^tina cu; to be potentially
effective instruments of repression against Individuals
or small groups. Nonetheless, D/HA objects to the
approval of most of these cases because there has been
no improvement in the human rights situation in
Argentina. D/HA is sendii^ you a separate moaorandum
concerning its views on these ^nroposed arms transfers.

A legal brief is attached.

Cases to be Decided

Ito objections have been raised to approval of the
following cases by PH, ABA, or iU^DA.

1. Periscopes A Munitions List license application

eONPIDEHTlAL

GOS

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

COWyiDBMTJLAL

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by Kollnotgen Corporation to export six sets of attack
and search periscopes (12 periscopes in all) valued at
$4.4 million for installation in six new West 6eziaan-
bnilt sutsaarines.

Recommenda tion ; That you approve the issuance of the
license;*

Approve ’ Disapprove

2. . Lockheed KC-130 Tanker Aircraft — Lockheed has
applied to tile ioiCtice of Munitions -Control for an advisory
opinion on eventual approval of the sale of two aircraft
if present Argentine Goverittnent iirt^est in thesa results
in a contract. . Although an adviso:^ opinion is not
binding, its issuance anticipates ^entual approval,
of any sale which might materialize. These planes
would most likely be used to refuel aircraft involved
in seatrch and rescue operations and in Antarctic
activities.

Recommendation s That you approve the issuance of a

Ap^ove

favorable

Disapprove

3. Helicopters — Responding to an Argentine Army re-
quest for a |«'oposal, Boeing Vertol Divislcm has applied
to the Office of Munitions Control for an advisory
opinion about the possible sale of 3 CH-47C Chinook
logistic transport helicopters. Although an advisory
opinion is not binding, its Issuance anticipates eventual
approval of any sale which might materialize. These
aircraft, which are variously configured to carry 33-44
persons and equipment, are limited to transport
functions. They caniKit be used as “gunshlps".

Recommendation t That you approve the issuance of , a

T?orpe<Stoes — An Argentine Navy request for cost
and availability data for 18 Mark 44 torpedoes. These
are acoustically guided anti-submarine torpedoes, which

' *

OeMPIDBRTTAL

CONFiUEilTiAV.
35 = —

are l^ing replaced in the OSH inventory by more modem
models.

Reconmendatlon ; That you approve the Argentine Havy request . j.

. _ Jr

Approve Disapprove ^ H$ki^

5. Bombs and Artillery Aimunition — Argentine Amy, Mavy
and Air Force requests to purchase mmmnition and
ammunition components as follows:.

a. 15 projectiles, 5" 3Smn-illuminatlng (for naval
guns)

b. 150 projectiles, ISSnm-high explosive artillery

c. 50 projectiles, ISSmm-llluninating artillery

d. 250 propelling charges for ISSmm artillery
projectiles

e. 762 artillery fuses

f. 750 artillery percussion primers

g. 10,000 cartridges, 20inm electric (used to ignite
charges in naval artillery)

h. 10 bombs, 5001b. general purpose,, llK-8 2, with
retarding fins.

Recommendation :

Approve

That you approve the saler. of the medium
artillery ammunition and bombs.

Disapprove

6. Cartridges
following :

The Argentine Kavy wishes to buy the

a. 50,000 cartridges, cal.. 50 ball (standeurd bullet),
aircraft grade

b. 30,000 cartridges, cal.. 50 tracer, aircraft grade
(above are probably for use in the A-4 aircraft)

C OKFIDEKTiAi,

Kv"'

latlon s That you approve the sale of these
' cartridges.

Approve

Disapprove

Shells — The Argentine Army wishes to buy the
following?

a. 550 shells, 4.2”, lOTmm-high explosive, for
iBortars

b. 40 shells, 4.2”. lOlnn- illuminating, for
mortars

Reconmendation ; That you approve the sale.

Approve

Disapprove

/feU

Attachment: As stated.

Drafted : PM/SAS ^Itub :rf
9/8/77 ext- 23876

Clearances: A8A/RPP/PM - DTC. QuiggA*'^
ARA/BCA - OBump^ ^ '

PM - SMinShip

ACm./mz/h’SE - Bratson/W,.
D/BA - OJones (inforraedjylv^
T - LBrown#^ '

PM/MC - BPeBminella#*^

S/P - ALake/t/W^ '

UNCLASSIFIED

65.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, November 3, 1977, 1643Z

262832

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770405-0653. Limited
Official Use; Immediate. Drafted in the White House, cleared by Bumpus and in S/S-0, and
approved by Zimmermann.

UNCLASSIFIED

Document View

Page 1 of 3

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL HSE

FACE 01 STATE 252832

ORIGIN ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 lSO-00 6S-15 HSCE-00 SSO-00 PRS-01 /031 R

DRAFTED "feY TEXT RECEIVED PRC»4 WHITE HOUSE :LK
APPROVED BY ARA : ECA ; RWZIMMBRMANN
ARA : ECA: JNBUHPUS
S/S-OsJETHmEN

008138 03170SZ /56

O 0316432 NOV 77

FH SECSTATS NASHDC

TO AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 262832
E.O. 116S2: GDS
TAGS: PN, AH

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT VIDILA FRCM PRESIDENT CARTER

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TEXT TO PRESIDENT VIDELA ASAP.

BEGIN QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: LET MB SAY AGAIN HC»f
PLEASED I WAS TO MEET WITH YOU DURING YCXJR VISIT TO WASH-
INGTON FOR THE SIGHING OF THE NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATIES.
OUR CXRIVERSATXON GAVE MS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF YOim
CONCERNS AMD THOSE OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, WITH WHOM HE
WISH TO HAVE THE BEST OF RELATIONS.

2. I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY YOUR COMMENT THAT WE
BOTH HAD THE S»«B ITEMS ON OUR AGENDA -- HUMAN RI(aiTS AND
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATKHI -- AND THAT YOU SAW OPPORTUNITY FOR
PROGRESS ON BOTH. I SHlUiE THE SAME HOPES.

3. WE Bora RECOGWI2E THAT ARGENTINA IS FREQUENTLY
CHARGED WITH SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. YOU HERE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATS 262832

CERTAINLY CORRECT IN STATING THAT TERRORISTS HAVE SOUGHT
TO ISOLATE ARGENTINA IN THEIR PROPAGANDA. HOWEVER, I AM
CONFIDaiT THAT SUCH PROPAGANDA HILL LOSE ITS FtHlCE IN THE
C»URT OP INTERNATIONAL OPINION AS YOUR GOVERNMENT

DEMONSTRATES PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. AND I CAN ASSURE
YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ALWAYS BE READY TO
ACKNOWLEDGE SUCH IMPROVEMENTS.

4. I WAS ALSO PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOU WOULD NOT OBJECT
TO VISITS BY HUMAN RI®ITS SPECIALISTS FROM RESPECTED
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. SUCH VISITS HILL BE AH
IMPORTANT MEANS OF EDUCATING INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION
(X? IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN A^QITINA.

5. IN THIS REGARD, LET ME MENTION THE VERY IMPORTANT
ROLE PUVYBD BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS,
AND MY HOPE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND MY FIRM BELIEF THAT THEY
SHOULD RETAIN THEIR CONSULTATIVE STATUS AT THE UNITED
NATIONS .

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

6. I WELCOME YOUR EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE DETAINEE
PROBLEM MIGHT BE RESOLVED BY CHRISTMAS THIS YEAR. AS I
TOLD YOU, THERE IS GREAT INTEREST AND CONCERN IN THE

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DHITED STATES OVra THE PATE OP PlOfliE DETAIKED IN ARGENTINA
UNDER THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER. THE CLARIPICATICW OF
THEIR STATUS MOULD BE WELL RECEIVED, I BELIEVE, THROUGHOUT
THE INTEBNATICHIAL COMMUNITY. LIKE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RECENT
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESTORATICMS OP THE RIGHT OP OPTION AND
A PAROLE FOR DETAINEES, SUCH A CLARIPICAITON WOULD BE
ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP IN DEMCNISTHATIHG ARGENTINA'S
COMMITMENT TO THE PROTECTION OP HOTIAH RIGHTS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 262832

7. I MAS MOST GRATIFIED AND PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOUR
GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO RATIFY THE TREATY OP TLATELOLCO^ I
REALIZE THAT THE TIMING OP YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RATIFICATION
IS DEPENDENT UPON POLITICAL COISIDERATIONS, BUT I HOPE THAT
YOU HILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE TREATY IN THE NEAR
FUTURE. ARGENTINA'S FtJLL ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY WOULD
HAVE GREAT IMPORTANCE. IT WOULD NOT ONLY DEMONSTRATE
ARGENTINA'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR
ENERGY; IT WOULD ALSO, I AM OSIVINCED, GIVE A SIGNIFICANT
IMPETUS TO WORW'WIDE ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY AS AN
IMPORTANT MEANS OF AVOIDING WAR.

8. I HAS VERY PLEASED THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATED

IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATICW COMFIRBNCI* IN

WASHINGTON.', llELIEVE IT HILL PROVIDE A GREAT OPPORTUBIW
FOR OUR NATIONS TO WORK WITH OTHERS IN MAKING NUCLEAR
ENERGY AN IMTORTANT AND SAFI MEANS OF MEETING OUR ENERGY
REQUIREMENTS.

9. MR. PRESIDENT, THE PERSONAL RELATICWSHIP WHICH WE

ESTABLISHED IN WASHINGTCK PIK5VIDBD ME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO
WRITE YOU. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT MB CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE
VIEWS WITH FRANKNESS AND CANDOR SO AS TO STRENGTHEN
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GREAT PEOPLES.

10. IN THIS REGARD, I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE YOUR
LETTERS OF SEPTEMBER 28 AND OCTOBER 11. 1977, AND THE
INFORMATICM WHICH YOU REIiATED IN "FHE SS CmO LETTER
CONCERNING miE DEUTSCH FAMILY. AS I AM^ISTRIE YOU ARE AWARE,
THERE IS CONSIDERABLE AND CQNTINUING CONGRBSSICWAL AND
PUBLIC CONCERN ON THIS MATTER IN MY COUNTRY.

11. IN HIS MEETING WITH YOU IN NOVEMBER, SECRETARY
VANCE WILL HAVE THE OPPORTtWITY TO CONTINUE OUR DIALOGUE.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 STATE 262832

12. I WANT TO THANK YOU AND MRS. VIDBLA FOR THE VERY
KIND INVITATION TO ATTEND YOUR SON'S WEDDING, AND REGRET
THAT ME MERE UNABLE TO ATTEND. PLEASE GIVE OUR
CCWGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES TO YOUR SON AND HIS
BRIDE. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER. END QUOTE. VANCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

UMITEO OFFICIAL USE

http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView,aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 5/13/2013

UNCLASSIFIED

66 .

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, November 11, 1977, 2212Z

270937

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770419-1318. Confidential.
Drafted by Bumpus, cleared by McNeil and Oxman and in S/S, approved by Christopher.

UNCLASSIFIED

DocumOTt View

Page 1 of 4

■ eowwp e m t A r

GOirFIDE!l f T t* a -

PAGE 01 STATE 270937

ORIGIN ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-IS SP-02 HA-05 NSC-05 MCT-01

L-03 P«-05 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 10-13

EB-08 C<»ffl-00 ACDA-12 OHS-07 HISS-OO /098 R

DRAFTED BY ARA : ICA : OBOMPUS : LK
APPROVED BY D-MR. CHRISTOPHER
ARA;F3MCNBII.

D:SOXKAN

S/S:SRPVALERGA

- — 109774 122322Z /64

R 112212Z NOV 77
FH SECSTATB NASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

e ' O » r-i p ' " ' r" if t i a i state 270937

E.O. 11652! GDS
TAGS! SHOM, AR

SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALLARA MEETING WITH DEPUTY
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER

1. ARGENTINE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER GUALTER ALLARA
ACCC»fPANIED BY AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL AND MINISTERS JUAN
CARLOS ARLIA AND MIGUEL ANGEL ESPECHE GIL CALLED ON DEPUTY
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ON NOVEMBER 4, 1977. AMBASSADOR
CASTRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MCNEIL, SPECIAL ASST.
OXMAN, DESK OFFICER BUMPUS. AND INTERPRETER HBRVAS ALSO
ATTENDS).

2. SUBSEQUENT TO INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, THE QUES TION OF THE
SECRETARY'S VISIT MAS DISCUSSED. MR. CHRIST<5fHIR “POINTED
OUT THAT THE SECRETARY VERY MUCH MISHED TO MAKE HIS VISIT AS
eO W FIPE NTI AE

eOllPIBBN T CTa '

PAGE 02 STATE 270937

SCHEDULED BUT THAT SOME UNCERTAINTY OVER THE PRESIDENT'S
WORLD TRIP MIGHT CALL FOR SOME ADJUSTMENTS. HOWEVER, THE
ARGENTINES SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE ORIGINAL SCHEDULE, ASMS
ARE DOING. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SECRETARY WILL VISIT
ARGENTINA ON NOVEMBER 21, 1977.

3. ALLARA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTY IN THE
SCHEDULING, BUT WISHED TO MAKE THE U.S. AWARE THAT THE

SECRETARY'S VISIT HAD CREATED GREAT ANTICIPATICW IN
ARGENTINA. CANCELLATICHI OR P0STP<»1BMENT WOULD CAUSE REAL
DIFFICULTIES AS PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD PUT GREAT EMPHASIS (M
THE VISIT. MR. CHRISTOPHER ASSURED THE ARGENTINES THAT THE
ARGENTINE CONCERNS WOULD BE STRONG FACTORS WHICH WOULD
MOTIVATE THE SECRETARY TO MAKE THE VISIT.

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017

4. AT MR. CHRISTOPHER'S INVITATICM, ALLARA DISCUSSED THE
SECRETARY'S AGENDA WHILE HE IS IN ARGENTINA. TERRORISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD CERTAINLY BE CONSIDERED ALONG WITH
A NUMBER OF OTHER TOPICS WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER
WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY TODMAN.

5. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WISHED TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS
FURTHER. DURING THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY SIGNING CEREMONY
CONVERSATIONS ME HAD BEEN QUITE IMPRESSED WITH PRESIDENT

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VXDBIA'S CC^OUTMEHT TO CHANGE AND REFORM IN ARGENTINA. W1
UNDERSTAND HIM TO BE DEDICATED TO THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS. HE HERE SORRY TO HEAR OF THE RECENT RESURGENCE OF
TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA BUT HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S
RESPONSE HILIi BE CONFINED TO THE LEGAL PROCESS. THE WAR
AGAINST TERRORISM SHOULD NOT BE USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

cciNgiumi ' i - Ai;

e O NFIDE BTI AL’

PAGE 03 STATE 270937

6. ALLARA POINTED OUT THAT THE ARGENTINE (X>VBRNMBNT HAD
SUFFERED TERRORIST AGGRESSION AND HAD BEEN FORCED TO RESORT
TO EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES. THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT OUTBREAKS
OF VIOI^NCE, BUT DESPITE THESE THE GOVERNMENT IS PLEDGED
TO RETURN THE COUNTRY TO NORMALITY. THE U.S. SHOULD BE
ASSURED THAT PRESIDENT VIDILA'S COMMITMENT TO PRESIDENT
CARTER TO RETURN ARGENTINA FULLY TO THE RULE OF LAN IN THE
SHORTEST PERIOD OF TIME REMAINS VALID.

7 . MR. CHRISTOPHER STATED THAT SOME ACTIONS BY THE ARGEN-
TINE GOVERNMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA DO STAND IN THE
WAY OF BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. HE
SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED DISAPPEARANCES. D ETAINEES AND THB
DEUTSCH FAMILY.^ WE CONTINUE TO HEAR OF DISAPPEARANCES}

WE HAD HOPED THAT INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE RESOLVED THE PROBLEM, BUT
THEY APPARENTLY HAVE NOT. THE LARGE NUMBER OF DETAINEES,
PRESIDENT VIDSLA SAID SOME 4,000, IS ALSO A CAUSE FOR
CONCERN. THB DEUTSCH CASE IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PUBLIC MOD
CC^GRESSIONAL INTEREST WHICH IS BEING CONCENTRATED OH
ARGENTINA. THE U.S. JEWISH COMMUNITY

HAS BE^ VERY INTERESTED IN THB FATE OF THE FAMILY. IT
WOULD BE A VERY GOOD CASE TO RESOLVE.

8. ALLARA RESPONDED THAT THB ARGENTINES HERE AWARE THAT
HUMAN RIGHTS CAUSED DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
IT PROBABLY CREATED MORE PROBLEMS THAN HERB MERITED. THB
ARGENTINES HAVE TRIED TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS OF DISAPPEAR-
ANCES, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO REACH A CONCLUSICSI. S<»(E
PEOPLE GO UNDERGROUND TO JOIN THE TERRORISTS, OTHERS TO
ILLEGALLY LEAVE THB COUNTRY AND SOME "DISAPPEAR* TO ESCAPE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR COHMCN CRIMES. MOREOVER, ARMED FORCES
PERSONNEL WHO HAVE COmtITTED EXCESSES ARE BEING PUNISHED
AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IS INVESTIGATING ALL ALLEGED
DISAPPEARANCES. EIGHTY PER CENT OP THE REPORTED DISAPPEAR-
ANCES HAD OCCURRED BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER IN
eatP i ProTt itt.

eOW Pl PEWTI AL '

PAGE 04 STATE 270937

1976.

9. CONCERNING THE DEUTSCH FAMILY, ALLARA SAID THAT THREE
OF THE FAMILY MEMBERS HAD BEEN RELEASED BUT TWO WOULD BE
TRIED BECAUSE THEY HERE SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED BY TIES TO
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AS WAS THE BROTHER, DANIEL, WHO
HAD LEFT ARGENTINA. ALLARA USED THE DEUTSCH CASE TO DENY
ACCUSATIONS THAT ANTI-SEMITISM EXISTED IN ARGENTINA.

THE GOVERNMENT REPRESSED ANTI-SSIITIC LITERATURE
AND HAD MADE IT A CRIME TO INCITE RACIAL HATRED. PRESIDENT
VIDELA HAS CLOSE CONTACT WITH LEADING JEWISH CITIZENS AND
ORGANIZATIONS. JEWS WHO ARE PROSECUTED IN ARGENTINA ARE
BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURTS BECAUSE THEY HAVE COMMITTED
CRIMES. NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE JEWS.

10. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID HE

WANTED THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TO KNOW

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THAT IT HAS HOT CaiLY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH BUT IBE CONGRESS
AND THE PUBLIC WHO HERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF ACTIONS ON
HOMAN RIGHTS. ON THE DEUTSCH FAMILY, MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID
HE WANTED ALLARA TO KNOH THE
GREAT SYMBOLIC VALUE THE CASE HAD IN THE U.S.

11. ALLARA SAID THE ARGENTINES HERB VERY AWARE OP THE

SYMBOLIC VALUE; PRESIDENT VIDSLA HAD WRITTEN PERSONALLY TO
PRESIDENT CARTER ABOUT THE FAMILY .' ARGENTINA IMERSfOiffi
U.S. CraiCERN OVER HOMAN RIGHTS, AND HAS DONE MUCH TO IMPROVE
THE SITUATION THERE. HOWEVER, NOT ONLY HOMAN RIGHTS BUT
ALSO TERRORISM SHOULD BE (XRISIDBRm . TERRORISM HAS SPAWNED
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATICRIS; PLANE HIJACKINGS VIOLATE THE RIGHTS
OF THE PASSENGERS. THE ON RECENT LY PA SSED A RESOLDTIOI^
CONDEMNING HZJACfaNS, lUT HE NEED SUCH mutsUKHS TO

OMraAT TERRORISM. DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID HE
GONPIDEaWHttr

TDRFXtrarrnor

PAGE 05 STATE 270937

AGREED FULLY HITH THE MINISTER'S CONCERN WITH HIJACKING.

HE MOST WORK TO GET ALL STATES TO RATIFY THE ANTI -HIJACKING
CONVENTION..

12. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT HE WISHED TO INTRODUCE A
HAPPIER HOTS; HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ADVISE SECRETARY VANCE
•IHAT HE SHOULD ISSUE A LICENSE FOR THE EXPORT OF PERISCOPES
TO ARGENTINA. FAVORABLE ADVISORY OPINIONS ON THE ISSUANCE
OF LICENSES FOR THE EXPORT OP CHINOOK HBLICOPTKRS AND
LOCKHEED C-130S HAD ALSO BEEN GIVEN. THESE ACTIONS HERE
AH INDICATION OF OUR FAITH IN PRESIDENT VIDBLA'S
MODERATION AND OUR HOPE THAT THE ROCKY RELATIONS WE HAVE
HAD ARE NOW IMPROVING.

13. ALLARA SPOKE OF HIS CONCERN OVER THE LIMITATKRIS OH
MILITARY EQUIPMENT- -ESPECIALLY SPARE PARTS AND FMS ITEMS
FOR WHICH ARGESrriNA HAD ALREADY PAID. THESE LIMITATIONS
WERE CAUSING REAL DIFFICULTIES. THE ARGENTINES HAD
HOPED THAT THE SERIES OP HIGH LEVEL U.S. OFFICIAL VISITS
WHICH RAO BEGUN IN MARCH WOULD HAVE CONVINCED THE U.S.

THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE ON HOMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA.
APPARENTLY THEY DID NOT.

14. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO SEE
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ON THE ARGENTINE AGQiDA FOR THE
SECRETARY'S VISIT. PRESIDENT CARTER PLACES GREAT
EMPHASIS @1 THE NUCLEAR (^IBSTION. THE U.S. DOES NOT WISH
TO KEEP COUNTRIES FR(M EXPLOITING NUCLEAR ENERGY, BUT WE
DO WANT TO LIMIT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH
PRESENT A GRAVE DANGER FOR THE WORLD. WE WANT TO SEE
Al^BNTINA USING NUCLEAR POWER, BUT AVOIDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENT AND REPROCESSING. THE PRESIDENT IS AKXIOJS
FOR ARGENTINA TO RATIFY THE TREATY OP TLATELOLCO AND AGREE
TO FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID THE
SECRETARY WOULD PUT GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION
WHEN HE NAS IN ARGENTINA.

CLWFiDEffngg

ttaiFIUENTrAg

PAGE 06 STATE 270937

15. ALLARA SAID THAT NUCLEAR TOPICS WERE OF GREAT
SIGNIFICANCE TO ARGENTINA, WHICH WAS A LEADER AMONG THE
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN NUCLEAR MATTERS FOR OVER 30
YEARS. ARGENTINA HAD DEVELOPED ITS NUCLEAR CAPACITY FOR
PEACEFUL ENDS AND IT WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. . THE
ARGENTINES DO NOT WANT TO DISTURB THE POWER BALANCE IN THE
AREA BY AN IRRESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. ALLARA
SAID THAT ARGENTINA MAS CONDUCTING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF

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ITS POLICY ON THE TREATY OP TLATELOLCO AND THAT HE SAW
VIRTUALLY NO IMPEDIMENT TO ARGENTINA'S RATIFYING IT.

THE ARGENTINES ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO A PULL DISCUSSION OF
THE NUCLEAR QUESTION WHEN THE SECRETARY IS IN BUENOS AIRES.

IS. MR. CHRISTOPHER THANKED ALLARA FOR THIS GOOD NEWS
ABOUT THE WILLINGNESS TO RATIFY TLATELOLCO AND THE

THOUGHTFUL AND CANDID CONVERSATION WHICH THEY HAD HELD.
THIS TYPE OP EXCHANGE STRENGTHENED RELATIONS BETWEEN
COUNTRIES. PROBLEMS EXIST BUT THEY MUST BE DISCUSSED, HOT
AVOIDED. IN THIS WAY THEY CAN BE RESOLVED. VANCE

eatfPiBB NT i i ar

NNN

CONFlPEWTtAfc

ht^://smartarcMve.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_..

7/1/2013

UNCLASSIFIED

67.

Briefing Memorandum From Richard Feinberg of the Policy Planning Staff to Secretary of State
Vance

Washington, November 19, 1977

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff — Office of the Director, Records
of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, Lot 82D298, Box 3, TL November 16-30 1977. Confidential.
Sent through Lake. Drafted on November 18 by Feinberg.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFINS MEMORANDUM
. S/S

eOMFIPEWT IMr

November 19, 1977

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH s S/P - ^thony Lak<jV
FROM: S/P - Richard Peinber^

President Videla; An Alternative View

A common view has been that President Videla would
gradually but effectively move to improve the human
rights situation in Argentina, and that he also repre-
sented the best hope for Argentine ratification of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco. If these views appeared probable
when General Videla assumed the Presidency in March,
1976, a year and a half later, thev are increasinolv
difficult to support; ""It is widely agreea that the GOA
is failing to in^jrove its human rights performance,
ztnd Videla is unlikely to counter his advisers who are
opposed to ratifying Tlatelolco.

Videla probably. has good instincts on human rights,
but several fundamental factors are preventing him from
taking effective action:

—He adheres to the 'clandestine war" doctrine,
which argues that subversion must be countered with
illegal measures. Re also accepts that this illegal
war be waged in a decentralized manner, with local
captains and commanders acting largely on their own.

This makes it impossible for the top generals, including
the junta, to effectively control the security forces —
but does provide the junta members with plausible
denlabllity.

--Videla fails to make a sharp distinction between
terrorism and dissent. . The loose application of the
term “subversive" to the government's enemies has
encouraged the security forces to strike not just at

COKF lPE NT rAI.

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIRED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

eOMWgg WTtfttr

- 2 -

terrorlats but at a wide range of civilian opinion.
Certainly less th^ half of the prisoners and dis-
appeared persons {estimated by human rights groups at
15,000) were active terrorists; some estimates place
the figure at under 15%.

— Vldela is closely tied to his minister of
economics, Martinez de Hoz, whose austere economic
policies hayp hit the middle and worJcing classes very
hard. These policies, which have successfully improved
Argentina’s external accounts, have failed to bring the
rate of inflation under 100%. As the government now
moves to attach Inflation through stringent monetary
measures, economic discontent will mount, as a recent
wave of strikes foretells. Mounting popular discontent
threatens to provoke further official repression.

However well intended Vldela may be, he will be hard put
to fall to take the necessary political measures re-
quired by his economic policies.

*• — Vldela *s own personality and governing style

is to seek a cautious concensus, in order to attain
the central objective of maintaining unity of the armed
forces. Iherefore, even though the moderates In the
military are numerically superior and could probably
win in a showdom with the hardliners, they are less
aggressive in putting their views forward. Videla
prefers to accede sufficiently to right-wing pressures
rather than risk a rift in the military. In the most
recent promotion cycle, Videla apparently failed to
make a serious effort to retire certain key hardliners.

These very basic elements help explain why Videla 's
performance on guaranteeing the security of his
citizenry has been — Md is likely to continue to be —
disappointing.

The presence of Videla and other moderates has
probably inhibited the hardliners from attempting to
mount an all-out war on "intellectual and economic sub-
version," i.e., dissenters of all stripes, "speculators,"

• 4 .

mm r x rs m Ttmr

. -3-

teuc evaders r etc. Nevertheless, the numbers of dead,
disappeared, tortured and jailed are so high as to have
directly touched a large percentage of Argentine families

Drafted byj S/P;RPelnbergiejq
X20822, 11/18/77

<»WPI P g tfffaiC;.

UNCLASSIFIED

68 .

Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the White House
Buenos Aires, November 22, 1977, 0025Z
Secto 11012

1 Source; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0545. Secret;
Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to the Department of State. Vance
was in Argentina November 20-22.

UNCLASSIFIED

Jdocumenf View

Page 1 of 5

S&CRBT

PAGB 01 SSCTO 11012 01 OF 03 220226Z

ACTIOM KOOS-00

IKFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /OOl H

- 077803 220230Z /73

O 22002SZ NOV 77 ZPF-4
FH DSDEIi SECRETARY IN BUENOS AIRES
TO THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S" K' L"'K' 'E"T SECTION 1 OF 3 SECTO 11012

NOOIS/CKEROKEB

WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND DR BRZEZINSKI ONLY,-
DEFARTHEKT FOR HASIB AND TMiNOFF CSHhY

E.O. 116S2: GDS

TAGS: OVIP {VANCE, CYRUS)

SUBJECT; MEETINQS IN BUENOS AIRES

1. DURING A SERIES nv L ONB AWp F RANK DISCUSSIONS HI™

PRESIDENT VIDEDA.o THE TWO MAUSERS OF THE JUNTA,, JSSO

FOREIGN MINISTER MCRITES,. HE KEACHEU BKEAICTtucUUUHE

IN TWO AREAS OF PRINCIPAL INTEREST. THE ARGSNINTES AGREED
TO A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR INTENTION TO RATIFY THE
TREATY OF TLATEIOLCO. THIS WILL BE CONTAINED IN A COMMUNIQUE
BEING ISSUED THIS EVENING. THEY ALSO AGREED IN THE COMMUNI-
QUE TO LAIK3UAGS STATING THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS WHIOI ADHERED
TO UNIVERSAL DECLARATION C»I mBON RIGHTS HAVE A MAJOR RE-
SPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THEIR
PEOPLE. TO RESPECT INTEGRITY OF PERSONS AND THE ROI^ OF
THE LAh.

2. IN COMPLETELY PRIVATE MEE TraGS, VI DELA RBMFIRMBD
HIS COMMITMENT TO YOU,. WHICH I&'SSHTHE Mas ALSO MAUo VJ
TBS CHURCH, TO RELEASE SIGNIFICANT NUMBER (WELL OVER 500}
PRISONERS AND TO PUBLISH A LIST OF ALL DETAINEES BEFORE

■ ’SBCRKT

SECRE T

PAGE 02 SECTO 11012 01 OF 03 220226Z

CHRISTMAS, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION, THE ARGENTINES
HAVE AGREED TO PERMIT THE INTERNATIONAL COWaSSION OF RED
CROSS <ICRC) TO RESUME VISITS TO PLACES OP DETENTICW.

THE LATTER CANNOT BE PUBLICLY STATED. I URGED VIDELA TO
GET THE ICRC'S PERMISSION TO MAKE THIS PUBLIC. I ALSO
URGED HIM TO INVITE IN THE ICRC OR OTHER INDEPENDENT AGENCY
IN CASES WHERE TORTURE IS CHARGED TO MAKS AN INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATION. THEY WILL TAKE THIS UNDER CONSIDERATIOJ .

3. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ALSO REPUDIATES INTHUIATICRIAL
TERRORISM AND AGREES ON THE NECESSITY FOR MULITLATERAL
COOPERATION INT THIS AREA. WE ALSO AGREED TO REACTIVE
THE MIXED COfOKSSION TO DISCUSS KCOKCMIC SUBJECTS.

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

4. ON SPECIFIC CASE OF JACOB TIMMERMAN, ARGENTINES TOLD
ME PRIVATELY THAT THEY HAD EVIDENCE HE WAS LINKED WITH
HANDLING OF FUNDS FROM TERRORIST SOURCES AND IS SUBJECT
TO CIVIL CHARGES. THEY SHOWED ME A CONFIDENTIAL FILE
INDICATING DEUTSCH ASSISTED IN THE ESCAPE OF HIS SON,

WHO WAS HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE OF COMMimiST OPERATIONS,

AND THAT HIS DAUGHTER IS ALSO INVOLVED IN CWBlUNtST ACTIV-
ITIES HERE. THEY EXPECT THE FATHER HIU, BE RELEASED BY
THE COURTS, BUT NOT HIS DAUGHTER. I AM NOT SANGUINE
THAT EITHER MR TIMMERMAN nn MtSS DEUTSCH HILL BE RELEASED
DESPITE OUR URGliro'.

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Page 2 of 5

5. IN MEETIKQ KITH JSHXSH LEADERS LATER, THEY STRESSED
THAT GOVEHHMEHT IS ttOT OFTICIALLY ANTI-SBMETIC, EOT THAT
THERE ARB A NDHBER OF AMTI- SEMITES IN GOVERNMENT OVER
NHOM GOVERNMENT IS UNABLE TO EXERCISE FULL CONTROL.

6. DURING OUR MEETINGS, I STRESSED THAT THE MAJOR
IMRBDIHEHT TO AN IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS IS THE

S EC RE T

•SEC RET

PAGE 03 SECTO 110X2 01 OF 03 220226Z

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. AND THAT UNLESS
THAT SITUATION IMPROVES OUR RELATICRIS MILL IKJRSBN, PARTI-
CULARLY AFTER A CONGRESSIONAL MIENDMENT IMPOSES AN ARMS
EMBARGO BEGINNING IN OCTOBER. MY SENSE IS THAT VIOELA
AND SOME OTHERS AROUND HIM ARE TRYING TO IMPROVE SITUATION,
BUT THERE STILL REMAINS HOCB. FOR THEN TO DO TO AMELIORATE
THE SITUATION.

7. OUR VIEWS GENERALLY COINCIDED WITH REGARD TO THE
MIDD1£ EAST, m mXCR THEY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO
HELP IN ANY HAY POSSIBLE, AND ON VARIOUS NORTH/SOUTH
ISSUES, WHERE HE AGREED ARGENTINA O^ULO BE ESPECIALLY
HELPFUL FALLING AS IT DOBS BETWEEN 3HE DEVELOPED AND
LESSSR-DBVEU)PBD COUNTRIES.

6. ARGENTINES WERE DfMmSTRABLY, EXTREMELY PLEASED
WITH THE FACT OF THE VISIT AND THE NATURE OF OUR a3N\mR-
SATIONS, WHICH THEY HOPE WILL LEAD TO BETTER
UNDERSTANDING.

- SBCRg l C

Omitted here is the text of the joint communique (20 paragraphs).

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UNCLASSIFIED

69.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, December 14, 1977, 1930Z

9523

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770465-1 125. Confidential;
Priority; Limdis.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIOENTW t:

2 of 4

CUMEIDESTim

PAGE 01 BOENOS 09523 142127Z

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 HA-02 NSC-05 SP-02 PM-03 L-01

H-01 INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 DODE-00 PRS-01 PA-01
USIA-01 /047 W

043731 142134Z /64

P 141930Z DEC 77

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3710

C O N -P - I DEN T I- A- tS - B UENOS AIRES 9523

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652 6DS
TAGS SHOM, AR

SUBJECT DETAINED OR ABDUCTED HOMAN RIGHTS ACTI VI S TS
REP; BUENOS AIRES 9420; STATS 295886

1. AMBASSADOR RAISED MATTER OF RECENTLY
DETAINED OR ABDUCTED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS
FROM MOTHERS OF PLAZA DE MAYO GROUP DURING
SOCIAL OCCASION WITH ADMIRAL MASSERA EVENING
DECEMBER 12, DURING, COURTESY CALL ON MINISTER
OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ EARLIER ON THE SAME
DAY, Aliro ON DECEMBER 13 WITH CHIEF OF THE ARMY
STAFF GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA. WE ARE CERTAIN
VIOLA WILL TELL PRESIDENT VIDELA OF US CONCERN
OVER THIS INCIDENT.

2. MASSERA PROFESSED NOT TO HAVE KNOWN OF
EVENT UNTIL TOLD BY AMBASSADOR. HE THEN REFUSED
TO REGISTER SURPRISE SINCE- -IN HIS WORDS- -THIS

SORT OF MUDDLED, ILL-JUDGED CAPER IS WHAT ONE HAS COME
TO EXPECT OF THE ARMY. VIOLA KNEW OF INCIDENT BUT DIS-
CLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABDUCTIONS’ ORIGINS AND/OR
CON F IDENTIAL

CO NFIDE NTI AL

PAGE 02 BUENOS 09523 142127Z

INTENTIONS. HE CONFIDED THAT HE HAS MADE AND WILL
CONTINUE TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO DISCOVER WHO
AUTHORED AND CARRIED OUT THE EVENT BUT SO FAR HAS
NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. VIOLA WENT ON TO SPECULATE THAT

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017

CONFIDENT I AL

2 of 4

3 of 4

CONFIDENT I A t

SOME "OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION" OF THE ABOaCTIONS HAD
TAKEN PLACE, HINTING THUS HIS BELIEF. THAT ANOTHER MILITARY
SERVICE (READ NAVY) HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE. MARTINEZ DE
HOZ--AND ALSO DEFENSE MINISTER KLIX, TO WHCM THE SUBJECT
WAS RAISED AT A SOCIAL OCCASION WITH A LARGER GROUP OF
PEOPLE— TOOK THE HARD LINE THAT THIS IS BUT A NEW DIRTY
INCIDENT IN AN OLD DIRTY WAR, ESSENTIALLY JUSTIFYING THE
ABDUCTION AS HAVING PROPER SECURITY MOTIVATION EVEN
WHILE DISCLAIMING KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

3. PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOTHERS* PROTEST MOVEMENT
SPECULATE THAT THE ABDUCTION-DETENTION MIGHT HAVE BEEN
STAGED TO DETER A LARGE PRE- CHRISTMAS DEMONSTRATION AT
THE PLAZA DE MAYO SLATED FOR TOMORROW DECEMBER 15. IF
THIS IS THE CASE THEN THEY EXPECT THE DETAINED GROUP TO
REAPPEAR OVER THE WEEKEND, MONDAY AT LATEST. IF THIS
FAILS TO TAKE PLACE THEN CLEARLY THE INCIDENT WILL TAKE
ON EXTRAORDINARY SIGNIFICANCE IN THE HISTORY OF
DISAPPEARANCES IN ARGENTINA.

4. BUENOS AIRES HERALD- -WHICH IS STILL THE ONLY LOCAL
PAPER THAT HAS COVERED THE DISAPPEARANCES --REPORTED
TODAY DECEMBER 14 THAT THE EMBASSY OF FRANCE HAS
PROTESTED THE DISAPPEARANCE OP TWO NUNS WORKING FOR A
FRENCH MISSIONARY ORDER HERE. THE FIRST, SISTER ALICIA
(NEE ANA MARIA DOMON) , A NATURALIZED ARGENTINE, WAS
MENTIONED IN THE BUENOS AIRES REFTEL AMONG THOSE WHO
DISAPPEARED PROM THE CHURCH OF SANTA CRUZ. THE SECOND,

A SISTER LEONIE (NEE RENEE DUQUET) IS REPORTED TO HAVE
CONFIDENTIAL

OONFID B JT T IAL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 09523 142I27Z

BEEN TAKEN OVER THE PAST WEEKEND BY FOUR MEN DRIVING AN
UNMARKED, US-MADE CAR. SISTER ALICIA IS REPORTED TO HAVE
WORKED WITH A MONSIGNOR NOVAK IN THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT,
WHILE SISTER LEKDNIE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BISHOP OF
SAN JUSTO, MONSIGNOR CARRERAS, AT THE CHAPEL OP SAN PABLO
IN RAMOS MEJIA. THE HERALD GAVE AGES OF ALICIA AND
LEONIE AS 40 AND 61, RESPECTIVELY,

5. WE WILL PURSUE OUR INQUIRIES, OF COURSE, INCLUDING
AT FOREIGN MINISTRY.

CASTRO

COWFID EW TIAi;

CONFIDENIIW.

3 Of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

70.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, December 30, 1977, 1715Z

310191

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780003-0409. Limited
Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Rondon, cleared for information by Oxman and O. Jones and
in EB/ITP/EWT and H, approved by Zimmermann.

UNCLASSIFIED

.Document View

Page 1 of 2

UMZTED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 STATE 310191

ORIGIN ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 HA-05 EB-08 H-01 MCE-00

ABF-Ol OMB-01 TRSB-00 IGA-02 AI0-O5 ACnA-l2 PM-05
/070 R

DRAFTED BT ARA/ECAsFKROHDONi JC
APPROVED BY ARA/ECA;RWZIMMERMANH
DrSOXMAN (INFO)

HAtEOJONES (INFO)

EB/ITA/EWT/PBLAKEBURN (INFO)

HsDGBLBER (INFO)

- - 041904 301818Z /43

P 30a715Z DEC 77

™ SECSTATB WASHDC

TO AMBMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 310191
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ESTC, MASS, MILI, SHUM, AR
SUBJECrT; SALES TO ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES

1. DEPARTMENT HAS AUTHORIZED EXPORT OF PONTOON BRIDGES
AND RECOMMENDED TO DEPARTMENT OF CC»«ERCE APPROVAL OP BELL
CCaOffiRCIAL HELICOPTERS. ALTHOUCHI ARGENTINE EMBASSY IN
NASHINGTON HAS BEEN ADVISED OF ACTION, POST ALSO MAY WISH
TO ADVISE GOA OF U.S. ACTION ON THESE CASES, WHICH SERVE AS
EVIDENCE OF USG INTEREST IN A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH
ARGENTINA - ONE WHICH HE HOPE HILL EVOLVE FAVORABLY AS
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IMPROVES.

2. OH DECEMBER 19, ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR APPEALED TO
ARA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MCNEIL FOR PROMPT ACTION
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 310191

ON EXPORT OF PONTOON BRIDGES, HELICOPTERS AND HRPTUNE
AIRCRAFT.

3. ON DECEMBER 20, DEPAR-mENT AUTHORIZED EXPORT OF ALMOST '
$3 MILLION IN ALUMINUM PONTOON BRIDGES. THESE ITEMS HAD
BEEN PURCHASED UNDER FMS AND PAID FOR IN FULL.

4. ON DECEMBER 27, SALE OF 8 CCROJERCIALLY CONFIGURED BELL
HELICOPTERS TO AIR FORCE HAS APPROVED IN DEPARTMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE HAS BEEN NOTIFIED. HE UNDERSTAND
THESE HELICOPTERS HILL BE USED INTER ALIA FOR RESCUE
PURPOSES, AND HE HERB INFORMED THAT ARGENTINA BECAME VERY
CONCERNED ABOUT ITS DEFICIENCY IN HELICOPTERS DURING
KOVNER EARTHQUAKE RELIEF EFFORTS AS HELL AS AUSTRAL
AIRLINES CRASH RESCUE OPERATICEIS. FURTHERMORE, ARGENTINES
AGREED TO DELETION OF ARMOR AND COLLINS KIT WHICH HAD
PLACED HELICOPTERS PREVIOUSLY ON MUNITICSIS LIST, AND
ASSURED US THAT THE HELICOPTERS 'HOULD BE USED FOR
CUSTOMARY AIR FORCE PURPOSES . "

5. DECISION ON NEPTUNE AIRCRAFT FOR CANNIBALIZING WILL
BE COMMUNICATED TO YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CHRISTOPHER

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UNCLASSIFIED

71.

Briefing Memorandiim From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
(Bushnell) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, January 28, 1978

1 Source; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 19, Memos from WC to Bureaus, 1978, 4 of 5.
Secret. Drafted by McNeil and Rondon on January 27.

UNCLASSIFIED

OECLASSIRED

Authority

Bv^ti^NARA Date 4-*/8^/

‘^0X781

DePARTMENT OF SiTATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

" "S B CR ICT

TO!

FROM;

The Deputy Secretary
ARA - John A. Bushuel

© Act

I A T- i
v> .-‘t r*. ‘-

Acting

SUBJECT! Is the Argentine Navy on the Side of the
Angels?

Xoa requested our thoughts on whether Argentine Navy
Cotmumder Massera may nol^be one of the villains in the
Argentine drama, after all.

Massera has worked actively of late to foster the
notion that he is the most d«noeratic meDdser of the
Argentine ruling junta and the one who would show the
greatest respect for human rights. He has gone out of.
his way to tnfriend^ union leaders, Feroaist politicians
and Jei^sb leaders. Re has also made it a point to tell
visiting Amerlc«i officials that his Navy is innocent
of wrongdoing because it has only a peripheral role in
counter-terrorism. But this is nonsense. Massera 's
1,000 man marine force is among the most active of the
counter-terrorist forces. We have quite credible
reports that the Navy has been responsible for repres-
sion against priests, and that the Ha^ Mechanics School
in Buenos Aires has been used as a torture center.

Nona of these activities could escape Massera *s knowledge
because of all the. services in Argentina, Massera 's is
the most tightly control!^.

On the other hand, Massera is the most astute and
ambitious of the Junta members, and smart enough to
realize that a public stance on behalf of human rights
will enhance his chances to becone Argentina's President
when he retires frcan the Navy (possibly late this year) .
It appears that Massera would like to seduce Argentina's
labor unions and the Peronist Party into supporting him.

■ag ewar

(GD^)

oe'cLassified

Authority MNTi ^^9^7
By^NARA DMe 4-/8^l

6EORH1

- 2 -

xitucb as Peron (no danocrat, either) courted labor in
the forties, ^is explains Hassera's public of^sltion
to the belt- tightening policies of the Econonqr Minister,
tOio is at once anathetoa to labor and closely linked
to Videla.

H\n>an rights aside, Massera is, or affects to be,
a jingoist. le ord^ed the Navy to fire against Russian
trawlers last fall in an action idrLch caused casualties
and had not been approved by Videla. hnd he seems to
have flirted with the notion of a grandstanding military
action against Chile in the Beagle Chaimel in an effort
to curry nationalist favor. Be has not shared Videla* s
desire for a close relationship with the United States,
and had privately criticized Videla ' s attendance at the
Panama treaty signing and indicated that Argentina should
not accommodate to us on the nuclear issue.

The prevailing Argentine view is that Massera
is a strong leader, not usually said of Videla, but
that he is unprincipled. fOiat militates most against
Nassers* s aadbitions is that the Army, ^rtilch cares
little for Massera, is by far the most important
military force. At all events, the image which he
seems to be successfully cultivating in some ipiarters
does not cncactly accord with the facts as we know
them.

We have asked Ezdjassy Buenos Aires for further
commenc.

ARA:S^icHEH,/AaA/ECA!PRondon: jd
1/27/7B

UNCLASSIFIED

72.

Memorandum for the Record
Washington, February 6, 1978

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA-CIA weekly meetings, 1978.
Secret. Drafted by Heavner.

UNCLASSIFIED

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

QBCRE T

- 3 -

the human rights attitudes of the Argentine military leader-
ship. He said the report indicates there are no moderates
there on the question of using harsh it^thods against
subversives. All the military leaders are in agreement
that they must use rough methods to control subversives.

The references we had heard to "curbing excesses" meant
only that the regime will not tolerate use of the campaign
against subversives as a cover for settling personal grudges

jjiM
Ted He^vner
INR/DDC

SECRET

sp

UNCLASSIFIED

73.

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman)
to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, February 15, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 27, Human Rights — ^Argentina II. Confidential.
Drafted on February 14 by Rondon; cleared in draft in EB/IFD/ODF, S/P, and the Department of
the Treasury and by Bova. Rondon initialed for all the clearing officials.

UNCLASSIFIED

rigii"

;

r. ^ 7803232

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S ■ ■ ■

FEB15I9?8

TOi

PROMs

SOBJECTs

The Deputy Secretec;

ARA - Terence A. ■TOdman

I UlClTBffiD DlRECTliT SOsJ^L
f~gcg asyigTOB BY g/s

0, S. Reaction in -Ifls to Argentine Human Rights
Actions

ISSOB FOR DBCISIOW

Nhether recent human rights actions by Argentina are
sufficient grounds for ^revising your earlier decision to
vote against, two Argentine * loans in the World Bank, now
scheduled for a vote On Pebruary 21.

BSSERTIAL FACTORS

A vote is expected on February 21 on two Argentine
projects idiich, before the developments outlined below,
you decided to vote against: a $109 million silo proj-
ect in the IBRD and a $9 million cement plant loan in the
International Finance Corporation. The Argentine Ambassa-
dor has mentioned publicly that the silo project was
developed after discussions with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, referring to our possibly negative position
on it as an indication of mixed and confusing positions
being taken fay the O.S. goverment. Even if we follow
current instructions on voting, we need to lofiow what
to say to Argentine feelers about our response to human
rights actions %fhicb they believe are positive.,

A progress report on the human rights situation in
Argentina was sent to the nepartmeot by our Embassy on
February 7 and is attach^.

— PriTOner releases . Approximately 440 prisoners
have been released from the state of siege powers of the
Argentine Executive since Deceive 20, 1977.

— Prisoner lists . On February 3, in a significant,
long sought after step, Argentina published a list of
705 state of siege prisoners.* A second list of ySfS
prisoners appeared on February 13 j further lists ^re ex-
.pected. -•

- ■ ' O b OT I BEWTIA g '

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIRED

by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017

— Right of option . Our Embassy believes that the
right oC option pr^raa, irtiereby prisoners maty opt for
exile, is now Mefinlteiy being inplen^ted, and the
Argentine government has told foreign enhassies that it
will cooperate in helping prisoners meet visa reguire-
ments. Ihe Embassy has underscored the importance of
this measure to prisoner releases.

— Treatment of prisoners . Ihe International <k>fflttit-^
tee of the Bed Cross resiSBed j^ison visits in Oecenditer
and has reported that political prisoners are being held
in the same physical conditions as other prisoners. This
is an iaprovement.

— Orf 8. interest eases . -The Argentines have author-
ised the" departure’ of certain high 0. S. interest eases
recently, including Guillermo Vogler and one of the Panero
sisters.

— Intangibles . The attached cable reports, that the
^Argentines " are ' becfohilng more "sensitised" to the impor-
tance of human rights steps and are no longer "stone-
walling" the subject. The cable states sIto that there
Is an attempt underway to reorganize counter-subversive
forces in order to achieve tighter control over them by
the central ^vernment.

Oh the other hand, and as the same cable reports,
there continue to be many problems, Miile disappearances
may have declined in 1977, more recently they appear to
have run at the sane rate as a year before. According to
our Embassy, it has heard of 39 disappearances since
Deceiriier 1, including two French nuns and mothers of the
disappMreds who were abducted without a trace in mid-
Decembec-w Iffie ^t^assy adds enat reports or secret oeren-
tion centers f^sisC, aiuJ that there is no evidence to
suggest that, toptore for information is no longer
practiced. In addition, the GOA admits that it is bold-
ing over 3600 prisoners under executive detention.

Human rights groups estimate that many thousands more are
being held secretly, in non-official detention centers.

To date the GOA has answered few of our requests for
information on missing persons. The International Commit-
tee of the Ked :Crpisa has not visited military camps %diere
unaccounted for prisoners may be under detention. Few.

t

eoWg I PBWTtfttr
- 3 -

prisoners have been released by the right of option pro-
gram to date. Xn the case of high D. S. interest cases
such as Timerman or Oeutech, they remain detained.
Internationally, the Argentine government has mounted a
campaign in the United Nations against Amnesty Interna-
tional and the International Commission of Jurists.

However you decide to handle this issue, our re-
sponse will come very shortly after Under Secretary
Benson decided against the sale of »av further mil itarv
training to Argentina, .'this TOans tnat we have continue
to get progressively tougher 'with Argentina.

Under Public Law 95-118 (PY 1U78 IPI authorislna
legislation},-oppo8iti.oh to a loan may consist of either
a no vote or an abstention. Neither of the proposed
options recommend support for Argentine loans at this
time.

THB OPTIONS

1. Follow current instructions but aclcnowledge change
privately , tte would advise the Argentines tliat we decided
to vote no on the $109 million silo loan and the $9 million
cement plant because of continuing concern with the human
rights situation in Argentina. We would note that improve-
ments in human rights will be factored into the stance we
take on future projects. We would acknowledge privately,
however, to both the Argentine and other bank directors
that we have noted favorable signs and express the hope
that they indicate a new trend.

Pro : I

— This would demonstrate our Ongoing serious concern
over continuing disappearances and other human rights
abuses but inject an element of hope into our IPX voting
pattern in return for further human rights performance.

We would not run the risk of suggesting that we are willing
to alter our policies in response to minor improvements.

Con :

— Itois would fail to recognize sufficiently or encour-
age actively Argentine human rights change, which may seem
minimal to us but is important in the Argentine view of
things. It risks' signaling, especially when we have just
decided to deny all military training requests, that we
remain opposed adamantly to j£he government, and xh the con-
text of our posture, our action might not only servj| as a

. CO NP I PE N TI AC

e o H fiPEH' wia;

- 4 -

htaaan rights disincenbiire but Impact negatively on bthec
major interesta, notably non-proliferation.

2. Abstain on both loans . We would inform the
Argentines that their recent steps will affect our
stance on the two loans, but we would not be more
explicit prior to the votes. We would abstain on the
loans, and explain privately to the Argentines and
Interested Bank members that our stance was taken
in recognition of recent positive signs, ex^hasixing
the need for further steps leading toward overall
improvement in idiat remains 'a poor situation.

gro t

— Uiis represents a prompt revision of our ear-
lier negative stance in the XfZs, signaling our will-
ingness to change as the Argentines chancy. It could
also: a} help to stem human rights regression, because
the Argentines would not wish to precipitate a return
to no votes in the banks and, b) it would strengthen
the hand of those in the government idio seeking
human rights la^rovement and idio would be able to point
to our action as indicating acknowledgment of steps
being taken.

Con :

— She ^bllcation of two lists and some prisoner
releases represent only Uie beginning of iri:at is needed
for real improvement in the human rights situations
to reverse our position with alacrity would undermine
the seriousness with which we have viewed past viola-
tions, including very recent dlsai^arahces.

RECQMMEMDATIOH

^at you approve Option 2 to abstain on both the
silo and cement projects, and privately eqglain our votes
in terms of Argentine human rights steps (favored by AHA,
S/P, Treasury, and the 0. S. Director to ^e XBSO).

Approve . Disapprove

ADTBIWATZ^DY, that you approve Option 1, (favored
by HA) kalntalnlng your earlier decision tO oppose the

CQW F l DB Wtoar

i

t

>5 ti

n .

’/'■Hr ‘ j, .

e o W PIOB H TlMi

. - 5 -

t»io projects but authorize representations to the
Argentines recognizing hopeful hunan riahts develop-
ments.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment ;

Cable - Buenos Aires 965

Drafted:

ARA/ECA : PEROMOn ; j c
2/14/785x22401

Concurrences:

{BB/OP^Nash (draft )/i^
VPrOWalker (draft)/^
HAtHBova (draft)

Treasury sWEscoube (draft^^^

■cd w pTpgw mfr

UNCLASSIFIED

74.

Note From the Deputy Executive Secretary of State (Wisner) to Secretary of State Vance
Washington, undated

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 27, Human Rights — ^Argentina 11. No classification
marking.

UNCLASSIFIED

HAioav wmivN 3H1 iv (Bonooadaa

The issue here '•is whether to take a new look
at the enormous backlog of Argentine arms transfe r
cases, with a view toward making selectea approvals
as an explicit "carrot" for Argentine human rights
reform and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Harold Brown has sucrgested in his letter to you
that we do this.- PM, S/P, AKA, and L agree with
Brown's suggestion and have identified certain
categories of spare parts and safety equipment that
they think we should approve. These approvals would
be given to Argentina with a request for significant
human rights reforms to be made before October 1
(the Congressional -mandated cut-off date for further
sales to Argentina) and ratification of the Treaty
of Tlatelolco before the SSOD. Argentina would be
told that no further approvals could be made until
these conditions were met.

H also agrees that we should make some approvals,
but proposes an alternative method of deciding which to .
make. There is a "grandfather clause" in the
Congressional cut-off legislation which would allow
us to go forward with those cases where contracts
or LOAs were signed before August 4, 1977. PM, ARA,

S/P argue against this approach, because it would
allow some large end-item cases to go, which they think
should be held, and it would not allow some essential
spare parts for items we have recently approved. They
also suspect that the total dollar value of approvals
made by the H-proposed method might be larger than
the categories of cases they proposed for approval.

HA is very much opposed to any approvals until
Argentina has made meaningful human rights reform®.

They have a considerable body of Congressional opinion
on their side.

Harold Brown has also recommended that we approve
training for some 68 Argentine officers. This has already
been decided against within the Department, but not yet

ADP Declassification Review

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S3AIH3aV IVNOaVN 3H1 iV 033nQ0ad3a

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communicated to the Argentines. Opinion is split:
one side argues that training is the last thing
we should cut off, so long as those involved have
not been guilty of human rights violations; the
other side argues that training should be cut, at
least for now, because of the domestic political
controversy about human rights abuses by military
officers.

The key consideration is whether our willingness
to provide some of these spares as evidence of our
continued interest in maintaining good relations with
the Argentine military will indeed work to produce
any "human rights" benefits in Argentina, or a
more tractible Argentine position on nuclear non-
proliferation. We have no firm evidence either
way, except that they are moving very close to
ratification of Tlatelolco right now.

PM, ARA, S/P, and L believe that with time
running out on military sales decisions, this "card"
is worth playing. The Argentines may do nothing
in which case they will have gotten much-needed spare
parts without having to put up anything in advance.

But their need for spare parts will continue and they
will clearly be mortgaging any prospects for further
approvals on our part if they show no response, a
point we would make clearly to them in communicating
our decision.

Because of the very intense domestic political
interest in Argentine hximan rights abuses, we must
be well prepared to explain the rationale behind and
nature of approvals on these cases, should you make
them. There is a question of whether to consult interested
members of Congress before or after making the decision.

At any rate, no decision should be announced until after
the President's trip.

The recommendations are at pp. 6-8. This memo,
although long, is the most concise statement yet produced
of the issue and the various positions, and it is the
only one that has proposed specific solutions. Whatever
your decision, someone will be unhappy.

UNCLASSIFIED

75.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, April 7, 1978, 0108Z

89468

1 Source; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780149-1018. Confidential;
Priority. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared by Schneider, McNeil, and Zimmermann; approved by
Bushnell.

UNCLASSIFIED

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c owF Tpgi mw r

CUNt'iUiaiTiAE'”

PAGE 01 STATE 0894£8

ORIGIN ARA-14

ADP Declassificalion Review
DECLASSIFIED
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C O « "F - l ' U E N T"l""a ~ C" STATE 089468

E.O. 116S2: CDS

TAGS: SHUM, BR

SUBJECT; REPORT OF NUNS DEATH
REF: BA 2346

1. DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED WITH DEEPEST CONCERN REPORTS
OF MURDER OF TWO NUNS AND FIVE OTHER WOMEN PICKED UP IN
DECEMBER ABDUCTIONS.

2. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES WE MOST ACT FORCEFULLY NOW TO
MAKE GOA AWARE OF OUR OUTRAGE AT SUCH ACTS. ARGENTINES
MUST UNDERSTAND THAT AS LONG AS SUCH DISAPPEARANCES
OCCUR OUR RBLATICWS WILL BE PLACED UNDER GREAT STRAIN,
EVEN THOUGH WE CONTINUE TO RESPECT VIDBLA*S EXPRESSED
PERSONAL INTENTIONS.

CONFIDEBTIBL

INFO OCT- 01

ISO- 00

HA-OS

ClAS-00

DODE-00 PM-

05 K-01

INR-10

L-03

NSAE-OO

NSC- 05

PA-01 SP-02

SS-15

ICA-11

SCS-OS

SY-05

MCT-01

AID-OS PC-01

/091 R

DRAFTED BY ARA/ECA: JBUHPUS;BP
APPROVED BY ARA t JBUSHNBLL
HA:MSCHNSIDER
ARA;FMC»EXL '

ARA/ECA: R?rZIMMEIU(ANN

027853 070235Z /20

P 0701082 APR 78

FK SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMSMBASSY BUSIDS AIRES PRIORITY

fUNFIUB BT im

PAGE 02 STATE 089468

3. ACCORDINGLY, AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH
PRESIDENT VIDSLA TO EXPRESS U.S. SHOCK AT THE REPORTED
DEATHS OF SEVEN WOMEN. WAIUJSS OF REMAINDER TO APPEAR
ON ISH LISTS HEIGHTENS OUR CCHJCERN. AMBASSADOR SHOUID
EXPLAIN TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS COME
AT AN ESPECIALLY UNEORTiniATl TIME. THERE HAD BEEN SOME
MODEST BUT POSITIVE STEPS ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINE
GOVERimENT AND THE UNITED STATES HAD RESPONDED TO THESE
WITH POSITIVE ACTIONS. WE tUU) MOVED FROM "NO" VOTES

m XFX LOANS TO ABSTENTIONS ON THE LAST TWO LOANS AND
HAD APPROVED THE SALE OF SOME MILITARY EQUIPMENT. OUR
POSITIVE ACTIONS WILL BE HARD TO MAINTAIN, HOWEVER, IN
LIGHT OP THE REPORTED DEATHS OF THE SEVEN WOMKM.J TO OFFSET
THE VERY NEGATIVE IMPRESSION CAUSED BY THE SEVEN DEATHS
— AND THE PRESUMPTIVE DEATHS OF THE OTHER 6 "MAORIS” --
ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER VISIBLE
PROGRESS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA.

4 . AMBASSADOR SHOULD CONTINUE PRESENTATION BY SUGGESTING
THAT GOA CONSIDER ACTIONS WHICH CAN BE TAKEN AGAINST THE
PEOPLE WHO COMMITTED THIS CRIME . > THEY SHOUllT BE BROUGHT
TO TRIAL AND IF SOME IN AUTHORITY WINKED AT THE CRIME
THOSE INVOLVED SHOULD BE DISCIPLINED. THERE WILL BE GREAT
PRESSURE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR CHANGES IN OUR POLICY
TOWARD ARGENTINA IP SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE STEPS ARE NOT

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TAKEN. IfE REALIZE HOH DIFFICULT THIS HILL BE FOR THE COA.
BUT HE MUST BE ABLE TO SHOH CCRWINCIl^ PROGRESS OR OUR
RELATIONS HILL UNDOUBTEDLY SUFFER. OUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVED
THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD COMMITTED THE GOA TO RELEASE OR
TRY ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS, TO RETUI® TO RULE OF LAH
AND TO PUT A HALT TO DISAPPEARANCES. YET ALL OF THESE
AREAS OF CONCERN CONTINUE. THE DEATHS OF THESE HOMEN UNDER-
LINE OUR CONCERN.

CONPIDia i WAir

tONFiD Ba rroa r

PAGE 03 STATE 089468

5. FYI. DEPARTMENT REALIZES THAT OUR INFORMATION
ABOUT THE DEATHS OF THE NUNS AND THE OTHERS IS BASB}

ON SENSITIVE SOURCES AMD THAT THE EMBASSY CORRECTLY
IS CCWCBRNKD ABOUT PROTECTING THESE SOURCES. YOUR
PRESENTATION HILL HAVE TO TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATICW .

HE CANNOT, HOHEVER, REFRAIN FROM CONFRONTING THE
ARGENTINES KITH THIS CRIME.

6. OEPARrHENT IS ALSO HOST CONSCIOUS OF THE REPORTS OF
THE IMPENDING RATIFICATION OF THE TRBITY OF TLATBLOLCO, THE
POSSIBLE RELEASE OF JACOBO TIMERMAN AND THE PUBLICATION OF
THE LAST PRISCRISR LISTS. HE UNDERSTAND TTIAT OUR PROPOSED
DEMARCHE COUtiD EFFECT THESE POSITIVE GOA STEPS, BUT FEEL
NtWETHELESS, HE MUST SPEAK OUT.

7. YOU SHOULD KNOH THAT FRANK HQIBIL RAISED THIS MATTER
HITH AJA ESPIL OH MARCH 30 ON BASIS AFP TICKER ITEM. AJA
ESPIL EXPRESSED HORROR AT POSSIBILITY REPORT WAS TRUE AND
SPECULATED THAT INCIDENT WOULD NOT ONLY ANGER VIDELA BUT
PERHAPS PUT HIM IN TOSITION TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THOSE
WHO SANCTIONED THIS OUTRAGE. SUBSEQUENTLY, AJA ESPIL
SUGGESTED TO JOHN BUSHNELL, PRESUMABLY AS A RESULT

OF CONVERSATIONS HITH BA, THAT REPORT MIGHT BE FALSI,

8. DEP^THEHT HILL MAIg PARALLE L PRESSITATKNf TO AJA
ESPIL. TO INSURE THAT THE PRESENTATICOIS ARE SYNCHRCSillZED ,
WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CABLING DEPT DATE AND TIMR.i5£.
AMBASSADOR’S APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA. VANCE

■COHFTDERTITnT

NNN

COWflOt-NI ' IHC

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UNCLASSIFIED

76.

Memorandum From Stephen Oxman of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State to the Deputy
Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, April 12, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 27, Human Rights — Argentina III. No classification
marking.

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: SAO

SUBJECT: Argentine Arms Transfer cases

In view of the recent tragic reports out of j

Argentina, it is not clear tnat now is tne appro- |

priate monent to go ahead with any of the arms |

transfers :^lch are the subject of t he under 1 vino __ -I

Action Memorandum. Castro delivered the aemarcne on f

Monday concerning the nuns' deaths. McAuliffe was
with him which is good. <The cab^ reporting the

demarche is attacl^ at Tab A.) Vxaeia's response, ,

while sympathetic, is like the responses he always I

gives, and it does not really change anything. {

Tab 1 of the Action Memorandum sets forth the
various categories of cases which are being held up j

and makes recommendations as to which categories
ought to be approved and which delayed.' wniie I
think some of the suggestions in Tab 1 are logical,

I am afraid that by focusing too heavily on the par-
ticular cases and categories in question, we could
lose sight of the forest.

The core Issue in our relations with Argentina
is whether we are going to- see genuine human rights
laprovM«ents , and I think we are really at scanething
of a crossroads with respect to that issue. The
trend over the last six ^nths has been quite halting:
modest is^rovmments punctuate by major retrograde
developments such as the murder of the nuns.

S

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ADP Declassification Review

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Ulth the aros eadjorgo six atonths away« It secans to
ai| the tine has come for iia to sit down with the
A^^tlnes and have a fathex' explicit disctisslon
of the warldhs ways ooald develop oyer the

next six Sloths. I thi.iA we should ejqplain to them
that because of strong views both within the Adminis-
tration aiXI In the CbiigreSB, we are fraohly not in a
position to gb ahead wl^ the laxge.itinber of arms
transfer cases that has aTOtmulajted. ‘ and that the
only way to begin to break this legjhm is for there
to be substantial, authentic human rights Improve-
ments in Argentina.

Specifically, Z think we should tell them that
unless they curtail the irregular detention practices
routinely lis^ ’by the security forces, .and begin to
charge and try — or to release — those held under
executive autherity, we lirill be unable to approve
most of these transfers. If there were solid steps
in these dlreetions,' we would be prepared to be
responsive in a'^eaiilirated and seguentlal" fashion,
but if there are only Ainor improranents , then the
status quo will persist.

I am afraid that unless we make this type of
approach — and instead singly approve certain
categories of equipment and disapprove others ' — we
will send a very mixed signal to the Argentines,
provoke considerable confusion and CTlticlsm on the
Bill, and most imikOrtantly, forfeit a good chance to
cause human rights improvements In Argentina. When
all is said and done, we have, through this backlog
of cases, built up a very cohaiderable amount of
leverage ovef the Argentines, and 1 think it would
be a pit^ to squander it. In general, it is
preferable to' avoid qdid yro qya arrangements in
the human rights context, but in this particular
instance, gl^^ the gravity of the hhnum rights
piKXilaas and the strength of our leverage, Z think
it.'would bd'Worth making an exception.

' Z have Informally discussed my suggested
approach wi th F rank HONeil. and he thinks it. is-
prOaiisifag^- A recenr cable tram me Embassy (Tab BIP
su^gedts that an approach of this kind would com-
plement dcmestic pressures building in Argentina

the sane types of Improvements I have mentioned
tbove. (Nhat I am suggesting Is In a sense a variation
of the BA suggestion set forth at pages 3-4 nf the
Action Monorandum.) - Xf the course l nave suggested seems
too problematic f then I would make the following recommendations

— Categories I.C. and I.D. (listed at Tab 1) stoura
be approved, (indeed, I.D. should ' pexhaps be
approved right away, irrespective of's^' suggested
approach. Perhaps the same Is true of I.C., but
X am less sure.)

— Category J.A. snould be approved after a month
or so.

— Category I.B. (spare peurts), iriilch Is the big

ticket Item In this whole package, should be
approved In stages over the next few months.

— Category II should be held In part and disapproved

In part. (The Items In II. B. ,are probably the
best candidates for disapproval.)

— Training should be disapproved.

— Congress should be Informed as we take the foregoing

steps.

Finally, Iccy says In her covering memo that she
Is aslclna t o gi ve us an accounting of the fms
" pipeline* x see no particular prooxem witn tnxs,
although It does single out Argentina, since we have
not sought such an accounting for any other htsnan
rights problem country. (Note that the FHS "pipeline"
is .'quite different from the" "pipeline" refeinred to by
H In the Action Hemorandum. Indeed, B's use of that
term Is sul generis and misleading. H uses "pipeline"
to mean not only signed FHS contracts, which is what
Lucy Is aslclng OOD about, and Category I.C. but also
any application for an export license or an FHS con-
tract t])at was received prior to August 4, 1977, the
day the Kennedy embargo was enacted. I see no rationale
for claiming that applications which we have never
acted upon are In any kind of "pipeline". X think
Kennedy's office simply told H that they could live
with SuCh a formulation, and H has dubbed It "pipeline".)

UNCLASSIFIED

77.

Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance
Wellington, April 26, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Ra:ords of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 13, Human Rights — Argentina III. No clesification
marking.

UNCLASSIFIED

gwouy ^ftiouvN »iiv oaanaoaiaH

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 26 r 1978

SEeRgg- ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Arms and Training for Argentina

Cy:

I have reviewed the Argentine situation
carefully. There have been some improvements in
human rights conditions there . inclu ding the
recent release of Timerman, nut these are more
than outweighed by the continuing disappearances
and the tragic, unexplained deaths of two nuns and
five other women who were picked up while demon-
strating in December.*

In view of this situation and the strong
Congressional interest in our policy on arms trans-
fers to Argentina, I think it would be inappropriate
to go ahead with any of the pending arms transfer
cases or to grant the Argentine request to purchase
training. Instead, I would suggest that in conjunc-
tion with Raul Castro, a team consisting of senior
State Department officials and senior U.S. military
officers should meet at a high level with represen-
tatives of the Argentine Government,

'7

I

• kj-

1U-,

The team would explain that because of hximan
rights abuses in Argentina, we are not in a position
to act favorably on either the large number of
arms transfer cases that has accumulated or the Argen-
tine request to purchase training, and tftat only sub-
stantial, authen^T^ htinifr"' ri gh ts improvements in
Argentina would permit us to act favorably on these
matters .

The team would inform the Argentines that if
they curtail the irregular detention and abduction
practices used by the security forces, and establish
and meet a schedule for charging and trying — or
releasing — those held under executive authority,

] k-

My.. yCZ.-

SEC - RS r ATTACHMENTS

"7

1

ADP Declassification Review

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jgrtOW 'WNOlWK ^ AV (BOCWC»!eM

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we will respond in a calibrated and sequential fashion,
as the human rights impro-yements occur, with approvals
of the pending matters. Depending upon Argentina's
response to the foregoing, the team would have authority
to indicate approval of some of the pending cases.

If you agree with this approach, I will ask ARA
in conjunction with other bureaus and DOD to prepare
for my review proposed instructions for the team. I
would envision the team going to Buenos Aires within
the next ten days. The proposed letter at Tab 1 from
you to Harold Brown informs him of the approach set
forth above and requests DOD's cooperation.

Warren Christopher.

Approve

Disapprove

Discuss

UNCLASSIFIED

78.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, May 11, 1978, 1552Z

120048

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004-1569. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared by Rondon and Bushnell and in S/S-0 and
substance by Schuller and Schneider; and approved by Christopher.

UNCUSSIFIED

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SE C RE T

S BC Rg r

PAGE 01 STATE 12004S

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /OOl R

DRAFTED BY ARA: JBUMPAS/RR
APPROVED BY DsWCHRISTOPHER
ASD/OASIA:AOM, SCHUUiBR (SUBS)

JU»/ECA : FEROHDON
ARAiJBUSHNELL
s/s-o:ijnnrDEN
HA:MSCKHSIDBR (SUBS)

071S50 111559Z /43

O 111552Z MAY 78 ZFF4
FH SBCSTATE HASHDC

TO ANEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

S K U H H 1” STATE 120048

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SHIM, AR

SUBOECT; A«3SNTIKE HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: BA 3538

1. DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE APPRECIATE YOUR
CONSTRUCTIVE CABLE CONCERNING ARGENTINE MXSSIOS. NE
FULLY AGREE THAT PREPARATORY WORK IS ADVISABLE TO ASSURE
SUCCESS. ACCORDINGLY, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO APPROACH
GENERAL VIOLA ALONG LINES YOU SIKSGESTED IN PARA 5, REFTEL,
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING.

2. IN YOUR PRESENTATION YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT USG IS
SECRET

5 8IC H B T

PJVSB 02 STATE 120048

INTERESTED IN OVERALL IMPROVEMENTS IN HOMAN RIGHTS
CONDITKWS IN ARGENTINA. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE INTERESTED
IN AND WOULD WELCOME THE NORMALIZATION OF ARREST AND
DETENTION PROCEDURES AS HELL AS A PROGRAM FOR THE RELEASE
OF PRISONERS HELD UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION. YOU SHOULD
STRESS THAT THESE AND OTHER STEPS BY THE ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATICW WOULD
HAVE A PROFOUND INFLUENCE ON WHAT NE KAY BE ABLE TO DO.

IN YOUR PRESENTATirai YOU SHOULD AVOID ANY IMPRESSION
THAT HE ARB LOOKING FOR AN "ESCAPE HATCH.” RATHER,

WE ARE INTERESTED IN A SERIOUS EXCHANGE WITH THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AS TO WHERE OUR RBLATlffllSHIP IS
HEADING IN VIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN
ARGENTINA.

ADP Declassification Review

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3. BECAUSE THE COMPOSITION OP THE DELEGATICRJ IS STILL
UNRESOLVED, YOU SHOULD SIMPLY REFER TO IT AS "HIGH
LEVEL, " BUT YOU MAY POINT OUT THAT IT WOULD INCLUDE
BOTH STATE DEPARTMENT AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

4. WE BELIEVE THAT VISIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOCW AS
POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY IN MAY 17-25 TIME FRAME. VANCE

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UNCLASSIFIED

79.

Instructions Prepared in the Department of State
Washington, May 20, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 27, Human Rights — ^Argentina III. Secret.

UNCLASSIFIED

r

SgeHBT-

IHSTROCTIONS FOR HISSlOH TO ARGSMTINA

1. The purpose o£ the alssion o£ the Under
Secretary for Political Affairs is to cry co errect a
change in United States relations with Argentina / a key
State in i;Atin America.

2. United States relations with Argentina are at

a crossroads due to continuing violations of human rights
by the country and the resultant deterioration in our
security relationships. . :

3. Argentina is particularly .lapdrtaht to the
United States because itr Is batin America's leading nuclear
technology state, with yery advanced plans for the prod uc»
tion of plutoiiiiia through reprocessing. 'Argentina also
has a growing arms production '-and export capability, and
is one of the most influential political and cultural
leaders in the Spanish speaking world. Its present (world's
4th largest wheat exporter}-- and potentially far more impres-
sive agricultural role, as well as possibly immense offshore
petroleum prospects ensure Argentina's importance into the
future.

4. - The President, the Secretary of State, a groving-
niatber-of Members, of Congress as well as informed Americans
are concerned about the course of events in Argentina,

and the impact of these events on our human rights, non-
proliferation, economic and military interests.

5. the Mission !will serve to underline the United
States desire for an improvement in bilateral relations.

The Under Secretary would ^pbasise the problems which
currently prevent fully normal relations and, depending
on the Argentine response, state that the United States
is prepared to be responsive. Including with respect to
Argentine requests- for arms and training.

6. The Under Secretary will advise the Argentine
Government that present practices in Argentina make it
politically, and in some cases legally, difficult for the
United States to follow through with previous military
programs. We -consider' -that the following practices and
policies are at the i^t- of the problost . -

- - ' " S gCKB T'' ■■

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— Irregulax detanti6n procedures, that is,
the practice of secret arrests, disappear-
ances and suBmary executions of thousands
(rneno attachedh;

— large numbers cf prisoners under prolonged
detention without charge or recourse to due
pTOcessi

— the persecution of nenbers of the judiciary
and of those niffid>ers of the l^al profes-
sion who defend political prisoners exacer-
bating the lack of legal remedies and due
process;

— standard practice of torture, brutality and
psychological abuse .of political prisoners

. (nemo attached)^'

— the limited "right of option" for political
prisoners under executive detention;

— and a wide variety, of restrictions on
religious, political, press and. labor
activities (specifically, the arrests and
disappearances of political and labor
.leaders; prohibitions on political and union
actiyiUes; constraints on the press, includ-
ing pwitlve short-tem closings and arrests
• of-nai^ journalists; official harassment
of religious groups,- in particular the
Jehovah's -.Witnesses and other sects denied
government registration, and reports of
imsldents of anti-semltlsm targeted at mem-
bers of the Jewish ccmunll^ and Jewish
pri.on„..)

7, If appropriate, the Dnd» Secretary would
continue th\t the United Sta^d believes the following .
are exang>les of the kinds of^ctrons which we reel iirould
contribute tangibly to an in^roved ataiosphere for govern-
ment-to-govemment relations;

— A promise and perceptible, action by '.President -
Vldela to curtail . the irregular detention and
abduction practices of the security forces.

S B CR BT

■SBC UB T

An end to torture and miatreatnent of prisoners.

— An accounting of those who have disappeared —

or at ^asl^ those shout whom Informa^on Is
known. . .

— The establishment of a timetable for promptly
charging and fairly trying (preferably In
civilian courts) or releasing those held under .
executive authority, ' in particular those not ' ^
suspected of violence.

— The establishment of. numerical goals by the
Argentine Military Review Board for Right of
Option for the release each month of a signifi-
cant number of persons from executive custody.

— The actual release of a considerable aiimber of
prisoners frcxa executive custody — either
freed or remanded to civilian or military courts
— by August 1. We have In mind action on per-
haps 500 cases.

The release of another tangible number of
prisoners (for example, 500 additional cases)
by September 15.

— An undertaking to continue this process so
that during 1978 the Argentine government
will release, grant right of option to, fairly
try, or schedule for trial, in civilian or
military courts, all remaining executive
prisoners .

The enforcement of procedures to Investigate at
a high level allegations .of security personnel
Involvement In future desappearances and torture
to try those who engage in, or are otherwise
responsible for such practices, and to punish
those found guilty.

8. The under Secretary will, on the basis of their
replies to the foregoing. Inform the Argentines that as
they take action on improving husian rights, we will respond
In a calibrated, sequential fashion.

-S E eRB T

V-

a BC RB T

-rr-— , : • .

9. The Under Secretary nay Infom the Argentina
Qoirernnent that aa hraian rights ii^rovenents are taksft
in the above mentioned areas, the United States will begin
to consider favorable action. In a calibrated manner, on
pending aspects of the military relationship. These
Include the purchase of military training^ safety related
egulfmient, spare parts for previously supplied items, and
items previously approved for sale or financing or needed
to fulfill previously approved contracts.

10. If in early 1979, it is evident publicly that all
prisoners have been removed from executive custody, and
that there has been a resolution of the problen of
violations of the rights of the person, including political
prisoners, disappearances, torture and due process, and that
some beginning steps have been taken toward restoration of
civil and political liberties, the Administration would
move to counteract the Xennedy/Bunqphrey Amendment.

esengT"

UNCLASSIFIED

80.

Memorandum of Conversation
Buenos Aires, May 24, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 84, Lot 81F93, Embassy Buenos Aires Post Files, 1978, Box
48, POL 7 — Newsom Visit. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Rondon on May 25. There is no
indication as to when or where the meeting took place. At the top right-hand comer of the first
page of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: “Key point is last paragraph of p. 4. See
also — don’t know where — ‘scope paper’ for this visit.”

UNCLASSIFIED

NODIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

fty ^ ^

DATE; Wedriesfey, May 24, 197

SUBJECT; Human Rights and United States Relations with A^^entina 1

^ 1

PARTICIPANTS: Lieutenant General Rafael Videla, President of

Argentina — - y

Col. Malea Gil,. Presidency '

David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs

Ambassador Raiil Castro ' < , ^ J _

Fernando Rondon, ARA/ECA r

The Under Seerdrary met with President Videla for approximately
90 minutes.

Mr. Newsom opened the conversation, outlining the purpose of his
mission, on behalf of the Secretary of State, to seek an improve-
ment in bilateral relations. The Under Secretary said that he
recognized the problems Argentina confronted and the extraordinary
steps that had to be taken to face the situation. He acknowledged
important Argentine steps to restore normalcy, including Christmas
releases, action on the Deutsch and Timerman cases, and Red Cross
visits.'' The Under Secretary further acknowledged Presiaenc
Videla *3 interest in good relations as manifested by the ratifi-
cation of Tlatelolco, a new civil air agreement and the resolution
of all but one investment dispute.

President Videla welcomed the dialogue he_said he began with
President Carter and Secretary Vance.' He commented that dialogue
is worthwhile even if disagreeable things are said.

Mr. Newsom noted that he had read the reports of conversations
between -Videla and President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Assistant
Secretaries Todman and Derian. Newsom remarked that Ambassador
Castro has also conveyed the views of the United States, so that
President Videla has participated in more than his share of
dialogues.

ADP Declassification Review

ARA/ECA: FRondon/mn 5/25/78 DECLASSIFIED

fD,.uhA Office .nd Office,) by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

(DiaUint Office and Officer)

FORM jjj, ^254
2-65

I

eeWFlDENlIAL - NODIS

(2

Mr. Newsom then outlined the political situation existent
in the United States after the sixties, stemming from
Vietnam and controversies over relations with other govern-
ments. He stated that there is a strong feeling in the
U.S. Congress, represented, for example, by Senator Kennedy
and Congressman Fraser, that while we should not interfere
in other states, we should not appear to be endorsing the
policies of other governments through our assistance
programs, when it appears the human rights situations in
these countries are not consistent with normal international
standards. This predates President Carter's election.

When he ran, htiman rights was part of his platform and, at
the time, Patricia Derian was one of his national campaign
managers.

The Under Secretary cited the Eximbank situation as an
example of a case where the Executive does not have a free
hand. The Bank currently has authorizing legislation
before the Congress, part of which deals with lending to
human rights problem countries. Eximbank therefore does
not wish to take steps which could complicate its dealings
with Congress. This is not an embargo as some have pictured.

President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Secretary Brown all
recognize the importance of relations with Argentina, Mr.
Newsom observed. In confidence, he said he is in Argentina
because Secretary Brown raised with Secretary Vance the
implications for the U.S, of a possible termination of mili-
tary relations with Argentina. It was his task to determine,
Newsom continued, whether present and future prospects for
normalization are such that we can go before Congress and
defend the resumption of military relationships on the basis
that the Executive is confident of a favorable trend for
human rights in Argentina. We recognize there are those who
do not want good relations between our two countries.

Actions may take place outside the control of Argentina which,
nevertheless, affect the climate for relations. We had
hoped that the Christmas amnesty would have helped us to
demonstrate to Congress that resumption of normal relations
is justified. Then we had the disappearance of mothers
and nuns and we could not demonstrate a positive trend.

Mr. Newsom said that all you can tell me regarding future
hopes for normalization, including control over disappearances
plans for the release of prisoners, right of option plans.

TOWFIDENTIAL - N.ODIS

CONFI - DEWfAfc - - NODIS

.3

will help me to present a positive picture when I report
to Washington.

President Videla responded that Argentina confronted two
types of subversive action: one armed and the other
ideological. Both sought to destroy the Argentine way of
life and seriously undermined the governing institutions.

The armed forces had to step in to save the country.

Having engaged in combat, borne the brunt of subversive
action, and proven to be the only unified institutions, the
armed services could not now risk internal disunity (within
the military) and destabilization in order to prove
Argentina is "western'*. Argentina had had no choice but
to adopt certain measures. These were matters of Argentine
internal affairs .

Videla stated that Argentina will have full democracy when
its house is in order, economically, socially, politically,
and in the field of internal security.

He would not be sincere if he were to give dates and nimibers
in order to save Mr. Newsom's visit.

President Videla stated there are no "loose groups" operating
any longer. He added that the "right of option" would be
applied with increasing generosity.

As an example of those we are interested in, Videla referred
to a recent German request for information on eight of
their citizens, six of whom have been charged and are being
tried, one who has disappeared, and one who is a two-time
murderer who was released in the 1973 amnesty and jailed
again by the military government. This latter individual
cannot be brought to trial legally by the military govern-
ment because of the amnesty, yet he is unquestionably
dangerous to society.

Mr. Newsom thanked Videla for his comments but noted the
American tendency to ask for statistics and figures.

Because we do get information from sometimes inaccurate
sources, Mr. Newsom asked for statistics on detainees and a
guess on the number of releases that might occur over time.
Newsom suggested this information might be given to him
later in the day.

CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS

NODIS

-ettn

• 4

Mr. Newsom referred to four categories of detainees, accord-
ing to the Minister of Interior:

— those arrested under military law and tried by
military courts;

— those being held for terrorist acts against
whom there is insufficient evidence for a
conviction;

-- those who are being tried under civilian law
and courts ; and

-- those who will be permitted to exercise the
"right of option" .

The President observed that 2,000 of 3,200 prisoners were
arrested before March 24, 1976. All these cases are under
review. He could not say how many of the cases would be
subject to military courts and how many to civilian courts.
The review would determine who should be held because they
are dangerous and who can be released or given option.

In answer to the Under Secretary’s question, Videla
responded that those being examined by the review commission
do not have access to counsel or the right to appear
personally before the commission. Videla said the com-
mission is not a court.

Mr. Newsom asked if President Videla might give us an idea
of how many prisoners might be released by August 1 or
September 15. Videla replied that commitments of this kind
would be difficult.

Mr. Newsom continued, asking whether the release of 500
prisoners might be possible in 1978. President Videla
stated that there would be an important number of releases
and options by Christmas.

President Videla acknowledged that a U.S. parole iprogram
would help to implement Argentina's right of option program.

As Mr. Newsom moved to Siam up his impressions, President
Videla said that he wanted to place a positive weight on the
Under Secretary's scale. Argentina would facilitate a visit
by the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and this
decision will be communicated to the lAHRC in June when
Foreign Minister Montes travels to the UNGA. Until then, /
Videla asked that this decision be held confidentially, f

CONFIDEN T lAi: ' - NODIS

■ COHFIDENTIAL - NODIS

5

Mr. Newsom then outlined positive signs, notably Minister
Harguindeguy ' s decision to enforce humanitarian treatment
of detainees by the police and security forces and Argentina's
willingness to accelerate the "right of option" if we
receive more prisoners. Newsom said he would have difficulty,
however, with the question of indefinite detentions.

After discussing the desirability of calls on the Supreme
Court and other Junta members, Mr. Newsom said he would
paint an honest picture of his conversations. Whatever
decision is reached by the United States Executive, it would
not reflect a lack of interest in Argentina. A decision
would be made in light of the total political circumstances
in the Executive and Congress. He noted that if progress
continues, we will seek to reverse the Kennedy/Humphrey
Amendment but that will take time and probably cannot be
faced until next year.

One way or another, Mr. Newsom promised that Ambassador
Castro would convey the results of this trip.

CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS

UNCLASSIFIED

81.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, May 25, 1978, 1737Z

4040

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860101-2444. Confidential;
Immediate; Nodis.

UNCLASSIFIED

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cowrapewTiAL

■" COMPI B BfTiatf

PAGE 01 BUEHOS 04040 01 OP 02 2S2043Z

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /OOl »

--117663 252048Z /70

O 2S1737Z MAY 78

PM AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE SASHDC IMMEDIATE 5841

OO H-f IPBW TI AT : SECTION 1 OP 2 BUENOS AIRES 4040
NODIS

FRC»f UNDERSECRETARY NEHSOM

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY BROKN DOD AND CHAIRMAN UCS

1. SUM4AEY: AFTER DAY OF EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS IN
BUENOS AIRES, I CMNCDUDE THAT FAVORABLE STEPS ARK BEING TAKEN
IN HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD IN ARGENTINA AND THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA,
AT LEAST. WISHES THIS TREND TO CONTINUE. PICTURE EMERGING

IN CMS AREA - PROCESSING OF DETAINEES - LESS CLEAR AND WE
HERE ABLE TO GET NO NUMERICAL COMMITMENTS ON RELEASES. fKIST
POSITIVE NEW ELEMarr WAS PRESIDENT'S CONFIDING IN US THAT HE
HAS INSTRUCTED FOREIGN MINISTER AT OAS SESSIO) IN JUNE TO
ANNOUNCE ARGENTINA'S WILLINGNESS TO HAVE VISIT FROM OAS HIRIAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION. ON THIS BASIS, j. Alt RECCXmENDlIK; THAT
AMBASSAIX>R CASTRO BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM VIDELA PRIVATELY
THAT, ONCE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN MADE, HE WILL, AFTER
CONGRESSIONAL CCWSULTATIONS. RESTOIE SALE OP MILITARY
TRAINING. END SUMMARY.

2. ON MAY 24, AMBASSADOR, FRED ROHOON, AND I MET
SUCCESSIVELY WITH UNDERSECRETARY ALLARA AND GROUP AT POREIOT
OFFICE, FORIGK MINISTER MONTES, MINISTER OP INTERIOR
HARGUINDIGY, PRESIDENT VIDELA, PRESIDENT OF SUPREME COURT
HEREDIA, AIR FORCE CHIEF AOOSTI AND ADMIRAL MASSERA, NAVY
CHIEF.- THESE SBSSICWS WERE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER MEETING WITH
CUNFiUKNTlSn-

COtUlDSHTTg C

PAGE 02 BUENOS 04040 01 OP 02 252043Z

INTERIOR MINISTER AND GENERAL VIOLA DURING RECEPTION AT
RESIDENCE IN EVENING.

3. MY APPROACH IN EACH MEETING WAS TO STATE THAT MY

VISIT HAS MANIFESTATION OF DESIRE WITHIN USG FOR NORMAL REL-
TIOHS WITH IMPORTANT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY, BUT THAT SUCH
RELATIONS HIRE NOT POSSIBLE IN LIGHT OF WIDESPREAD U.S.
CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERCEPTICSJ OF SITUATION IN
ARGENTINA. I WAS IN BUENOS AIRES TO EXAMINE WHETHER
ARGENTINE PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD WAS SUCH AS TO JTOTIFY IN
EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS RELEASE OF OUTSTANDING ARGENTINE ORDERS.
WE UNDERSTOOD WHAT ARGENTINA HAD BEEN THROUGH AND AGREED ON
DESIRABILITY CLOSE RELATIONS THESE TWO SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN
NATIONS, BUT POLITICAL REALITIES IN BOTH CCXINTIIES APPEARED
TO PLACE LIMITS C»f WHAT WE COULD DO.

4. BXIM BANK LOANS WERE RAISED ONLY IN FOREIGN OFFICE
MEETING. I EXPLAINED BANK'S DIFFICULTIES IN PROCEEDING WHILE
ITS LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS AND IN FACE STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS
FEELINGS, BUT EMPHASIZED FINAL DECISIONS HAD NOT BEEN MADE.

I HAD PEELING THIS NOT MAJOR LEVERAGE POINT WITH GOA. THEY
HAVE AMPLE OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND PINANCll®, EXCEPT
POSSIBLY, FOR $200,000,000 COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT ORDER.

5. QUITE APART FROM OBVIOUS INTEREST IN RELATIONS WITH

ADP Declassification Review

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by John Fitzpatridc, 4/24/2017

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us BECAUSE OF MILITARY SUPPLY. I FOUND, I«)HE THAN I HAD
EXPECTED, FSELIKG THAT RELATIONS MITH US WERE IMPORTANT FOR
THEIR OWN SAKE. THERE IS MYSTIQUE ABOUT U.S. HERE WHICH IS
IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN DECISIONS THEY MAKE.

6. FROM CONVERSATKWS, THESE POSITIVE ELEMENTS EMERGED
{IN ADDITION TO ACTIONS ON TIMEHKAN, DEUTSCH, AND
DECEMBER RELEASES) ;
eeilFI P BWTTAL'

' tfaW F IDEW T IKg

PAGE 03 BUENOS 04040 01 OF 02 252043Z

A. PRESIDENT INFORMED US IN CONFIDENCE (WHICH I

PROMISED TO RESPECT) ARGENTINA WOUU} ANNOUNCE ITS WILLINGNESS
RECEIVE OAS HUMAN RIGHTS CCN(HISSI(Rf AT MEETING IN JUNE. THIS
MAY HAVE BEEN DECISION HE MADE AS RESULT MY VISIT. IN EARLIER
MEETING WITH FOREIGN OFFICE HE HAD BEEN INFORMED ARGENTINA
UNHAPPY WITH OAS COMMISSKMU BECAUSE THEY HAD INTERRUPTED
DIALOGUE TO PRESS FOR VISIT. I HAD MADE CLEAR IK THAT AND
OTHER CONVERSATICaiS IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO VISITS BY
OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS.

B. MINISTER OF INTERIOR IN RECENT SPEECH TO POLICE CHIEFS
HAS EMPHASIZED NEED FOR HUWUfE TREATMENT OF ALL ARRESTED
PERSONS. SIMILAR WORD APPARENTLY HAS QOSB OUT MORS QUIETLY
TO ARMY. THERE APPEARS DEFINITE OIHINDTKRI REPORTS ANTI-
TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND DISAPPEARANCE. (IN MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT, I ASKED FOR ACCURATE DATA ON DETAINEES. MINISTER
OF INTERIOR HANDED ME FACT SHEET IN EVENING STATING THAT
3.363 PERSONS ARE PRESENTLY DETAINED -- 1.544 APPREHENDED
SINCE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN MARCH OF 1976. THE REMAINDER
BEFORE THAT DATE. CLAIM IS MADE THAT 3.328 PEOPLE ARRESTED
FOR "TERROHIST" ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM CUSTODY
(2,554 OF THEM SINCE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER), AND THAT A TOTAL
OF 1,679 ADDITIONAL HAVE BEEN SENTENCED OR RELEASED THROUGH
JUDICIAL PROCESS, CIVIL MID MILITARY. (OF THESE CASES, 911
HAVE BEEN TRIED SINCE MARCH OF 1976.) THE FACT SHEET STATES
THAT 600 PEOPLE HAVE BESI PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY
UNDER *RIGHT OF OPETION". 160 FOREIGNERS EXPELLSb, AND 58
PERSONS HAVE DIED WHILE IN CUSTODY. (NOTE: NO DATES HERE
GIVEN FOR THESE LAST FIGURES, NOR OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
EXPLAINED.) MINISTER AND TOREK® OFFICE OFFICIALS
ACKNOWLEDGED FAR LARGER NUMBERS OF DISAPPEARED. REFERRING

TO LISTS PUBLISHED IN PRESS BY HOMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
THEY SAID THEY WERE NOW SEEKING TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY SO THEY
COULD RESPOND TO RELATIVES.)

-eOMWBBNTnOS

CUNFlUUN'X'fAi;

PAGE 04 BUENOS 04040 01 OF 02 252043Z

C. CASES OF ALL SOME 3,300 POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE NOW
BEING REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHICH SHALL BE GIVEN RIGHT OF
OPTIC®, WHICH RELEASED, AND WHICH REMANDED TO CIVILIAN COURTS.

D. PRESIDENT VIDELA STATED HE WOULD SPEED UP EXERCISE OF
RIGHT OF OPTIC® IF WE WERE TO OFFER MORE SPACES IN U.S.

(I DID NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT IN VIEW MY UNCERTAINTY AS TO

NNN

TSJITFTDENTliar

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PASS 01 BUENOS 04040 02 OF 02 252044Z

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT- 01 ISO-00 /OOl W

117673 2520S2Z /70

O 251737Z MAY 78

FH AMEHBASSY BOEmS AIRES

TO SECSTATE KASBDC IMMEDIATE SS42

c O N P“I D 2 K T 1 X“i: SECTIOS 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4040
NODIS

FROM UNDERSECRETARY NENSCM

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY BROHN DOD AND CHAIRMAN JCS

HHAT ACTICWf ATTORNEY GENERAL MAY TAKE IN PENDING PROPOSAL
FOE 500 RIGHT OF OPTION PAROLES.)

E. PRESIDENT VXDELA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF JUNTA MADE

CLEAR THEIR GOAL OP ULTIMATE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE. WHILE
IT HAY BE SUPERFICIAL IMPRESSION, I DID NOT GAIN FEELING
THAT PERSONALITIES IN JUNTA WERE SEEKING TO RETAIN POSITION
FOR OWN PERSONAL POLITICAL OR FINANCIAL GAIN AS IN SCME OTHER
COUNTRIES. I WAS IMPRESSED BY FACT THAT EACH HAS DATS FOR
STEPPING DOWN FROM JUNTA HOLE. HOWEVER WE MAY DISLIKE THE
WAY THEY CARRY IT OUT, THERE DOES SEEM DEFINITE FEELING
OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGItiQ COUNTRY BACK TO NORMAL
POLITICAL PROCESSES.

F. ICRC VISITS CCBJTINUB TO PRISONS WITH EFFECT

ON CCttlDITIONS.

7. THERE ARE, ON THE OTHER HAND, LESS POSITIVE ELQiSNTS:

A. THE DETAINEE REVIEW PROCESS IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE

ONE ONLY; THERE IS NO OPPORTUNITY FOR ACCUSED TO APPEAR OR BE
REPRESENTED AS DOSSIERS ARB REVIEWED.

CUHfflPEN'nag

■eew F i oE WTi ftc-

PAGE 02 BUENOS 04040 02 OF 02 252 044 Z

B. PRESIDENT AND OTHERS HERE UNWILLING HAKE COMMIT

HENT OH TIME TABLE FOR REVIEW, ALTHOIX3H THEY SAID RELEASE OF
ADDITION 500 BY END OF 1978 WAS *REAS(»IABLE SXPECTATIOT . *

C. IT IS UNCLEAR HOW LONG THOSE WILL BE DETAINED WHO

ARE SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, BUT ON WHOM THERE IS INSUFFICIENT
evidence to CONVICT IN COURT . I HATOIERED HARD ON DHACCEPTA
BILITY THIS SITUATICRJ IN US AND HAVE, AT LEAST, RAISED THEIR
CONSCIOUSNESS OF' THIS PROBLEM AREA. SINCE TOTAL REVIBN STILL
GOING (»l IT IS DIFFICULT TO STATE HOW MANY MAY ULTIMATELY FALL
IN THIS CATEGORY OF INDEFINITE DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL.

D. THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE ARRESTS UNDER STATE OF
SIEGE ORDERS. PRESIDENT OF ONE COMMUNIST PARTY DOMINATED
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION HAS ARRESTED FEW DAYS BEFORE MY
ARRIVAL. I POINTED OUT THIS WAS EXACTLY KIND OF EVENT WHICH
SET BACK EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS. HE HAS RELEASED t-asT
NIGHT (MAY 25) AFTER BEING HELD AT POLICE PRECINCT STATION.

E. REPORTS OF TORTURE CONTINUE TO BE RECEIVED BUT
CONFIRMATION IS DIFFICULT.

8. IT WOULD BE RASH TO PREDICT THAT WE HILL BE UNINTER-
RUPTED POSITIVE TREND IN HlDtAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. HARDLINERS
WITHIN REGIME WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO SANCTION OR TAKE
REPREHENSIBLE ACTICSJS WHICH WILL GAIN WORLD ATTENTION. CCHITROL
OVER ELEMENTS AT LOWER ECHELONS IS FAR FROM COMPLETE. NEVER
THELESS, THERE IS ON PART OF PRESIDENT VIDELA AND MEMBERS
OF JUNTA I MET CLEAR DESIRE TO IMPROVE SITUATICET. SUCCESSION
OF DISCUSSIONS WITH US OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT CARTER,
HAS clearly RAISED CCMSCIOUSNESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AND

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!

HAS, I BEIiIEVE HAD POSITIVE IHPACT. AMBASSADOR CASTRO HAS
EFFECTIVELY CONTIITOBD DIALOGUE AMD IS IN POSITION TO OJNTINUE
AND. PARTICULARLY, TO RAISE INDIVIDUALY ACTS WHICH REPRESENT
SET BACK TO OUR EFFORTS.

-COBFTDSimSir

-coRrrnENrnor

PAGE 03 BUENOS 04040 02 OP 02 252044Z

9 . OUT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, I REACH CONCLUSION THAT
TRENDS HERE AND IMPORTANCE OF RESPC^ING TO ARGENTINE DESIRE
FOR NORMAL RELATIONS JUSTIFY («3DEST STEP. WITHOUT SUCH

STEP, I CANNOT SAY OUR ACCESS HERE WOnai BE SERIOUSLY REDUCED,
BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT WITH SUCH STEP OUR LEVERAGE IN HUMAN
RIGHTS WILL CCWTINUB AND COOPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS (SUCH
AS NUCLEAR QUESTIONS) MORE LIKELY.

10. PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO PERMIT VISIT BY OAS COMMISSICaSt
GIVES US POSITIVE STEP ON WHICH TO BASE POSITIVE RESPONSE.

TO LET HIM KNOW THAT WE ARE RESPONDING, PROPOSE THAT
AMBASSADOR CASTRO BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HIM IMMEDIATELY
THAT, AS RESULT VISIT, I AM RBCCKMENDING THAT, ONCE THIS
ANNOUNCraiENT IS MAOB‘, WE WILL CmSULT WITH KEY MEMBERS OF
CCfflGRESS AND, FOLLOWING Surn CONSULTATTOVS WILL RESUME SALE
OF MILITARY TRAIKll^. Ws' WXLL XHEREAFTBR, aNlTIMOE TU
EXAMINE SITUATION AND, IF POSITIVE TRENDS OaJTINUE (PARTICULARLY
ON DETAINEES) , HILL SEEK TO RESPOND WITH OTHER RELEASES.

11. AT SAME TIME, I AM SUGGESTING TO AMBASSAIX« THAT HE
CONTINUE, AS HE HAS. TO POINT OUT IMMEDIATELY THOSE ACTIONS
WHICH WILL COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS (StX» AS FURTHER ARRESTS,
REPORTS OF NEW DISAPPBAR^CES , ETC.)

12. GENERAL 8URUT AND ADMIRAL SCHULLER WILL MAKE CALLS

TOMORROW ON SERVICE CHIEFS AMD WILL CONVEY MESSAGE SIMILAB

MINE (PARA 3 ABOI^) :. THEY WILL HAKE MO COMMITMENTS ON FUimE
SALES OR GIVE INDICATION OUR CONCLUSIONS. THEIR VISITS WILL
BE HBLFPFUL IN GIVING US FURTHER FEED BACK OH YESTERDAY'S
CC»VERSATIONS .

13. 1 WILL MEET WITH U.S. CORRESPONDENTS IN BUENOS AIRES
C»l BACKGROUND BASIS BEFORE M Y DEPARTURE EMB ASSY WILL S END
REPORT. MY PLAN IS MERELY TO OUTLINE PROBLEM WITHyUT
INDICATING WHERE I COME OUT OR WHAT I AM RECOMMENDING

TO DEPARTMENT .

CUNFIUENTIST

t l UMFIPEN ' IIAL

PAGE 04 BUENOS 04040 02 OF 02 252044Z

14 . I AM ALSO MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES FHCT4 HUMAN
RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING "MOTHERS OF DISAPPEARED"
GROUP, AND PRIVATELY WITH BUSJOS AIRES HERALD DIRECTOR COX,
NOTED FOR HIS COURAGEOUS PUBLIC ADVOCACY OP HUMAN RIGHTS.
CASTRO

CUHimENTTK C

NNN

eeNHPewTmt:

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UNCLASSIFIED

82.

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter
Washington, May 30, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20,
Evening Reports (State), 5/78. Secret. Carter wrote, “Cy J” in the top right-hand comer of the
memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR;
PROM:

THE PRESIDENT
Cyrus Vance C*^*

Omitted here is mataial unrelated to Argentina

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina

Argentina ^ We have had our first indication that
Under Secretary Newsom's trip to Argentina may be sparking
needed action on human rights. Subsequent to News<»i's
return. Ambassador Castro informed Videla that military
training would be resumed when Argentina announced publicly
that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was being
invited. Videla was obviously pleased, and responded
that in addition to the announcement, positive strides
would be made in prisoner releases before September 30,
and that by year end an impressive jiraaber- of- People would
be released. Such action could enanie us to resume some

- 3 -

shipments to Argentina and hopefully ultimately create
conditions which could allow us to recommend repeal
of the Kennedy /Humphrey new eucms embargo. Videla
* seems genuinely to want improved relations with the

OS, and the question is whether his political situation
will give him room to take the necessary steps.

Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina

UNCLASSIFIED

83.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, June 26, 1978, 2313Z

162533

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780265-0540. Secret; Niact
Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Schneider, Bushnell, McGiffert, Oxman, in H
and S/S-0, and for information in EB; and ^proved by Newsom.

UNCLASSIFIED

■Document View

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S E CRK T

EXDIS

■aSCRET

P&SE 01 STATE ie2533

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTEO BY FiDDNEWSOHiCHG
AFPROVS) BY P - MS NENSOM
HA - MSCHNEIDER
EB (INFO)

ARA - HR BUSHNSUi
DOD/OSD - MR MCGIFPERT
H - MR COTTER
D - MR OXMAN
S/S-Oi SCASTRODALE

048292 270013Z /62

0 2S2313Z JON 78 ZPP4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEHBASSY BUWiS AIRES NIACT IWlBDIAfE

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

S B C ~ R ' ' S -T~ STATE 162S33
EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS; SHUN, AR, MMOL

SUBJECT :Hro(AN RIGHTS AND U.S. PROGRAMS IN ARGENTINA
REP: STATE 16150::'

1. ON BASIS FACT THAT lAHRC DOBS NOT FEEL ABLE ACCEPT
CONDITIONAL ARGENTINA INVITATION .-“ISCtlTART aJS DF-
CIDED THAT;

(A) HE CANNOT GO FORWARD, AS HOPED, WITH MILITARY
TRAINIIR3 PACKME AND DEFENSE IS BEING INF0RME5?J

SECRE T

- S E CRE T

PAGE 02 STATE 162533

(B) IN RECOGNITION OP MODEST IMPROVEMENTS, WE WILL
(AFTER CONGRESSIONU CONSULTATIONS) RELEASE SAFETY
ITEMS (LISTED SBPTBLJ

INCLUDING COMPASSES FOR VESSELS OF U.K. MANUFACTURE;

(C) HE HILL INFORM EXIM BANK THAT, m FOREIGN
POLICY GROUNDS, HE RBCCN91END AGAINST FINANCING
FOR ARGENTINA AT THIS TIME (THIS APPLIES PRIMARILY
TO ALLIS CHALMERS APPLICATION FOR YACIRETA HYDRO-

»OJECT,,

(D) WE RECXJMMBND AGAINST EXIM^INIWCING-OR .AIR4HAFfl

BUT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO EXPORT IF THEY CAN BE
PRIVATELY FINANCri).

2. DEPARTMENT HOPES ARRANGE CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTA-
TIONS, INCLUDING SENATOR KENNEDY, ON THESE CASES
THIS WEEK.

3. EMBASSY MAY INFORM GOA, STRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT
THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE EXTEND NORMAL INVITA-
TION TO lAHRC (ALONG LINES OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN

htto://smartarchive.state.seov.cov/ui/view/DocView.asDX?kev=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.S AS ... 4/22/201 3

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Page 2 of 2

COUNTRIES) AND HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN ABUS MOVE
APPRECIABLY ON EITHER RELEASES OP DETAINEES OR
ESTABLISHMENT OP RESPONSIVE MACHINERY FOR THOSE
SEEKING INFORMATION ON RELATIVES MHO HAVE DISAPPEARED.
OF COURSE, ANY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE lAHRC AND THE GOA ENABLI1K3 THE COMMISSION TO GO
TO ARGENTINA WOUU) BE VXENPn A S A POSIT IVE D.EV1LOP-
MENT'. THESE POINTS STRESSED To DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
ALLARA AS REPORTED REFTEL. (FYI: ARGENTINA ALSO
HAS NOT HALTED ILLEGAL DETENTIONS AND DISAPPEARANCES.

SBeiU ft

■SE C RE T

PAGE 03 STATE 162533

END FYI)

4 . FYI ; ANY PROSPECT THAT WE MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERED
EXIH BANK FINANCING APART PROM HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS
WAS ELIMINATED BY ALLARA' S INSISTENCE THAT GOA LOOKED
UPON RESTRICTIONS ON EXIM FINANCING AS POLITICAL ACT
AND CLEARLY SOUGHT APPROVAL OF SUCH FINANCI1K3 AS IN-
DICATION OF U.S. ACCEPTANCE. END FYI.

5. EXIM HAS IHFOIU4ED BOTH ALLIS-CHALKERS AND BOEING
OF DECISION.

VMICE

' "S ' KCKB T

NNN

fleener

EXDXS

http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS^_... 4/22/2013

UNCUSSIFIED

84.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, Augi^t 9, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4,
Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. Inderflirth initialed the top right-hand comer of the
memorandum. In the top right-hand comer of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, “What do we
do to get hold of the initiative? ZB.”

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

GOMFIDBNT £Mi- ~ CDS

August 9, 1978

MEMORflJIDUM FOR;

FROM;

SUBJECT;

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DAVID AARON

ROBERT PASTOR

Argentina; Your Questions

\J^

A '

You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status
of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S.
policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the
Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the
NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President.

The itCTi for the President is at Tab a, The“otfier questions
are answered below.

I. Argentina *s Human Rights Situation ^

Argentina is still one of th e woijiilAJafiafc— serious human ' *
rights problem countries. Just this month7*'^®t8S^5'*®^J^*’
national launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at
focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which
includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000
political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been
charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented
stories of ari^st and torture. IQne ^report from our Embassy
is at Tab B.i On ftiiman rights-related matters, world opinion
always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to
correct that.

While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere,
there has been some improvement in recent months. We under-
stand that the Minister of Interior has instructed tne police,
and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under
executive power have decreased and lists of those detained
have been published; and a limited right of option for political
prisoners to request exile has been reinstituted. On a number
of cases in which we have expressed special interest — Jacobo
Timeinnan, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family —
the Argentine Government has released them.

II. U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting
"no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining.

GONFIDENTiair - GDS

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

COMFIDENgl - Mr - Gud

f

We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related
munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another
group of requests.

We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach
agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter -American Commission
on Human Rights/ and there is no deterioration in the human
rights situation ^ we will go ahead with military training to
them and will recommend that the Export- Import Bank permit two
major credit sales.

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy-
Humphrey amendment prohibiting new anas transfers, and the Roybal
amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come
into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps
which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be com-
mitted before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for
$50 million and $150 million on the munitions control lists.)
There are also funds for military training, which are being
held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had
a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving.

Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the
lAHRC to visit in accordance with the lAHRC's regulations;

(2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without re-
arresting them) I (3) to stop the disappearances and explain
those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule
of^ law.

Everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement

( with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the
other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance
with various legislative requirements , was made State without
con sulting J? Sfc. —

III. Future O.S. Policy; Who Blinks at the Brink ?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its
effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and
jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify
the repression?

The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all.
President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the
war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he wais
working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left
Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And
Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just
encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless,
a central tenet of our human rights policy is that government-
sanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in
his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism
is to promote justice. , . Justice that is summary undermines
the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more
violence..." —

GONFIDEMTIA - L - GDS

CONFIDEM'H Mr - GDS

-3-

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits
and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union,
there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed,
it is even more difficult to change direction than with the
Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate
that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose
bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything
less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find
oxir self, would be judged as a Presidential retreat lust as
siirely as a different decision on Dresser.

^Personally, I am most disturbed ab out the decisio n not to
1 finance $270 mill ion worth of Export-Import Bank credits.
rr'dflh'T I'ftW t-liflit this is either a legitimate or an effective
[Tinstrtnaent , though I do agree with State that the law aave_u3
little choice. The ^decision did have an unintended positive
impact in that it has finally aroused the business conraiunity
(there are $600 million worth of credit applications pending
in X-M) , and they have descended on me, and I have deflected
them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive
amendments to the X-M bill last week.

I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom
told me he had decided to hold everything up until the
Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission.
Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought
Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and
still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking
into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if
it is we who blinked first.

It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first.

For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March,
and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion
is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and
the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half
dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least
$1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image.

Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time,
is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward
on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps,

I will make sure that we are quick to respond.

So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy
to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have
to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around,
and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.

IV . The Southern Cone; Are We Winning or Losing ?

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy
around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against

CONFIDENT lAb - GDS

CONFIDENTlMr - GDS

-4-

us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short time, in early 1977,
the Southern Cone countries — led by Brazil but including^
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay — tried to establish
a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these
governments distrusted each other more than they despised
President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and
indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Ass^ibly.

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with eKtremely
narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The
narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things,
the pettiness of their international disputes with one another.
Chile and Araentina have almost_gone to war over the B eaole
Channel, and BrazilT and Argentina have sWainec tneir relations
almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.

Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been
at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can
be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate
chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have
tried through the working groups and the visits by the President
and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will
have to await Brazil's new government next year.

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with
the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy
Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans;
no other American President in this century has done that.

Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected
in the universities because of his strong anti-Conmunism and the
Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of
great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the
young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately,
sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military.
Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike any-
thing the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at
the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America,
which we had almost lost.

The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern
Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that
the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our
relations. They use every opportunity and every channel —
including Kissinger — to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty,
twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines v«3uld
ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would
have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real.

The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed
by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated

CONFIDENTIAL - - GDS

GONFIDBHraMr - GDS

^ 5 _

than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scape-
goats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt,
and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think
it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy
around at this time.

GOIilFIDEWTIAE - GDS

UNCLASSIFIED

85.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, August 10, 1978, 2100Z

6232

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Memos to Secretary 1978, 1 of 2. Confidential;
Niact Immediate. Sent for information to USICA.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONF I DENT I AL

2 of 4

CQNPIDSMT ' fft ' ii -

PAGE 01 BUENOS 06232 102137Z

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01

SP-02 SS'15 HA-05 AID-05 10-13 XMB-02 EB-08

COME-00 TRSE-00 /085 W

033212 102143Z /61

O R 102100Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SBCSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6958
INFO USICA WASHDC

C 0 N F -I D ' E N ' T" I A li- BUENOS AIRES 6232

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SHUM, HR, AR

SUBJECT: DERIAN TESTIMONY TO HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE

1. PRENSA, CLARIN AND BUENOS AIRES HERALD CARRIED
PROMINENTLY UPI REPORT OF TESTIMONY BY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY PATRICIA DERIAN BEFORE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE,. SAYING DERIAN "CHARGED THE ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT WITH 'SYSTEMATIC TORTURES' AND 'SUMMARY
EXECUTIONS. ■ AND CLAIMED THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT
SIGNS THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

IS IMPROVING."

2. "IN TESTIMONY BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE US
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MISS DERIAN DECLARED THAT
SO MUCH EVIDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
ARGENTINA HAS ACCUMULATED THAT TO ARGUE ABOUT IT
WOULD BE A ■ WASTE OF TIME ' . "

3. ACCORDING TO UPI DERIAN ALSO SAID THE GOA HAS
FAILED TO CARRY OUT ITS COMMITMENT TO INVITE THE
lAHRC TO VISIT ARGENTINA AND SAID ARGENTINA HAS A

CON FI DEW TI AL

CONg I ' D ' ENT ' IAL ' ADP Declassification Review

DFa A^JSIRFD

PAGE 02 BUENOS 06232 102137Z

by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017

VERY SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM.

4. HERALD HEADLINED "HARSH STATEMENT ON
ARGENTINA IN THE U.S.," AND PRENSA "ACCUSATION

COW PIDE WTIAt

2 Of 4

C0NFID5NTIAL 3 of 4

AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT . " IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE ,

PRENSA COLUMNIST MANFRED SCHONFELD STRONGLY CRITICIZED
THE REPORTED DERI AN REMARKS IN WHAT WE EXPECT WILL
BE THE FIRST OF A NUMBER OF EDITORIAL ATTACKS AGAINST
THE U.S. BESIDE THE DERIAN STORY IN LA PRENSA WAS
A UPI PHOTO OF A PHILADLEPHIA COPyT^USHING HIS FOOT
DOWN ON THE HEAD OF ONE OF THE MOVE GROUP ARRESTED
TITLED "REPRESSION AGAINST EXTREMI STS IN THE U.S."

5. WE RECEIVED THE WIRELESS FILE TEXT OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AND USINFO
092045Z BRIEF REPORT ON SOME OF HER TESTIMONY.-
HOWEVER, THE LATTER DOES NOT CONTAIN THE QUOTE THAT

UPI FEATURED.- WE HAVE ASKED ICA TO PROVIDE IF AVATT.ABLE
THE VERBATIM TESTIMONY ON ARGENTINA ASAP.

6. COMMENT; IN THE ALREADY OVERHEATED ATMOSPHERE I BELIEVE WE
CAN EXPECT EVEN SHARPER GOA AND PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE DERIAN
REMARKS THAN WE HAD AFTER THE EXIM BANK REFUSAL OF CREDITS TO
ALLIS CHALMERS WHICH WAS PERCEIVED HERE AS A PUBLIC AND
FORMAL ACCUSATION BY THE USG OF ARGENTINA. THIS IS THE SECOND
BOMBSHELL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD. I ATTENDED A RECEPTION

THIS MORNING SPONSORED BY THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE AT NEWBERRY
(AEROPARQUE) . I WAS THE ONLY AMBASSADOR AND ALSO ONLY U.S.

EMBASSY STAFF PERSON INVITED. I FELT AS THOUGH I WAS WALKING INTO

PROVERBIAL LION'S DEN. IMMEDIATE REFERENCE WAS MADE TO

PAT DERIAN 'S ALLEGED STATEMENTS. GREAT CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED

ABOUT A TOTAL DETERIORATION IN USG-GOA RELATIONS. THE

ARGENTINE CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED IN A TACTFUL AND

CO WF r P g W T IAL

e OW F IPEW TI AL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 06232 102137Z

COURTEOUS MANNER AND NOT IN ANGER, AS I HAD ANTICIPATED.

I DO ANTICIPATE THAT WHEN THE WHOLE AFFAIR IS BETTER
DIGESTED ALL HELL WILL BREAK LOSE.

7. MY"GUT REACTION" IS I MAY BE CALLED IN AGAIN BY THE
FONMIN AS TO THE SOURCE OF ASSISTANT SECRET^^RY'S INFORMATION
ON SYSTEMATIC TORTURE AND SUMMARY EXECUTIONS.' I FEAR GOA'S
ASSUMPTION IS INFO CAME FROM THIS EMBASSY. GOA MAY WELL
DEMAND THAT USG SUPPORT ITS PUBLIC ACCUSATION WITH EVIDENCE.

8. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON LINE I MIGHT TAKE
WITH GOA.

CASTRO

CONFIDENT I AL

3 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

86 .

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 14, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country
Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-8/78. Confidential. Sent for action. Inderfurth initialed the top right-
hand comer of the memorandum. Brzezinski wrote in the top right-hand comer of the
memorandum: “RI DR item for the P.”

UNCLASSIFIED

COPYCARTEftUBRAfSIf

. V.

4877 Add-on

NiEMORANl^M
eOHFIDEWTIA ir - GDS
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:

SUBJECT:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 14, 1978

ZBIGNIEW BRZE21NSKI

ROBERT PASTOR /! ^^1

V

U.S. Policy to Argentina

H

rr

M-

This Diemorandum responds to your questions and conmients on my memo of
August 9 on Argentina.. ~~

You asked how we can get hold of the policy and also asked me for a memo
on the fact that State did not consult with NSC in selecting its policy
towards Argentina. I don't think it would be productive to send a memo-

I randum to the Secretary expressi'ne displeasure for not being consulted
on a previous decision.

On Friday, I spoke to Vaky about Argentina. I asked him as well as
Christopher's office, to keep me fully informed, atj.d I expected that
I would be asked to attend the meeting to discuss it. I wasn't, but
Vaky brought me up-to-date. He said that he and Newsom had agreed
to [send Vaky to Argentina at the end of the month to make one last
attempt at breaking the impasse in U.S .-Argentine relations. "In order
to Improve the prospects of a successful meeti ng between V akv and.
Videla, they hope to obtain State-NSC approval of several items in
the munitions control list. COdld then be presented as a

positive gesture of our interest, in good relations. In addition, it
is vitally important that we make an attempt at mediating between an
Inter-American* Commission on Human Rights and the Argentine Government
in a way which permits the latter to save face and the former to pre-
serve its institutional integrity. Vaky also thinks that a Presidential
letter reiterating the President's interest in good relations with
I Argentina would be useful, and while I think it is also a good idea,

I I think we should wait until we have looked at the whole range of
. ' decisions that need to be made before we consider a letter.

"-I had originally planned to recommend that you send a memo to Vance
which, in effect, requested that the next round of decisions on U.S.
policy to Argentina would be made with full NSC involvement and con-
sultation by the NSC, but after speaking with Vaky, and repeating your
interest that we stay very much involved, he assured me that he would ,
keep' me Involved . I am not so certain that Dave Newsom, who made. the
previous decisions without the NSC's involvement, is as interested as
Vaky is. Perhaps a brief mention of this to the Secretary would be
helpful. To the extent that I am involved. I will, of course, keep you
fully informed.

■ CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

“7

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

ty

P

UNCLASSIFIED

87.

Letter From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary of State Vance
Washington, August 22, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country
Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9-12/78. Secret.

UNCLASSIFIED

VWASMINCTON. O C 20301

25iAUGlS7S

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Rizpatrick. 4/24/2017

Oear Cy; . . , ■

4$ a follow-vip to the Aoipust 17 dUcuasicn hetween you, ?hlg. an^

. rte'<oonoe.rn|flg[/our:'dtffd'<^1efatf.n9;-rel.ati'Cms with -Arfentinaj i. woul#
like to recdf^iid scinW fjosrtlve Steps which I believe should be
teken on an urgent hasls toi reverse the recent sharp downturn in
those rel at lots.

it*':

I heiftn^e there was gjenerai agreefflent between us that our relations
with Argentina have yet;^ seri'WJsty deteflOrated. f believe the
.^rei^j|;(Atgehtin^'Ha^5^iaio{S>-,tb<.wlthdr^vfroQ>UM(<%l|>'in^^ ^ .

just the first steps whieh the 60A will feel forced to

. take\ unless /we ^ nodetata'eur approach, Wle,.qpr^huflan rights policy' ■
ii very In^rtant, we need also to take into account that Argentina
ts/ a nation with reside t ins our i^n^pfoliferation
■^t a’:gp-:It-a1one Arg^tinavr*--irthethiervthat-^--rfil^t-.'-»eah^fOrwa!t|oh
cMf dcstabilialng provocat ive stand

"^fteaile''Chahnel isfue^-^ vit.thdri^.l the'IUo-pact , or ^enhan^d,^ ■'
relations with Soviet hide If not Ih our interest,

Rirther, it may well J>e at this pot At thdt some modification of
our approach, if properly explained, will actiially help on the
human rights Issues,

f ynslcoffie Secretary %i^'s pro|x}sed Septen^^ But in addition,

ednerete actfons^^l^ Ihi- the military side, 1 recommend we

moderate our position hy a^rov I ng hefore Septenier 3^1 ali the pending
/'Ai^«itine spare\pa«^s:-reduests, ;ihciudinE-hut sot' i'tmited' to-thdsd
which are safety i^latedv, offering this 1 a gesture of hi S> good
' ■ faith., at'a ' time.- whea/tddft^' An&es Sador ':testro charagterlxes aS.^VjUt--'
raged nationalism'^ Sweats to he the governing factor in xrgentTne
politics. Aiso^ to the extent our law allows, T believe we should
approve the pending requests to purchase PoO training courses.

There have been several developments since a hold was put on these
transactions. Argentine public reaction to the denial of the %t70
million EXlrt Sank loan for the hydroelectric project^and to the
public testimony by fat Oerfan before the House Subcbniroi ttee on
Inter-'American Affairs/ has been, as we understand it, very negative.

N

Ci.

/./' ,\/’N:/

^ -a ' IfS: A

■' GE^OiU. isGS^^siriCAria::,?::

Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of State
lilash ingtOn , &. jC . 2©520 .

|2

The terrorist bombing of /Wmirel Lambruschioi 's r«sidenGe,' resuitlng
lii the ideath of hfe teeha^ge daughter, has’ also served to stT^^gthen
the afgijpe^ minority hard-^line elementi of the Argent military
that rdfofnis ere pren^tyre. The alleged Tyson stafl^nt reflectino
USi support for the Hontonefo terror? star, even thOj^h totaHy false^
ha% dOrte ftirther SerlOtts harm to our efforts to prcHhote d^^eratlie-?
tion, Ihe GW has. In feet, taken some positive sieps to the
condltiens laid down durihg Dave Newsom's visit by inltTlting an
invitatioh to the iANAG. by agreeing to a irajority of eondieiohs
neOessary for such a visit, and by continuing to consider the remain-
der. Finally* in view Of the new iunta-oresideot oOwer reVatiOnshio
estahrished August A, power plays between the pres i cent and junta, '
and Within the junta Itself, will probahly continue for the near term*
delaying the resolution of key pol icy Issues.

Unltlce the EXIN Bank decision, our decision to withhold traTnlng and
spare parts has hot been made public here or in Argentina. For this
reason, i think we could safely modify our Current position without
-seottlngfs.^^ do this- immediate ly or at the

\lateiat hiy the Vaky visit because of the administfatiye

lead-time prior to the legislaited embargo date of September 30 which
.woui^ be needed to implement any go-ahead decision, in connection
with such a decision we Could inform the' GOA privately that J (i)

, we recognia* tbe ihtcrnai pol itical.dTffiCulties which have recently
deveioped, (Z) we are offering these approvals a$ concrete eyidence
of Our good faith and determination tO work together toward mutual
objeccives, ahd (3) we hoge and expect tiiey will see fit to develop
and ia4>isment a set of substantial htmtan rights initiatives soon.

Slocerdly,

UNCLASSIFIED

88 .

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 28, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country
Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-8/78. Confidential; Limdis. A copy was sent to Mathews. At the top
right-hand comer of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezirwki placed a check mark and
wrote the phrase “a compelling, forcefiil report. ZB.”

UNCLASSIFIED

5115 3DC

r

f

j MEMORANDUM
1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDEMT I AL/ LIMDIS

XGDS-4 August 28,

MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:

SUBJECT:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZ INSKI

ROBERT PASTOR

Human Rights i^Argentina

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has sent us a 14-page, single-
spaced Memorandum of Conversation with Alfredo Bravo, co-
President and one of the founders of the Arge ntine Perma-
nent Assembly for Human Rights. Bravo spent four hours
with our Embassy officials detailing the horrors of his
imprisonment and torture by the Buenos Aires police.

Bravo's story is a compelling one, and I found myself
reading through the entire 14-page Memcoh r '(hHougn i naa
intended only to skim it. / .

Co J JL T ^

Because I believe his story is important as we begin to lay A

the groundwork for a new strategy to Argentina, I have pre-
pared below a short summary of that Haacon.

Bravo's account is that of a classic "disappearance" — plain-
clothesmen entered the classroom where he was teaching, took
him for "questioning" blindfolded and in an unmarked car.
Then begins the horror.

Bravo was held for ten days in various detention centers.
During that time he was hooded constantly, naked, and denied
food and water. The list of tortures he experienced and
witnessed reads like a primer of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. He himself was;

— beaten, both by hand and rubber clubs;

— subjected to electrical shocks via a four-pronged
electric picana until his mouth and jaws were paralyzed;

— subjected to a bucket treatment where his feet were
held in a bucket of ice water until thoroughly chilled and
then shoved into a bucket of boiling water;

— subjected to "the submarine" — repeatedly being held
under water until almost drowned.

CONTTBEWTIAL/ LIMDIS

XGDS-4 (Classified by Z. Brzezinski)

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

CONFIDBlf¥fM r / IiIMDIS
. XGDS-4

Beyond the physical torture were a variety of psychological
horrors that Bravo was forced to watch or listen to:

— As he was moved from detention center to detention
center, Bravo was thrown in vans with dead bodies and other
naked prisoners showing physical evidence of violent torture.

— Group tortures occurred in which Bravo was placed in
a circle of prisoners holding hands and electricity was ap-
plied? a woman prisoner was raped with the group standing by
and her boy friend shot when he objected? the group was beaten.

Throughout the ten days of torture, the interrogation was a
litany of questions about the activities and political affilia-
tions of people known and unknown to Bravo. In the last session,
Bravo and a number of other prisoners were taken to a field
which appeared to be a garbage dump. Bravo, still hooded,
heard the sounds of beatings and many shots being fired- Then
he and a few other prisoners were returned to the truck and
to detention.

Following that episode, further interrogation was conducted on
an entirely different plane— as civilized people conducting
a conversation. Then, Bravo was made a "regular prisoner",
and warned not to talk of what had happened to him or he would
be found to have committed suicide. During his months in
La Plata prison, Bravo heard other stories paralleling his
own and worse.

In his talk with Embassy officials, Bravo emphasized that he
was no superman and had cried out with pain like any other
man. He said he provided Jdiis infoinnation " to st^ow vou w hat
you are f iaht ing for " . He asked tnat the ianoassy treat tne
information careiuixy, "as my life is in your hands".

cc: Jessica Tuchman

COHFIPEKTTAL/ HMD IS
XGDS-4

UNCUSSIFIED

89.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 31, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4,
Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen and Denend. At the top right-
hand comer of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “set up meeting, inch
McGiffert, you, DA, & Vaky ZB.”

UNCLASSIFIED

5150

ME^RANbUta

r^TiONAL sEGURi'ry coungil

August 31j» 197^

Mmo$mbm foe ;

EECM : '

SUBJBCO?:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZII^I

RbfiEBT PASTOR

U. $/ Policy to Argentioa

> '/•i)

0^-

In my last ra^oranct'iM to you on this subjects I told yoo
that Vaky had aaaured me hys would keep NSC fully inforifiod as
we developed an av#jfall strategy to deal with our deterio-
rating relationsi^ip y^ith Argentina. I regret that this has
not been the case, ©ecisibns are beginning to bh ,made by
the ^tate Department in a haphazard^ uncoordinated manner.

I understand that 'Newsom has approved the licensing of
several munition items, and today Christopher's staff called
to inform me that Chnistoisther had approved the sale, of two
Boeing helicopters for the Argentine army.

I asked Vaky wlmit had happened to our agreement to develop
an overall strategy, and he said that he had a strategy, and
it was "in his Jiead". Vaky said that these individual
decisions are designed, to send positive signals to Argen-
tina r thus improving the atmosphere in our relationship and
providing an Induc^ent for Videla to agree to meet -with
Vaky.

>g@aaeviiy^:

It I think thf^#-(a*l® s^crious

aaper which sets c

business comni^ity Idarns that the Export- Bnport Blank "has ,
at St^te Department request, denied issuing. a letter of
interest on a $^“^0 million sale of hydro-electric equipment,-
while a few weeks later State fecommends the issuance of a
license for the sale of' two Army helicopters and other
military eguiiaa^nt, the President and our ^‘licy will look
foolishly inconsistent, in other words, while individual
decisions may appear right one day, they may (appear to) be
inconsistent, unless we put all the steps together in a
logical and coherent strategy v^ich' is puhlicly defensible,
we will leave ourselves open to serious and leg it imate
criticism.' ' ■

(GDS>

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

; ■ (GDS)

ftftfjp reguestipg aix %ccowt;iiig, of it^s ciji^rent^ belttg wifK*-
held by the Sfato Departnipht for months/ filially Pete Vaky
.gave;,|fte a-':ll.st/ and ’;l '•am-^^afes o.ljiifceiv astoitttded:-Ky'''-the ;s h^

■ ■g^ai |M^^;'Oif ffae ti^<^':\w e^-:haa?fe.;v i;dn^e^£eo^^ : '

A 3 ra^ta.i^ . : ,. ,■

requests, valued at $.145 million; 29 Commerce license requests,
valu^ #t $31 millioh; and approximately 11 Export'^^|)drt Bank ^
ttahsacstions, valued .at nearly $600 million. ^The iatter

figirfe 1 iri the brief which Coleman left with Owen;

the brief indicated that the State Department had estiiaated
that there was $1.25 in nonHmiiitary , ekpor^^^^^

■ i^gehtlnd -beihg held' up for /human ;ri:ghfcs 'reasons. ).,/ ■ She;' iiSt ■
da ad. ataggering . that.-;-'l',.am'led to .wonder 'juit'^how-' much
trade world-wide is being held up by the State Department; it
may be /enough to have a significant impact on pur balande of -i
paymehte’^*. - The, letter' 'drcmi ■'■-Harold B-rd^ini--. to -■■secretary,.-

'(he' sent you a^copJ^:C;at .Tab'-'-B'),-'‘-’yhtfdrtu¥ately'; doe

■ US- -ahif' ■-guidance'* ' -bCp'-,-.-he'e-'. ■.no. 'strategy, ■ except '’to open ' the -

:I ,bel-ieve -that there -.are- -certain -s-teps ''''that .we -.can. -take -'s--,

r-- (1)^ our Ambassador Castro in to see

Prefiddht Videla (or General viola) to convey a personal
message from j^resident Carte^v.of concern about the state of
our relationship and a wish that we both take steps to improve
' ''that '''rb-iationship,- .'•-h®'-,'-i'-\pd,:Sitive. gesture, Castro can tnfdrm
-VideXa '-'"that we. have 'cpcroved'. licenses for- -the- 'helicopters' and
■for - sevp?ai ■■Other 'Sd^ty^relat©! equ-ipraentt. '.'■■: He'-'. Should also
'S'tate--'-tha'-t ■ l-reSident/=^art'^-.; would; l.ihe it''"-if- '.■P-res''ident Vid'e'la - ,
could receive feaba^^ to discuss ways it^

reda-tidnship "in gr-e,ateir:;,-detaili. , ,'■’. ;■. ■ ■ '■'

-- (2) We appresph t^.e inter-American (^itmis^^

Human Bights in an ih^dri^ way and suggest various foonil^
which could possibly break the deadlock and secure an agree-
ment from the Argehtihe: Goyerimient for an early yisit . (Qhce
■an /-agreement Is 'reach-^-^.-'- we 'are'-in a '/legitimate -/pp-sition- to
■begin moving, on a- .-la^e Share, of ■ thqSe- .i-t^s' whiC;h-are cu-r- - ...
re rttiy sUspehded. )_ ' "■ '■*'''■ -

(3.) ■ I-n.-advaqic-e''cf ''Vaky'-S' yisit.,’','the--'jExport-*--Ifflpdrt
Bank should begin dp|u:qying several loans Which ate from
'■qqr-.private. sectO'r ."'tq":-.:-&eir' private sector. '■'■;-We:"; can .■■gius.'tify . ■'
that by eayiug,-h'ha-t,’---tftd$h::-'lo-,Phs cannot- in 'au-y ■■■'’bay .■’he-,' ihter- -
preted as Supportive of the ^vernmeht if they go directly to
the, private -.sector* ■''■■'.■ '

, — (4) The Vaky yisit should be more than just atmospherics ,

■■aithovigh thst \:ShquJc'- bd 'Wi' ' it®ortant-'-'ei®peht.'>. He,"'Shduld--make'- '
■-c'lear-'-'ro.-'Vid'el.a ■■’thah-'we 'are'' prepared'-.'jto'- '-■move- 'iiiHai^ie-.tely ■-■on -a-
large ntaaber of items if Videia reaches agreement with the
Inter-^imierican ConwiiSsion on Human Rights and takes several

■ {'GDS-.)-'

UNCLASSIFIED

90.

Memorandum of Conversation
Rome, September 4, 1978, 10 a.m.

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas
Assignments — Trip Files, 1977-80, Box 22, Vice President’s Visit to Rome and the Vatican,
9/2/78-9/4/78: Background. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Gardner’s residence.
Clift sent an abbreviated record of this conversation under a September 5 covering memorandum
to Vaky, Aaron, and Pastor. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material,
North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9-12/78)

UNCLASSIFIED

SEC1E T / SENSITI?E

XGDS

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

September 5, 1978

MEMOBANDTOf OF OON?ESSmON» AMBASSADOR GARDNER'S RESIDENCE
September 4, 1978, 10:00 a.m.

ARGENTINE SIDE

D.S. SIDE

President Vldela

Col. Miguel A. Mallea 611

Dr. Ricardo Yofre

Vice President Walter F. Mondale

A. Denis Clift

Interpreter:

VP; I- am pleased to have this meeting. I remember the meeting
we had In the White House at the tla« of Ae Panama Canal
Treaty ceremony. We want goon relations and, speaking
candidly, there are strains now. I hope today we can
make some progress. I told the President of your inquest.

He said by all wians I should meet with you and he asked
me to extend best wishes. He said we don't want trouble
with Argentina, but human rights are a central concern.

I will report to the President personally on your views.

V; Thank you, Mr. Vice President, for inviting me. For me

It is an extremely Important opportunity to discuss these
matters becai»e I feel our relations are deteriorating.

I fully concur with President Carter's position on human
rights. We have profound belief In the democratic ’
process so that men can live with dignity and freedom.

We are with the United States and we are not troubled
by criticism when It Is objective. However, we are
concerned by attltt^es projecting Intervention In
domestic affairs. I spoke with President Carter about
this at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty signing,
but since that time we have had to delay our announcement
of an Invitation to the Interamerlcan Coonlsslon on
Human Rights because of U.S. criticisms projecting
Intervention.

A second probfem — Argentine political were Invited to
visit the. United States, but they, too, did not visit because

ADP Declassification Review
«ECiasT/SENSiTivE XGDS DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

Ifenorandum of Conversation
Ambassador Gardner’s Besidence

■«B«ifiWSENSITIVE XGDS
page 2

September 4, 1978

V: (continued)

of the n.S. statements intervening in our affairs. Mrs.
Darien's statements are contributing to a deterioration
in our relations. ‘

yP: Were her statements made in Argentina or in Washington.

V: In Washington before Congress. Mr. Vice President, the

western world must be united, and the Dnited States must
lead the western world. At the same time, the people of
Argentina cannot tolerate intervention. This is our
concern.

VP: I fully understand. We don't want to get into such a

situation. We want to work with you to have good relations.
As you know, the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendnent is coming into
effect. We must soon take decisions on the Allls-Chalmers
deal. We want to be helpful. It would be inqjortant if you
could have the Interamerlcan Human Rights Commission received
in Argentina on terms acceptable to the commission. We
would not link your actions with our own, but if you do
something, then we could do something.

As you know, the U.S. press covers developments in Argentina
closely. There are certain human rights cases with the
people known to our press — people such as Jacobo Tlmezman.

To the extent that you make progress on these cases, it
will help us to make progress. We know that you have had
problems in your country, and we want to work with you to
establish a firm basis for progress.

V: I understand, and govemment-to-govemment relations are

not easy. My concern is when a problem between us is raised
to the level of a public or popular issue. This leads to
situations where our citizens adopt partisan positions
against the United States, to situations where our businessmen
adopt partisan positions because they cannot conclude deals
when £x-Im does not grant a loan.

VP: I understand. If we could get this turned around then we

could move ahead, for example, on Allls‘-Chalmers. I would
also like to suggest that it would be good if Assistant
Secretary Vaky could come to Argentina to meet with you
or with a person of your choice for a review of our relations.

V: Would this be after the Interamerlcan Commission or before.

^BQffiT/SENSITIVE XGDS

^fi€KB¥/SENSITIVE XGDS

Memorandvim of Conversation page 2

Ambassador Gardner's Residence September 4, 1978

VP: Oh, I think It should be as soon as possible.

V: Perhaps ve could arrange a visit by the commission by

mid-October.

VP: But could you announce the visit earlier.

V: Perhaps. I would like to point out that since our meeting

at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of
events showing the efforts on the part of our government :

— we have Issued a list and names of all the detained;

— we have published a list of all of those who disappeared
and then reappeared;

— last Christmas we released approximately 500;

— this last week, 65 Individuals were freecl;

— I have Indicated that we are prepared to give a

favorable response to the Com^sslon on Human Rights;

— Tlmerman's situation has changed; he Is now out of
jail and imder house arrest;

— Professor Bravo Is now under house arrest and we
expect the court to lessen the charges against him.

Officials of the U.S. government are welcome In Argentina,
but they cannot give the Impression that they are coming
to Inspect us.

VP: No, they would come exercising discretion. It will be

Important to have the announcement on a visit by the Human
Rights Commission on the terms acceptable to the commission.

V: We could have done so last month, but Mrs. Darien's statement

before the Congress forced us to suspend our announcement.

In the course of a few days, I believe we could develop a
satisfactory announcement.

■SfiCRBT/ SENSITIVE XGDS

SECRET /SENSITIVE XGDS

Memorandum of Conversation
Ambassador Gardner's Residence

page 4

September 4, 1978

C: In considering the announcement. It Is Important to remember the

tight timing In the United States. The Ex-Im Bank must take
Its decision by September 15. The Humphrey-Kennedy
Amendment ccnnes Into effect on October 1.

VP: We would hope the announcement could be taken care of before

then.

V: This was our Intention. I don't think It c^ be done, however,

' before September 15.

VP; We are encouraged that you will receive the commission. Will
you authorize me to tell the President that this will be done.

V; Yes.

VP: When may Assistant Secretary Vaky come.

V: After our announcement on the commission. **

For Vaky we would prefer no other stops.

VP: You would like him to visit Argentina alone.

V: Ideally, yes.

VP: I won't give you a yes on this, but I will recommend It and

I will get back to you.

V: Will you let us know ahead of time what his mission will be to

permit us to prepare for It.

VP: I will report to the President on mv return and we will contact

your ambassador Immediately.

V; Mr. Vice President, D.S. -Argentine relations proceed in multiple

channels — economic, political, cultural. Now our relations are focused
solely on human rights. We can understand this problem If It
is addressed In the broader spectrum of our overall relations
and Is not the single focus.

SBCKBT/ SENSITIVE XGDS

Memorandum of Conversation
Ambassador Gardner’s Residence

^fieSfi¥/SENSITIVE XGDS

page 5

September 4, 1978

VP: We have no desire to interfere in the affairs of your country.

We have enough domestic problems of our own,. If we can get
on the road to progress in human rights, this whole other
vista will open. We want the best possible relations. The
President was taken by you during the meeting he had last
year. He is disappointed in the current course of our
relations. He wants our relations to head In the right
direction. I think we are now at a point where we can turn
the right way.

V: I think we can. Mr. Vice President, I know your time was

limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my
greetings and best wishes to President Carter.

♦

^BCMT/SENSITIVE XGDS

UNCLASSIFIED

91 -

Memorandxim From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to
Vice President Mondale

Washington, September 15, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 57, Foreign
Countries — Latin America I, [2 1978]. Confidential.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5496

CONFIDENTIMr

September 15, 1978

BffiMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:

THE VICE PRESIPENT
DAVID AAROn'

SUBJECT:

US-Argentine Relations; A Status
Report Since your Meeting with Videla

Following up your meeting with President Videla, we asked our
Ambassador to speak to Videla’ a assistant. Ricardo Jofre, to
obtain a timetable for Vaky's visit, we learnea tnat the
deadline for the submission of the bid by Allis-Chalmers was
put off one month to October 15. We were also Informed that
the Argentines plan to announce in early October an agreement
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for a visit
and that they expect a visit from Pete Vaky by the second or
third week of October.

Christopher and Henry Owen met with John Moore and decided that
a letter of interest could be issued to Allis-Chaimers about
October 1, which is satisfactory to the Argentines and to Allis-
Chalmers. The Argentine Government will be taking a number of
steps, including releasing prisoners, before then, and that will
make it easy for us to explain to the American public why we have
altered our x-M decision.

Dave Newsom will be chairing a meeting next week to discuss an
overall strategy for US policy to Argentina. -

We have noticed in our conversations with the Argentines a new
receptiveness and interest in discussing a wide range of issues,
and we believe this was made possible by your conversation with
Videla. Still, there is a long way to go. We have learned, for
exeimple, that the Argentines are playing games with us on ratify-
ing the Treaty of Tlatelolco primarily because they feel we are
playing games with them on human rights.

GOI<rFIDEW TTAir

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

UNCLASSIFIED

92.

Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, September 25, 1978

1 Source; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country
Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9-12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Pastor, Albright, and Renner.

UNCLASSIFIED

I share seme of Bo^' s frustratlooj' but I cannot agree that our poxicy
toirards Argentina has been "disastrous". ' Xt: has certainly been difficult
uneven and tense, !n»t given the conflicting Interests at stake I'm not
sure esactly how it could have been Improved. Consider!. ..

— The human rights record of President Vldela^s administration Is
horrible. Reports of vicious and institutionalized torture are
well documented. On the other hand, neither we nor Videla can
control the indisputable terrorist threat, and Videla is probably
better than anyone wIki would replace him on the right or the left.

— The GOA is caught between wanting toi continue its long and close
relationship with the US and wanting to prove its pride and strength
by thtmbing Its noSe at us -- as Brazil has done. :

— The GOA wants to pursue (or at least keep alive) a nuclear weapons

option. Ue don't waat them to., \

— Argentina has been the site of heavy foreign investment ^ while
the Congress, over Administration opposition, Kiacts linkages
between trade/investment and huma n rights. On the merits, if these
restrictions apply anywhere, they apply in Argentina.

— There is a very high sensitivity- to Argentine events in Congress.

The Kenedy Amendment which takes effect next week is unique.

Given all these crosscurrents, both between the two goverraaents and
within^the-GOA, 4 don-'4^ knoW-sdiat. aa. overall "strategy" would look
like. Our actions haven't been as random as they might seemT ' see ' ~
two, threads as having shaped pur behavior toward Argentina. First,
reaction to confllctijng si^guals from the GOA -- promises of progress,
short term progress then regressioh, a forward and back pattern repeated
over and over. Not just on huinan rights, but equally on proliferation.
Secondly, iiaplementina the law •>- the impending deadline of the Kennedy
amendment, and the Harkin amentoents, particularly on Ex-Im.

At one point an effort to explicitly define a "strategy" was made — with
bad results. That was Newsom's instructions for his visit there' last
spring. To a certain extent, that approach was repeated in’ MondalS^s

' ADP Declassification Review

■ xeNFiBgNTtAir/GPS DECLASSIFIED

byJohnRtzpatrick. 4/24/2017

ObiPyCARTERltBRAftY

2

recent meeting wl,th Videla^ . in thet we tried to define an explicit
tradeoff for the GOA you do this and we'll do that. While that
approach seems tight and neat^ it doesn't work because, when the GOA
doesn't do what it promises we cannot be flexible without appearing to
."blink". When we change the conditions or give the quid without the
quo, I suspect that we streos^hen the hands of the hardliners within
the GOA and further weaken the credibility of the moderates.'''

I have only two .prescriptions and helther has to do with Argentina
they are of general application. The first is that . we devote considerahle
effort to an education project to convince Congress that linking certain
trade and investment policies with human, rights does not further the
cause of hiiman rights. This would be a .long, slow process withc»it a new
. "acGompliahment" at the ahd, but I suspect -it. wcxild be:.well worth the
ef fort. The second is that we try, in adninisterlng the human rights
programs, to avoid judglr^ trends — poaitive or negative —r at less
than annual, intervals. This would be hard vto apply on visits .from
the Presidential level down to the Assistant Secretary^ for it is on these
occasions . that we most often look for some hook oh which to hang a positive
action -- gift, loan, agreemeat or whatever, but there are other
artificial deadlines to which we frequently react an Impending IFI
vote for example. The truth is that in reacting -to short term changes
we inevitably coi^emn ourselves to folinw a jerky and inconsistent policy,
for chaij^e that is lasting aaid meaningful on e societal sc^le. seldom
occurs in less than a year's time, and generally in much longer (obvloualy
there are ^ceptions — r a revolution, etc.}. Making this change in
poiicy would requiz'e a Presidential decision since it would alter
established ways of doing. business. It also obviously carries the risk
of being overly tl^d, but least it seems to me worth, a serious look — - a
study of its pluses and minuses,

RECOMMEWPATION:

That you approve my drafting a Dodson-rTarnoff memorandtim directing an
interagency study of the a dvanta ges and d isadvant ages Of a policy that
would eacpllcltly seek to aVoid^ny US evaluatioiT of positive or negative
trends in human rights' ^servance at less than annual intervals.

APPROVE V bo .Sr' DISAPPROVE ■ ■ '

9 ^ O yv ) V

cc: Bob Pastor \ 0 \ v ^

Madeleine Albright ^ »

John Renner

■ jCQMP IDEW Ti a L/GDS

UNCLASSIFIED

93.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, October 3, 1978, 0029Z

250739

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Box 10, EXDIS 1978 Memcons for Vance.
Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pfeifle; cleared by Ruser, Newsom, and Vaky and
S/S; and approved by Perry. Vance was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly.

UNCLASSIFIED

uuiuu inu

P*8£ 01 STATE 250739

08ICIH SS-2S

IKFO OCr-01 ISO-CO SSO-30 /02ii ft

OfiAfTEB BY ASA/CE«:LPFEIFIE:JHA

AfPROWB BY SiJPEBRY

ARA/ECA - C, W., RUSER

PjOIIEtfjOH

S/S - JPERRY

m-.emi .

Department of State TELEGRAM

.... n«i .7

-031039 0301222 /13

0 0300292 OCT 78

FH SECSTATE UASHOC

TO AHEHBASSY BCEHOS AIRES IHIUBIATE

« B 0 F I 0 E R I "rTT STATE 250739

7819344

4. WOnTES ilOTED TRAT THEBE WAS SOOE CONCERK IN THE
UNITED STATES AIIO ESPECIAUV IH THE STATE JEPARTHEIIT
UITH RE6ARD TO THE TREATY OF TIATEIOICO. < HE EXPlAllinP-
THE PROCESS OF RATIFICATIOII. -THE FOREIfiH HINISTRY
SEHT A ORAFT TO THE OEFESSE AND ECONOHIC HltliSIRIES
AND THEN THE TREATY WAS SENT TO THE PRESIOEMT. THE .
PRESIDENT RETURHEO IT TO' THE FOREIOH HINISTRY FOR
CHANCES AND THE TREATY HAS SEHT TO THE DEFENSE
HINISTRY OH AUCUST 14 FOR SI6HATURE. IT THEN WENT
A6AIH TO THE PRESIDENCY. FROH THERE )T HAS SEHT TO
THE AOHIHIST.-ATIVE AND lECISlATIUE COHHISSlOH FOR
.APPROVAl. nONTES INDICATED IT HOUIO THEM REOUIRE
PRESIOEHTIAl- SIGHATORE TO COMPUTE FORKAl lECAl
RATIFICATION. HE EnPHASITED THAT IH ACCORDANCE WITH
WIOEIA'S IHSTRUCTIOHS. AU STEPS IN THE RATIFICATIOII
PROCESS WOUID BE TAKEN AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE..

E.O. 11652; COS

TAOS; ■ PEPR, AR

SUBJECT: S ECRETARY WAHCE'S MEETING WITH AROEMTINE

FOREIGN fllHISTER tIOtITES

^ 1. SECRETARY VANCE MET WITH ARCEIITIHE FOREIGN flIIIISTER
^ tIOHTES OH SEPTE.MDER 29 H i NEW YORK. AHBASSAOOR ROS
AND AHBASSAOOR AJA ESPIL OF ARGENT IIIA AND UNDER
‘^ SECRETARY NEWSOH WERE ALSO PRESENT. FOREIGN HIHISTER
HQNTES RAISED THE HUnPHREY/KEHNEDY ANENOHENT AND THE
O TREATY OF 1LATELOLCO AND OFFERED ARGENTINE ASSISTANCE
ON HtODLE EAST EFFORTS.

■3

2. HOHTES NOTED THAT DURING THE flEETlHO BETMEEH VICE-
PRESIDENT NDUDAiE AND PRESIDENT VIOELA IH ROHE, IT
‘ ■’ NAS AGREED THAI CERTAIN STEPS WERE TO BE TAKEN BY THE
_ UNITED STATES AND THEN BY ARGENTINA. HE KAO REEK
^ IKFORHCD OF THE INCREASED FLEXIfilllTV in THE US EK-IN
BANK AND THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR THIS. THE NEXT
O STEP, WAS UP TO AR6EHI1HA. ME LEFT IN lUEHOS AIRES A
ORAFT OF THE POSITIVE REPLY TO THE IHTEB-ANERICAN
O***^"*)* RIGHTS COttniSSIOII IIAKRCI AND VIOELA PLANS TO
REPLY BEFORE THE OEAOIIIIE. HOHTES MOPED THAI IF THE
-i^^lANRC GOES TO ARGENTINA IT Will BE AS OCJECTIVE AS
POSSIBLE.

^3. HONTES NOTED THAT THE KUHPHREY/KENNEOY AOHEHOHEHT
GOES INTO EFFECT OCTOBER 1. FOR HANY YEARS THE U.S.

HAS SUPPLIED ARGENTINE HIIITARY EQUIPHENT AND
TRAINING. THE CUT OFF OF SPARE PARTS WILL EE PRR-
IICUIARIY DIFFICULT. PERHAPS THE NEXT STEP WOUIO BE
FOR THE U.S. TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AHO DETERHINE
If LEGALLY SPARE PARTS COULO BE SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA.
AMBASSADOR NEHSOH NOTED THAT THE BROOKE AflEHOREHT
NAMES IT POSSIBLE TO RELEASE SOME GOODS WHERE THE
CONTRACT WAS NADE BEFORE INE NUttPHREY-KENHEDY
AIIENOIIEHT. IK HAG REVIEIKO SOKE CASES AHO HAD RELEASED
SME ITEMS, IHaUDIIIG HELICOPTERS AND PERISCOPES.

NEWSOM ADDED THAT THE USG NAD LOOKED AT A NUMBER OF
ITEMS IN LIGHT OF LEGISLATION AND IIIEOUITIES TO
MANUFACTURERS. CONSUL TATICWS WITH CONGRESS, HOWEVER,
1NO,ICATEO THE AUTHORS OF THE AHENDMEHT TOOK A STRICT
VIEW WITH REGARD TO HIIITARY SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY
SPARE PARTS. NEWSOM SAID THAI THE UNITED STATES
RECOGNIZED THE HARDSHIP FOR AR.GEHTIHA BUT MUST AWAIT
AH IMPROVED SITUATIOII AND COIIGRESSIONAl ACTION.

NOHtES NOTED THAT IN TERMS OF THE POLITICAL REIATIOIISHIP
SPARE FARTS iKRE VERY IMPORTANT. SECRET.ARY VANCE SAID
NE WOULD LOOK IMTO THE ISSUE.

5; THE SECREIARV BRIEFED MONIES Oil CAMP OAVIO AMD
NDHItS COHCRALULATED HIM ON THE SUCCESS. HOWES
RELATED THAT WHE* HE SPOKE WITH PRESIOEMT CEAUSESCU
IH ROMANIA, THE ROHMIIAN LEADER SAlO THAT ARGENTIHA
COULO USE ITS GOOD OFFICES EFFECTIVELY WITH BOTH THE
ARABS -ANO THE ISRAEliS. MONTES PERSONALLY HAD

SPOKEN TO BOTH THE JEWISH AND ARAB COMMUHITlES IH
ARGEHIINA AH OFF EHEO. TO SPEAK TO THE AIIBASSADOB
IF THE SECRETARY THOUGH THAT WOULD EE USEFUL.

THE SECRETARY SAIO HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HOHTES
WOULD SPEAK TO THE AMOASSAOORS IN BUENOS AIRES.

6. MOMIES SAIO HE PERSONALLY HAD TAKEN STEPS TO
IWROVE RELATIONS BECAUSE HE FELT THAT US/ARGEHTIHA
RELATIONS WERE FUNDAMENTAL TO BOTH COUNTRIES ANO
NOTED COMMERCIAL RELATiWS WERE ON THE RIGHT TRACK.
SECRETARY VANCE EXPRESSED IKE DESIRE TO MOVE THE
RELATIOHS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN A POSITIVE
BIRECIIOM AND WAS PLEASED THAI THE MOHDALE/VIOELA
MEETING HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE. CHRISTOPHER

ADP Declassification Review ^
DECLASSIFIED :

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 ^

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE
AUTHOR I ZAT I ON Of THE El^OUltVE SCCRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED

94.

Memorandiim From the Vice President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice
President Mondale

Memo No. 999-78

Washington, October 19, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 57, Foreign
Countries — Latin America I, [2 1978]. Confidential. Sent for information.

UNCLASSIFIED

memorandum

i

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
Memo No. 999-78

COtlFIBBNTO ai-
October 19, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Denis Clift

Argentina to Accept Human Rights
Commission Delegation

Argentina announced October 17 its willingness to permit a
visit by a delegation from the Inter-Aii«rican Human Rights
Coimnission (lAHRC), preferably between March and May of
next year. An official in the Argentine president's office
told Embassy Buenos Aires that the lAHRC delegation will
have access to prisons, political leaders and the relatives
of missing persons — but not to military bases. Even so,
he added, the decision to accept the delegation was contro-
versial in Argentine military and government circles.

GONFIDEMTIM '

ADP Dedassificalion Review

DECLASSIRED

by John Rtzpatrick, 4^24/2017

UNCLASSIFIED

95.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
(Derian) to Secretary of State Vance and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, January 26, 1979

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren
Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 28, Human Rights— Argentina IV. Secret. Printed
from an uninitialed copy. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received
in D at 6:02 p.m. At the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote, “WC — Here is Patt’s
thinking on Argentina, which I mentioned in my memo for your meeting Friday.” Reference
presumably is to Friday, February 2.

UNCLASSIFIED

TOi

FROM:

SUBJECT:

OEPARTMENT OF STATE / 1^90jL704

WwHIrwnn, O.C. »5» i^. jjtiSi ^

ik

^ W 6 03/

January 26 , 1979

The Seciretary
The Deputy Secretary

HR “

sz&mRED siRscraT

Patricia K. Deriaj: PM BEyiEtrEP by S/s

Rext Stepe in Argentina

flie Increaeii^ aagnltude and brutality of Argentine
buaan rights yiolatlons convince ae that it is tine for
US to taXe additional iseasures to underscore our concerns
and bring pressure to bear on the Junta to aaXe iaprove-
■eata . Only substantial pressure across a broad front is
likely to have any real effect, and there are a number of
things we can and should do.

iwf

The situation is clearly|tetarioratdLn^ ^

— 38 bodies, •many of them without heads or hands,
were recently washed ashore on one of Argentina's
Atlantic bea^MS. A Buenos Aires newspaper which had
investigated the report killed the story at the direction
of the Presidential Press Office.

Our Embassy estimates that about
a month taka place in Argentina. The International Red
UfdlF'fepresentatlve in Biwnos Aires recently characterised
the disappearances as "a calculated poll^* of the
I Argentine authorltiei.

the past three weeks, security forces have
arrested uid threatened to imprison mothers of the dis-
a^iea^red idio have held weekly silent desionstrationa in the
capital's swln square for the past two years. This heavy-
handed police intimidation follows by <»ily a few weeks the
soothing promises given the mothers by a Presidential
Palace sp^esaan at Christmas.

— An officer of the Argentine Permanent Aasemb lv fo r
Buswin Rlgd^ts told our Embassy in December cnau secrurity
forces simply snirdered a cot^le in their own home without
bothering to take them to a dstention center. The same
source said he had received other recent reports of such
killings. ^

SBOXSt-

{ROS-4 01/26/94, DERZAH, Patricia M.)

I

ADP Declassification Review

DECUkSSIFIED

by John Fitzpafrick, 4/24/2017

-■> If* continue to receive nuiMroiis highly credible
reports thet

interrofatlon' of detalnsar. me electric '^picena , “
.SOMthing lUee e siqpercharged cattle prod, is still
apparently a favorite tool, as is the "sobnarlne” treat-
aent (isaarsion of the head in a tub of eater, urine,
excrement, blood, or a ccxnbination of these) .

— Prison treatment of the 3,200 acknowledged
political detainees has deteriorated sharply in recent
months, acterding to the Internatimaal Bed i^xoas.
ra^presentative in Argentina, for cure, nestings, and
dietary neglect are eaasmn for them and for the
lUiackBbM'ledgad detelnees held in secret military
facilities. Another source reported that fifty female
detainees recently transferred between prlscms "have
not been exposed to the sun for so long that teeir skin
color is greenish... Scsie have lost their eyesight. Many
are mentally dteranged.*'

Ihese tevelopsnnts illustrate the reasons why I
believe we should,, at a minimum, taka these action s »»

— Vote *»o" on air ipr loans to Argentina which do
not clearly meet the basic human needs criteria, and
at least invite, other, donor countries to take similar
action.

— Switch fttei "yes* to "Abstain" on XFl loans triiich
meet the basic human needs criteria.

— > Znstraet our Delegate : to the int Human Rights
Comsdsaion to make a strong statement condemning
Argentine human rights violations.

» Begin to den y cfiBtmercial licens es of militery-
relatte ..eg uipsient destined te the argontine Axmed Forces,
aanraTnow do with equipment for the poll<%.

— Deny or delay Bxport-lnport Baric flnanelno for
new projects in Argeatina.\j 11 necessary, we shteld seex
a Presidential determination under the Chaffee Amendjqsht
that denial would advance XJ. 8. human rights objectives#

SHCBBf

,

gac B W

- 3 -

Moant niBjoc new dlplonatic effort t o. peraue de
IgMlan erae_eaca3liar« to stop selllno mllltarv and
poxiee agulpownt to Argentina .

— Give oareful consideration to snspending or
baiting Mitlrely tbe p^ipeliz» of 0. S. - origin Military
eguipment parehased by Argenuna under earlier programs.

— In connection with, and explanation of, tbe above
Measures, Issoe a strong p^llc statoaent condeMning tbe
continuing deterioration of Argentine hunan rights
practices .

llm siaply have to begin to take measures like these
if we expect to see any meaningful isq^rovesients . There
is no longer any doubt that Argentina has the worst human
rights record in South America. We cannot %iait for the
Mter-American Buman Ri^ts Ckmmisalon visit at the end
of May. Mhile we hope that Argentii» Government prepara-
tions for the visit, aM the visit itself, will result in

( sosM IsgicovesMnts, we should not rely exclusively on this
event. A high-ranking Voreign Ministry official recently
said his government plans to stonewall the Cosmiission on
the disappearance issue.

Me would not be alone in taking more forceful
measures. I understand that both Canada and the OK share
the view that the situation is worsening.

lust of _a

as WB'il~a8 suu
considering opposing

XFI loans to Argentina.

#

s te w st

UNCLASSIFIED

96.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs (Vaky) to the
Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tamoff)

Washington, February 13, 1979

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron
and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot
85D366, Box 1, Argentina — ^August 9 Testimony. Secret. Drafted by Vaky. In the top right-hand
comer of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote “Rec’d 2/16.” Below this the hand wrote
“(cc: SC [Steven Cohen]).” Derian crossed out “SC” and wrote below it: “my file Arg.”

UNCLASSIFIED

•sfiefgr

MEMORANDUM

TO;

FROM:

SUBJECT;

Pursuant to your tasking memorandum of January 27
I enclose the paper now approved by ARA, INR, HA and
S/P. I have included on two or three points a dis-
senting analyses and evaluation in the form of foot-
notes. These were basic differences which could not
be reconciled.

S/S - Peter Tarnoff
ARA - Viron P. Vaky

Evaluation of Argentine Human Rights
Situation

Enclosure;

Argentine paper.

Drafted: ARA;VPVaky ; lif

SECRET

RDS-'? 5713/94

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of State
Washington, undated

UNCLASSIFIED

SeCRET/MOFOim/MO COHTRAeT -

ARGENTINA: ASSESSMENT OP CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Par ame tecs and problems . The following assessment
covers the Argentine government ! s 1978 performance and the
current situation with respect to category-one human rights.
Inevitaoly, efforts have Deen hampered somewhat by the US
Government's limited capacity for monitoring human rights
events in Argentina and verifying reports of either positive
or negative developments.

■ ( Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical
material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many
people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being
held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We
are forced, in many cases, to reply upon estimates whose
credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance among
groups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights
developments.

tCt We do not believe, however, tnat timely, precise
and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the
assessment offered below. _ The record or Argentine human
rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing
cumulative picture of the government's performance. And
while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative
dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would
remain unchanged.

i-ei- Current situation . With respect to category-one
rights, conditions can be summarized as follows:

“tCt — Political prisoners : Approximately 2,900 persons
purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained
at the aisposition of the national executive branch under
state-of-sieq e powe rs provided for in the Argentine constitution
(PEN pr i sober s7 T^

(CT V^ll^he current state of siege was instituted on
November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the
state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain
prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punish
detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that
the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention

SB GRET/MOFOAH/Ne - CONTRACT

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

g^^’wk&^mivaaontmsM

SaCRET/MOrOItN/MO .COWTRIICT "

- 2 -

There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which
is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is
being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAM
prisoners) and probably includes about 500 persons. According
to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are
either former terrorists now cooperating with security units
or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore,
listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners
who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by
the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the
program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most
a few hundred persons.

“tCt No sustained official effort is being made to sub-
stantially reduce the number of political prisoners by (1)
releasing those against whom there exists no evidence of
terrorist or criminal involvement nor pending charges j (2)
trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting
political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights
to choose exile over imprisonment (r ight-of-option) . The
r ight-o£-option program initiated inlate 1977 has resulted
in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile.

("Cf There is little evidence to substantiate persistent

rumors that thousands of political prisoners are being
held in clandestine camps located throughout the country.

ttr) ~ Torture and prisoner, mistreatment ; Physical and
psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment
for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have informa-
tion about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security

in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners.
However, the Executive does not always respond to court
order. While we have little information that would permit
categorizing detainees according to types of offenses, the
PEN list probably includes few if any terrorists suspected
of having committed violent acts against persons or property.
Such individuals, when captured by security units, are routinely
killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations
of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include
sucn things as (a) non-violent actions undertaken in support
of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings
contrary to the military,' s conception of social order)
groups, e.g., poster and pamphlet distribution and a variety

SECRBT/HOrOIUi}/NO. CONTRACT

giiCRBg/NOPORN/N0.COWTRA e T

-3-

officials. Torture generally occurs during interrogation,
prior to official listing of a detainee as a PEN pris oner, or
his or her

tlie PEN prisoners and many undeclared prisoners reported in
August that as many a s 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured
during interrogation.

-fet” Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage
and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending
upon such factors as the prisoner fs alleged offense, the
proclivities of the regional military commander, and the
character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment
(beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise,
etc.) are most often associated with specific military
jurisdictions and prisons, car with the transfer or release of
prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances
in early 1978, for example, prisoners released from a La Plata
jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably
by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented
recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978
an ICRC official reported to the Embassy his belief that
prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during
the year.

"tej- — Disappearances ; Reports of disappearances continue
to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases, responsibility
almost certainly lies with one of the many security units. In
the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing thousands
of allegedly disappeared persons, roost must be presumed dead.

of other support activities; (b) economic actions perceived
by the authorities as directly having supported subversion
(the Graiver case) or otherwise endangered national interests;

(c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as "leftist"; or

(d) actions that contributed to an intellectual>-cultural
environment conducive to the growth of ^subversion" (herein
lies the danger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing
artists, etc.). Thus, the term f security violation" has no
specific meaning. Its operative definition is largely left

to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest
powers.

ter (£k

substantiate

eports rec eived from released prisoners tend to

I observations on the frequency of torture.

1

CBCRDT/NOFORM/MO. C e WTRAC r

WNOttW su w (Bana»<Bii

s i;cREa?/Moromi/MQ GONTf tf t e r

-4-

(U) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend
to use the figure of 15, 000 for disappearances over the
past 3-4 years. Argentine groups share that estimate and
have presented the government with documentation on almost
5,000 cases. In truth, however, no one knows precisely
how many people have disappeared or, in many cases, why
specific individuals were victimized.

tCt Few who have disappeared since, about mid-1977,
and on whom we have any information, could be considered
terrorists or security threats. V?ith most terrorists either
eliminated pr living in exile, the security forces have made
a significant shift in their targetting practices to draw
into the security net a range of non- terror ists associated
with the vague and expansively defined political left. The
decision as to which specific individuals will be picked
up is left to regional and local authorities and, therefore,
depends upon the latter's perception of what kinds of activities
constitute security threats. The victim's culpability may
only have involved past membership in a group tnat was
entirely legal at the time. Insofar as there is a discernible
pattern, there has been a tendency toward the disappearance
of persons with a common association past or present; e.g.,
graduates of the same high school or university faculty,
members of a political party or youth group, etc. However,
there are aiany cases that make no apparent sense and for
which tne explanation may lie more in internal politics than .
in any specific act of the victim.

fd Public criticism of government policies has, with
few known exceptions, generally not been considered by
authorities as grounds for detaining the critics and abusing
or killing them. Many politicians, labor leaders, businessmen,
and other professionals have criticized the government ,'s economic
political and human rights policies without suffering
retributidi) at the hands of the security forces.

( C-) ■ There has been no significant official effort to
collect and publish information on persons who allegedly
have disappeared. When queried about disappearances by non-
governmental organizations or foreign governments, the Argentines
standard, response is "no information". The Argentine courts

S£CRE.T/NOFOJtN/HO: C.ON.TRACT

au « (Barnkaa

sscReavNOPORM/NO coMTimey

-5-

regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged
disappeared persons, but they have refused to accept
jurisdiction in such cases.

("€) The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (relatives' of

disappeared persons) one of the most persistent and cohesive
groups seeding information on disappeared persons, has
recently been prohibited from conducting what had been a
weekly Thursday vigil in frpnt of Government House in down-
town Buenos Aires. The demonstrations apparently had become
too large and potentially disruptive in the judgment of
government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands
for information. The Mothers are now holding their gatherings
at smaller and less conspicuous sites.

( C j ■ Given the diffusion of authority that has character-
ized the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that
any government agency either has collected or will be able to
collect definitive files on alleged disappearance cases. The
various security units have an obvious interest in withholding
or destroying information on cases for which their operatives
have been responsible.

tCT Reappearances'/ emerged as a new and possibly under-
reported facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are
no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probably
quite small in relation to the reported number of disappearances.
As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15
cases and by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placed
the figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting
it might be as high as 300. During 1978, the government
published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who
ftad allegedly reappeared. In most cases, however, the
individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular "missing
persons" cases. Their names did not appear on the lists of
disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine
human rights' organizations.

~t^ — Fair, public, trial . All who have been detained by
official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have,
obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges
against them.

SECrtET/^*OPORM/Ne C O NTRACT

^jS^imouwsKi.jycaanaoii.sH

GECRET/NOFORIVNP CONTfaCT
- 6 -

-(-ef Insofar as alleged security violators ^-aii£_charaed
and tried in civilian or military courts, ’*•* there are two
notable problems; the often extended period between de-
tention and judicial processing and the reported predominance
of convictions based on confessional evidence extracted
through torture. Professional legal groups such as the
ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional
evidence.

tCI — Invasion, of the home . The detention practices of
operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal
invasion of the home. In addition, there are numerous reports
of arresting officers ransacking private residences and
stealing the personal property of the detainee,

TCI Trends . 1978 produced no substantial quantitative
improvement or deterioration in category-one terms. The year
featured a variety of positive and negative factors, but the
net result was to leave the situation little changed. ^
Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official
security personnel were frequent throughout the year, and
there was no evidence of a concerted, effective government
effort to halt the abuses.

It is difficult to refine the trends analysis to
reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds
of abuses because the available statistical material is not
always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a
good example.. In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires and
Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances
during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequeny
(about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977. By later in

The status of PEN prisoners with respect to
judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner
held under-' a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on
charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted,
serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half
or more of the current PEN detainees are either being
tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities.

This is significant because, among other reasons, PEN
detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction
of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition
for exile under the r ight-of-option program.

SEGRE T /WPl fO RM/WO. COWTRA Cr

-WNOiiiiN wi i¥ (BonooifcaM

CBCRET/WPfORW/tg Q CONTRACT '

-7-

the year, however, additional information forced upward
adjustments in the figures. Interior Ministry records showed
a rate of 40 per month for January to October (as compared to
150 per month in iy77 and 250 per month in 1978) and a Foreign
Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at about
80 per month. By November, the Embassy had reports of dis-
appearances averaging aoout 34 per month for the January-Apr il
period. The Embassy has since concluded that a figure of
55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978.

■fCj” On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion
that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative
frequency Uiroughout the year with month- to-month variations
reflecting tactical considerations rather than policy
decisions- In essence, the situation changed little
during 1978.^

( S/NF/NGt Counter terrorism.- uncontrolled . The
conclusion tnat conditions did not improve in 1978 is
based, in part, on evidence that the security forces
continued to operate without effective central control.

Numerous reports during the vear from a variety of int elligence
sources stated thars

— President Videla and his moderate supporters
were attempting to establish rigid command and
control over security operations;

— new orders had been issued with respect to con-
ducting police and military operations within
the bounds of the law; or

— police and military operatives had been dis-
missed or disciplined for abuses.

■tCT" Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken.
Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in
areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward
reform. Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent
that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted
in accord with orders issued by regional and local military
authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrained by the
law or the directives of national authorities. In late
October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsibilities
in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that
there was almost no central control over operational
counterterrorist units..

CBCRBT/WOFORM/NO. gOWTRAC r -

^^swwffla.yN3Hiivca3noo»aii

" ■ " SgCIlDT/NOPQRM/N0. CQMTRfieT

- 8 -

tC f The political- context . The “dirty war" argument
so frequently employed by Argentines to rationalize human rights
abuses is no longer relevant. According to estimates drafted
by the Argentine Federal Security Service in late 1978, there
were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina; no single
group was estimated to have more than 245 resident activists,
and no group was judged a serious and immediate security
threat. High government officials, including President Videla,
have repeatedly stated both publicly and privately that the
"war" is over, i.e, that there is no continuing high-level
internal security threat.

{ The explanation for the continuing human rights
abuses lies' in armed forces, and especially army, politics
rather than in internal security problems. The army is
the preaominant service, and its political heterogeneity
is reflected in the conduct of government affairs. President
Videla leads a group of military and civilian moderates who
would prefer to see human rights abuses halted. Videla Is
priority concern, however, is to maintain the maximum degree
of ^my and military unity, because the development of
irreparable internal splits probably • would spell his own quick
demise and the end of the military', s National Reorganization
Process. Videla is not power hungry, but he is committed
to the military government's reform program and believes
his own role important. Thus, Videla Is preferences give way
to his long-term political goals when his preferences
threaten military cohesion.

■fet In the case of human rights abuses, neither Videla
nor any other significant military figure, has questioned
the pre-March 1976 decision to physically eliminate hard
core terrorists. Videla Is differences with the so-called
haraliners center on violations of the rights of non-terror ists.
The hardliners are philosophically authoritarian and inclined
to label a wide range of political activity and sentiment
as subversive. They do not entirely share the moder^es
perception.' tnat the “war" against subversion is overJ^

Powerful corps commanders like Major General Carlos Guillermo
Suarez Mason (formerly Commander, Corps I, Buenos, Aires) and
Major General Luciano Benjamin Menendez (Corps III, Cordoba)
continued throughout 1978 to condone counterterrorist tactics
that ensured human rights abuses.

Other factors that diminished Videlals cnances of
achieving human rights reforms in 1978 included his August
retirement as an active-duty officer and Army Coirunander and

S BCRBT/MOPOrttl/WO. CONTRAC ' ^

SECRD f r/HOPORN/W e : .COMTRa.CT -

_9_

a gradual increase in military and civilian disenchantment
with the general economic and political performance of his
government. Those conditions, plus the degree to which the
Beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official
attention during the last quarter of the year,- create nignxy
improbable circumstances for bold human rights initiatives on
Videlajs part.

fC)- The results of the recent army promotion/reassignraent
cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms.
Moderates politically in sympathy with Videla and Army Commander
Viola now may be in a position to exert more effective control
over the service. Particularly notable changes involved
the following officers:

— Suare.2- Mason has been shifted from his Corps I
commander slot to Array Chief of Staff. His
new post is a prestigious one from which he
might be able to advance to the Commander in
Chief Is slot. Nonetheless, since he no longer
has a troop command nor, more importantly,
direct control over counterterrorist units, his
promotion is probably a net short-term human
rights gain.

— Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Gal tier i has
replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander.

Galtieri most recently commanded Corps II
(Hosario) where he established a reputation for
reasonableness and restraint. in human rights
matters. It has been in his geographic jurisdiction,
for example, that the most progress has been
registered with respect to the judicial processing
of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same
tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a
needed improvement over Suarez Mason.

— Majdr General Santiago Omar Hiveros , another
officer notorious tor his permissive attitude
toward human rights abuses, has been shifted from
his sensitive Buenos Aires command (Military
Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board.

— Magor General Jose Montes will replace Riveros.

A Videla-Viola loyalist, Montes could combine with
Galtieri to give the moderates the potential for
curbing the abuses heretofore characteristic of

gECRDT/NOPORiq/NO. COWTRACr

ji^TWOUYH au. IV mflooiwaa

i SFf’RPT/WOrOIUl/MO COin ' MCT
- 10 “

counter terror ist operations in. the Buenos Aires
area.

— Brig. General Juan Bautists Sassjain ' s appointment
as Chief of the National Police is an ominous
move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist
expert, Sassiain is reputedly rough and cruel.

— Major General Luciano B. Menendez , a fanatic on

suoversion who has condoned human rights violations
by those under his command, remains the Corps III
commander <Cordoba). Militarily, Menendezjs retention
may^ be attributable to the need for his services
in the event of hostilities with Chile over
the Beagle Channel. In human fights terras,
however, it means that the situation in Cordoba
is not liable to improve in the near future.

In all likelihood, the array command shifts will not
result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements,
but the political context appears to be more f avor able than
it has been since the March 1976 coup.'S^ Much will depend
upon whether the Videla-Viola tandem chooses to exercise
the necessary leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether
the Argentine public becomes sqf f iciently exercised over
continuing abuses to demand change.

^ lAHRC visit . From the Argentine government's
perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29
when the Inter-Amer ican Human Rights Commission (IAHRC5 will
begin a week-long on site investigation*

It is questionable, however, whether the prospect of
the lAHRC visit will lead to fundamental changes in the tactics
employed by the security forces and, thereby, open the way to
long-term human rights advances. In this critical area, the
army command changes oroba^bly offer more hope for reform than
the lAHKC vdsit.^

S FTRET/tlOrpRM/NO LUNl ' K^VCS:'

S BCRBg/tlOFOIQl/MO COHgitftCT

FOOTNOl'ES

1. HA Note: HA pcefers the following wording for

the text from sentence two of paragraph
1 tnrough first sentence of paragraph 3.

“Although it is difficult to quantify precisely
certain aspects of the situation - such as
the exact number of people killed. and tortured
and the number being held in clandestine
military camps - we receive a steady flow of
detailed information from a wide variety of
credible sources in Argentina about human
rights events and co nditions. These so urces
include our Embassy

() I

and Amnesty Inter-
national, Argentine Government. officials,
Argentine human rights organizations,
victims of arrest and torture, eyewitnesses
to incidents of abduction and torture, and
relatives of victims."

2. HA Note: No overall trend of improvement in category -
one terms can be shown. There was substantial
qualitative deterioration in at least two areas -
the widening scope of the victims of dis-
appearance, and the worsening of treatment
of political detainees. The simple passage
of time can also be wiewed as a negative
factor - anotlier year of widespread violations
long after any terrorist threat* has passed.

3. HA Note: HA would again emphasize that despite uncertainties

with quantitative material, the shift in targeting
noted above is a significant negative development.

t

4. HA Note: However, Videla himself said last year that

"A terrorist is not gust someone with a gun
or bomb but also someone, who spreads ideas that
are contrary to Western and Christian civilization"
(Reported in the London Times, January 4, 1978).

INR and ARA view the inclusion of this statement
attributed by the press to Videla as potentially
misleading when used in the above context. The

0 DCRDT/MOFORN/MO- COWTACT

’^H3W TWOtilW 3HI1V tBOnOOlkSB

5. HA Note;

6 . S/P and
HA Note':

SECRE^/NOPOItN/NO, .CON T ACT
- 2 -

quote invites the inference that Videla
supports the application of extreme security
measures against those who have not committed
violent terrorist acts. There is no evidence
to support that contention.

The army command changes present a mixed
picture from which it is not possible to conclude
that the overall political context for human
rights improvement is more favorable than in
the past.

S/p and HA would delete this last sentence
because it contradicts the assessment that
the command changes are “mixed".

)

C BCllBaVM OFORN/ WO; ..CONTaCT

UNCLASSIFIED

97.

Memorandum From John Spiegel of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State to Robert Pastor
of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, February 28, 1979

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country
Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-7/79. Secret.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM PORs

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Mr. Robert Pastor
National Security Council
The White House

John W. Spiegel 0t»*^

Special Assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of State

Assessment of Current Human Rights
Situation in Argentina

Attached is a report on the current human rights
situation in Argentina, done at Secretary Vance's
request by the Assist^mt Secretaries for Latin America,

Human Rights Policy Planning, and Intelligence cuid
Research. The report concludes that Kidnapping, by
official security , units , continued during 1978 at a
rate of roughly 55 "disappearances" per month.

Approximately 90% of those abducted are estimated
to have been tortured during interrogation, and many
have been summarily executed.

On the basis of the attached report. Secretary
Vance and Mr. Christopher believe that we cannot
continue abstaining in the multilateral development
banks on non-basic human needs loans to Argentina.

The United States moved from a position of voting no
on non-basic human needs loans to edjstention because
of signs that the Argentine government intended to
address seriously the very grave human rights situation.

We have urged the GOA to do so in repeated diplomatic
approaches at the highest levels, including Secretary
Vcmce and the Vice President. We had hoped that the
GOA's decision last fall to invite the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission to visit Argentina this May
would provide a further inducement for improvements
in advance of the visit, and for that reason we went
forward with Export-Import Bank financing and some
IMET courses. Notwithstanding our efforts and
expectations, there has been no improvement in what
remains the worst human rights situation in the
hemisphere.

ADP Declassification Review

O rr/ ^ P CTT DECLASSIFIED

"OtWiAti by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017

RDS-2/3 2/28/85 (Spiegel, John W.)

2

O CPP CT

{

As you know, the legal restrictions, from a human
rights standpoint, on U.S. positions on loans by the
multilateral development banks are much stronger and
more explicit than in other areas of economic relations
such as Ex-lm lending, OPIG guarantees, or export
licenses, where we have followed a scmiewhat more
liberal course with respect to Argentina. The U.S.
is required by law to seek to channel assistance in
the multilateral development banks away from countries
whose governments engage in "a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights," and to oppose loans to those countries unless
the loans serve basic human needs. We consistently
vote against loans to a nxui^er of countries where the
situation is not as grave as in Argentina. Given
these considerations, and taking into account the need
to address this difficult bilateral issue in a positive
way whenever possible. Secretary Vance and Mr. Christopher
have concluded that the U.S. must move soon to a "vote
no" position unless there are substantial improvements
in the Argentine human rights situation.

Amb. Vaky is discussing with the Argentine
Ambassador this need for improvement in the near
future and the likely consequences of a continuation
of the current situation.

Please let me know if you have any reactions to
the attached report.

Attachment :

As stated.

SEeRgT

UNCLASSIFIED

98.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, March 21, 1979

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4,
Argentina, 1/79-1/80. Secret. Pastor drafted the memorandum on March 20, but recommended
that it be used as taking points rather as a memorandum. (Memorandum from Pastor to
Brzezinski, March 20; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South,
Pastor, Country Files, Box 91, Argentina, 3/79-12/80)

UNCLASSIFIED

/XX

• SECR E ' .

MExMORANDUM FOR

’’HE WHITE HOUSE

WASH I N GTON

March 21 , 1979

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

I understand that you are considering changing our approach
to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in
human rights. I have read the INR report on the human riahts
situation in Argentina, and I agree that it is a sobering
document. The human rights situation in Argentina may just
be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach
the United States Government should take to Argentina, I
believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina

to encourage them to respect human rights? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to susta^ in the U.S.
our overall hxiraan rights policy.*' When we take'actions towara
Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only
enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business
sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we
shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they

are required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully
and explain our position to a wide-ranging audience — in the
U.S. and elsewhere — before taking any steps, least we
jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an
impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never
as direct or as much as we want. This is the case in our
human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us
at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige
and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the
Argentine military government is legitimate. Such legitimacy
would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina
and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutional-
ization of the military government. The Argentine government
has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the
U.S.: (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they

have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights

SECRET Declassification Review

Review on March 20, 198 5 DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

- 2 -

SE ' CRBT

policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human
rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue,
still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners,
they have released the names of about 3,5000 people who
remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority
individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they
have invited the Inter -American Commission on Human Rights. (S)

The last — ^the invitation — may well be the most important.

It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to
the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate
basis on which we and other countries should make decisions
on human rights to Argentina- (S)

I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and
correct until such time as the hxrnian rights situation
dramatically improves and the government has begun to move
toward deraocratizatiSn. ' I believe that we should continue
to use every opportunity both directly and through third
countries to encourage them to improve their human rights
situation. They will continue to try to lure high-level
visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as
punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and
conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their
support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would
be effective vis-a-vis Argentina. (S)

Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would
recommend that you delay implementing this approach until
after the Ccmanission has completed its report. I realize
that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the
wait is justified. (S^

In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on
Argentina. I think we should continue to maintain a strong,
cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress
in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to
move to negative votes in the IFI ' s or to cut back Export-
Import Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report
and then adjust our policy appropriately. (S)

ZBIGNIEW BR2EZINSKI

□ECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

99.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, March 27, 1979, 1831Z

2399

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790165-061 1. Secret;
Immediate.

UNCLASSIFIED

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I

S ECRET

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ISO-00 NSCE-00 COME-00 SP-02 AID-05 EB-08
SS-IS STR-08 OMB-01 CEA-01 IHRB-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 HA-OS L-03 H-01 SSO-00

112752 281642Z /46

O 271831Z MAR 79

FH AMEKBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SSCSTATl WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9997

E E U H E T SECTIC»i 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 2399

E.O. 1206S: XDS-1 3/27/09,- (CASTRO, HAOD H.) OR-M
TAGS: SHUH AR

SUBJ: (S) AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES RAILROAD LOAN WITH PRi^IDENT
VIDELA

REF: CASTRO-RUSER TELECONS, 3/26,-- STATE 075474 j- STATE 0761^2.

1. 1SECRETT ALL TEXT.

2. I RECEIVED A CALL FROM DEPARTMENT YESTERDAY (MAR 26) INFORM-
ING ME MESSAGE WOULD BE ARRIVING SHORTLY REFERENCE USG VOTE m
GOA RAILROAD Wm TO TAKE PLACE TODAY (MARCH 27) . I WAS INSTRUCT-
ED TO SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA ASAP, ANTICIPATING
MESSAGE, I CONTACTED PRESIDENT VIDELA' S OFFICE AND HAS TOLD
PRESIDENT WOULD SHORTEN HIS MEETING AWAY FROM PRESIDENTIAL
PALACE TO MEET ME AT 20:30 HRS LAST NIGHT (MARCH 26) . DUE TO
NON- ARRIVAL OF DBPT'S MESSAGE, I CONTACTED DIRECTOR, (ARA/ECA)

FOR GUIDANCE AS TO CONTENTS OP MESSAGE. CONTENTS WSiE FURNISHED
ME AMD SUBSEQUENTLY AN AHBNDM»r HAS GIVEN JUST BEFORE LEAVIM3
FOE MY MEETING WITH VIDELA.

3. ON ARRIVAL, VIDELA WAS WAITING FOR HE. HE APPEARED IN GOOD
SPIRITS AND INVITED ME TO HIS WORKING OFFICE. I HAD ALWAYS MET
WITH HIM IN HIS MAIN OFFICE. TO MY DISMAY, HIS WOR3CING

SE C RET

’SECRET

PAGE 02 BUENOS 02399 01 OF 02 281600Z

OFFICE APPEARS TO BE AN ADJtmCT TO 8C»ffi BISILICA AS THE
DECOR IS HEAVILY RELIGIOUS. AFTER MY MAKING FULL INQUIRY
INTO THE HEALTH AND WELFARE OF HIS FAMILY AND THE PRESIDENT
OF MINE, I GAVE MY OPBNIl^ STATSIEHT. I TRANSLATED IN FULL
DETAIL CONTENTS OF MESSAGE GIVEN HE. I MUST ADMIT IT MAS
MOT PLEASANT TO READ TO THE PRESIDENT AN INDICTMENT OF
CHARGES THAT HIS COUNTRY HAS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATOR AND
FOR THAT REASCRi USG, AS REQUIRED BY LAW, IT WAS REQUIRE}

TO VOTE ■NO" <m LOANS WmU HILTILATERAL DBVELOmEQIT BANKS.

I THEN EXPLAINED TO VIDELA THAT IN 1978 THE USG CHANGED
ITS POSITION FROM VOTING "NO" TO ABSTAINING ON THESE LOANS
BECAUSE THERE WERE SEVERAL INDICATIONS WHICH IIUIICATED
IMPROVEMENTS HOUW BE FORTOCOMItp. I TOLD KIM WE CONSIDERED
THE lAHRC VISIT AS A VERY POSITIVE FACTOR.

4. I THEN EXPLAINED TO VIDELA THE YEAR 1978 WAS EXTRSIBLY
DISCOURAGING. I THEN WENT DOWN THE LINE ON CHARGES AND TOLD
VIDELA SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS HAD NOT OCCURRED IN 1978.

BY THIS TIME PRESIDENT VIDELA APPEARED VERY MUCH LIKE THE
ACCUSED AND I AS THE SUPERIOR TOURT JUDGE. I TOU3 THE PRESI-
DENT ARBITRARY ARRESTS, DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS DUE TO
EFFORTS OF SECURITY FORCES HAD BLATANTLY CONTINUED IN 1978.

1 EXPLAINED THERE HAS AN AVERAGE OF OVER SO PERSONS DIS-
APPEARED PER MONTH LAST YEAR. I EXPLAINED OF USG TOTAL CON-
TEMPT FOR TORTURING AND MIS-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS DURING

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

r /w rJ AW p— • //C? A O /C* A C? OAO A A ^

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INTERROGATIONS AND THAT FURTHERMORE THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL
PRISONERS REMAINED VERY HIGH. DURING ALL THIS TIME I SPOIS
FIRMLY, SUCCINCTLY AND AT A RAPID PACE SO AS TO AVOID THE
PRESIDENT INTERRUPTING MY TRAIN OF THOUGHT. I WANTED TO BE
SURE HE HEARD IT ALL. AS I WATCHED THE PRESIDENT, IT BECAME
CLEAR HE WAS IN PAIN OVER MY STATEMENTS. (COMMENT! I WAS
HAPPY I WASN'T TALKING TO MININT. HASGUIfflJEGUY, WHO WEIGHS
ABOUT 240 POUNDS AND DOESN'T SPEAK BUT IHSTSAO ROARS.)

S BC REr

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PAGE 03 BUENOS 02399 01 OF 02 281600Z

5. I CCEITIHUSD TELLING THE PRESIDENT USG HAD BE^ MONITORING
GOA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HOPING TO FltS POSITIVE INDICA-
TIONS SO AS TO AVOID VOTING "NO" ON LOANS. I MENTIONED THE
PRESIDENT'S STATBSHT OVER THE RECENT SUPREME COUOT OECISIC^
AMD ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TIMERMAN RELEASE. I UHlSH
EXPLAINED THERE WAS LACK OF CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO INDICATE
TORTURE AND DISAPPEARANCES HAD C(»<PLETBLY CEASED. IN VIEW OF
THESE FACTORS, VIDSLA HAS TOLD USG HAS READY TO VOTE "NO*

m TUESDAY, MARCH 27.

6. VIDELA HA THEN TOLD THAT BASED ON STATEMENTS MADE BY
THEIR AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL ON MARCH 22, Vm HAS WxLLING TO
TAKE ANOTHER LOOK ON SITUATION. I INFORMH3 VIDELA THAT AJA
ESPIL HAD STATED DISAPPEARANCES HAD STOPPED, THAT GOA WOULD
INVESTIGATE NEW DISAPPEARANCES AND ACTICM WOULD BE TAKEN
AGAINST ANY SECURITY FORCE RSSPCMSIBLE FOR DISAPPEARANCES.
VIDELA HAS THEN TOLD AJA ESPIL HAD SUBMITTED TO HIS GOVERN-
MENT NAME OF PERSON SUPPOSEDLY DISAPPEARED ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979

PER RECORDS OF AMNESTY INTBRNATICBIAL. VIDELA DISCLAINai
KNOWING ANY SUCH DISAPPEARANCE ON FEB. 9. (C(E4MBNT: EMBASSY
RECORDS FAIL TO INDICATE ANY DISAPPEARANCE OH FEB. 9. I
ASKED AJA ESPIL, WHO WAS IN TOWN FOR ONE DAY, TO SUBMIT
NAMES OF MISSING PERSON, SO CASE CAN BE SUBSTANTIATED. END
CCEOiEHT:)

7. I TOLD VIDELA BASED ON HIS AMBASSADOR'S AND OTHER
REPRESENTATIONS CSI HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMTOTS, THE USG WOULD
CONTINUE ITS POLICY OP ABSTENTION ON MARCH 27. AS I MADE
THIS STATEMENT, VIDELA GAVE A UMG SIGH OF RELIEF, SMILED
REACHED OVER, AND SHOOK MY HAND AND THANKED HE. (CC»(MBNT;

THIS ACTION HAS MOST PERPLEXING FOR MB AS I FELT AS THOUGH
I HAD FAILED IN KY MISSICET. I ANTICIPATED LITERALLY BEING
TOSSED OUT DURING HY INITIAL PHASE OF THE INTERVIEW, BUT
HAVING THE PRESIDENT OP ARGENTINA THANK Ml FOR AN •ABSTENTION*
HAS TOTALLY UNEXPECTED. VIDELA WAS THOROUGHLY PLEASED WITH

bsUKEil

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PAGE 04 BUENOS 02399 01 OF 02 281600Z

THE "ABSTENTION*, EVEN THOW3H MY CHARGES OP HIS COUNTRY WERE
HARD, FACTUAL AND NOT EASY TO ACCEPT. END Ca^OllNT:)

SKCRgi '

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8. I THEN SHIFTED OVER BY TELLING VIDELA USG HOPED GOA WOULD
SOON START WORKING ON LISTS OF DISAPPEARED SUBMITTED BY US
AND INTERNATIONAL ORGAHIEATICBIS . I AGAIN STRESSED NEED TO
RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS ASAP AND IMMEDIATELY HALT TO
TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT OF PRISCWIRS. I COMPLIMENTED
VIDELA FOR VIRTUAL CESSATION OF DISAPPEARANCES SINCE JANUARY
AND WILLINGNESS OP GOA TO INVESTIGATE AND TAKE ACTION AGAINST
SECURITY FORCES WHICH ACTED ILLEGALLY. IT WAS MADE CLEAR

TO VIDELA GOA'S ACTIONS WOUU) BE MONITORS NOW AND IN THE
FUTURE.

9. TIMERMAN CASE: I TOLD VIDELA I HAD HEARD HE AND THE
JUNTA HAD DISCUSSED THE FATE OF JACOBO TIMERMAN. HE SMILED
A^ SAID IT HAS TRUE. VIDELA MADE A GESTURE AS THOUGH
PUTTING ON A PAIR OF GLOVES AND STATED THE TIMERMAN CASE
COULD NOT BE HANDLED WITH BARE KNUCKLES BUT ONLY WITH KID
GLOVES. I SUGGESTED THE PUTTIIKS ON OF THE KID GLOVES SHOUU)
MOT PROVE TO BE A DILATORY TECHNIQUE. VIDELA im TOLD ME
HE KNEW I HAD PERSISTENTLY DISCUSSED THE TIMERMAN CASE WITH
GENERAL VIOLA AND VIOLA HAD IN TURN DISCUSSED THE CASE WITH
HIM AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE JIRITA. I THEN SAGGESTEO PERHAPS
IT MIGHT PROVE GOOD P.R. WORK IF TIMERMAN WOULD BE RELEASED
ASAP SO AS TO AVOID GIVING APPEARANCE OF ACT BEING ONE OP
PRESSURE BEFORE ARRIVAL OF lAHRC. HE AGREED. I THEN TOLD

saiCKJSi'”

SBCRET

PAGE 02 BUENOS 02399 02 OF 02 2816112

VIDELA I HOPED TIMERMAN CASE TOULD NOT TURN OUT TO BE ANOTHER
TLATELOLCO RATIFICATION - JUST PROIISES AND MORE PROMISES.

WITH A SHEEPISH GESTURE, KB TOLD ME STRCMG EFFORTS WERE BEING
MADE TO DECIDE TIMERMAN AND TIATBLOLCO CASE BY MIDDLE OR BID
OF APRIL. IN A l«)HENT OF LEVITY (HI MY PART, I TOLD PRESIDENT
I HOPED TIMERMAN AND TLATELOLCO HC»LD BE RESOLVED BY APRIL 14,
AS I WOULD BE VISITING THE DEPARTMENT (W THAT DATE. I ALSO
TOU3 VIDELA I WANTED TO GET CREDIT FOR TIMERMAN AND TLATELOLCO
BEFORE I LEFT AS I DIDN'T WANT THE DCH, MAX CHAPLIN, TO GET
THE GLORY. VIDELA LAUGHED HSAI^ILY AND SAID HE WOUU MAKE
MIS BEST TO ACXX»«CH3ATE MB. I SUGGESTED TO VIDELA THAT IF
TLATELOLCO HAS RATIFIED AND TIHEBIAN RELEASED, THAT HE
SHOULD PHCMB PRESIDENT CARTER DIRB(n?LY, SO THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENT WOULD BE THE FIRST TO KNOW THE FATE OF TWO
MATTERS OF HIS HIGH INTEREST. PRESIDENT VIDELA REPLIED
THIS HAS WHAT HE HAD IK MIND OF DOING .

10. RIGHT OF OPTI<»I: 1 TOLD VIDELA USG WOULD BE VERY
APPRECIATIVE IF HE PUT IN A TOOD WORD WITH GENERAL
KRGUINDEGUY, MIN OF INT, SO AS TO ACCELERATE RIGHT OF
OPTI(» PROGRAM. VIDELA PROMISED HE WOULD BUT THEN CLARIFIED
ISSUE BY STATING A NEW COMMITTEE HAD BEEN FORMED FOR RIGHT
OF OPTION CASES. HE IMPLIED HARGUINDEGUY' S ROLE HAD BEEN
DIMINISHED .

11 . FUTURE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIONS: THE PRESIDENT GAVE MB
ASSURANCES DISAPPEARANC:ES HAD STOPPED AND WOULD NO LONGER
BE A FACTOR. HE EXPLAINED THERE WILL BE INSTANCES OF
CRIMINAL DISAPPEARANCES FOR RAHSCW AND PERHAPS AN OCCASIONAL
SECURITY OFFICnSR WHO MIGHT GO OFF HALF-COCKED. HE DID AGREE
TO INVESTIGATE ALL DISAPPEARANCES AND THAT CULPRITS WOUU

BE TRIED IN A COURT OF LAW.

INRE-00
K-01 SSO-00

i

2816412 /46

1 «* if . 4 . •

./TV . .X r*

— iM _ . //o A o /r« *, n ju . Cl A n

A A n

Dociunent View

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aB C Rg r

PAGE 03 BUENOS 02399 02 OF 02 281611Z

12. DISAPPEARANCES; VIOELA STATED HE FORESAW AN IMPASSE
DURING THE lAHRC VISIT. HE SAID GOA IN ALL SINCERITY LACKED
INFORMATION ON DISAPPEARANCES AND WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY
NOT BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO COMMISSION REQUIREMENTS. HE STATED
DISAPPEARANCES HAS (XTE PHASE OF lAHRC INVESTIGATION GOA

HAS UNABLE TO COME UP WITH ANY ANSWERS. VIDELA EXPRESSED
GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE
TO ABIDE BY THE RULE OF LAW. HE TOU> ME A SINCERE EFFORT
HAS BEING MADE TO CLEAN HOUSE BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF lAHRC.

13. I THANKED VIDELA FOR RECEIVING HE FAST AS SOON AS HE
DID. HE REPLIED BY STATING HE WAS GLAD HE COULD ACCOMMODATE
ME AS MIN ECON MARTINEZ DE HOZ TOLD HIM LAST WEEK USG WOULD
VOTE "NO* ON RAILROAD LOAN. HE SAID HE LOOKED UPON ME AS A
BEARER OF GOOD TIDINGS.

CASTRO

SECRE T"

NNN

S E CRE T

//O A 0/0 A O O A O

A I^A i^r\% ^

UNCLASSIFfED

100 .

Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, July 27, 1979

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, David Newsom Files, 1978-81, Lot 81D154, Box 14, Latin
America. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Newsom. The meeting took place in the Embassy of
Argentina. The time of the luncheon is not indicated in the memorandum. Copies were sent to
ARA, HA, S/P, S, D, P, and the Embassy in Buenos Aires.

UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

X

Memorandum of ConvenoHon

SUBJECTt

U.S. -Argentina Relations

DATE: July 27, 1979
Place: Argentina Embassy

PARTICJFANTSj

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
David D. Newsom

Argentina Ambassador Aja Espil

C|!pies to: ARA, HA, S/P, S, D, Buenos Aires, P

.

'■ 'fi..

During the "course of a luncheon conversation, Ambssador, Aja Espil
stressed the need for a continuing^ dialogue with his country.

He noted that it had been more than "a year since my visit to
Buenos Aires and a considerable time since the important meet-
ing between Vice President Mondale and President Videla iii
Rome .

Some new contact at a high-level was necessary in order to
give support to the moderate elements in Argentina at a
time when the military were reacting to a series of '•shocks."

He mentioned the Nicaraguan situation and the Ar gen tine vote
in favor of our resolution at the OAS. Also adverse from
the military's standpoint were the recent visits of John
Oakes of the New York Times -- who^wrptfi two articles
critical of the regime on May 15-16 -- ana a delegation from
the New York Bar Association. The problem with the military
will be further aggravated by the results of the upcoming
visit of the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission,

The Ambassador emphasized that the vote on behalf of our
resolution should be seen by us as a positive step to be
acknowledged. He acknowledged that there were still human
rights problems, but said there had been progress in the

P : DDNews om : chg

(Drtifmg «nd OfimJ
D5,|254

j . 65 '

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
- 2 -

release of prisoners and the reduced number of disappear-
ances. He acknovledged that the Timmerman case and the
inability of the government to account for the disappeared
remained serious problems.

He suggested that Ambassador Vaky might consider a visit to
Buenos Aires after the inauguration of the Bolivian Presi-
dent in La Paz bn August 6 (if this takes place*) . He sug-
gested, also, that the Secretary receive the new Foreign
Minister, pastor , who will be in New York from September
22 to 26. He said "even a half hour" would be very important.

The Ambassador said it was important, particularly in view
of the OAS vote to explain to the Argentine government our
view on the Nicaraguan situation. The military reaction
to this had been further aggravated by the appearance last
week in Managua of a Montonero leader who proclaimed that
"what has happened in Managua will happen next in Buenos
Aires."

I responded by agreeing to discuss the matters he had raised
further with Ambassador Vaky, I said we wanted good rela-
tions with Argentina, but that some of the matters he had
raised clearly stood in the way. I asked whether, for ex-
ample, it would be possible to make any progress on Timmer-
man. He said, "perhaps at the end of the year." He said
Timmerman, unfortunately, talks too much and says the wrong
things as far as the military is concerned.'

On Nicaragua, I suggested that Argentina had close relations
with some of the Andean states, such as Venezuela and that
his government might want to talk to these countries. I
said we were trying to take a less central role and to
leave such matters as much as possible to the Latin Amer-
ican states directly interested. The Ambassador acknowledged,
this, but insisted that his government still considered us
"the key."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNCLASSIFIED

101 .

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Argentina, and Nicaragua
Washington, August 14, 1979, 2220Z
212082

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790369-1 171. Confidential;
Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts. Drafted by
Adams; cleared in S/S-0 and in draft by R. Pastor and Bremer; and approved by Vaky.

UNCLASSIFIED

Ddcument View

Page 1 of 5

CONFIIH-WTOO:

EXDIS

PAGE 01 STATE 212082

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-OO SSO-00 /02S R

DRAFTED BY ARA/ECaiMMADAMS, OR. : MAS
APPROVED BY ARA:VPVAKY
NSCsRAPASTOR (DRAFT)

S/S:JBREMER (DRAFT)

S/S-OiRSTEVES

- 034059 142321Z /75

0 R 142220Z AUG 79

FM SECSTATE W7VSHDC

TO AME»ffiASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE

AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

AMEHBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS

XMT AMS18ASSY BUENOS AIRES

AMEHBASSY MANAGUA

AMEHBASSY QUITO

e e » F 1 U t. M I I A L STATE 212082
EXDIS

E.O. 120SS.- GDS 8/10/8S (VARY, VIRON P,)

TAGS: PGOV.PINT, PORS, PARM, XK. XM, AR

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

PASTOR

1. OTJFTDEirrm; - entire text

2. SOTMARY: SECRETARY VANCE HAD EXTBNSJVE^BXCHANGE

\ OF VIEWS WITH FONMIN PASTOR IN QUITO. PASTOR EXPRESSED
\ CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA AND THE ’DANGEROUS”
; CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION. HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA
eOW F IP EWT Ig B

PAGE 02 STATE 212082

HOPES TO PROCEED TOWARD DEJKXfRACY IN NEM FUTOHB BUT
NOT UNTIL IT GETS ITS HOUSE IN ORDER. HE APPEALED FOR
BETTER TIES WITH USG AND ASKED THAT ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IWT BE SOLE CRITERIA IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. SECRETARY
VANCE EXPRESSED APPRECIATICW FOR i^GENTI NA'S V OTE IN
QAS ON NICARAGUA, AND N^/i'ED TIKAT U.S. VAflJinilUllLY
ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND CONSIDERS IT A
FRISID --AN ALLY. HE CHARACTERIZED HUMAN RIGHTS
PROBLEM A “FESTERING SORE" IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. W
NICARAGUA, SECRETARY VANCE STRESSED NEED TO PUSH NEW
GOVERNMENT INTO DIRECTION OF BEING INDEPENDENT, UNALIGNED
COtJNTRY. WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL AMERICA, HE POINTED
TO NEED FOR COLLECTIVE HEMISHPERIC EFFORT TO PERSUADE
THESE COUNTRIES TO MOVE IN A RESKRISIBLK WAY. TURNING
TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, THE SECRETARY PRESSED PASTOR HARD
ON THE URGENCY OF ARGENTINA RATIFYING TREATY OF
TLATELOLCO AS PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD ASSURED PRESIDENT
CARTER WOULD BE THE CASE . PASTOR RESPONDED THAT
TLATELOLCO WOULD BE RATIFIED AFTER GOA COMPLETES
ARRANGEMENTS FOR PURCHASE OF HEAVY WATER PLANT AND
"PEW OTHER STEPS." END SUMIARY.

3. DURING RECEPTION AT NATIONAL PALACE IN QUITO AUGUST
10, SECRETARY VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
VARY AND MR. PASTOR OF NSC (WITH DCM FIMBRES AS NOTETAKER)
HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN
MINISTER PASTOR. FULL TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OP CONVERSATION

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIRED

by John Rtzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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OP THAT MEETINO FOLLOWS:

CENTRAL AMERICA

THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE GOA SAW THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN SITUATION AND WHAT STEPS THE FOREIGN MINISTER
■ CONPIDBIT S tt-

PAGB 03 STATE 212082

BELIEVE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THIS AREA.

IK RESPONSE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE AN HISTORIC
SKETCH OP THE SPREAD OP COMMUNISM, BEGINNING WITH ITS
BIRTH IN 1917 AND ITS EXTENSION TO CHINA AND EASTERN
EUROPE. HE ASSERTED COMMUNISM HAD REACHED NICARAGUA
AND NOW THREATENED SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA. HE
CHARACTERIZED THE CENTRAL MIERICAN SITUATION AS VERY
DANGEROUS. HE BELIEVED THE NEW NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT
IS UNDER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROK CUBA TO LAY ikjW AND
TO SEEK AS MUCH HELP AS POSSIBLE PROM AN ARRAY OF SOURCES.
AS NICARAGUA RECOVERS ON THE BASIS OP THIS ASSISTANCE
IT HILL BECOME A SEVERE MENACE TO ITS NEIGHBORS. AGAIN,
BROADENING HIS PERSPECTIVE, HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA IS
AWARE THAT IN COLOMBIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TERRORISM IS BOILING
UNDER A CALM SURFACE. THERE ARE ALSO SICTS OF GREAT
INSTABILITY IN BOLIVIA, AS WELL AS IN PERU.

IN SYNTHESIS, A RED STAIN IS SPREADING OVER A LARGE
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, AND A GREATER NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
ARE "INTENSE PINK", HE COMTINl^ THAT ARGENTINA KNOWS
THE PROBLEM BETTER THAN OTHERS BECAUSE OF ITS INTERNAL
STRUGGLE. THE GOA KNOWS THE TECHNIQUES THAT C<»IMUNISTS
USE IN SUBVERTING GOVERNMENTS. TO COUNTER COMMUNISM
ARGENTINA IS TAKING STEPS IN AREAS SUCH AS THE
UNIVERSITIES AND IS REVAMPING ITS ECCHOMY. THE GOA
HOPES IN THE HEAR FUTURE TO PROCEED ALC»«3 THE DEMOCRATIC
PATH BUT NOT UNTIL IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE PROBLEMS THAT
BEFELL PERON WILL NOT REVISIT THE COUNTRY.

HE MAINTAINED THAT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS THAT
THE SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THE U.S. AS THE
LEADER OP THE WEST. ARGENTINA, ESPECIALLY, HAS A SIMILAR
CONSTITUTION TO THAT OF THE U.S. AND WANTS TO BE TREATED
AS AN ALLY. THE GOA DOES NOT WANT THE (WLY THING TO
MATTER IN BILATERAL RELATIONS TO BE THE ISSUE OF HUMAN
CON F IDEOTIKC-

PAGE 04 STATE 212082

RIGHTS. IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS
DONE, EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER: FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS INVITED
A VISIT BY THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSICai.

IF THIS COMMISSICW APPLIES OBJECTIVE CRITERIA, IT HILL
SEE HARKED PROGRESS IN THE COUNTRY AND THAT THE TREND
IS ONE OF IMPROVEMENT. THIS MATTER OF HUMAN HIGHTS
SHOULD BE PUT IN PERSPECTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPOSED
AS A BARRIER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

ARGENTINA RECENTLY SUPPORTED THE U.S, IN THE OAS
AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS OP
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY DO HOT CCMPLETELY
COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE H.S., THESE COUNTRIES ARE
THE U.S.' TRUE ALLIES IN THE HEMISPHERE. AFTER THE
O.S., ■raE FOUR MOST IMPORTANT COtMTRIlS ARE MEXICO,

BRAZIL, VENEZUELA AND ARGENTINA. IF THIS GROUP CAN
ESTABLISH BETTER COMMUNICATION WITH THE U.S., INDEED
THEY HAVE A HEALTHY DESIRE FOR COLLABORATION WITH THE
U.S., THEY CAN SERVE TO GUIDE THE SMALLER LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES .

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. APPRECIATED
ARGENTINA'S RECENT VOTE IN THE OAS. ARGENTINA IS

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CONSIDERED A FRIEND --AN ADDY. THE D.S. VADUED HIGHLY
ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND EXPECTED THIS TO
CX^TINOS INTO THE FUTURE. HE FRANKLY CHARACTERIZED
THE HUMAN SIGHTS OBJECTIVES AS A FESTERING SORE. THIS
AND OTHER ISSUES SHCRJLD BE DEALT WITH AS FHISTOS AND
ALLIES. THE O.S. SHARED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW
REGARDING ARGENTINA'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE
INTERNATICHUAL COMMUNITY. BUT, THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED,
THE U.S. CANNOT IGNORE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A FESTERING
SORE IN OUR RELATIONS.
eOWPIDEHTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 212082

TURNING TO NICARAGUA, THE SECRETARY SAID NO DOUBT
THERE ARE SOME MARXIST/LENINISTS IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT
AND THAT CUBA SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL
RECONSTRUCTION. BUT THERE ARE ALSO MODERATE ELEMENTS
IN THE GNRj CONSEQUENTLY, THE COUNTRY CAN GO EITHER
HAY. NICARAGim HAS TO BE PUSHED IN THE DIRECTION THAT
WE WANT, TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT AND UNALIGNED COUNTRY.
THE NICARAGUAN SITUATION ALSO AFFECTS ITS NEIGHBORS
WHO ARE ALSO UNDER POLITICAL TENSION. THE U.S. FEELS

THAT COLLECTIVELY THE HEMISPHERE HAS TO HELP THESE
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FACE THEIR PROBLEMS. IF THESE
TENSIONS ARB NOT EASED AND THERE CONTINUES TO BE
SUPPRESSION OF RIGHTS, THERE HILL LIKELY BE AN EXPLOSION
OFFERING CUBA NEW OPPORTUNITIES. THE LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES SHOULD SEE WHAT THEY CAN DO ABOUT THIS AND
TRY TO MOVE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY SINCE WE ALL HAVE
A COMMOU RESPCRJSIBILITY FOR THE GOOD OF THE HEMISPHERE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HIS ANDEAN GROUP
COLLEAGUES HAD REPORTED TO HIM THAT NICARAGUA WILL HEED
A LONG PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION WHICH WILL ABSORB ALL
THE ENERGIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP HILL HAVE NO TIME TO THINK OF EXTENDING ITS
MARXIST VIEWS. BUT, THE MINISTER WONDERED WHAT THE
RESULT WOULD BE IP IT IS THE SANDINISTAS WHO
DISTRIBUTE HUMANITARIAN AID AND CHANNEL RECUPERATION
ASSISTANCE. WHO WILL GET ALL THE CREDIT FOR THIS EFFORT,
HE ASKED, BUT THE SANDINISTAS. THE RESULT CAN ONLY
BE THAT THE LEFTISTS WILL END UP ENLISTING THE MAJORITY
OF THE PEOPLE IN THEIR BEHALF SO THAT IN TWO OR THREE
YEARS, SHOULD THE 6NR ACCEDE TO

ELECTIONS, THE SANDINISTAS WOULD BE THE LOGICAL WINNERS
AND COMMUNISM WOULD TAKE OVER.

ee WFIPBW T IAC

PAGE 0£ STATE 212082

THE SECRETARY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IP HE
HAD AN ANSWER TO THIS DILEMMA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER
REPLIED THAT HE DID HOT HAVE AN ANSWER. HE WENT CW
TO COMMENT THAT NICAHAGia'S NEIGHBORS LACKED FAITH IN
THE U.S. HE ASSERTED THESE NEIGHBORS WANT AND NEED
THE U.S. TO as FORTHCX»<ING IN ASSISTANCE TO THEM TO
ASSURE imT NICARJWSia OVER TIME WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
TOPPLE THEM. THE MINISTER SAID HE PERCEIVED THIS IN
HIS TALKS WITH HIS CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLEAGUES. HE
FELT THERE SHOULD BE GREATER COMMUNICATION ON IDEAS
OF HOW TO STOP NICARAGUAN ENCROACHMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE FELT HONDURAS HAD A
GOOD CHANCE TO SURVIVE ANY THREATS. BUT WITH RESPECT
TO SALVADOR, THE TIME IS SHORT TO RESPCfflD TO THAT
COUNTRY'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE
FELT THAT UNLESS SALVADOR RESP<»IDS> QUICKLY ITS GOVERNMENT
MAS IN PERIL.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED

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AT NEWS THAT THE U.S. IS SBRIODSLY STUDYING PROVIDING
MILITARY AID TO THE GNR. HE THOUGHT THE EFFECT WOUU>

BE INDIRECTLY TO ARM CUBA.

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE GENERAL QUESTION
HAD BEEN RAISED, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS
AND THAT IS WHERE THE MATTER NOW STANDS. THE U.S.

WILL CONTINUE TO TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID, BOTH PROM
A MORAL NECESSITY AND FROM THE PRACTICAL INFLUENCE IT
COUUJ GIVE THE U.S. IN THE FUTURE THROUGH EXTENDING
A HELPING HAND. THE U.S. ALSO HOPES TO CHANNEL ANY
RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE THROUGH THOSE MINISTRIES RUN
BY MODERATES. FRANKLY, HE OBSERVED, SHORT-TERM AID
COWPlDSNTI W l

PAGE 07 STATE 212082

AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE CAN BE EXTENDED BOTH TO
MEET IMMEDIATE HUMAN NEEDS AND TO SERVE OIK LOI«3BR -RANGE
OBJECTIVES .

THE TERRITORIAL SEA

THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ABOUT A WIRE SERVICE
ACCOUNT REGARDING A SHIFT IN THE U.S. POSITION ON WATERS
BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL THREE MILES. REPORTEDLY, THE
U.S. WOULD DELIBERATELY EXERCISE TRANSIT RIGHTS BEYOND
THE THREE MILES AND WITHIN THE 200 MILES TO AFFIRM ITS
VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN THE NEWS ACCOUNT
AND WAS NOT AWARE WHAT IT MIGHT HEFER TO. HE COMMENTED
THAT IT MIGHT BE A GARBLED STORY COMING OUT OP THE LOS
NEGOTIATIONS . - -

TREATY OF TLATELOLCO

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM
THE FOREIGN MINISTER' S RREDECBSSOR "njAT ARGENTINA WOUI43
MOVE ON TLATELOLCO, *AND HE ASKED AlsOOl CdS STATUS us
IT.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE WANTED TO BE FRANK.
ARGENTINA HAD VARIOUS SOURCES OF ENEiaiY, AIWMK3 THEM
NUCLEAR PLANTS SOLELY INTENDED FOR PEACEFUL ENDS, FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE jCOUNTRY, AND TO COMPLEMENT THE
COUNTRY'S HYDROELECTRIC CAPACITY. ARGENTINA HAD NOW
REACHED THE STAGE OP BEING ABLE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT ITS
ENERGY PLAN. AN OBSTACLE TO THIS IS THE STRONG PRESSURE
BEING APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SAFEGUARDS. HE BELIEVED
THE GOA'S POINT OF VIEW IS A JUST ONE. IF ARGENTINA CAN
COMPLETE ITS KJBRGY OBJECTIVES IT HAS NO OBJECTION TO
FULL AND COMPLETE SAFEGUARDS. ARGENTINA IS FUIiLY DETER-
COMflUEMTlAL '

PAGE 08 STATE 212082

MINED TO SIGN TLATELOLCO BUT WANTS TO BE IN A POSITION
TO TAKE A FEW STEPS TO FULFILL ITS ENERGY PLAN. IT

HOPES TO FINISH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A HEAVY WATER PLANT IN
THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. ONCE THESE MEASURES ARE ACHIEVED,
ARGENTINA PLANS ADHERENCE TO THE BAH ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
AND TO ■raE TREATY OP TLATELOLCO.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THERE
WERE CONDITIONS IN THE PREVIOUS JOINT COMMUNIQUE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT AT THE TIME THE
CIRCUMSTANCES HE REFERRED TO HAD NOT EXISTED.

THE SECRETARY AGAIN ASKED WREN ARGENTINA COULD
SIGN.

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THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPEATED THIS OJDLD BE IN
A COUPLE OF MONTHS AFTER ARGENTINA HAS ARRANGED PURCHASE
OF THE HEAVY WATER PLANT. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT
HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT ARGENTINA HAS PRESSED ON
THE MATTER SUCH IHAT IT COULD NOT ABIDE BY THE COMMUNIQUE.
HE ASSUMED ARGENTINA’S STATED INTENTION WOULD BE CARRIED
OUT AS INDICATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. THE FOREIGN
MINISTER'S RESPONSE WAS THE FIRST INDICATICBI OP A
DIFFERENT VIEW PREVAILING IN ARGENTINA. PRESIDENT
VIDELA HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT ARGENTINA WOULD
RATIFY TLATELOLCO AND THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE
OTMMUNIQUE.

' THE FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTED THE "CENTRAL CONCEPT"
HAD NOT CHANGED; WHAT WAS DIFFERENT WERE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH ARGENTINA HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE SIGNING.
coNriP B W T iAr;-

PAGE 09 STATE 212082

VANCl

CO N FIPEH T IHL

« END OF DOCUMENT »

c ew w pew T B i ti:

EXDIS

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UNCLASSIFIED

102 .

Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, September 29 , 1979, 0405Z

4059

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS memcons 1979. Confidential;
Exdis.

UNCLASSIFIED

k

M

?■

■>*

m

1>A6l f] ttSUN N tmi $i 12 1101152

MTI« 55-25

EiXDlS INCOMIN§<gi'j(Qg.|( '

ep'ariment of State TELEGRAM^/

INFO OCT-01 KDS-M 550-00 /$n V

-120330 0101242 /I0

* 2104052 5£P 70
FN U»ISSiOK USUN NEW TONK
TO StC5T0T£ VA5KK 2550'

^s iii
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SECTION 01 OF 02 05UH NEW YORK 04050

t.d. 1205$; 005 1/25/55 SIACXEN. J.D.! OR-R
TAoS: PERII. ffi

SUilECT: ^RE SECRETARY'S HEETING WlTN MtEITiNE FONHIN

^MstOR

1 . “T-EKTIRE TEXT).

2. SOHHARY! FOMBIN PASTOR C«W IKNTrn TNE SECRETMY
ON RIS WHOA APORESS.' THEY OISCUSSEO TIE HAVANA NAN
SUNfllT, ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA, SOVIET TROORS IN CU0A,
THE WVIUN RIGHTS COWIISSION VISIT AND TIE EFFECT OF
NUIUN RIGHTS ON US/ARGENTINE REIATIONS. END SUtflARY.

3. Vie secretary Net with argentine foreign hinister
Pastor on sertehsei 24 . also attending were argentine
AKSASSAOOR AJA E»'IL, UNOCR secretary NEI^On AND ARA
bERIlTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY EATON.

4. SECRETARY’S VNGA STATCItENT. THE FOREIGN HINISTER
cohriiheNteo the secretary on NIS UNGA SREECH, Rarticuur-
LY HIS CAll FOR GREATER COOPERA|ION TO COtllAT TERRORISM!
hiS REFERENCE TO THE TOKYO ROUHg<'TO WICN ARGENTINA

HAS SEEN THE FIRST COUNTRY TO ADHERE; MB IIS FOCUS ON
THE REFUGEE PRDSlEn. IN THIS RECARO, HE IHFORNEO THE
SECRETARY THAT ARGENTINA HAD ALREADY RECEIVED THE FIRST
GROUP OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES. TlE SECRETARY EXPRESSED
VERY GREAT RtEASURE AT THIS HEWS.

5. Hah suHHli pastor said Argentina was not only a

FRIEHDEY COUNTRY, 5UT AISO AN ALLY TO THE V.S. ARGEN-

#

aHerUan systeh and on Puerto rico.

THIS IS NOT JUST FOR THE SENEFIT OF THE US RUT lECAUSE
bF A COINCIDENCE » POLICIES SETUEEN
OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED NIS
APPRECIATION FOR ARGENTINE EFFORTS IN HAVANA AND SAID
THAt WILE HE WAS UNHAPPY WITH NANY OF THE CMCLUSIONS
OF THE HAVANA SUIHIIT COnmiHIOUE, HE WAS PLEASED THAT
HUCH OF tHE LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUHENT AFFECTING THE
HEHISPHERE was changed, he was also NAPPY THAT THE
POSITION ADVOCATED SY PRESIDENT TlTD CN KAINTAINING THE

HoveHent's true Hon-aligniient had prevailed.

I. Nicaraguan assistance, the secretary has nappy to

REPINtT TO THE foreign HinISTER THAT SINCE THEIR LAST
HEETING in OUlfoWNE US HAD BEEN ABLE TO PROCETD THTT
NUHAlilTARlAN AND RECONSTRUCTION AID TO NICARAGUA AND
THAT WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO REPROGRAn FUNDS FROH OTHER
MEAS. we were considering also a SUPPLEHENTM. BUDGET
FOR NOT ONLY NICARAGUA BUT ALSO El SALVADOR. HONDURAS AND
POSSIBLY GUATEMALA. THESE FUNDS WOULD BE KEYED To THE ,

Efforts of these countries to address the probleiis which
THEY Face, particularly in novihg toward hore oenocratic

SOCIETIES. THE US NAD FOUND ITSELF SOIKWKAT BAHSTRUNG,

However, in dealihg with Ehergency situations, and he
intended to seek a contingency fund for ecmohic
and Military assistance in unexpected

USUN N 04050 01 OF 02 0101152 /

crises, pastor said ARGENTINA RAD DECIDED TO GIVE f I
IKPORTANT ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA, NOT IN FINANCIAL
AID, HOWEVER, BUT FOOD AID. HIS COUNTRY WOULD GIVE "IIAHY
■ THOUSANDS OF TONS* OF MEAT TO NICARAGUA. ARGENTINA
WAS DISTRUSTFUL OF HOT ONLY THE RADICALS, BUT ALSO THE
imiERATES IN NICARAGUA. THE SECRETARY SAID, HtNffVER,

THAT IF Ml EFFORT WAS NOT HADE TO SUPPORT THE IWOERATES
WE WOULD YIELD THE FIELD TO THE RADICALS WHICH WOUIO
NOT RE IN THE INTEREST OF THE REGION. PASTOR ASKED
WHAT TYPE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE WAS CMTEHPIATED. THE
SECRETARY CLARIFIED THAT THE CDHTiNGENCY FUND TO WHICH

He referhed was for wmldwioe use,- however, in central
McrIca an Example of us assistance would be helpful in
providing spare parts of aircraft engines to El SALVADOR.

7. SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA. FONHIN PASTOR REOAllED
THAT ARGENTINA HAD BEEN THE FIRST LATIN COUNTRY TO
EXTEW NAVAL AND AIR ASSISTANCE IN THE 1062 MISSILE
CRISIS. ARGENTINA, THEREFME, HAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE
PRESENCE SOVIET COMBAT TROn>$ IN CUBA. THE SECRETARY
SAtO THAT IMMEOIATEIY UPON CONFIRMATION THAT THE BRIGADE
WAS THERE THE FACT WAS MAOE PURL I C AND THE US ENTERED
IRTO DISCUSSIONS WITH tHE SOVIET UMION. THE US WAS
SEEKING RECTIFICATIW OF THE SITUATION AMI HAD TAKEN THE
POSITION THAT THE STATUS OUO IS UNACCEPTARLE. « ARE
SEEKING A SOLUTION BASED ON CHANGES IN THE STATUS GUO
WHICH ARE SATISFACTORY TO VS.

t. nCETIHG OF AMERICAN ARMIES. PASTOR ASKED WHAT
>OSITIOH THE US WOULD TARE REGARDING NICARAGUA'S PRESENCE
AT THE MEETING OF A«RICAN ARMIES TO TRKE PLACE IN,
CKWaiA. THE SECRETARY SAIO WE WOULD FAV»)

NICARAGUA'S PRESENCE.

DIST:

S, D, P, s/p, NSC* S/S, ARA, HA,
vS/S=I BXDIS Files sjTW

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9. lAHRC VISIT. THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE VISIT OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH hc TEH’h/TBu'A POSITIVE
STEP. HAD GONE. PASTOR SAID THE VISIT HAD BEEN "VERY
SATISFACTORY IN GENERAL TERMS" BECAUSE THE GOA HAD
GIVEN FULL FACILITIES TO THE COMMISSION WHICH WAS ABLE
TO CONDUCT ITS BUSINESS FREELY. HE BELIEVED THE REPORT
WOULD BE OBJECTIVE. NORMAL AND REASONABLE. HE SAID.

"WE DO NOT EXPECT APPLAUSE OR CONGRATULATIONS. BUT UNDER-
STANDING. " HE FELT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE MEMBERS
OF THE COMMISSION TO UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
THE SITUATION TODAY AND THAT OBTAINING IN THE 1973-75
PERIOD IN ARGENTINA AND TO NOTE THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS
WHICH HAS BEEN MADE.

10. HUMAN RIGHTS IN US/ARGENTINE RELATIONS. PASTOR
SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO DIFFERENTIATE
BETWEEN WHAT IS TEMPORARY OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND WHAT
IS PERMANENT. HE SAID THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION HAD
BEEN A REAL WAR AND ARGENTINA HAD SUFFERED AN INFLUX
OF SUBVERSIVES FROM URUGUAY AND CHILE. "EVERY WAR,"

He POINTED OUT, "HAS ITS DEAD, ITS MISSING IN ACTION.

AND ITS PRISONERS. " ARGENTINA, HOWEVER, WAS TRADITIONALLY
A COUNTRY WHICH RESPECTS HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY; IT WOULD HAVE TO OVERCOME "THIS SAD
PERIOD." IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO UNDERSTAND
THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOT PERMANENT. NATIONAL SECURITY
HAD TO TAKE PRIORITY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS; NOW THAT THE
FORMER IS GUARANTEED. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WOULD END
RAPIDLY,

THE SECRETARY SAID HE APPRECIATED THE CONVICTION WITH
WHICH MINISTER PASTOR HAD SPOKEN. THE US V.'AS CONCERNED,
HOWEVER. ABOUT RE CENT D T SA PPF AR ANCF S AND HOPED THEY _WOUL D
BE CLEARED UP, PASTOR SAID THE SECRETARY "COULD t)t
ASSURED OF THAT. " HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BECOME AN ISSUE IN
THE US ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. "WE DO NOT WANT TO BE

ALL

ARY RESPONDED THAT THE US

a¥ fneSE ISSUES "AS a friend, PUTTING THE CARDS
ON THE TABLE. “ WE HAD A MUTUAL CONCERN ON THESE
ISSUES AND DIO NOT WISH THESE ISSUES TO DIVIDE US.

X

0

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11. RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO AMEMBASSIES
BUENOS AIRES AND MANAGUA. ABOVE TEXT HAS BEEN CLEARED
WITH ARA DAS EATON.

MCHENRY

X

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ns .

MOT TO BE BEPRODUCEB WITMOUT THE
AUIHOPIlftTIOM OF. THE EXECUTIVE SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

103.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tamoff) to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, January 16, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4,
Argentina, 1/79-1/80. Confidential.

UNCLASSIFIED

January 16,

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

/ |e>

S/S 8001008

cofmr i AT

(Entire Text

1980

i

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$

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Subject: Consultations with Argentina on Human Rights

On January 8, you advised us of President Cartsr!Ls j

request for a proposed course of action on tfte suggestion j

(BUENOS AIRES 0163) that the Argentine Government might :

negotiate specific human rights improvements for a O.S. !

commitment not to condemn them in the meeting of the , i

United Nations Commission on Human Rights next month. I

Such a plan was drawn up, approved by the NSC,
and transmitted to our Charge d'Affaires in Buenos Aires
on January 11 (STATE 8592j.' However, earlier the same - |

day, when delivering the message from President Carter }

to President Videla urging Argentine cooperation with
us on restricting grain and soybean sales to the ussw
(STATE 8135) , our Charge, as instructed, raised this
question. He told the Acting Foreign Minister that
we had observed significant improvements in the Argentine
human rights situation over the past year and had been i

considering appropriate ways of recognizing these improvements
(BUENOS AIRES 385). He then suggested that the Geneva
session of the Human Rights Commission might be an occasion
on which we could consult, should President videla so
wish.

The Acting Foreign Minister replied with great
satisfaction, saying he would forward this news to President
Videla. He asserted that recognition of Argentina's
efforts in human rights was what the Government had
wanted, and implied that genuine recognition would bring
"understanding and support for Argentina." He said
President videla would make a prompt reply to President
Carter's message, and the meeting ended with his expression
of optimism about the future of US-Argentine relations.

Our Charge had planned to follow up this initial
approach with a more substantive exchange with Colonel
Cerda of the Office of the President as proposed in his
original message. However, in the interim, the Ambassador
has returned to Buenos Aires and now has been instructed
to personally approach President videla to urge Argentine

GDS 1/16/86

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cooperation on grain sales and to propose that a special
emissary b e sent to Argentina to discuss with tfte Gok
k number of Issues, among them U.S. positions in multilateral
fora dealing with human rights in Argentina (STATE 12183).

If the GOA expresses interest in consultations
with us as a result of our Charge's approach to the
Acting Foreign Minister, as a result of any subsequent
approach to Colonel Cerda, or after meeting with our
special emissary, we would propose to follow the plan
furnished to the Embassy earlier (STATE 8592). Specifically,
we would seek from the GOA a commitment to release a
certain number of prisoners by a set date (if possible,
a schedule of releases); a commitment to additional
releases under the right-of-option program; and a
reaffirmation of previous Argentine statements, not
fully honored to date, that disappearances definitively
will cease. With regard to information about the disappeared,
we plan to convey our continuing concern that the GOA
find a way to inform families of their fate.

For our part, we would plan to assure the Argentines
that the United States does not and will not seek public
censure or condemnation of the GOA in the coming meeting
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Instead,
we would look toward either s

— a Commission request to the Secretary General
to establish direct contact with the GOA; or

— the Commission's appointment of a rapporteur
to study the Argentine situation.

We do not believe that the human rights situation
in Argentina has improved sufficiently to warrant merely
keeping the situation under review, nor do we believe
that the other members of the Commission would wish
to appoint a special investigatory committee, since
this already has been done throuoh the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission. We consider it unlikely that
the Commission would seek to censure Argentina publicly,
despite GOA fears, as this is the first time the Argentine
case will come before the Commission. However, given
Argentine fears, and the fact that both direct contacts
by the Secretary General and the appointment of a rapporteur
are confidential procedures, we believe it likely that
our planned position will be acceptable.

eONFIDCNTIAL

COtflDEHTHL

- 3 -

We also shall seek from the Argentines a commitment
not to lobby against or offer resistance to the proposed
resolution in the UNCHR that the Sub-Commission on
Discrimination and Minorities be given authority to
establish a special group of experts to "make contacts
with governments and families concerned to assist in
locating missing and disappeared persons." In return
for this, we would assure the Argentines that we would
not introduce or support resolutions dealing solely
with Argentina,

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

7

UNCWSSIFIED

104.

Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting
Washington, January 22, 1980, 9-9:45 a.m.

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 31,
Meetings — SCC 257: 1/22/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation
Room. Carter initialed the top right-hand comer of the summary. In preparation for the meeting.
Sick sent Brzezinski a January 22 memorandum outlining issues for discussion. (Ibid.)

UNCLASSIFIED

S ECRET

SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING
Januaxry 22, 1980

(7

Time and Place: 9:00 - 9:45 a.m. , White House Situation Room

Subject: Iran, Olympics, Pakistan, Argentina, Yugoslavia,

Intelligence, Military Deployments and
Bartholontew/Murray Mission

Participants :

State

Deputy Secretary Christopher
David Newsom
Harold Saunders

l^cietis e

Secretary Harold Brown
Graham Claytor

Vice President* s Office
Denis Clift

White House
David Aaron
Hedley Donovan
Hamilton Jordan (briefly)
Lloyd Cutler

CIA

Admiral Turner
Frank Carlucci

JCS

General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

^jpmitted here is material unrelated to Argentii^

NSC

William Odom
Gary Sick
Thomas Thornton

ADP Declassification Review

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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SE CRET

Q mittod here fs-flfatciM imraiMea to ArgSalnar

7. Argentina . General Goodpaster has agreed to go to
Argentina tonight. He will have a heavy series of briefings at
State and the White House today. Mr. Clay tor said that a finding
that Argentina had made substantial progress on human rights (in
connection with the Kennedy Amendment) would be extremely helpful.
Others noted that the Kennedy Amendment merely established a
deadline (October 1, 1978) for Argentinian performance on human
rights but indicated no relief for subsequent improvement. Mr.

Newsom noted that this amendment would be much harder to lift than
the Symington Amendment on Pakistan. The Argentinian record is
still very bad, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission report
which is coming out soon will be extremely derogatory. Mr. Aaron
said that General Goodpaster must have something to encourage the
Argentines to be helpful. The instructions for his trip are being
drafted and will be reviewed this afternoon, state wiii. take a new
look at the legislation. We are prepared to be helpful to Argentina
with respect to the UN Human Rights Commission. (S)

SECRE T

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

UNCLASSIFIED

105.

Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs
(Bushnell) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, January 22, 1980

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800028-2024. Confidential.
Drafted by Whitman and Flood on January 21; sent through Christopher. A stamped notation on
the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it.

UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGINAL TO; FADRC

2 L DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORArpUM

1405

0 7 jr‘: ngg

The Secretary

COPIES TO;

S

D CXagFFPENT fMr (Entire text)

P

ARA TO; The Secretary

H

HA THRO; D - Mr. Christopher

S/P

S/S-S PROM: ARA - John A. B«shn<

TMA

RF(JAB)

FROM: ARA - John A. Bushnell

ISSDE FOR DECISION

Whether to approve the ARA version or the HA
version (or parts of each) of the O.S. Human Rights
Report for Argentina.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The President has asked that you review the Human
Rights report for Argentina.

ARA and HA have reached substantial agreement
on the major part of the Report's contents. However,
significant differences remain in the introduction
and in Section l.a. (torture), rnie attachnKsnt hiqhliohts
the differences between the reports,

ARA Position

ARA believes that the version of the Introduction
to the Bia&an Rights Report on Argentina that is being
proposed by HA is unnecessarily provocative. In terms
of our maintaining any powers of suasion with the
Government of Argentina in the area of human rights,
it could even be counter-productive;

— The is well aware that the attention of
the Congress, of the media, and of the public focuses
most readily on the introduction to these reports.

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— The version proposed by HA is far more lengthy
and substantially more detailed than those on other
countries with human rights records no less serious
than that of Argentina.

— The detail contained in HA*s introduction
is repeated in the body of the report.

— There has been substantial improvement in
human rights, Basket I, in 1979 for which the GOA
should be given credit.

— The length and weight of the historical detail
of abuses tends to submerge the evidence of very real
improvements, and makes it unduly severe and harsh
in tone. It will be seen by the Argentines in this
light.

Argentines will compare this report with the
ones on other countries and will be strengthened in
their conviction that they are being singled out,
that the United States has no intention of recognizing
the progress they have made. Our actions in the public
domain, and those by our representatives to the United
Rations Commission on Human Bights and the private
U.S. citizen member of the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission have already come under ^severe fire from
the Argentines as being discriminatory. Any further
exacerbation of their injured feelings might serve
only to cut off our dialogue.

As regards the description of torture, ARA's
version refers to the severe psychological and physical
abuse that took place, but avoids specifics which
we believe are inappropriate in a Government report.
Such minute detail will certainly be perceived as
unduly inflammatory and provocative by Argentina.

We have thus far retained considerable influence
with the GOA, and have used it effectively in pressing
for improvements in human rights. The HA version
of the report would needlessly inflame relations and
emotions. It would push Argentina toward greater
isolation from us and the remainder of the Western
world, and toward the Soviet Onion, which has quietly
supported Argentina in multilateral fora on human
rights.

HA Position

CWIgFI P gK Tffttr

- 3 -

The revision of the report proposed by HA is
the result of extensive discussions with ARA's Office
of East Coast Affairs (ARA/ECA) during the period
before Christinas, which culminated in agreement on
December 23, The alternative version resulted from .
a post- holiday review of this text by the ARA Front
Office.

•’’he principal differences between the two reports
lie in the introduction and with the section on torture:

— Introduction: HA believes that ARA's revisipn
tends to give the unintended impression that the Argentine
Junta's repressive activities at least to some extent
are justified, that the tone is unduly upbeat and
optimistic, and that it omits essential information
about the nature and extent of human rights violations
in the country. Although most of the latter are covered
in the body of the report, it is important to treat
them in the introduction because:

— the introduction sets the tone of the

report?

— as ARA points out, many readers focus
almost exclusively on the introduction; and

— as this is the first report on Argentina
prepared during the Carter Administration, a more
extensive treatment of historical antecedents is justified.

Moreover, the length of the proposed introduction
is not out of line with those in many of the other
reports we have prepared this year. The introductions
vary in length from a paragraph to four pages, in
accordance with conditions in the country concerned.

They tend to be longer for countries being covered
for the first time, especially with serious human
rights problems.

— •'V>rture; ARA's version omits mention of torture
methods. However, the guidelines approved last August
by the Deputy Secretary for the preparation of all
reports specifically requests the inclusion of this
information. ARA's editorial revisions also soften
the tone of this section; the same holds true for
the opening irords of the following section (on Cruel,

Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishmenty. These
sections would be substantially different from other reports.

OONPIPE t TflAL

GONFIDCN ' P Jftfc

-4-

ARA argues that adoption of the HA version vould
complicate our relations with the Argentine Government.
However, Congress established the requirements to
submit human rights reports for the purpose of obtaining
objective, accurate, and comprehensive information
on human rights conditions, in all countries. The
purpose of the report is not to praise or condemn
individual governments. The Deputy Secretary's guidelines
call for both objectivity and specificity, and we
have followed these norms in preparing all 155 reports.

Ho report has been deliberately softened, toughened,
or otherwise modified because of the state of our
relations with the country concerned. We should not.
make an exception of Argentina# or appear to be willing to
negotiate human rights principles for other objectives.
Recommendations

That you approve the ARA proposal.

Approve Disapprove

Approve Disapprove

Alternatively, that you approve some combination
of the two.

you approve the HA pro^Kssal. ,

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment ;

As stated.

/

Dr a f ted : ARA/ECA : GJWh i tman : BA : PFlood : mas
1/21/80 X29166

/

/

UNCLASSIFIED

106.

Telegram From the Consulate General in Argentina to the Department of State

Rio de Janeiro, January 26, 1980, 0527Z

313

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002-0385. Secret; Niact
Immediate; Nodis.

UNCLASSIFIED

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC HIACT IMMEOIATE 8670

e 0 N T T U E N" T"! g~ ' g SECTION 1 OP 2 RIO OS JiUJlIRO 0313

NODIS

FOR THE SBOiBTARY AND DR. BRZEZINSKI FR(»< GENERAL GOOOPASTER

E.O, 1206S: GDS 1/25/85 (ROSER, CLAUS W.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, PINR

SUBJECT: GSIERAL GOOOPASTER 'S MISSION TO ARGENTINA:

GENERAL REPORT

-^e-ENTIRE TEXT)

1 . I BELIEVE DISCUSSIONS OP THE LAST THREE DAYS HAVE OPENED
OPPORTUNITIES FOR US-ARGENTINE RELATICSIS WHICH SEEM
PROMISING FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO FOLLOW OP. DURING

THE TALKS I SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ON THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS
BOTH THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WICH WE WOULD VIEW TWR
EROSIION OF THE US GRAINS EMBARGO AND THE DESIRE
TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION WITH ARGENTINA AS A SERIOUS
AND RESPONSIBLE COUNTRY OP THE WEST.

2. THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS, I FEEL, APP!«aCHBD THE TALKS
IN A POSITIVE, BUSINESS-LIKE MANNER. PRESIDENT VTOELA,
RECALLING HIS MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE, EM-
PHASIZED HIS DESIRE FOR SETTER RBLATICaiS. BUT ALL THE SENIOR
ARGraiTINE OFFICIALS ALSO STRESSED THE ARGENTINE VIEW THAT
MUCK OF ARGENTINA’S SUPPORT OF US INITIATIVES HAD

GONE UNACKNOWLEDGED AND THAT US POLICIES HAD REQUENTLY
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PM3B 02 RIO DS 00313 01 OF 02 2606562

FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOIBIT lUlGENTINA'S SEVHiE DOMESTIC
PROBLEMS AND TO RECOGNIZE IMPROVEMENTS WHEN THEY OCCURRED.

3. THE ARGENTINE LEADERS RESPONDED WELL TO MY PRSSBNTATAIOH
ON AFGHANISTAN. THEY APPEARED FULLY TO SHARE OUR VIEW

ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET MOVE, OUR CONCERNS FOR
ITS BROADER STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS, AND THE NEED FOR
WESTERN UNITY. WHILE THEY REPEATEDLY QUESTIONED THE
APPROPRIATENESS AND PROBABLE EFFECTIVB^SS OF THE
•BOYCOTT" (UNDOUBTEDLY IN GOOD PART FOR TACTICAL REASONS) ,
THEY SEEMED GENUINELY IMPRESSED WITH THE RANGE, WEIGHT
AND SERIOUSNESS OF THE MEASURES THE U.S. HAS TAKEN OR
INITIATED. CmS FURTHER REPORT: IN THEIR RESPONSE, THEY
ALSO NOTED ARGENTINA'S OWN RECENT STRUGGLE WITH LEFT-
WING TERROR AND INSURGENCY WHICH HAD BROUGHT THEM, IN
THEIR TERMS, ONLY "ISOLATION AND DISGRACE."

4. GRAINS EXPORTS. WHILE STANDING THEIR GROUND CW THE
PUBLIC POSITION THEY HAD TAKEN, IN ESSENCE THE ARGENTINE
LEADERS GAVE A POLITICAL AND MORAL CffllMITMENr THAT THEY
MOULD SEEK TO PREVENT DIRECT SOVIET PURCHASES SUBSTANTIALLY
GREATER THAN NORMAL LEVELS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY

MADE CLEAR THAT, GIVEN THIS PUBLIC POSTURE (AND THE

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POLITICAL REPRECUSSSIOHS IN ARGBUTIHft IF THEY HERB PER-
CEIVED JIS GIVING IN TO U.S. PRESSURE} THEY HOOLD BE
WILLING TO DO THIS ONLY THEOW3H INFORMAL AMJ PRIVATE
ARRANGEMENTS; AND THEY DECLINED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR TRANSSHIPMl^S BEYOND THEIR BORDERS, WHICH THEY
ALLEGED HERE ONCONmtLLABLE BY THE GOA. TO THE EXTENT
THEY MAKE GOOD ON THEIR WORD, THE DANGER OP MASSIVE
DIRECT SOVIET PURCHASES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED, EOT THIS
LEAVES US RPT US WITH THE ^ALLY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF.
INDIRECT PURCHASES. THE ARGENTINES SAID THEY WOULD NOT
ee WFlBEBTI Ai; '

CUNFiUKNTiAL

PAGE 03 RIO DE 00313 01 OF 02 2606S6Z

OBJECT TO OUR PURSUING THIS PROBLEM WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS
AND TRADING C(NtPANIES, AND THEY GAVE SOME INDICATIONS OF
COOPERATION ON ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, BUT THEY ARE
CLEARLY RELUCTANT AND THIS HILL REQUIRE FOLLOW-UP
(ADDITIONAL DETAIL WILL BE THE SUBJECT OP SEPTBL.),

5. mmm rights, the forthcmiing oas report^

CLEARLY IS OF INTENSE CONCERN TO THEM, AS IS THE US
GOVERNMENT'S OWN REPORT. THEY HAD AraUTTED THE lAKRC
BECAUSE THEY EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE
REFORMS AND IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY THE NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP, ALONG WITH THE DISMAL RECORD OF THEIR "DIRTY
WAR." (IN PRIVATE, THEY STATED BITTERLY THAT THE
CCNmiSSION STAFF HAS BEEN (WHBLPFUL AND PARTIAL, CITING
THE PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF SOME OF ITS KEY MEMB^S.) THEY
ASKED WHETHER HE COULD BE OF HELP IN THE NEXT PHASE OP
THE CCMHISSIONS DILIBBRATIONS . WE, OF COURSE, STRESSED
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CC»miSSION AND OUR INTUBILITY TO
INFLUENCE THE COMMISSION IN ITS REVIEW OF THE GOA'S
COMMENTS (M THE DRAFT REPORT (DUE IN THE CCSWISSIQN NEXT
MONTH.)

6. W1 EMPHASIZED THAT THE US INTEREST WAS MOT IN
ARGQITINA'S INTEI^ATIONAL CENSURE BUT IN THE IMPROVEMENT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS. (THE TENSION WHICH HAS PREVIOUSLY IN
EVIDENCE WAS REDUCED CONSIDERABLY BY THIS STATEMENT.)

THERE WAS A GOOD DISCUSSION OF THE FORTHCOMING UNHHC

CONFTDBWnm

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eoMPiBa iT iAii '

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030660 260710Z /12

O 260S27Z JAN 80

FM AMO^SUL RIO DE JANEIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8671

CONFIDBH T 1 A" t SECTION 2 OF 2 RIO DE JANEIRO 0313

TODIS

MEETING; WE INDICATED THAT THE US, WHILE CCW-

CERNBD TO MAITAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE COMMISSIWS WORK,

WOULD SUPPORT MODERATE APPROACHES ON AGENDA ITEMS AFFECTING

ARGENTINA. THE ARGENTINES SAID THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE

THE PROPOSAL IN THE UNHRC FOR A GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR

DEALING THE QUESTION OP HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS

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DETAIHS3 OR IMJPRISOKSD . TREY EXPRESSED SOME CONCBRH
THAT AM ATTEMPT MIGHT BE MRDE (POSSIBLY BY CAMADA) TO
INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY CENSURING ARGENTINA;

HE REPEATED THAT THE US HAD NO INTENT TO CENSURE ARGENTINA.

7. WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPLAINTS AG^thST ARGENTIlOl UNDER
IHE OaiFIDENTIAL 1503 PROCEDURE, THE ARGKMXiWC OFFICTSE
REQUESTED US SUPPORT FOR A DECISICRI BY THE COMMISSION TO
KEEP THE ARGENTINE SITUATION UNDER REVISE, IN VIEW OF
CONTINUING AND PROSPECTIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN ARGEINTINA'S
HUMAN RIGHTS SITTOTION. WE STATED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE
CimRBNT US POSITimr and that we would have to refer their
REQUEST TO WASHINGTCSl.

8. NUCLEAR ISSUES.* THE ARGHITINE LEADERS, AS WOULD BE
EXPECTED, DISPLAYED A STRONG INTEREST AND SENSITIVITIES
OVER US POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN THIS AREA. FOREIGN
MINISTER PASTOR STATED THAT THEIR PROGRAM WAS FOR
PEACEFUL USES ONLY; ARGENTINA HAD NO DESIRE TO EXERCISE
eoNPiBa r riAL

e owFiBBrriAL

PAGE 02 RIO DB 00313 02 OF 02 260704Z

A NUCLEAR OPTION AND WOULD DO SO ONLY IF REQUIRED BY
WORLD-WIDE OR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS (HE MENTIONED BRAZIL
AND CHILE) . HE SAID THAT THE RATIFICATION OF THE
TLATILOLCO TREATY MUST AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF AN
APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS J^RE]0(SNT WITH THE IAEA,

NEGOTIATIONS FOR WHICH ARE NOW UNDER WAY. (I UNDER-
STAND THERE MAY BE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE KIND OF
AGREEMENT THE ARGENTINES WANTED.)

9. THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS RAISED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS
ABOUT OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SWISS AND THE FRG.

WE STRESSED THAT THE US OBJECTIVE HAD NOT BEEN TO STOP
THE SALES OR TO DENY TECHNOLOGY BUT LEGITIMATE COFTCERN
OVER SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENTS AS ARGENTINA IS ABOUT TO
CLOSE THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. PURSUANT TO YOUR INSTRUCTIONS
WE STATED THAT THE US WOULD SHORTLY SUBMIT A REPLY ON
THE ASSURKANCES WE REQUIRE IN ORDER TO SUPPLY THE
PENDING SHIPMENTS OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR AIKSENTINA'S RE-
SEARCH REACTORS.

10. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. MB DETECTED CONSIDlSABI£

INTEREST IN THE RESUMPTION OP A RELATIONSHIP AMONG OUR
ARMED FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR QUESTION, WE STATED
THAT HE COULD SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF LIFTING OP THE
HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT THAT THE
ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE RESTORATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
MILITARY RELATIONS WAS AN INTEREST BOTH COUNTIRIS SHARED.

AS FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THIS GOAL WE SUGGESTED THE
POSSIBILITY OP VISITS AND JOINT EXERCISES, PERSONNEL
EXCHANGES AND CONSULTATIONS OHI SECURITY MATTERS. THEY
EVIDENCED INTEREST IN ALL OF THESE.

11. GENERAL CONSULTATIONS. IN THE DISCUSSIONS THERE
ee«FID 8WTI «C

TONFTDENTTJa:

PAGE 03 RIO DE 00313 02 OF 02 260704Z

SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT THAT INCREASED C<»7SUDTATIONS WERE
required AS A MEANS OF DEEPBMIl® AND IMPROVING OUR
RELATIONS .

12. THE ARGENTINES RAISED NUMEROUS OTHER POINTS WHICH
WILL BE REPORTED IN SEPTELS AND MBMCONb.

13. AN ATMOSPHERE OP CORDIALITY WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT
EVEN WHEN CONTENTIOUS POINTS WERE DISCUSSED. MY OVER-

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sij;, ASsassMiHT rs that ths talks had a positive effect.

DEWITT

CONFI ' OEHTiaX T

f

NHN

— SECRET”
n/a, NOOIS

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UNCLASSIFIED

107.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, March 26, 1980, 2134Z

2604

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800005-0023. Secret; Niact;
Immediate; Nodis.

UNCLASSIFIED

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secRg T

n/a, NODIS

SICHKI

PRGS 01 Bvmos 02604 01 OF 02 262224Z

ACTION NODS -00

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /OOl W

095600 262229Z /62

O 262134Z HAR 80

FH AHBMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATB WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4797

"S ' "E C «~"8 T SBCTICW 1 OP 2 BUENOS AIRES 2604

NODIS

. FOR THE SECRETARY PROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 (3/26/10) (SMITH, GERARD)

TAGS: ENRG

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF MY VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES

1. TST ENTIRE TEXT

2. CONDITIONS FOR OUR VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES HERE HOT
AUSPICIOUS. WHILE WE HELD TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT
OF ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY CASTRO MADSku,

HIS DEPUTY WAS IN MOSCOW AT THE SOVIET'S INVITATICRI.

A HIGH-LEVEL GERMAN DELEGATION, HEADED BY VAN WELL,

HAS ALSO HERE TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ATUCHA
II REACTOR. DURING OUR TALKS WITH VIDELA, PASTOR,

MARTINEZ DE HOZ; GALTIERI AND VIOLA WE STRESSED THE
SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH HE VIEW THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION, THAT THERE WILL BE NO 1 LURCH TOWARDS DETENTE, "
AND OUR AIM TO STRENGTHEN RELATKRIS WITH ARGENTINA.

3. THERE CLEARLY REMAIN DEEP DIFFERENCES ON MAJOR
ISSUES FROM NWI-PROLIFERATIOK TO CENTRAL AMERICAN
STRATEGY. SOME OF THE EXPECTATIONS QE.-OOOD<tIJ.

CRATED BY THE GOODPASTER HISSI(% < yviOlE DISSIPATED BY
THE CLASHES AT THE UNHRC MEETING IN GENEVA, WHICH

SgeUB T

SECRET

PAGE 02 BUENOS 02604 01 OF 02 262224Z

WERE FULLY REPORTED IN THE BUENOS AIRES PRESS. BUT
I BELIEVE ARGENTINA'S LEADERS -- CONSCIOUS THAT RELA-
TIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE NEVER BEEN EASY --
ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN IMPROVING RELATIONS ON THEIR
TERMS. THEY STRESSED AGAIN, AS THEY HAD TO ANDY
GOODPASTER, THAT imiLE THEY HAVE PRAGMATIC RELATICWS
WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE THIRD WORLD, THEY CONSIDER
ARGENTINA PART OF THE WEST. THEY CONSIDER SOME FORWARD
W>VEMEMT C»i MILITARY RELATIONS AND OUR ATTITUDE IN
THE OAS C»I THE lAHRC'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT IMPORTANT
TESTS OF WHETHER WE SHARE THEIR DESIRE FOR COOPERATI(»I.
MY PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS ARB:

A) WE SHOULD CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO REBUILD THE RELA-
TI(»1SHIP. ARGENTINA'S HUNAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAS IM-
PROVED OVER THE PAST YEAR — MORE SO THAN THEY ARB
INTERNATIIONALLY BEING GIVEN CREDIT FOR, ARGENTINA

IS AN IMPORTANT NATION, WITH CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE
ON MAJOR US INTERESTS, AND ONE WITH WHICH HE SHOULD
HAVE DECENT WORKING RBLATIC»S.

B) HUMAN RIGHTS. OUR POLICIES SHOUI^ BE BASED e»7
CURRENT PERFORMANCE, HOT THE GRIM RECORD OF THE PAST.

WE SHOULD BE CSNCIRNID WITH CURRENT SECURITY PRACTICES,
THE CURRENT QUALITY OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURES, AND THE

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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OPENNESS OP ’THE BHERGING POIiITZCAI. OZALOGOB. BUT I
QUESTION WHETHER AH ACCOUNTING OF THE PATS OP THE
THOOSANOS OP DISAPPEARANCES IS A REAIiISTIC CBJECTIVB AT
THIS TIMS; MS SHOOIZJ, CONTIOTE TO UIK3E MOVES ON HUMANITARIAN
GROUNDS, BUT WITBOUT MAKING OUR RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA
HOSTAGE TO THIS ISSUE. (MO MAJOR ARGENTINE POLITICIAN
SEEKS SUCH AH ACCOUNTING.)

C) POLITICAL EVOLUTION. MOST OF ARGENTINA'S MILITARY
LEADERSHIP WISHES TO RETURN ARGENTINA TO ITS DEMOCRATIC
TRADITIONS -- IN A MANNER THAT MOULD AVOID PAST PATTERNS

hTEdCBTr^

. SECRE T

PiUSE 03 BUENOS 02S04 OX OP 02 262224Z

OF CHRCallC INSTABILITY. BUT WHILE PROGRESSIVE IMPROVE-
MENT IN THE SECURITY OP THE PERSON CAN BE EXPECTED,

THE INSTALLATICRT OP AH EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL BE A MATTER OF YEARS. TOO MUCH
OF THE COUNTRY'S INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE HAS BEEN
DESTROYED BY PBROHISM AND ITS AFTERMATH. THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE THAT PRESSURE AND SANCTIONS WILL ACCELERATE
THIS PROCESS.

D) NON-PROLIFERATION. THERE HAS NO ENCOURAGEMENT
DURING MY TALKS THAT ARGENTINA MILL RATIFY TLATELOLCO
ANY TIME SOON; ON FULL- SCOPE SAFEGUARDS WE AGREED TO
DISAGREE. ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS HELL ADVANCED
AND WILL MOVE AHEAD UNDER ABLE LEADERSHIP. OUR CENTRAL
OBJECTIVE, MUST BE TO PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF A
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE HEMISPHERE. THE ARGENTINE
LEADERSHIP HAY BE ON THE THRESHOLD OF CONCERN OVER
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROLIFERATICRI AND HAY BE INTER-
ESTED IN A DIALOGUE ON POLITICAL SOLUTION. THEIR NEW
COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH BRAZIL OFFER HOPE OF
FOSTERING MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND CmPIOENCE BETWEEN THESE
TWO COUNTRIES AND MERIT OUR SUPPORT.

SECRET

NNN

" 5EC K ET

PAGE 01 BUENOS 02604 02 OF 02 2e2229Z

ACTION HODS -00

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09S614 262230Z /62

O 2e2134Z MAR 80

AM0IBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASKDC SIMTt IMMEDIATE 4798

SEC R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 2604

HODIS

E) BILATERAL NUCLEAR COOPERATION. FOR THE PRESENT?

THE ARGENTINES DO NOT APPEAR INTERESTED IN COOPERATION
BEYOMO THE SUPLY OF FUEL FOR THEIR RESEARCH REACTORS,

TO WHICH HE ARB COMMITTED. MB SHOULD, HOWEVER, MAIN-
TAIN REMAINING LINKS TO THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM BY RE-
SOLVING THE RELATED SAFEGUARDS ISSUE TN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF US LAW. I THINK WE CAN SOLVE THE
ISSUE ON THAT BASIS,

F) OLYMPICS AND GRAINS BIBAE^O. THERE IS A REASONABLE
POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARGENTINES ULTIMATELY WILL WITH-
DRAW FROM THE MOSCCMI GAMES, AND THEY COULD HELP SWING

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THl OTHER lATIS AMSHICftN COHKTRIIS. ( WE SHOULD KEEP
THEM CORRENTLX ISEORMBD ABOUT Otffi CXSUNT OF THE HWffiER
OP PROSPECTIVE WM-PARTICI PASTS. (W GRAIHS, I SIB
!JO JUSTIFICATION FOR ACCUSING THEM OF HAVING UNDERCUT
THE GOODPASTBR UNDERSTANDING. THEY HAVE A CASS THAT
MB HAVE UNDERSOLD THEM IN THEIR TRADITIONAL MARKETS.
THE GRAIN THEY NOW HAVE AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT HAS BEEN
SEVERELY REDUCED BY DROUGHT AND THUS THEY MO LCWGER
HAVE FUTURE ABILITY TO AFFECT A MAJOR PART OF OUR

msm^.

B) CENTRAL AMERICA. THE AGREHTINE LEADERSHIP IS
DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT REGION.
SECRET"

sioorf

PAGE 02 BUENOS 02£O4 02 OF 02 2S222SZ

THEY HAVE DECIDED TO FOCUS THEIR SUPPORT ON GUATEMALA
AND HONDURAS, AND ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS IN
NICARAGUA AND EL SALVATOR.

H) RELATICRIS HIT THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS O^INUB
TO PROBE FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPAND COOPERATION.

THEY HAVE BEC(»4B ONE OF AGRENTINA'S LARGER TRADING
PARTNERS IN RECENT YEARS, COOPERATE WITH ARGENTINA IN
THE UN. AND NOW PR(»B ARGENTINE INTEREST IN MILITARY
SALES AMD NUCLEAR COOPERATION. THIS SHOULD BE A NATTER
OF REAL CONCl!® TO US.

4. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE HI SHOULD CCRTTIHOE CLOSE
CONSOLATIONS OH SUCH MATTERS AS CENTRAL AMERICA AND
THE FORTH-COMING lAHRC REPORT. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT
WE PROCEED WITH AN INVITATION TO THE ARMY CHIEF-OF-
STAFF, GENERAL VJ^USRO, SOMETIME THIS SUMMER, IP
DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO ARGENTINA CONTD*m»
FAVORABL'B. there is MERIT IN ECONWIC TALKS. MHICH
I UNDERSTAND ARE SCHEDULED FOR LATER THIS YEAR, AND
IN PERMITTING THE PURCHASE OF SUCH TECHNICAL SERVICES
UNDER AID'S REIMBURSABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AS
THEY MIGHT FIND OF INTEREST, OR THE PROGRAM OF
TBOOIICAL COOPBRATIC»I WORKED OUT BETWEEN USDA AND THE
ARGENTINE SECRETARIAT OF AHGICOLTURE. ON THE OTHER
BAND, WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT HE SEE NO POSSIBILITY
OF CHAINING OUR VOTE IN THE IFI'S OR LIPTIIB3 THE
PROHIBITION ON MILITARY SALES AND TRAINITO UNTIL
THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND IMAGE FURTHER
IMPROVES. DIALOGUE SHOULD BE CONTINUEO ON POLITICAL
APPROACHES TO GUmL AND RBGI(»IAL PROLIFERATICRI
PROBLBSM. CASTRO

-5BC1BT ' "

s e cmr r

n/a, NODZS

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UNCLASSIFIED

108.

Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, May 6, 1980, 2:30-2:50pm

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country
Files, Box 1, Argentina, 5/80. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen, Deal, and Pastor. The
meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

GOHPIDEMTB gr-

MEMOBAEDOM OF COHVERSAnOH

PAHICIPAIITS;

DATE AND TIME:

PLACE:

Argentiaa

Jose HarCinez de Ebz« Minister of the Economy
Ambassador Jorge A. Aja EspU

Dnlted States

Zbigniew Brzezlnski* Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Thomas Thornton, Staff Member, National Security
Council

Tuesday, May 6, 1980
2:30-2:50 p.m.

Dr. Brzazlnstci's Office

SUBJECT: US-Argentine lelations; Grain Sales; Soviet Politics tC)

Dr. Brzezinski opened by welcoming the warming trend in US-Argentine relations
but stated his great concern about Argentine grain exports to the Soviet Union.

Be stressed the need to take tangible actions to show the depth of Western con-
cern and resolve. This involves sacrifices, which we are making. Dr. Brzezinski
went on to discuss in some detail the strategic BManing to the West of the Soviet
move into Afghanistan ~ affecting not only the immediate region but all of the
non-communist world. The increase In Argentine grain sales diminishes the Impact
of Western pressure on the USSR and it i s strange to see a country of Argentina's
tradition playing such a role Brzezinski closed by saying that he found frictlnns
in US-Argentine relations be unnatural and thus wanted to address the grain
problesa frankly. tU)*

Martinez de Hoz reassured Dr. Brzezinski of Argentina’s commitment to the West and
went on to restate Argentina's rationale on its trade with the Soviet Union. In
speaking of the Argentine-Soviet grain sales agreement, Martinez said that the
figures Involved would be less than 1980, which is recognized as a peak year. He
urged that the focus of pressure on the Soviets not be limited to grain but be
extended to such things as European sales of capital goods. He urged a global
comprehensive policy against Communist expansion. -^6^

coNPiDENT iar:

Declassify on May 6, 2010
Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

2851

» . «

COlO'IDENTB ttr 2

Dr. Srzezlnaki observed that seeking a total solution often leads to no solution
and noted that we are fiorking with the Europeans to limit techMlogy sales and
tighten COCOH. He again returned to the question of Argentine grain sales noting
that the growth had accelerated greatly this year and this made it harder for us
to keep the other major suppliers on board. Be urged Martinez to think about this
problem not just in bilateral terms but in light of Argentina's role as a member
of the West. It would be a pity if Argentina were seen by history to have plaved
the saxse kind of role that France played when Hitler occupied the Rheinland.

Martinez de Hoz said that Argentina wants to take a stand but frankly doubts that
grain embargos will be effective. Brzezinskl promised to supply information to
Argentina to demonstrate that the embargo is being effective.

Dr, Brzezii^ki agreed that there are problems for Argentina in implen^ting sanc-
tions but said that more can always be done if there is determination. Argentina
is, after all, one of the world's major countries and has a critical role to play.

-(cy

cc: Henry Owen
Tim Deal
Robert Pastor

CONFIPES T IAT

UNCLASSIFIED

109.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State
Washington, May 12, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton,
Subject Files, Box 102, PRC: Argentina, 5/14/80: 5/80. Secret. Drafted by Eaton, Ruser, and
Whitman; cleared in draft by Dworkin, Flood, and Buchanan and in P, S/P, S/MS, EUR, E, EB,
S/AS, INR/RAR, INR/RSE, OES, PM/ISP, PM/SAS, 10, ARA/PPC, and ARA/RPP. Dodson
sent to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Bergland, Duncan, Earle, Jones, and Turner under a May 12
covering memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

ISSUES PAPER - ARGENTINA

I. TEE SSTTII^

The United States has three major interests in
Argentina? East-West relations, nuclear nonproliferation,
and human rights. It also has significant interests
in a peaceful solution of the Beagle Channel dispute,
Argentine support in Hemispheric matters, and in trade
and investment relations.

The Goodpaster, Hodges and Smith visits have
introduced new balance into our relations with Argentina.

They have substantially improved the tone of the relationship
while making a promising start at reducing the differences.
The current status of our interests is as follows:

East-West Relations . As part of its probings
to expand political and economic influence in South
America, the Soviet Union is consciously courting
both Argentina and Brazil. Argentina has responded
to a limited degree because of:

— a strong interest in Soviet trade opportunities;

— a strong desire for Soviet support in international
fora on human rights matters;

— an interest in keeping open the possibility
of nuclear supplies; and

— some desire for greater balance in its foreign
relations between East and West.

However, the Argentine military regimes in prospect
for at least the next four to seven years have no
desire to emulate the Soviets or to align themselves
with the Soviet Union, although there is a natural
inclination for economic and political reasons toward
warmer bilateral relations. Our Improved dialogue
with Argentina since January has produced:

— repeated affirmation of Argentina's basic
commitment to the West;

GDS 5/10/86

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Rtzpatrick, 4/24/201 7

- 2 -

— a degree of cooperation on grains exports
despite our late start on consultationsi and

— greater evidence of Argentine desire to consult
and cooperate on Hemispheric matters, such as accepting
Cuban refugees and consulting on Central America.

The dialogue also contributed to Argentina's
decision to join the Olympics boycott.

Huclear Nonproliferation . It is clear that Argentina

will insist '"on "the "continued developnent of its nuclear

technology capabilities, of which it is very proud,
and the maintenance for the foreseeable future of
a nuclear explosive option. It has demonstrated that
it will not respond to pressure on these matters.

Our best hope is that a calmer assessment of its own
long-term self-interests will lead it more toward
safeguards and away from keeping an explosive option
open. Closer Brazilian-Argentine relations, sy^olized
by President Figueiredo's visit to Buenos Aires scheduled
for Hay 13-15, may be helpful in this regard. Argentina
is still considering whether to proceed now with the
ratification of Tlatelolco. Although the Argentine
interpretation that the Treaty permits the development
of peaceful nuclear explosives is unhelpful, its ratification
could be an important step. The Smith visit was useful,
and we hope to reach agreement with Argentina on arrangements
to maintain limited nuclear cooperation.

\

Human Rights . The status of human rights remains
a matter of deep concern. While there is broad agreement
on the facts of the situation, views differ on the
scope and significance of the improvements that have,
occurred, especially over the past year. Disappearances,
a central human rights concern, have declined, as
have the number of political prisoners. We are aware
of at least 2 disappearances thus far in 1980. (There
reportedly were 44 disappearances last yeari 55 a
month the year before.) Our Embassy recently reported,
however, that suspected active terrorists would continue
to be dealt with summarily. There is no present prospect
that the Argentine Government plans to respond positively
to pleas for information about the fate of the thousands
of ^ople who have disappeared in recent years. GOA
officials recently told Ambassador Smith that about
half of the 1300 remaining political prisoners would
be tried or released by the end of the year. GOA
officials say ‘that, although there is insufficient
evidence to try the others, the security forces regard

3 -

them 8S dangerous and do not plan to release them.

The latter group includes some persons who bene fitted
from the 1974 amnesty of President Campora (who, elected
with Peronist support, opened the door for Peron's
return) and therefore cannot be tried. The state
of siege and lack of due process continue. The military
government has committed itself to eventual return
to civilian, democratic rule, but no one expects this
to occur before the mid or late 1980s, and few in
Argentina are pressing for a more rapid timetable.

A basic issue that remains unresolved is the future
form of Argentina’s political party system, especially
the future role and orientation of Peronism. A dialogue
with political leaders is now beginning, although
political party activity remains prohibited.

In the economic area, the government continues
to reconstruct the economy on the basis of free market
principles, to remove the burden of controls accumulated
under Peronism, curtail the role of the public sector
while strengthening the functions of provincial and
local governments, progressively bring inflation, under
control, and encourage foreign investment as part
of a drive for greater productivity and a higher rate
of investment. In the short term, these policies
have resulted in belt-tightening for lower and lower-
middle income groups, lowever, full employment has
been maintained as part of a deliberate government
policy to cushion the impact of these measures. In
the longer term, these policies could produce sustained
dynamic Argentine economic performance and a decentralized
economic system more compatible with a pluralistic
political order than the statist centralism of the
Per on period.

Argentine officials and human rights activists
have praised our human rights report this year as
balanced and objective. There were difficulties between
the Argentine and U.S. Delegations to the UN Human
Rights Commission meeting in Geneva last February-
March. These reflected honest differences over substantive
issues such as the new disappearance procedure and
the draft torture convention. The Argentines will
be very sensitive to what occurs in OAS and UN considerations
of their human rights performance later this year
and early next year; they want to see an end to the
Huraphrey-Kennedy Amendment against military sales,
and positive U.S. votes in the international financial
institutions.

OHO nu t "

-4

The discussion paper previously distributed <described
our continued political and economic consultations
and military and nuclear relations over the next few
months. Is there more that could and should be done
in this period?

II. ISSPES FOR THE KBIT SIX MONTHS

1. Significance of Argentine-Soviet Ties and
the Appropriate P.S. Response s

The discussion paper draws a distinction between
expanding trade ties and political cooperation. The
expansion of bilateral trade is a normal phenomenon
and will continue, irrespective of P.S. action. The
Argentine interest in political cooperation with the
Soviets, on the other hand, is related to the Argentine
desire to assure Soviet bloc support on human rights
issues and reduce the danger of censure in PN fora.

A possible interest in Soviet nuclear supplies is
related to P.S. safeguards conditions (this issue
appears to be approaching solution).

The basic approach proposed in the discussion
paper is a political one: to manage P. S.- Argentine
relations in a way that strengthens Argentina's sense
of identification with the West, to pursue P.S. interests
in a balanced fashion and in a manner that takes into
account Argentine deep-seated nationalism, and to
achieve these goals without ccxspromising our human
rights objectives by diminishing or appearing to have
diminished our interest in human rights conditions.

Is the approach advocated in the paper an adequate
one, in terms of the significance of expanding Argentine-
Soviet relations? In terms of the balance of the
various P.S. interests?

2. How can the P.S. obtain meaningful Argentine
cooperation in restraining exports to the P.S.S.R.
for the 1980/81 crop year ?

The Acting Secretary of State asked the Arsentine
Economic Minister on May for tsOA cooperation in
a program of tighter restrictions on grain shipnents
to the P.S.S.R. in the coming crop year. Strategy
and tactics for cooperation among all the major grain
exporting countries are currently under consideration
in the SCC, including the explicit ceilings we would
seek from each exporter.

SECR bt

&. An Argentine-tJ.S.S.R. grain agreement is
in the offing (contrary to the discussion paper, it
has apparently not yet been signed). Reportedly it
vill state Argentine intentions to supply certain
minimum levels of grain. Can the U.S. take advantage
of such an agreement to secure an understanding that
Argentina will regard the minimum specified in the
agreement as a maximum as well? Or would such levels
be too high to constitute "meaningful restraint"?

b. How can the D.S. persuade Argentina to announce
publicly any ceiling agreed upon? To do so would
reinforce the commitment and would help reduce the
current premium on prices on Argentine grain which
have resulted in the loss of traditional Argentine
markets. If the minimum levels contained in the Soviet
agreement are consistent with a meaningful Argentine
ceiling, the conclusion of the agreement could provide
the pretext for a public announcement helpful to the
cooperation effort. ••

3, What is the appropriate human rights stance
for the tr.S. in this period in the light of Argentine
performance and our other interests?

a. In bilateral demarches and contacts
with Argentina?

One approach would strongly press for improvements
in all areas, including strong pressure for a serious
accounting to families, either directly or indirectly,
of the fate of disappeared persons? the other would
proceed -more selectively, with emphasis on further
reform of current security and judicial practices
rather than an accounting for the disappeared’ and
other past violations. One approach would include
occasional strong public criticism of the GOA's practices
the other, while maintaining our public posture of
criticism and concern, would do so in a lower key,
and place greater emphasis on quiet but persistent
dialogue to press for specific reforms, taking advantage
of an improving atmosphere and closer bilateral relations

b. In the OAS and the ON?

The GOA is greatly concerned over the potential
work of the new group of experts on disappearances
established by the ONHRC with strong U.S., West European,

- 6 “

r

and Canadian support. It feels that the group's principal
effort will be directed at Argentina, for an accounting
of the fate of disappeared persons. The GOA undoubtedly
fears that specific data, if available, on disappearances
(i.e., torture and summary executions) would lead
to demands that those responsible be identified and
punished. Although the methods of the working group
remain to be worked out, the GOA fears that the group's
work will be the basis of moves next year to seek
the appointment of a special rapporteur on Argentina
and the GOA's public condemnation in UN fora. This
fear is a principal reason the GOA seeks to strengthen
political cooperation with the Soviets in UN fora.

The OAS has recently released a report on the
human rights situation in Argentina based on the visit
of the Inter-Amerl£an Cnimlssion on. Human Eights last
September. The report is highly critical of Argentina
and has been attacked by the GOA as biased and an
interference in Argentina's internal affairs. The
lABRC report will be taken up at the OAS General Assembly
this fall.

The Argentine position on how to deal with the
lAHRC report is still under study in Buenos Aires.

One view circulating within the regime — reportedly
angered by the report's alleged failure to properly
acknowledge the history of pre-1976 terrorism and the
improvements accomplished since 1978 — is that Argentina
should withdraw from the OAS, thus perhaps triggering
an exodus by other countries, including Brazil. In
private conversations, Argentine diplomats have warned
of this possibility, stressing the depth of feeling
on the issue in Buenos Aires. Ne have no evidence as
of this time, however, that this view is about to be
adopted as the Government's policy.

How should we deal with these matters in OAS
and UN fora?

c. With our NATO Allies?

One approach would be to initiate a series of
high-level consultations with our NATO Allies for
the purpose of sharing information about human rights
developments and about the Soviet-Argentine relationship,
and of discussing the most effective way of dealing
with these matters, including possible joint or parallel
demarches, public statements, and coordinated action
in international institutions (including the multilateral

banks) .

d. With regard to sanctions (i^ote in the

IFI's, military training, and military sales)?

Our abstentions in the IFI's hatre not prevented
ordinary capital loans to Argentina. The prohibition
of military sales has shifted Argentine purchases
of new equipment to European sources; it is, however,
beginning to create problems for the Argentines with
respect to spare parts for D.S. -supplied equipment.

On the other hand, our measures have considerable
political significance as a tangible expression of
disapproval of Argentine human rights violations.

Any possible modification of our posture in this area
would have to take into account the implications for
our stance toward other countries with major human
rights violations, as well as the message this would
send to human rights groups in Argentina and to other
countries who have joined us in criticizing human
rights violations in Argentina.

4. How far should we carry milltary-to-military
contact and cooperation under preseht circumstances ?

Cooperation involves three possible levels:

— visits, joint exercises, consultations on
security matters;

— the sale of military training;

— a military supply relationship (new equipment
and spares).

The sale of training under EMS and military supplies
(FKS and Munitions List items) are prohibited by the
Humphrey-Kennedy amendment. In addition, under current
policy, the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions
List items to the Argentine military and the police
through the Commmerce export control licensing system.

The PRC discussion paper argues for limited contacts
(visits, joint exercises) but opposes a change in
our military supply policy at this time.

A second view is that we should avoid the political

GLCiliil”

- 8 -

synbolism of support which these contacts imply/ or
minimize them until there is a definitive breakthrough
on human rights. A third view, on the other hand/
argues that/ because of our strategic interests and
the improvement in human rights/ we should streamline/
liberalize/ or lift altogether/ the restrictions on
the military supply relationship. This would involve
a) an elimination of restrictions on Commerce export
licences; and/or b) the modification or elimination
of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.

The denial of training (the sale of training
under FMS is now prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy
Amendment) involves a separate issue: Argentine officers
traditionally sent to the U.S. are officers with promising
careers. (Videla/ Viola/ and Galtieri all received
training or served in the U.S.) Shortly the Argentine
Armed Forces will have no officers of the rank of
major or below who have received U.S. training. One
view questions whether the U.S. should continue to
deny itself this avenue of influencing the outlook
of the next generation of Argentine military leaders.
Another view argues' that the present generation of
military leaders is responsible for the government's
repression of the past four years and questions the
premise that U.S. training has had a significant positive
influence on their outlook. It also argues that a
military training relationship is a clearly visible/
high-profile means of demonstrating U.S. political
support for a government.

5. Are our present policies with regard to nuclear
relations with Argentina adequate ?

The issues are:

— At what level can we and should we pursue
nuclear cooperation?

— Is there anything more we can and should do
to encourage Argentine ratification of Tlatelolco
and acceptance of full-scope safeguards?

— How would possible actions in these areas
impact on our general relationship and would they
be worth the cost?

The discussion paper argues:

— Nuclear Cooperation . We should try to resolve
the pending safeguards issue on the basis of what
is required by U.S. law. Official Argentine interest
in further cooperation, beyond the research fuel,
appears to be modest at this time. Once the safeguards
issue is resolved, we would probe to see what interest
there might be in Argentine nuclear circles in U.S.
cooperation (see also below).

— Tlatelolco . We should continue a dialogue
with Argentina *s most senior leaders on global and
regional proliferation concerns. Nothing more specific
to encourage Argentine ratification appears feasible
or desirable at this time. (We should, of course,
on appropriate occasions, continue over the next few
months to remind the GOA of President Videla's commitment
to ratify. )

In addition, looking beyond the issue of safeguards
assurances, the Administration must also address the
issue of licensing of U.S. components for Argentine
nuclear projects. This issue carries with it the
possibility of a continuing role of U.S. industry
in Argentina's nuclear program even though the position
of prime contractor has been lost to German, Canadian,
and Swiss companies. For example:

— the U.S. firm. Combustion Engineering, working
with the Argentine firm, Pescarmona, wishes to bid
as a subcontractor for the pressure vessel for Atucha
II. Slemens/KWU argues against Combustion Engineering's
qualifications on grounds that the U.S. firm, in view
of the uncertainties of whether a U.S. export license
can be obtained, is not a reliable supplier.

— Sulzer Brothers, the Swiss prime contractor
for the heavy water plant, has approached Canadian
firms about components, some of which may be U.S.
controlled.

The issue is whether the U.S. should encourage
or discourage such industrial collaboration. The
current U.S. stance has been to discourage Combustion
Engineering, partly because of our concern to keep
good faith with the Canadians who — unsuccessfully
— insisted on full-scope safeguards as a condition
of the sale of a nuclear power reactor and heavy water
plant.

bbUKt r l

-lO-

Significant U.S. exports, the future of D.S.-
Argentine industrial cooperation in this important
sector, and U.S. nonproliferation policy are at stake
in this issue.

III. THE BROAD CHOICES

Option A. Continue strong concentration
on human rights .

We would maintain a cool and correct posture
until the human rights situation shows substantial
further progress, making clear that we are prepared
to improve relations when and to the degree that fundamental
human rights problems are solved. Military relations
would be kept to a minimum; political relations should
be cool and correct.

Rationale ; The human rights situation remains
exceedingly grave and outweighs the practical significance
and relevance of other interests in our relations
with Argentina. The essential elements of Argentine
human rights violations — the apparatus of repression,
the lack of due process, the prohibition of meaningful
political and labor union activity, and the failure
to provide information about disappeared persons "■

-all remain in place. Expanding Argentine-Soviet
cooperation thus far has been pragmatic and self-limiting.

It is not now a significant threat to U.S. strategic
interests, but we should continue to watch Argentine-
Soviet relations closely.

Option B . Continue the current level of
effort for more balance in the treatment of our interests
in Argentina .

We would continue the present efforts to strengthen
working relations with the GOA, principally through
stepped-up political consultations, but also through
some increase in cooperation and increased military
contact. We would continue to stress the importance
of human rights, but need to establish priorities
in terms of benefits to Argentine society and attainability.
We should seek further specific improvements through
dialogue in the improved atmosphere, but maintain
our present policy on votes in the IFI's and the restrictions
on military supplies. We should, however, seek to
reopen the sale of training (which would require modification
of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment). Our general approach,
especially in the 0NHRC, should seek to avoid pushing
Argentina into cooperation with the Soviets.

Rationale ; Our approach to limit Soviet influence
should be basically a political one. There has been
progress in human rights — notably, few new security
cases and a new assertiveness by the judiciary and
in public expression and a general decline in violence
and repression. Our approach should acknowledge this
progress. Certain issues in the relationship which ^
have not been linked in the past should be kept delinked.
There is no strategic need to relax military supply
restrictions at this time. Training, however, is
important to try to influence the next generation
of Argentina's military leaders. We do not want to
create too much of an imbalance in our relations with
Argentina and with Chile, however, while the Beagle
Channel issue is still outstanding.

Option c l Move a step further toward normal

relations .

#;

We would seek further to strengthen working relations
with the GOA by lifting the restrictions on Commerce
licences and by initiating a move to lift the Humphrey-
Kennedy lUsendment restrictions on the military supply
relationship. We would stress to the GOA that human
rights remain important to us and would continue our
abstention on IFI loans. But we would more explicitly
and unconditionally reaffirm General Goodpaster's
general assurances that we were not interested in
seeking the GOA's public censure at the 1980 ONHRC
meeting, and would not support future moves for censure
in ON or OAS fora in view of current and prospective
progress.

Rationale ; The deteriorating international security
situation makes Argentine cooperation important.

We must take seriously Soviet probes to establish
influence in Argentina and Brazil and to foster mutually
profitable economic relations. Argentine fears of
public censure in the UN, essentially for past human
rights violations, are a principal reason for increasing
Argentine-Soviet political cooperation. Many political
observers agree that a solution to the problem of
past disappearances is not feasible at this time and
will come, if at all, as part of a broader political
settlement, including a general amnesty. The Smith
mission, in its report, noted that no major Argentine
political leader is pressing for an accounting at
this time. The measures contemplated under this approach
are the strongest card we can play to counter Soviet
probing for influence, to reestablish close working
relations, to obtain Argentine cooperation on grains
and other East-West issues, and to elicit further
Argentine cooperation in Hemispheric matters.

UNCLASSIFIED

no.

Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting
Washington, May 14, 1980, 10:30-11:15 a.m.

1 Soxirce: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton,
Subject Files, Box 102, PRC: Argentina, 5/14/80, 5/80. Secret. Sent for information. The
meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

UNCLASSIFIED

2972 Add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SBCRET —

INFORMATION

POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING
May 14, 1980

TIME AND PLACE: 10:30-11:15 a.m. ; White House Situation Room
SUBJECT: Minutes — PRC Meeting on Argentina tCf

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher, Dep.
Secretary

John Bushnell, Dep. Ass't.
Secretary

Defense

W. Graham Clay tor, Jr. ,

Dep. Secretary
Fremk Kramer, Principal
Dep. Ass't. Secretary

Agriculture
James Starkey, Dep.

Under Secretary

Commerce

Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary
Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary
for Internat. Economic Policy
and Research

Energy

Woody Cunningham, Ass't.

Secretary for Nuclear Energy

Arms Control and Disarmeunent
Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
Richard Willieunson, Nuclear
Exports Div. Chief, Bureau
of Nonproliferation

Lt. General John Pustay

Central Intelligence

Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

White House
David Aaron
Henry Owen

National Security Council
Thomas P. Thornton
Robert Pastor

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Bustoell began the meeting by discussing Argentinian relations
with the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the current government
is unlikely to get close to the Soviets and this provides a cer-
tain implicit limitation on the process of Soviet/Argentinian
ties. The Argentine Government is playing a short-term gcune in
the grain, trade and perhaps nuclear area. The only point of
contact between the Soviet Union and Argentina that raises
longer term concerns is a possible fishing agreement although

SECRE T-

Review on May 14, 2000
Extended by Zbigniew Brzez inski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13 (e)

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

2972 Add-on

SEGB»

2

even here the Argentine Government is moving to limit its
impact on their people. In addition we are very much con-
cerned about Argentinian/Soviet cooperation in United Nations
organs. Originally the Argentinians only wanted to prevent
the Montaneros from mobilizing Soviet and Cuban support against
the GOA. Over time however this hats developed into a cooper-
ative vote trade-off between the two sides. In the coming
months, Bushnell continued, Argentina will have a heord time
taking any positive actions whatsoever due to the imminent
retirement of President Videla. This is certainly true until
the decision on a successor is made in September and probably
the period of inaction will continue until eaurly next year
when a new government is in place. We will not be able to
force major decisions on them in this time. In the shorter
term the main issue is the Argentine fear of condemnation as
a result of the report of the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission. They might make some minor steps on the human
rights front to avert condemnation. The other important
short term consideration is the question of the grain embargo
where they have not been supportive of our interests.

Hodges asked whether Argentine humem rights performance has
improved .

Bushnell replied that there has been a major improvement but
there are still gross violations and the system of repression
remains in place. One could say that they have prob 2 ibly killed
roost of the people that they wanted to kill, but there are now
fewer political prisoners emd in some instances the rule of law
is being followed better.

Hodges reported that the Argentine Economics Minister had assured
him that the current economic policies would continue under a n ew
government next yeairT^ Hodges tinted out that we have a great
economic potential in relations with Argentina and we should do
everything we can to maximize that.

Owen , speaking of the grain situation, said that the Argentinians
have undoubtedly made their decision emd will follow the same
policy next year as they did this year. They have almost cer-
tainly reached an agreement with the Soviets which would provide
only a floor, not a ceiling, on Soviet purchases. This in effect
will mean no limit on Argentine sales to the Soviet Union other
than that provided by crop conditions.

SECRET

2972 Add-ott

SECRET

3

Starkey agreed with this conclusion.

Aaron said it was not clear from the paper! what the issue is ~
are we seeking a decision on overall tone or individual policy
decisions? He asked whether the wheat embargo will be circum-
vented.

Owen replied that once Argentinian policy is clear, and no doubt
the Canadians will be equally uncooperative, other countries will
not support us.

Christopher agreed and said that in any event the whole question
is irrelevant if the Soviets have a good crop. We may have to
find a way to announce a one-year policy success.

Aaron . Do we want to take some move against Argentina because
of this or simply forget it? Bear in mind that Martinez was
lectured at the highest levels of government here about the
need for Argentine cooperation. .

Owen said that we should certainly take a tough line on Argentina
to match the warnings that were given to H 2 trtinez.

Aaron observed that it is clear that Argentina doesn ' t care very
much about its relations with the United States .

Christopher , discussing the purpose of the meeting* said that the
real decision to be euidressed is one of tone. The paper should
then be submitted to an Interagency Group which could work out
the individual is^lementing decisions in line with the broad
decision on tone to be made by the PEC, Mr. Christopher also
observed that the Argentinians are not going to do anything to
court us.

Claytor said he did not blame them; our policies are forcing them
to the Soviets.

Owen said that they are sensitive to our concern about beina a
major supplier for their hydroelectric project. Uaftinez had
said that he would favor the United States if all other factors
were equal .

Hodges noted that OPIC insurance would be important in this regard.

Owen agreed and said this would be discussed with Deputy Secretary
Christopher tocrorrow.

sa C RE T

2972 Add-on

SECRET -

4

Keeny / discussing nuclear matters, said it is not clear what
the options are. The Soviets are interested in some nuclear
cooperation with the Argentinians but there has been minimal
activity to date. Thus there does not seem much to preempt
there. Our own relations with Argentina are another question.

We do not want to (indeed legally we cannot) escpand these re-
lations unless they accept full-scope safeguards and ratify the
Tlatelolco Treaty. We do have some flexibility tlxjugh on whether
we should continue to cooperate in marginal ways within the law.
The question is whether we are willing to supply things that at
some future date might be related to a nuclear weapons program.

Bushnell said there is no problem because what we are supplying
is for their research program. The issue is whether we want to
break a nuclear dialogue with them coi^letely eind perhaps turn
them to tile Soviets. He hopes that we might be able to make
greater progress next year when there will be a new adminis-
tration and leadership on nuclear matters. Thus he asked,
should we break the dialogue now or continue to do "minor"
things.

Keeny said it depended on which items were involved.

Claytor said that the nuclear non-proliferation policy is bank-
rupt in general and that we should do absolutely everything we
can under the law to cooperate with Argentina.

Keeny inquired whether that would include the provision of
tritium. Perhaps the only thing the Argentinians want are
things that cause no problem for us. We should look at the
specifics.

Christopher pointed out that the President has certainly not
abemdoned the nuclear non-proliferation policy.

Claytor countered that the policy had been ineffective and that
the Soviets are always ready to jump in where we are imable to
extend cooperation.

Bushnell observed that there were very few license requests pend-
ing from the Argentinians and there probably would be no problem
over the next six msnths or so.

Christopher , returning to the general topic, said he believed
that the group should support the middle option. We should
give due weight to |K>sitive trends in the h\im«m rights area
but should not try to repeal the Himphrey-Kennedy Amendment

SECR ET-

2972 Add-on

SECRET

at this time since that would be impossible with the present
Congress emd politically unwise. This Option B needs fine
tuning from the Interdepartmental Group; what we should do
in the coming months is to warm up our relationship with
Argentina. Perhaps in 1981 we will be able to have an
initiative on the milit2Lry side, including training at
least.

Hodges said he was encouraged by Christopher's summation. for
the trends in human rights are importeuit. The Commerce Depart-
ment also supports Option B.

Aaron said that we needed a specific program to improve our re-
lations. The options as stated in the paper axe too static.

Oiir goals should be first, to maintain a nuclear relationship
that will result in Argentine accession to the Tlatelolco
Treaty; secondly, a commercial policy that makes clear that
we want the hydroelectric contract and will pursue it; third,
there is no possibility of changing the military legislation
now; fourth, there is a major OAS vote coming up and how we
react will be a signal to them. We should relate that to the
policy issues. Overall, we should have a tone that rests
somewhere between Options B and C, leaving out for the time
being any ch 2 mge in our military supply policy. The Inter-
departmental Group should set up an 18 -month program with
benchmarks for our progress and for Argentine performance.

At the same time Aaron noted that there is no reason to improve
relations dramatically with Argentina now directly after they
have stuck their finger in our eye on the grain issue. We
should make clear our irritation with them at this time and
then pick up the pieces with a new administration when it
comes into office. We will not be able to get very far with
Videla. We should take the opportunity .of the new adminis-
tration, however, for turning a new page. If we move to im-
prove our relations with them now we will simply not have the
respect of the Argentinicuis .

Cl ay tor said that he saw Option C as the desirable goal, less
the repeal of the Humphrey-Kezmedy Amendment which would be
impossible. We should do all that we can with the Argentine
militcury to restore relations between our two armed services.

At the moment we are driving them to the Soviets. The Soviets
are our greatest global problem and we are simply letting small
things interfere with our dealing with this problem.

SECRET

2972 Add-on

SEORBg -

6

Pustay supported Clayt»r's statement and noted that we now have
a number of opportunities to increase contacts with the Argentine
militeury and JCS wsuld like to pursue them. He noted for instance
the Galtieri (sic/) invitation which is being held up in State
Depaxtment, Pustay said that Galtieri is prepared to come.

Bushnell said we had received mixed signals. Galtieri, for his
own political puxrposes, wauld like to receive the invitation but
not actually accept it until after the Pr eside ntial decision is
made in September in Argentina. Whatever we do we are T:ikely to
become involved in Argentine politics. He also asked whether,
following so close on their poor performance on grain, we want
to give this signal of reward to them.

Owen cautioned that we should be careful about assuming that the
Argentinians will do the worst possible things on grain. It is
conceivable that even if they have signed an agreement with the
Soviets they may have some marginal flexibility. We should not
take reprisals against them until they publicly azinounce the
content of their agreement with the Soviets.

Bushnell said that the announcement will not tell us very much
in all likelihood. In any event the reality will depend on the
Argentine harvest levels and we will not know that for some' six
months.

Aaron pointed out that we had pushed the Argentines very hard on
the grain issue and wondered whether we are now going to let them
undermine us,

Owen pointed out that nobody else is likely to cooperate with us
either next year.

Pustay , returning to the question of General Galtieri 's visit,
said tdiat it should be borne in mind that Galtieri had been
instrumental in the positive decision that Argentina made on
the Olympics.

Keeny observed that we should maintain a nuclear relationship
but we should not push it to the brink of what the law permits
if this would undercut our non-proliferation efforts elsewhere.

Christopher summarized the meeting by pointing out that there
seemed to be no stark alternatives that need to be put to the
President. It was generally agreed that:

SECRET

2972 Add-on

CECKB^

7

1. There is enough human rights progress to justify movement
towards improvement in our relationship.

2. Over the next six months events will be conditioned by the
electoral situation in Argentina.

3. We will also have see whether we need to react to the
Argentinian decision on grain.

These axe short-term items which the Interdepartmental Group
can review as it goes along. On the longer term:

4. If there is continued improvement in the humaui rights situ-
ation in Argentina we should seek improvement in our relations
with the new regime.

The Interdepartmental Group will work out in detail what this
improvement might involve.

SECRET '

UNCLASSIFIED

111 .

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter
Washington, June 14, 1980

1 Source; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country
Files, Box 1, Argentina, 6-11/80. Secret. No drafting information appears in this memorandum.
Concurred in H, EB, OES, PM, EUR/SOV, EUR/RMP, 10, S/AS, USOAS, AID/RDP, OPIC,
SIR, DOD/ISA, JCS, CIA, Commerce, Treasury, USDA, DOE, EXIM, ACDA, ICA, and L/PM
and by Derian, Lake and Thornton. In the right-hand margin. Carter wrote, “Ed- good ideas.
Same process should be followed with other difficult countries. J.”

UNCLASSIFIED

8012956

J7/7

3717

MEMORANDUM FOR;
From;

Subject;

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

rT"

Steps To Improve U. S, -Argentine
Relations

June 14, 1980

THE PRESIDENT
Warren Christopher, Acting UJ-d-.

/,

Pursuant to your instructions, the Inter-Agency
Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan
of action for 1980, which 1 am submitting for your
approval.

I.

OBJECTIVES

Our principal objectives in moving to improve
our relationship with Argentina are to:

— foster Argentina's identification with the
West and thus to contain Soviet political and economic
influence?

— encourage further specific improvements in
human rights practices?

— seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues
(e.g. grains); and

— obtain progress on nonproliferation objectives,
particularly full-scope safeguards and ratification

of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and foster increased

sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation

concerns.

We also wish to encourage continued Argentine
cooperation with the Papal mediation of Argentina's
dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the
Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to
war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally,
we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive
role with respect to developments in Central America
and other Hemispheric issues, .

ADP Declassification Review

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

2

II. ACTIONS FOR 1980

1. The Consultative Process

We will continue the process of political and
economic consultations begun with General Goo^aster's
visit to Buenos Aires in January, we contempiaces

— a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affafri^ tO " ^6nos -S±rg 5 , pOSsibiy AbOUr i iti gTOt

1, during which he will review our policy concerns
and the state of our relations and will be prepared
to discuss steps we would plan to take to strengthen
cooperation in selected areas, depending on the nature
of the Argentine response.

— a meeting of the D.S. -Argentine Mixed Economic
Commission in October, the O.S. delegation possibly

to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs. The meeting would include discussion
of ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues
and to expand commercial relations.

— periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric
issues , with the' Hrst round to be held during the
visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs.

2. Military Relations

We will begin to rebuild relations through increased
contact and consultations, while stressing that further
progress on human rights will be essential to the
more fundamental improvement in these relations (including
consideration of modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy
Amendment, as reported in the conclusions of ^he PRC
meetingj. We plan to:

— begin periodic security consultations with
Argentina ? the first round, to be held this year in
Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in
the South Atlantic;

— invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make
a return visit to Washington later in the year to
discuss global defense issues;

— invite Argentina to send a guest instructor

to the D.S. Army School of the Americas after consulting

Q cr D

37/1

- 3 -

with members of Congress to ensure that this initiative
would not be regarded as conflicUng with the spirit
of the Humph rey-Kennedy Amendment.

f

Other issues are:

— High-Level Military Visit .

We will keep under review the desirability of
proceeding with an invitation to a senior Argentine
military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chlef of
the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staf f ) to
visit Washington this year. A final decision on cnis
(including the question of timing) should take into
account the implications of such a move on the selection
of the next Argentine president now under way within
the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as continued improvements
in the observance of human rights and developments
in U. S. -Argentine relations.

— Sale of P-3 Aircraft .

In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for
the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA.

We see no possibility, however, of seeking special
legislation which would modify the Humphrey-Kennedy
Amendment to permit the sale of these aircraft to
Argentina this year.

3. Human Rights

We will continue the dialogue on human rights
with Argentine leaders, principally but not exclusively
through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by
the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
Ambassador Bowdler. In these consultations we will
attempt to obtain assurances that:

— the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which
recognizes the role of the OAS Commission on Human

Rights and which encompasses a call for further improvements
by Argentina;

— there will be no new disappearances, including
no disappearances of persons alleged to be terrorists;

— all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive
activities, including unacknowledged detainees, will

Q cr. P CT

QC.Ui"u

- 4

£«» I

J‘7f7

be processed through normal judicial channels and
ensured due process?

— guarantees will be instituted to prevent the
torture of detainees; and

— there be substantial progress, in advance
of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political
prisoners held without charges through release, trial,
or exile (during his recent visit. Ambassador Smith
was assured that half of these prisoners — 1,300 at
the time — would be released or sentenced by the end

of the year).

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting
of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed
in ON fora and concluded that, while this should not
be a central requirement for the improvement of our
bilateral relations, it should remain an_impartant
O.S. objective. We should urge Argentina, in bilateral
discussions, to cooperate with these multilateral
efforts, particularly with the ON Human Rights Commission's
new expert working group on disappeared persons and
with other groups such as the Catholic Church.

In addition to human rights discussions initiated
by the Ambassador and by Assistant Secretary Bowdler,
the U.S. side of the Mixed Economic Commission will
be prepared to raise or respond to human rights concerns
in discussions with their Argentine counterparts,
and will be fully briefed for this purpose.

4. Nuclear Relations

We want to move Argentina over time to accept
IAEA safeguards on future as well as current facilities
(including the reprocessing facility) and to ratify
the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To do this, we need to
keep open the door for continued cooperation with
Argentina's nuclear program to the extent commensurate
with your policy. We should:

— try to resolve promptly, in accordance with
D.S. law and our nonproliferation objectives, the
remaining safeguards issues to permit delivery of
highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's
research program, as well as components for its power
program;

37/7

— once this is done, undertake a review of the
conditions under which we could facilitate expanded
participation by O.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear
program, (A major case currently at issue is an export
license application for the sale of a pressure vessel
for the Atucha II power reactor. )

5. Other Cooperative Steps
In addition, we would:

— Sign the pending O.S. -Argentine Agricultural
Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs?

— Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral
income tax treaty?

— Seek to negotiate a consular convention .

6. Consultations with Other Allies

The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether
and in what form the Administration should consult
our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern
such as human rights and recent Soviet Initiatives
toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere.
These subjects and our policies thereon could be discussed
within NATO fora such as the Political Advisors Committee,
the Permanent council, and the NATO experts group
on Latin America. Depending on the results of these
consultations, we could consider further actions in
Buenos Aires. A majority of the Interagency Group
recommended against new high-level bilateral approaches
to our Allies on these issues. We would continue
the practice of consulting on human rights in the
appropriate ON fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission.

7. Implications for O.S. Policy Toward Brazil and
Chile

The Group also considered the implications for
neighboring countries, especially as regards security
consultations.

With respect to Brazil, the Group noted that
many of these steps will restore a better balance

-SESREf

- 6 -

in U.S. relations with the two countries, since the

U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process

with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations)

Chile is concerned about our improving relationship
with Argentina, which it sees as threatening in the
context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted
to persuade the Chileans that what we are doing with
Argentina has nothing to do with Chile or with our
position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage
acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoidance
of war. This issue will be more fully addressed in
the review of our relations with Chile later this year.

Concurrences

H - Mr. J. Brian Atwood
EB - Mr Deane Hinton
HA - Ms. Patt Derian
OES - Mr. Louis Nosenzo
PM - Mr. Daniel O' Donohue
EDR/SOV - Mr. Robert Peri to
EtJR/RMP - Mr. Stephen Ledogar
S/P - Mr. Anthony Lake
10 - Mr. Michael Newlin
S/AS - Mr. Allen Locke
DSOAS - Mr. Herbert Thompson
AID/RDP - Mr. David Raymond
NSC - Mr. Thomas Thornton
OPIC - Ms. Caryl Bernstein
STR - Mr. Robert Hormatz
DOD/ISA - Col. Patrick Briggs
JCS - Admiral J.A. r.vons

E.O. 13526 3.5(c)

Commerce - Mr. A. Katz
Treasury - Mr. Fred Bergsten
DSDA - Mr. Dale Hathaway
DOE - Mr. Les Goldman
EXIMBANK - Mr. Grafton
ACDA - Mr. Charles Van Doren
ICA - Mr. Victor Olason
L/PM - Mr. T. Borek

UNCLASSIFIED

112 .

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
President Carter

Washington, July 3, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office Fil
Country Chron File, Box 3, Argentina, 1979-1980. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the
memorandum and wrote “Zbig” in the top right-hand comer.

UNCLASSIFIED

•^7 ^ copy CABTERlIBfiAfl? ' N -

MEMbRANDUM f

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 3, 1980

'• . SECRB?

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM;

SUBJECT ;

THE PRESIDENT
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKi
Report on7 US -Argentine Relations <U)

Attached is Warren Christopher’s memo to yon detailing the
steps we ere planning to take over the remainder o£ this year
to strengthen ties with Argentina. This action program was
worked out by tte liatin American Interdepartmental Grono and
reflects your injunction to move more rapidXy, lU)

There is no mention of Navy Secretary Hidalgo’s trip/ which was
a bit of private initiative on Hidalgo's part unrelated to the
program elaborated by the Interdepartmental Group. (In fact,

DOD never even mentioned it at the ) The Hidalgo trip

can be a useful contribution, however, and State has
briefed him carefully, id-

Assistant Secretary Bill Bowdler will b® going to Buenos Aires
in late July, His visit and the attendant consul tations will
be s;^ftbolically the high point of our actions with Argentina
this year and aiso the vehicle for tough bargaining, not just
on human rights^ but to pin down the Argentines on other issues
of importance to us, especially their relations with the Soviets.

-m /

Thera are two significant omissions in Christopher's report: A
strategy for dealing with Argentine grain sales to the Soviet
Union? and an understanding of the impliGations of a new US
policy to Argentina on our overall approach to Batin America.

(S)'

With regard to grain sales, we have received intelligence re-
ports indicating that Soviet trade officials will sbon be in
Buenos Aires to sign a lohg-term grain agreement (BTA) with the
Argentine Government for a minimum of 3 million tons. As this
will be Moscow's first new BTA with a westers supplier since
the US embargo was ainnounced on January 4, this will be

SECRET — ^

Review on July 2, 1986

' cOrnrCARTERlffiRAItlf

a significant positive development for the Soviets and a setback
to our embargo policy; it will m 2 Uce it more difficult to keep
the Canadians on board. We have already informed the Argentines
of our concerns about such an agreement; they claim it is neces-
sary economically, given their large trade deficit with the US
and the fact that they are being squeezed out of other marJcets* -fsy

We probably have little hope of turning the htgentines around
on this, but should give one more try as. a means of d^onstira"
ting our concern. In addition, we CQuld argue that they should
agree (as Australia, the EC and — questionably — Canada have
done) not to :exceed this year's sales. If we are to have euiy
prospect of success, this will have to be done at a high diplo-
matic level — pref er^ly by Secretary Muskie calling in the
Argentine Ambassador. , Bowdler could follow up on this later
in the monthi.

ia?CCfti@NDA!rXDW i

^Therefore, I recommend that you approve the steps in Christopher ' s
memo with the following additional points:

— Secretary Muskie would summon the Argentine Ambassador
to ip^^ge once more that the Argentines not sign (or at least de-
lay Signing) a long-term grain agreeiSent with the Soviet Union

and, failing that, that they hold sales to current levels. fS)

• - ' ' - - .

— That as we proceed to develop closer relationships,
dod/jcs and other agencies inVolyed with Argentina would con-
tinually reaffirm the importamce which the Carter Administration
attaches to human rights and democratization.. tS7

^ ^ Approve '■Bisapprove "

UNCLASSIFIED

113.

Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter
Washington, July 28, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23,
Evening Reports (State), 7/80. Secret.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Blmund S

1. Assistant Secretary Bowdier's Visit tn Argentina
I approved postponement of the trip today after reviewing the
evidence of Argentine complicity in the Bolivian coup. The
evidence is not conclusive, but it points to
some elements of the Argentine military,
had been designed tx> advance our dialogue with the Argentines
on the Issues of grain sales to the Soviets, nuclear non-pro-
liferation and human rights progress. Given the need to cftiject
publicly and privately to the Argentines* positions on Bolivia,
the trip would at best serve no constructive purpose as far as
these other Issues are concerned. And, cancelling the trip is
probably a more powerful statement than any Bill could have
delivered in person.

involvement^ at least
BUI Bowdler^ visit

Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

— / • / / -

UNCLASSIFIED

114.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, August 15, 1980, 1936Z

6584

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800392-0933. Secret; Exdis;
Nofom.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET -

2 of 3

SEGRST-

PAGE 01 BUENOS 06584 172144Z

ACTION SS-30

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122830 172207Z /23

R 151936Z AUG 80
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
■K3 SECSTATE WASHDC 6406

3 B C R E - T BUmiOS AIRES 6584

EXDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12065; RDS-4 8/14/00 (RUSER, CLAUS W. ) OR-M
TAGS: EAID MASS PCT^ AR GT

SUBJECT: tSt GROWJ^G ARGENTINE INVOLVEMENT IN GUATEMALA
REF: STATE 203396,

1.-S-/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE KNOW FROM BOTH ARGENTINE AND GUATEMALAN CREDIBLE
SOURCES THAT THE GOA PERCEIVES OF CENTRAL AMERICA AS A
VACUUM RAPIDLY FILLING WITH RADICAL LEFTWING EXILE GROUPS
--SOME TERRORIST, TO INCLUDE MONTONERO GROUPS
WITH CLOSE TIES TO HAVANA. GHSERAL CARLOS MARTINEZ,

OilEF OF THE ARGENTINE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INTELLIGENCE
(SIDE) HAS STATED THAT HIS SERVICE HAS INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF
THAT THE MONTONEROS AND OTHER SOTHERN CONE TERRORIST GROUPS
HAVE TRANSPLANTED THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN EXILE FROM EUROPE
TO HAVANA, WITH AN INCREASINGLY GREATER PRESENCE AND MILITANT
INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERIA, AT TOIS TIME PRIMARILY
NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR. ( WE CANNOT CONFIRM THEIR VIEWS
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH "HEADQUARTERS" IN HAVANA.)

THIS IS, OF COURSE, CREDITED IN GREAT PART TO USG ABDICA-
TION OF STRONG LEADERSHIP IN THAT REGION, AS RANKING
- SECRET

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 06584 172144Z

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ARGENTINE OFFICIALS VIEW U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN. THUS, SENIOR ARGENTINE OFFICIALS SEE
CENTRAL AMERICA AS A NEW SAFEHAVEN AND FOCUS FOR CUBAN-
LINKED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION LED BY THE SAME MILITANTS OF

3ECRE= P

2 of 3

3 of 3

S E CR ET

THE RADICAL LEFT EXPELLED FROM ARGENTINA, CHILE AND OTHER
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. MARTINE25 EXPRESSED SERIOUS CON-
CERN THAT THESE ACTIVISTS OF THE RADICAL LEFT, IF PERMITTED
TO TRIUMPH IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WOULD USE THAT REGION AS A
BASE OF OPERATIONS FOR RENEWING SUBVERSIVE AND GUERRILLA
OPERATIONS AGAINS ARGENTINA. THAT IS, PRESUMABLY, THE
RATIONALE FOR ARGENTINA'S INTEREST IN ASSISTING GUATEMALA
EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS, ESPECIALLY, IN RESISTING THE
RADICAL LEFT IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.

3. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA REGARDS
ARGENTINA AS THE ULTIMATE "SUCCESS STORY" IN . DISARTICULAT-
ING THE LEFT, AND IS EAGER TO EMMULATE "THE ARGENTINE
fTODEL" IN REPEATING THAT EXPERIENCE IN ITS OWN COUNTRY.

TO THAT END WE ARE AWARE OP TRAINING IN THE AREAS OF
COUNTER- INTELLlGmCE AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY ALREADY GIVEN
OR BEING GIVEN TO MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM GUATEMALA,
SALVADOR AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. WE SUSPECT
THAT THE FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ARGENTINA OF GUATEMALAN
FOREIGN MINISTER RAFAEL CASTILLO VALDEZ, MAY HAVE A
GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS CONTEMPLATING
FURTHER TUIGENTINE ASSISTANCE AND POSSIBLY MATERIAL
SUPPORT FOR GUATEMALA. AT THIS TIME WE ARE NOT
SPECIFICALLY AWARE OF POSSIBLE ARGENTINE AGREEMENTS WITH
THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA TO SELL THEM MILITARY EQUIP-
MENT, TRAIN POLICE PERSONNEL, OR TO FACILITATE ARGENTINE
EXPORTS TO GUATEMALA.

RUSER

■ SE C RE T

NNN

SECR E T

3 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

115.

Telepmm From Secretary of State Muskie’s Delegation to the Department of State and the
Embassy in Argentina

New York, October 1, 1980, 1756Z

Secto 8046

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800470-0449. Confidential;
Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Asuncion, Brasilia, the U.S. Mission to Geneva, La
Paz, Montevideo, and Santiago. Muskie was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly.

UNCLASSIFIED

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055626 Q11907Z /43

O 011756Z OCT 80 ZPF-6
PK OSDEI, SSCRSTARY IN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASfflJC IMMEDIATE
AMSMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
INFO AHEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEKBASSY BRASILIA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMSMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
A}fra4BASSY SANTIAGO

C U K P 1 D a N f i k T SECTICai 01 OP 03 SECTO 08046
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/01/86 (BOMDLER, WILLIAM G.), OR-S
TAGS; AR, PEPR, OAS, SHUN

SUBJECT! <U) SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH ARGENTINE PM PASTOR
SEPTEMBER 30

1. ■(COWPlIBEtlT I ltti - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SISBIARY. PASTOR SPEAKING FIRST SUMMARIZED RECENT
ARGENTINE HISTORY AND AIMS OP CURRENT GOA, WAS HIGHLY
CRITICAL OP OAS REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND EFFORTS TO
HAKE ARGENTINA A PUBLIC TARGET. DEFENDED GOA RBCOGNITI(»l
OF THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME IN BOLIVIA WHILE CLAIMING GOA
HAS AND HILL COUNSEL MODERATION, AND DEPICTED US/ARGENTINE
BILATERAL RELATIONS AS MAINLY A ONE HAY STREET WITH HIS
COUNTRY ON THE LOSING END. NEVERTHELESS ARGENTINA IS A
FIRM ALLY AND HOPES, WITH IMPROVING RELATIONS, IT HILL BE
TREATED AS SUCH. HE MENTIONED A POSSIBLE VISIT OF THE
ARGENTINE PRESIDENT-ELECT TO WASHINGTON, AND INVITED THE

ajNFiuwrrsL

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PAGE 02 SECTO 08046 01 OF 03 011900Z

SECRETARY TO BUENOS AIRES. IT WAS A TOUGH PERFORMANCE
WITH NO OBVIOUS DEPARTURES FROM SCRIPT. THE SECRETARY,
WHILE ALSO VOICING STRONG INTEREST IN IMPROVING
RELATIONS, EMPHASIZED THAT THERE ARE TWO SERIOUS PROBLEMS
-- BOLIVIA mn HUMAN RIGHTS. IN ADDITION HE STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE THE USG ATTACHES TO CONTINUED ARGENTINE
RESTRAINT ON GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO THE USSR, AND EXPRESSED
HOPE THE GOA HILL SOON RATIFY TLATELOLCO. END SUMMARY

3. BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY AND GOA FH PASTOR
LASTED 45 MINUTES. ON U.S. SIDE HERS|/ SECRETARY
NEWSOM, AS BOWDLBR, COUNTRY DIRECTOR SERVICE, AND
INTERPRETER. IN ADDITION TO PASTOR HERE AJA SSPIL, AND
FH OFFICIAL JORGE STOCK. AFTER PLEASANTRIES, PASTOR
DELIVERED LENGTHY SUMMARY OF RECENT ARGENTINE HISTORY,
EMPHASIZING THE SOVIET- INSPIRED MARXIST SUBVERSICW IN THE
PERIOD 1973-1976 AND THE CHAOTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
SITUATION THAT PREVAILED WHEN THE MILITARY TOOK POWER
IN 1976. THE JUIGBNTINB MILITARY TAKEOVER WAS NOT IN THE
CLASSIC LATIN AMERICAN MOLD; RATHER IT WAS DEMANDED BY
"ALL THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE." THE ARGENTINE MILITARY SET
FOUR GOALS FOR THEMSELVES: ESTABLISH PEACE AND SECURITY;
REORGANIZE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND MAKE IT MORE

ADP Declassification Review

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EFFICIENT; REVERSE THE ECONOMIC DECLINE; RESTORE
DEMOCRACY. ACCORDING TO PASTOR, THERE HAS BEEN GOOD
PROGRESS ON THE FIRST THREE OF THESE OBJECTIVES, AND
THE GOA REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE FOURTH. IN THE
LATTER REGARD, PASTOR NOTED THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT
HAS BEEN MEETING WITH MORE THAN SO INTEREST GROUPS TO
DISCUSS HON ARGENTINA'S CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE CHA1K5ED
TO ENSURE "SOLID AND STABLE DKfKJCRACY" IN THE FUTURE.
PASTOR CONCLUDED THIS PART OF HIS EXPOSITION WITH THE
ARGUMENT THAT ARGENTINA'S MILITARY RULERS ARE NOT LIKE
GOWFIPBW T IAL

eoNFipmirgCL

PAGE 03 SECTO 08046 01 OF 03 011900Z

PINOCHET IN CHILE (WITH HIS LENGTHY TRANSITION PLANS) OR
THE GOVERNMENT IN PARAGUAY.

4. PASTOR THEN ADDRESSED THE lAKRC REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. HE SAID THAT THE COMMISSION HAD
ARRIVED WITH PRECONCEIVED IDEAS, THAT THEY SPENT ONLY
15 DAYS IN THE COUNTRY, AND THAT THEY HERE NOT EVEN
CCWCERNED WITH TAKING BACK THE DOCOMHJTS PROVIDED BY THE
GOA. IN PASTOR'S VIEW, THE PRIMARY PURPOSES OF THE OAS'
ARB SECURITY AND COOPERATION. HE RECOWITED A LONG
HISTORY OF ARGENTINE COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
JOID OTHER B^ISPHERIC NATIONS IN THESE REGARDS. THE
GOA DOBS NOT BELIEVE THE OAS SHOULD BE A FORUM FOR
ACCUSATIOAIHST ONE OR ANOTHER MEMBER. ALL COUNTRIES
HAVE THEIR PROBLEMS. HE MUST NOT LET THOSE

PROLBB® INTERFERE AND IMPEDE PURSUIT OF TOE PRIMARY
objectives". IT IS NEITHER FAIR NOR JUST THAT ARGENTIN
SHOUU} BE THE TARGET ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE OAS.
according TO PASTOR, SOME ARGENTINES ARE BEGINNING TO
ASK IF IT WOULD NOT BE BETTER FOR ARGENTINA SIMPLY TO
WITHDRAW.

5. ON BOLIVIA, PASTOR BEGAN BY SAYIMS THAT ARGENTINA HAD
BEEN BLAMED FOR A MILITARY COUP IN 1962, THAT BRAZIL

AND THE U.S. WERE THE SUPPOSED VILLAINS IN 1964, THAT THE
U.S. WAS GIVEN CREDIT FOE THE DOWNFALL OF TORRES WHILE
BRAZIL WAS MENTIONED WHEN BANZER STEPPED DOWN, AND NOW IT
IS ARGENTINA'S TURN AGAIN TO GET THE BLAME. THE GOA
HAS A LONG HISTORY OF PROVIDING MILITARY AND BCON(MIC
ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA. PASTOR VENTURED HE THOUGHT
THAT IF OTHER COUNTRIES HAD PROVIDED MORE ASSISTANCE ALOIG
TOE WAY, THE BOLIVIAN PEOPLE WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES. PASTOR ARGUED THAT RATHER THAN ENCOURAGING
TOE BOLIVIAN MILITARY, THE GOA HAD IN THE PAST COUNSELLED

■tajHPTDraronr

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---105810 081428Z /41

O 011575Z OCT 80 2FF-6
FW USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO SBCSTATB WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES
INFO AMEHBASSY ASWCION
AMEHBASSY BRASILIA
USMISSION GENEVA

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AMBMBASSV XA PhZ

KmmmsY ioitevioso

AHBKBASSY SJUrriMXS

e 0 » r i ii a, H 'i ' rx ' i r sectioh 02 op 03 secto obo 46

EXDZS

RESTEUVINT (TO BANZSR EARLIER THIS YEAR) . WHEN GARCIA
MEZA TOOK POWER , THE 60A WAITED 14 DAYS BEFORE ACCORDIHG
REC0GNITICRI--A1I UNUSUALLY LONG TIME FOR NEIGHBORS IN THAT
PART OP THE WORLD. MORE RECENTLY IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION
WITH BANZER, THE GOA HAS ARGUED STRONGLY FOR RESPWSI-
BILITY AND PRUDENCE OH THE PART OF THE NEW BOLIVIAN
GOVERNMaJT AND THAT IT SHOULD QUICKLY SET FORTH A SERIOUS
PROGRAM. PASTOR SAID THAT IF SOME ARGENTINE OFFICERS
HAVE MADE STATEMENTS PRAISING THE NEW REGIME, THEY ARE
SPEAKING OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OP OFFICIAL POLICY.

6. TURNING TO BILATERAL RELATIONS, PASTOR ASKED JORGE
STOCK TO READ FROM A LIST OF ALL THE HAYS IN WHICH THE
GOA HAS COOPERATED WITH THE U.S. IN THE PAST YEAR OR SO
(NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, REFUGEES, AFGHANISTAN, MIDDLE EAST
PROBLEMS, HOSTAGES IN IRAN, ETC.), AND ON THE OTHER
HAND, NEGATIVE U.S. ACTIONS INVOLVING ARGENTINA (THE UN
ee i H g xDBWTim —

eewFiflEHTiK ir

PAGE 02 SECTO 08046 02 OF 03 011811Z

WORKING GROUP ON HISSING PERSONS, VOTES IN THE IFI'S,
NUCLEAR MATTERS, THE MALVINAS AND BEAGLE, FAILURE TO
HELP CORRECT THE TRADE IMBALANCE, ETC.) .

7. PASTOR CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION WITH THE AFFIRMATION
THAT ARGENTINA IS A WESTERN COUNTRY AND THAT IT RECOGNIZES
THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OP U.S. LEADERSHIP. ARGENTINA
IS AN ALLY AND FRIEND OF THE U.S., AND HANTS TO TREATED

AS SUCH. IK THIS REGARD, AFTER THE U.S. ELECTION,

PASTOR SUGGESTED THE DESIRABILITY OF A "MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING’ BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, SETTING THE
FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION ACROSS THE BOARD. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE DESIRE
OF THE NEXT PRESIDENT-ELECT OF ARGENTINA (UNNAMED) TO
MEET WITH PRESIDENT CARTER TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR, AND
PASTOR INVITED SECRETARY MUSKIB TO VISIT ARGENTINA EARLY
NEXT YEAR.

8. SECRETARY MUSKIE THANKED PASTOR FOR HIS REVIEW OF
RELATIONS. HE AFFIRMED THE US INTEREST IN IMPROVING
RELATIONS AND REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION IN
THIS REGARD TAKEN LAST SPRING. WHILE WE APPRECIATE THE
IMPROVEMENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND WANT TO SEE THIS
CONTINUE, THERE ARE TWO SERIOUS PROBLEMS FROM THE U.S.
PERSPECTIVE. WITH RESPECT TO BOLIVIA, THE U.S.

BELIEVED THAT THE GOA SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE RECENT

CHMK3E IN GOVERNMETi . HE DO NOT CONSlUtSK THE GARCIA MEZA
REGIME REPRESENTATIVE, AND WE DISLIKE THE "HARSH AND
BLOODY" MEASURES WHICH HAVEBEEN EMPLOYED. ARGENTINE
SUPPORT FOR THE RB3IHE IS A SETBACK TO OUR BILATERAL
RELATICaJS; IT IS A PROBLEM WHICH NEEDS TO BE WORKED OUT.
WHILE IT IS NOT THE U.S. DESIRE TO INTERVENE IN THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, REGIMES SUCH AS THE

■CONFITJKNnHn

■eoNFTDSBTna:

PAGE 03 SECTO 08046 02 OF 03 OllBllZ

<»JS HOW IN POWER IN BOLIVIA GENERATE VERY NEGATIVE
FEELINGS AMCWG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

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9. TURNING TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA, THE
SECRETARY NOTED RECENT IMPROVEMENTS BUT ALSO THAT THERE
CONTINUE TO BE SOME 2,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS, THAT THERE
HAVE BEEN 11 DISAPPEARANCES THIS YEAR, AND THAT THERE IS

NO INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY. TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THE
U.S. ATTACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS, THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT
WHEN HE FIRST CAME TO THE SENATE THE U.S. AMD ARGENTINA
HAD GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS. THERE HAD FOLLOWED A
LONG PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES, CAUSED IN PART BY INTERNAL
ARGENTINE PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE THAT
HE MAY NOW BE ENTERING A NEW ERA OF IMPROVING RELATIONS.

10. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR BOWDLER WOULD
BE DISCUSSING OTHER ISSUES IN MORE DETAIL WITH PASTOR,

BUT THAT HE WANTED TO MENTION THEM ALSO. REGARDING THE
ISSUE OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION, THE SECRETARY WONDERED IF
THE GOA NAS CONSIDERING RATIFYING TLATELOLCO; IT WOULD
BE A USEFUL STEP. (»( THE GRAINS EMBARGO TO THE SOVIET
UNION, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT ARGENTINE SHIPMENTS THIS
YEAR HILL EXCEED BY 8 TO 10 PERCENT THE TARGETS AGREED
LAST JANUARY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE REDUCED GRAIN
IMPORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION HAVE FORCED A CUTBACK IN
MEAT CONSUMPTI(»( AND THAT, AS f(E HAVE SEEN RECENTLY,

THIS IS ALWAYS A SENSITIVE MATTER IN A COMMUNIST COUNTRY.

HE POINTED OUT THE CURRENT IRAN/ IRAQ WAR AS FURTHER
EVIDENCE OF THE IMPORTANCE TO THE WEST IN KEEPING PRESSURE
ON THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SOVIETS
NOT BE ALLOWED OR ENCOURAGED TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE
INTO OTHER AREAS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IF, FOR EXAMPLE,

THEY WERE TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, THERE
WOULD BE SERIOUS DANGER OF WORLD WAR III. GOA SUPPORT

ON GRAINS IS CRITICAL TO THIS EFFORT. WE ARE ASKING
OTHER ALLIES TO ALSO MAINTAIN RESTRICTIONS IN MANY
•CDHPTDEHTiro

LUNFIUENTIAL

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tCINFlUENIIAL

NNN

e O W F ID E l TTI K P

PAGE 01 SECTO 08046 03 OF 03 011812Z

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-Ol ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W

---055254 011910Z /41

O 011575Z OCT 80 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

C U N F 1 U E N T r'"A"T SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 08046

EXDIS

AREAS- -E.G., THE NATO ALLIES TO CONTINXre HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY SANCTIONS.

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11. IH CJjOSIHG HIS REMARKS, THE SSCRBTAEY MEHTIONED A
CURRBHT EFFORT MITHIH THE SCMI-AI,I(WED MCJVEMBNT TO EXCI-UOB
EGYPT. PASTOR REPI.ISD IMMEDIATELY THAT HE HAD ALREADY
TALKED WITH THE SSYPTIAHS JWD PROIISID FULL GOA SUPPORT.

12 . WITH TIME RUNNING OUT, PASTOR COffliESTED QOTCKLY

ON SCa4S OF THE POINTS THE SECRETARY HAD MADE. ON BOLIVIA.
THE GOA CAN NOT ABANDON IT BECAUSE IT NIGHT PALL APART,

BUT IT WILL UNDERTAKE A CONSCIENTIOUS AND SERIOUS EFFORT
TO STEER THE NEW REGIME IN A MORE ACCEPTABLE DIRECTION.
PASTOR DENIED THAT THERE ARE ANY POLITICAL PRISONERS IN
ARGENTINA; RATHER THERE ARB 1200 TERRORISTS THAT ARE
BEING DEALT WITH BY THE JUDICIARY WHOSE POWER IS ABSOLUTE.
REGARDING POSSIBLE DISAPPEARANCES THIS YEAR, THE GOA
HAS ABOUT BECOME CONVINCED THAT PERSONS ARE BEING PAID
GONPlDlMTHai '

COMPIDBHTfltt

PAGE 02 SECTO 08046 03 OF 03 01iei2Z

TO DISAPPEAR, AND HE CLAIMED AS PROOF THAT SOME HAVE
LATER SURFACED. ON GRAINS. PASTOR SAID GOA IS RESTRICTING
SALES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BUT IT IS DIFFICULT AND,
FURTHERMORE, ARGENTINA HAS AN UNFAVORABLE TRADE BALANCE
WHICH MAKES ALL GRAIN SALES IMPORTANT. PASTOR AFFIRMED
THAT ARGENTINA IS GOING TO RATIFY TLATBLOLCO. ON THIS
POINT, HE ARGUED THAT THE GOA WOULD HAVE DONE SO BEFORE
IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR U.S. LACK OF COOPERATION ON
miCLEAR HATTERS. HE NOTED THAT THE RECENT DECISO
SELL URANIUM TO INDIA WAR VERY DIFFIC ULT FOR THE
ARGENTINES TO UNDERSTAITO. THIS LINE OF REASONING
PROMPTED A FINAL PASTOR COMMENT ABOUT RECENT APPARENT
U.S. APPROBATION FOR THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN TURKEY--
AGAIH IN CONTRAST TO OUR RELATIONS WITH HIS OWN MILITARY
REGIME.

13 . THE BIIATERAL CONCLUDED WITH MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF
DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS.

MUSKIE

COM F lPHjr r' IHI I

NNNH

C O WWD e N TI AL -

EXDIS

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UNCLASSIFIED

116.

Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, November 20, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton,
Country Files, Box 91, Argentina, 3/79-12/80. Secret. Sent for action.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
November 20, 1980

■ SECRET/ ACTION
MEMOSANDDM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THCmS THORNToi^-^

M-B-B Follow-up — Argentiaa

Yesterday’s M-B-B outdid itself la ambiguity on the Argentine front, -tef

State thinks it is supposed to prepare an overall review of US-Argentine
policy for use in a TSC. •ftf'

Defense thinks that it is supposed to do a much briefer paper which would,
presumably, find its way via us to the President. The paper would pre-
sumably cover only some small-scale actions on the military front that
could be taken to keep the ball in play until the new administration (s)
take over. “tSf

Nobody is quite sure how this is to relate to the Viola (not Videla)
visit since there is no particular reason to assume that Viola will even
be interested in talking to anybody in this Administration-

I would like some guidance from you on what has happened and is supposed
to happen. After that I will meet early next week with Kramer (iSA) and
Bushnell (State) to develop a plan of action. ~

GUIDANCE REQUESTED ; (Please check as appropriate)

1. Are we supposed to do a full-scale review of US-Argentine relations

or simply put forth some specific decisions for the President to make
(Note that the really big issue is Kennedy-Humphrey and with the Congress
going out of session there is no way that this Administration can deal with
that. ‘tST

'

2. Do you want a PRC or a |:oordinated interagency mem4 for the Presi-
dent to pass on ?

3. Should further action be k eyed solely to a Viola visit (which may well

never take place) or should we be thinking in terms of routine con-
tacts (as DOD prefers) tCJ

4. What do you want to come out of this drill? As you know, my preference
is to put everything on ice but my responsibility is to represent your
interests. (A phone call or a meeting would seem to be indicated unless
your preferences are pretty simply and straightforward.) -(St

^ ^ V.

SECRE T

Review on Nov. 20, 1986 ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4 / 24/2017

r